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1Chapter 1
Introduction: A Genealogy of Eccentricity 
The follow ing pages comprise a study  of the  eccentric—of his invention 
as a relatively coherent, recognizable figure in early-eighteenth-century 
England; of his p u rp o rted  characteristics (above all, m ale sex, m onom ania, 
benevolence, sexual haplessness, and sen tim entality , w ith  different em phases 
at different times); of his changes between 1700 and  1900, by which time he 
had taken essentially  the same form we still u n d e rs tan d  him to take; and of 
the social and discursive purposes he has served.
This study o f the eccentric is the first, to m y knowledge. By this 
statement I mean tw o things. First, that to this day, very few books focus 
directly upon the subject of eccentricity a n d /o r  eccentrics. Only a handful of 
books are devoted entirely  to the subject, and they  are not really studies in the 
rigorous sense (see below). Most broach the subject only giancingly. They 
refer (after 1800) to particular fictional characters as "eccentric," for example, 
but take that concept as granted and tim eless, requiring  no discussion or 
analysis. This m akes discursive sense, in that the w ord  "eccentric" was not 
used as a noun signifying what we now usually  assum e it to signify—"A 
person whose conduct is irregular, odd, or w him sica l"—until the nineteenth 
century. The Oxford English Dictionary lists the first such use as Sir W alter 
Scott's, in St. Ronan's Well, 1832: "Men of every country playing the 
eccentric." The first application of the adjective "eccentric" to hum an beings, 
meaning "irregular, odd , or whimsical," occurred about twenty years before 
this. This sense of the  w ord t did not appear earlier because the concept was 
still forming. Only after rules for eccentrics had  been firmly codified, only
1 The English word "eccentric" actually goes back to 1398; but until the nineteenth century, it 
was generally used in an astronomic or geometric sense. "Eccentric" described the path o f orbits 
or the shape o f ellipses that im perfectly followed the circular form.
after "the eccentric" had acquired a widely recognized shape and personality, 
only after a fairly coherent discourse of eccentricity had been formed, could he 
be signified by the nominative "eccentric." Only after the figure gained 
discursive recognizability could he be studied and w ritten  about; therefore, 
until the n ineteenth  century, he really w asn't. A nd even  since then, the 
eccentric hav ing  been codified and the discourse which accomplished this 
having been naturalized,^ it has seem ed pointless to analyze or discuss the 
figure. N ot only has he appeared inherently laughable, and  unw orthy of 
serious consideration on that ground, but also naturally  occurring and 
timeless. To study such a figure would be like "studying" the fact of the sun's 
coming up in the east: once the self-evident fact is observed, w hat's to study? 
And so there is no significant body of literature which directly addresses the 
subject.
Therefore, to study the eccentric I have largely had to do so indirectly. 
By exam ining medical, legal, and scientific texts, popular novels, biographies, 
and periodicals published between 1700 and 1900, I have pieced together an 
account of the process by which the concept of eccentricity was invented, 
developed, and solidified. T hroughout my research, the idea that a culture's 
boundaries are embodied in its texts has guided which texts I've chosen to 
study and  cite. Stephen G reenblatt observes that "texts are not merely 
cultural by virtue of reference to the w orld beyond them selves; they are 
cultural by virtue of social values and contexts that they have themselves 
successfully absorbed" (227). Thus one can understand a culture, and the 
rules and boundaries abroad in that culture, by reading its literature (in the 
broadest sense of "literature"—w ritings of all kinds). This is especially true of 
w riting tha t explicitly concerns itself w ith  setting, enforcing, a n d / or altering
2 See Chapter 4  for a discussion o f this process.
its cultural boundaries, "the kinds of literature that are explicitly engaged in 
attack and celebration: satire and panegyric" (226). For any culture draw s its 
limits both positively and negatively, through both dos and don'ts, by both 
constraint and mobility. . . .  The ensemble of beliefe and practices 
that forms a given culture function as a pervasive technology of 
control, a set of lim its w ithin which social behavior m ust be 
contained, a reperto ire  of models to w hich individuals m ust 
conform. . . . [A] culture's boundaries are enforced more 
positively as well: through  the system of rew ards that range 
again from the spectacular (grand public honors, glittering 
prizes) to the apparently  modest (a gaze of admiration, a 
respectful nod, a few w ords of gratitude). (225-26; emphasis in 
original)
For this reason, m ost of m y "literary" examples (as distinct from the 
"scientific" examples such as Dr. Battle's treatise on madness, or legal 
examples such as John Brydall's explanation of m adfolks' legal rights) are, at 
least in significant part, works of satire and panegyric: for example. The 
Spectator, Launcelot Greaves, Boswell's Life o f  Johnson, and the novels of 
Charles Dickens and George Cissing. At first I chose such works instinctively, 
since satiric and panegyric works seemed most relevant to the elusive subject 
of eccentricity; then later, recognizing this pattern, I did so consciously, 
purposely.
My second point in claim ing this book as the first study of eccentricity 
is that it is the first real study  of eccentricity. That is, "studies" of the 
eccentric—particularly after the turn  of the nineteenth century, after the 
eccentric had a name—tend in actuality to be literary freak shows, g a l l e r ie s ,3
3 There is, in fact, a 1943 British book titled An Eccentric Gallery.
collections of oddities. They don 't study  eccentrics so m uch as exhibit them : 
"Look at this nut! Now get a load of the one over here!" T heir tone is 
uniformly one of "am used tolerance," to borrow  Michel Foucault's phrase 
from Madness and Civilization. Eccentric galleries directly or indirectly elicit 
tolerance, even applause, for their subjects' personal quirks—but alw ays with 
the unm istakable stronger message that these quirks are silly, comical, and 
m isguided, and that they render their possessors ridiculous, laughable, and 
harmless. This has been true of eccentric galleries since the early nineteenth 
century, from the four wacky volum es of The Eccentric Mirror, first 
published in 1807 and running through several immensely popu lar editions; 
through Dickens's first published book. Sketches by Boz, and his subsequent 
large and famous assortment of fictional oddballs; to such tw entieth-century 
galleries as Edith Sitwell's 1933 classic English Eccentrics. One recent book 
that typifies and perpetuates this freak-show approach is Timpson's English 
Eccentrics, published in 1991. John T im pson whimsically divides this book 
into chapters corresponding to the them es of particular eccentrics' oddities, 
arranging them in the table of contents so that the themes' first letters spell 
out the word "ECCENTRIC":
Eccentim entals[:] love me, love my rat—or whatever 
Competicentrics[:l taking sport to extremes 
ClericcentricsJ:] quirkiness is next to godliness 
Eccentrifrugals[:] mean, moody, and mostly miserable 
N atticentrics[:] dressed to kill, or just to confuse?
Touricentrics[:] better to travel odd ly  than to arrive
Reliccentrics[:] if i f s  old, collect it 
Inhericentrics[:J oddness can run in the family 
Colossucentrics[:] build it extravagantly, and build it big 
In  Eccentricium Memoriam[:] and ifs  goodbye from him  
Xechnicentrics[:] "mad inventors" or genuine geniuses?
Vukkicentrics[:] if it m oves, eat it
Many exhibitionist "studies" such as The Eccentric Mirror  proclaim  their own 
high educational value and serious-m indedness: "It has been justly observed 
by the prince of British poets, that T h e  proper study of m ankind is MAN.' It 
is w ith a view to prom ote and facilitate this im portant study, that the Editor 
of these volumes presents to the public a series of lives of such individuals of 
either sex, as have been distinguished by any extraordinary circumstances 
from the mass of society" (l:iii). But in fact, w hat the exhibitionist approach 
encourages in the reader is the unabashed gawk, the norm al person's open- 
m outhed astonishm ent at the freak. If these "studies" teach anything it is 
norm ative boundaries; aside from that, they merely enterta in .
In 1995 Dr. David Weeks and Jamie James pub lished  one of the very 
few ostensibly rigorous studies of the eccentric, namely. Eccentrics: A Study o f  
Sanity and Strangeness. It is intriguing, and telling, that for a would-be study 
of eccentrics to be written it takes a British psychiatrist^ so insistent upon his 
impeccable professional credentials and high scientific seriousness that he 
places the title "Doctor" before his name on the book 's cover. He even 
describes his day job on the back cover: "clinical neuropsychologist and
4 That W eeks is British is interesting, and fitting, given that Great Britain has since the 
nineteenth century proudly proclaimed itself the world capital o f eccentricity (see Chapter 4).
psychotherapist at Scotland's Royal Edinburgh H ospital." Apparently only 
one whose vocation it is to study "sanity and strangeness" can be induced to 
keep a straight face on the subject.5
Eccentrics beautifully exemplifies how strongly ingrained is our habit 
of viewing the eccentric with amused tolerance. No m atter how analytically 
we originally approach the subject, we eventually m eander, like Weeks and 
James, back into am used tolerance—because that is the w ay certain powerful 
cultural forces which are discussed in this study d irect our thoughts.
Eccentrics begins w ith a few chapters establishing the study's scientific 
ground rules, covering such topics as the defin ing characteristics or 
symptoms of eccentricity (see below), the authors' m ethods for locating and 
gathering inform ation from eccentrics, and the serious purpose behind the 
stu d y -a  revaluation of eccentricity backed by science. But even in stating the 
study 's ostensibly scientific and pro-eccentric purpose, the authors reveal the 
presence of a pow erful cultural demand for am used tolerance. Weeks and 
James argue that eccentricity, which "is taken on at least partly by free choice,.
. . is something positive and pleasurable to the indiv idual" (14); consequently, 
"eccentrics tend to be healthier than most people" (9); and  therefore, "in an 
age of increasing standardization and homogeneity, psychologists [and society 
in general] . . . should keep their minds open to the rebellious fun of those 
who deviate from the norm " (19). Eccentricity, the authors claim, is good not 
only for the indiv idual but for the species: "H um an evolution needs hum an
5 Speaking of keeping a straight face: in writing this work, I have been struck by the 
universality of the response to my topic. People have asked m e what I'm working on, and I 
reply, eccentrics. They then invariably smile: "Ah, eccentrics!" U sually they then name a few  
of their favorite eccentrics from literature, most often Tristram Shandy  or characters from 
Dickens. Or else, clearly thinking that a serious study cannot be written on such an obviously  
unserious topic, they dubiously ask, "Really? Eccentrics?" These highly consistent responses 
demonstrate how  powerful a hold the "discourse of eccentricity," or certainly amusedly 
tolerant ways of understanding and speaking about the eccentric, still have on our culture as a 
w hole.
eccentricity" (19).6 Eccentricity is good, then, for a variety of scientifically 
verifiable reasons: people enjoy being eccentric (good from a psychiatric point 
of view), it makes them healthier, it com bats societal hom ogeneity, and it 
benefits the species. Solid, analytical stuff...except for that phrase "rebellious 
fun." Eccentrics and their differences, their eccentricity, are m erely "fun"— 
am using, laughable, silly, and so on. T hough vaunted on several grounds, 
and supposedly  the subject of analytical study, eccentrics are in the end 
hilarious freaks even for Dr. Weeks. W henever tolerance for them  is 
recom m ended, even w ith scientific docum entation , the am usem ent cannot 
be far away.
The beginning of Eccentrics is about as close to serious study of 
eccentricity as anyone ever gets. Most of that book, too, succum bs even m ore 
thoroughly to the cultural demand for am used tolerance. For instance. 
Weeks and James actually begin with the surprising statement, "It is usually 
assum ed, erroneously, that the United States has never been a m onarchy" (3), 
then go on to chuckle over the bizarreries of the self-appointed "Em peror" 
Joshua A braham  Norton. In other w ords, this would-be sober study  begins 
with an am using anecdote, like some after-dinner speech. Several chapters— 
for example, "Four H undred Years of Eccentrics," "Eccentricity and Creativity: 
The Artists," and "Lost Continents and Golden Ages"—have little content bnt 
one anecdote after another, short, entertain ing m ini-freak shows that closely 
resemble the "freak books" of the early nineteenth century (see C hapter 4). 
The opening chapter, then, is a microcosm of the book at large (which itself 
typifies our general cultural inability to take eccentricity seriously): it seem s  to 
be about som ething serious—"What, the U. S. A. has been a m onarchy?" or
6 See C hapters on this point, especially the d iscussion  of John Stuart Mill on eccentricity as a 
cure for societal homogenization, and the discussion of Charles Darwin on the importance of 
individual difference to the species.
"Eccentricity is scientifically proved to be valuable?"—but closer examination 
reveals that the underlying and more im portan t message is, "Gosh, cracked- 
headedness is funny!"
Eccentrics dem onstrates that the w ays of thinking, speaking about, and 
responding to eccentricity—the "discourse of eccentricity"—which developed 
and solidified in the eighteenth and n ineteenth  centuries still dom inate our 
late-tw entieth-century understanding of the subject so thoroughly  that, to a 
considerable extent, replacing our usual am used tolerance proves literally 
unthinkable. Discourse in general shapes our whole social existence both 
overtly, th rough  disciplines and institutions such as m edicine, madhouses, 
prisons, and hospitals, and covertly, th rough  ineffable forces such as the 
definition and delim itation of truth, perception, and speech. Overt and 
covert discursive means circularly su p p o rt and perpetuate each other: 
discourse "m akes possible disciplines and institutions which, in turn, sustain 
and distribute those discourses" (Bove 57). Because this is so, I freely examine 
both "literary" and "nonliterary" texts, and frequently discuss socio-material 
forces, in m aking my argument. As Foucault's Discipline and Punish in 
particular show s, discourse operates th rough  m yriad channels, blatant and 
subtle. Because, for example, a popu lar novel, an influential scientific text, 
and a new  tendency for people to move to cities can all affect and reveal the 
workings of a discourse, all such phenom ena provide legitim ate m aterials for 
this study. Therefore, I trace the developm ent of the discourse of eccentricity 
by all m eans available, moving freely am ong them.
Discourse presents itself not as d iscourse—as a construction that could 
be otherwise—but as simple, obvious truth; as James H. Kavanagh phrases it, 
"The dom inant discourse produces an audience, context, and text in which 
the reigning political framework appears as 'norm ality ' itself; any other
sociopolitical nuances of a text are rendered either im perceptible . . .  or 
im possible to take seriously" (318). O ther truths are hard  to imagine, for as 
Foucault argues comprehensively, "Discursive practices are characterized by 
the delim itation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitim ate perspective 
for the agent of knowledge, and  fixing of norm s for the elaboration of 
concepts and theories" ("H istory" 199); in other words, a given discourse 
dictates that only certain w ays of seeing, understanding, and  speaking about 
its objects are even possible. A nd finally, we can never tru ly  break free from 
our own discursive milieu; there  is "no place for any of us to stand  outside of 
it" (Bove 54).
So 1 attribute great and subtle pow er to discourse. Still, my approach is 
"Foucauldian" but not hardline  Foucauldian. To explain: Foucault shows in 
"W hat Is an Author?" that au tho rs—for example, F reud  and Marx—can 
produce radically new discourses. He also dem onstrates that particular 
cultural events and works, such as Jerem y Bentham 's Panopticon and its 
theoretical justification, can profoundly  alter existing discourses. Discourse is 
not static; events and authors change it. And so, as Foucault articulates the 
point in "History of Systems of Thought," discursive practices "cannot be 
reduced to precise and ind iv idual discoveries; and yet we cannot characterize 
them as a general change of m entality, collective attitudes, or a state of mind" 
(200). In o ther words, neither the  indiv idual (or the ind iv idual work) nor 
"the system " is solely responsible for changes in discourse. Foucault credits 
6of/z/neither individuals a n d !n o r  discourse w ith autonom y, and this is the 
model for discourse 1 follow here. 1 conceive of and discuss the discourse of 
eccentricity in dialectic fashion: ind iv idual authors alter the shape of this 
discourse, and  what they w rite is shaped by the discourse w ith which they 
live. Influence travels both directions.
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r would d istinguish  this approach from  a "hardline" Foucauldian 
approach such as that exam plified by Nancy Arm strong. As Pat Gill argues, 
A rm strong envisions discourse speaking th rough  authors, who perform  as 
oblivious m outhpieces for a pow er greater than  themselves. Between her 
essays in The Ideology o f  Conduct and her book Desire and Domestic Fiction, 
A rm strong posits a coherent, unified discourse which originated in w om en's 
conduct books, insinuated itself into other discourses (primarily by means of 
the novel, which was then a new literary form), dissem inated itself, and 
thereby ultim ately caused "the formation of a coherent set of [capitalist] 
economic policies," "the establishm ent of m arriage as a social institution" 
(Ideology 135), and m odern bourgeois consciousness. Aside from the large 
problem of having one discourse do too m uch too coherently, Arm strong has 
all this happening as if by magic—by the power of the discourse speaking itself, 
autonom ously. In A rm strong 's account, "ind iv idual authors seem tools of a 
process of which they are entirely unaware and to which all personal motives 
and specific concerns are subordinated" (Gill 462).
My objection (and Gill's) to this understanding  of discourse is that it 
requires us to view discourse as one huge false im position upon everyone by 
no one. It is all too easy to make this error w hen adopting a Foucauldian 
emphasis upon discourse's power, and it is an error this study attempts to 
avoid .7 As Terry Eagleton points out:
it is surely hard  to credit that whole masses of hum an beings 
would hold over som e extensive historical period ideas and 
beliefs which were sim ply nonsensical. Deeply persistent beliefs 
have to be supported  to some extent, however meagrely, by the
7 T o speak of the study as if it had its own will. In writing this explanation of what I'm trying 
to do, 1 notice I alternate betw een imputing will to the work itself—"this study tries..."—and 
imputing all will to myself—"I try..." Again, this is how I want the study to proceed: assum ing 
a dialectic, mutual relationship betw een individual authors and a discourse.
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world ou r practical activity discloses to us; and to believe that 
im m ense num bers of people were absolu tely  vacuous and 
absurd is to take up an unpleasantly dem eaning attitude towards 
ord inary  m en and women. (12)
Although it is true that "we have w itnessed enough pathological 
irrationalism  . . .  to be nervous of any too sanguine trust in some robust 
human rationality" (Eagleton 12), still, the concept of no-consciousness or of 
totally false consciousness is in my opinion finally not warranted. I do, 
therefore, im pute som e  agency and consciousness to authors, and I delve for 
the often sound cultural reasons why the discourse of eccentricity takes the 
particular shape it does.
In this dialectical model, rebellion against current discursive 
conventions is quite  possible. One can transgress a cu lture 's boundaries only 
so far, though, for two reasons. First, the dom inan t discourse heavily 
influences (but does not fully determine) our thought; therefore, dissent or 
transgression is only imaginable for a certain lim ited distance. Greenblatt 
makes this poin t in his famous essay "Invisible Bullets": in Shakespeare's 
day, to call som eone an atheist was an extremely rude but, in terms of getting 
the charge to stick, ultim ately ineffectual insult, because to actually be one 
was unim aginable under that culture's dom inant discourse. God simply was, 
and that was that, and  so to believe that someone else m ight truly not  believe 
was finally impossible: "the stance that seem ed to come naturally to me as a 
green college freshm an in m id-tw entieth-century A m erica seems to have 
been alm ost un th inkable to the most daring  philosophical m inds of late 
sixteenth-century England" (22). Second, even challenges to the dom inant 
discourse are influenced by that dom inant discourse. Aside from the first 
problem —that the dom inant discourse shapes the very m eans of thought and
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expression we can m uster to fight it—there is the problem  of preoccupation: 
the very fact of feeling sufficiently dissatisfied with an em pow ered discourse 
to try to change it m eans that one is for the moment still caught w ithin  the 
dom inant discourse's web. That discourse is still occupying our time and 
thought, if only in the sense that w e are plotting to subvert it. To make 
fundam ental change in the offending discourse takes several authors, several 
small discursive steps, considerable time. But again, w ith  these built-in 
limitations, discursive change is possible. After considerable tim e and many 
subtle discursive shifts, a dom inant discourse can look radically different 
from how it used to. As Karl Marx explains the concept in  The Eighteenth 
Brumaire o f  Louis Bonaparte, "Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it just as they please; they do not make it under circum stances chosen 
by themselves, bu t under circumstances directly encountered, given, and 
transm itted from the past" (300)—I w ould add, from the present, as well.
This view of discourse and of discourse's means and  rate of change 
inform this study. I m ust explicitly m ake this point because eccentricity, like 
love, or benevolence, or madness—and, as I w ill show, tightly  bound up with 
these concepts—is a quality that "w e [erroneously] tend to feel is without 
history" (Foucault, "Nietzsche" 139). But in fact, there was no such thing as 
"the eccentric" before 1700. There were of course strange people we would 
now call eccentric; however, there w as no systematic m ethod for viewing, 
understanding, and  talking about them ; there was no nam e for the figure. 
There was no discourse of eccentricity. A discourse had to be invented, and it 
was invented early  in the eighteenth century. Then it w ent th rough  slow but 
significant shifts; certain sociocultural and economic forces, as well as 
individual authors, speaking both in their own voices and  in the voices of 
their respective dom inant cultures, effected these changes. By the end of the
13
nineteenth century, these forces had produced a powerful, solidified 
discourse of eccentricity. Since that time, we have know n (or thought we 
knew) who is or can be eccentric, w hat eccentrics are like, how we can tell 
they 're eccentric, and how good or bad a thing it is to be eccentric. So again, 
the eccentric is anything but tim eless and naturally  occurring; he is a product 
and creation of a particular discourse which is itself contingent. In short, 
there is no such thing as the  eccentric—there are and  have been eccentrics, 
plural, as culturally and tem porally defined, bu t there is not one  a historical, 
acontextual, unchanging creature we can call the  eccentric. When in this 
study I refer to "the eccentric" I alw ays mean the eccentric as understood at a 
particu lar cultural moment.
This study is arranged according to this discursive, contingent 
understanding of eccentricity. Each chapter focuses upon one major 
alteration in the discourse of eccentricity. These alterations correspond 
roughly to standard literary periods: the early and late eighteenth centur\: 
(Chapters 2 and 3), the Romantic era (Chapter 4), and the Victorian era 
(Chapter 5). Chapter 2 describes the invention of the eccentric, which arose 
out of the overly rigid (yet difficult-to-fix) A ugustan dichotomy between 
reason and madness. The eccentric was from the start coded as male, as the 
first two chapters in particular show, and he was m odeled directly after Don 
Quixote. Early in his existence, great effort had to be poured into making him 
as adm irable as he was dotty, in o rder to make him welcome in a culture so 
hostile to madness. He was therefore, made upper-class, benevolent, and 
generally beneficial to British society.
Chapter 3 shows how, in the second half of the eighteenth century, 
increasingly medicalized conceptions of m adness altered conceptions of 
eccentricity. Eccentricity, w hich had always been grasped as a form of minor
14
madness, came to seem a m inor illness, com plete w ith  diagnosable 
symptoms. A t the same time, the means used to m ake eccentricity palatable 
were increasingly sentimental: what was ostensibly great about the eccentric 
was his good, loving heart. Thus was produced the still-current idea of the 
eccentric as harm less and silly: he was considered m entally ill, but lovably 
and not dangerously so.
In the Romantic era, covered in Chapter 4, eccentricity or oddity in 
general became of much greater general interest. "Freak books," which 
described m any varieties of unusual people, sold like proverbial hotcakes. By 
the 1830s, these books evolved into innocuous "physiologies" like the 
Parisian "sketch-books" Walter Benjamin describes. These books reflected 
and furthered the culture's mania for scientific classification; they sought out 
all kinds of difference in order to account for it all, in order to contain it. 
Under these pressures, "the eccentric" finally gained a name to go with his 
now-"scientific" status as a kind of species unto himself. He also came to 
seem less unusual, less different, less oppositional.
As C hapter 5 shows, in the Victorian era both positive and negative 
views of eccentricity were asserted with increased intensity. Some writers 
staunchly and directly defended eccentricity's value. Victorians' newly 
practical, D arw inian understanding of the w orld, on the other hand, made 
the impractical, asexual eccentric appear biologically unviable and doomed. 
Somewhat paradoxically, both positive and negative assertions regarding 
eccentricity finally did it in. Both views finally m ade eccentricity seem even 
less valuable (and possible) than it already did. W hat we hold today is 
essentially the late-Victorian conception of eccentricity, which, as even this 
brief sum m ary of discursive developments should show , differs w idely from 
that of the early eighteenth century.
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That the eccentric is a figure w ith a history is a key, and new, aspect of 
this study's m ethod. The standard  approach is to view the figure as timeless. 
Timpson, for instance, describes eccentrics from the English Renaissance 
onw ards, making no cultural allowances and providing no historical context. 
All his examples are sim ply "eccentrics." Weeks and James discuss 
eccentricity this way, too. Because they provide more detailed explanation of 
w hat they are doing than  anyone else, a close exam ination of their method 
reveals the erroneous assum ptions and built-in pitfalls of an ahistorical 
approach to eccentricity.
They assert that the  eccentric—of any period—"may be described in the 
following ways, more or less in descending order of frequency":8 
• nonconform ing;
•creative;
•strongly m otivated by curiosity;
•idealistic: he w ants to make the world a better place and the 
people in it happier;
•happily obsessed w ith  one or more hobbyhorses (usually five or 
six);
•aw are from early childhood that he is different;
•intelligent;
•opinionated and outspoken, convinced that he is right and that 
the rest of the world is out of step;
•noncom petitive, no t in need of reassurance or reinforcem ent 
from society;
•unusual in his eating  habits and living arrangem ents;
•not particularly in terested  in the opinions or company of other
8 That is, eccentrics o f all periods supposed ly  exhibit the following traits, the m ost common 
ones first and the least common last.
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people, except in order to persuade them  to his—the correct— 
point of view;
•possessed of a m ischievous sense of hum or;
•single;
•usually  the eldest or an only child; and 
•a bad speller. (27-28)9 
These are the characteristics by w hich Weeks and James identify both their 
current and historical sam ples. This presents the problem  of inappropriately  
retrofitting current discourse. T hat is. Weeks, a psychiatrist, defines 
eccentricity here as if it were a form of mental illness. Doubtless because he is 
a psychiatrist and trained  to think and  write in accordance w ith  that field's 
specialized discourse, his list very closely resembles a DSM-IV^O classification 
of a mental illness. A standard DSM  entry on a particular illness lists, say, 
seven sym ptom s, at least five of w hich m ust be present for that illness to be 
diagnosable. Some of the characteristics of the eccentric even duplicate 
official DSM sym ptom s: "not particu larly  interested in the opinions or 
company of other people"; "unusual in his eating habits and living 
arrangem ents"; and "convinced that he is right and that the rest of the world 
is out of step." The influence of psychiatric discourse is especially visible in 
this case, given Eccentrics' author's occupation, but Weeks m erely exaggerates 
our general cultural tendency to v iew  eccentrics as "nuts." As my study 
shows, madness has been associated w ith eccentricity from the start, and is 
now more than ever. The discourse w hich casts m adness as m ental illness—
9 One should return to this list and read it again after reading my study. The list reflects the 
persistence of several key concepts in the history o f eccentricity: the eccentric's quixotic, 
idealistic benevolence, his sexual haplessness, and the concept o f the "hobbyhorse."
10The Diagnostic and Statis tical Manual, n ow  in its fourth edition, is nearly universally used  
among mental health professionals. It standardizes criteria for diagnosing and rating the 
seriousness of all forms of mental illness. (The manual includes a few  catch-all categories in 
order to be truly comprehensive.)
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regrettable but blameless, etiologically physical, and probably treatable—is a 
very m odern discourse; thus, to speak officially like W eeks or unofficially 
like the rest of us, of eccentricity as if it were a diagnosable m ental illness, is a 
peculiarly m odern tendency. Therefore, to identify eccentrics from centuries 
past by quasi-psychiatric symptoms is anachronistic. As is the case with any 
discourse, psychiatric discourse presents itself as tim eless, sim ple truth; but it 
isn't, necessarily, and  so to proceed as if it were is to m isrepresent the past.
Having defined eccentricity anachronistically, as we all tend to do. 
Weeks and James search 400 years of historical reco rds^  for a "historical 
sam ple," for characters fitting that definition. The definition is inherently 
dism issive of historical contexts, for psychiatric discourse, like scientific 
discourse in general, implicitly claims for itself universal application and 
validity.12 It should  be no surprise, then, that the au thors find all eccentrics 
throughout history to be like their living sam ple. H aving set up their study 
so that they can only find the present in the past, they "prove" scientifically 
that eccentricity has always been the same.
This m ethod leads to absurd statements like: "O ur research revealed a 
great outburst of eccentricity beginning around 1725, w ith  a peak in numbers 
during  the last quarter of the eighteenth century" (47). I w ould argue that 
there was not in fact a sudden increase around 1725 in people who objectively 
speaking were  eccentric; instead, after 1725 it was new ly possible to know and 
say, by the terms of the budding discourse of eccentricity, w hat an eccentric
 ^1 They read "legal docum ents, parish church records, the annals o f  local historical societies, 
and old newspapers, magazines, and encyclopedias" (42) written between 1551 and 1950. 
Actually, though, most o f the historical examples they discuss com e from between 1725 and 
1800—just after the eccentric had been invented.
12 One of the guiding assum ptions of scientific discourse is that science steadily uncovers a 
priori,  timeless, universal truths: N ew ton's laws, for example. T his is true of individual 
scientific disciplines, as well: for instance, one can hardly im agine a psychiatrist who didn't  
think that m odem  psychiatric discourse and techniques were self-evident improvements upon 
earlier benighted beliefs and m ethods.
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was. Such conceptions, constantly changing, rem ained relatively novel and 
visible until the beginning of the nineteenth century, w hen the freak books 
diluted them by expanding the category of eccentricity to incorporate all forms 
of individual difference.
Weeks and James do make a vague nod tow ard historical forces, but 
only to dismiss those forces' significance: "Eccentricity has doubtless been 
with us in some form since the beginning of history: establish a norm 
anywhere, anytime, and there will be someone to flout it" (41). In other 
words, eccentricity has been ever thus, and will ever be. In contradiction to 
the fairly specific, psychiatric definition of eccentricity given above. Weeks 
and James—again, like our culture in general—define the eccentric sim ply as 
that person who crosses cultural boundaries, whenever, w herever, and in 
whatever form those boundaries exist. Only the act of crossing signifies—not 
the shape of the boundaries, not the m ethods of draw ing and  policing them. 
That m ethodological move, telescoping all of history, cuts out the most 
interesting questions, those this study  specifically concerns itself to answer: 
What cultural forces produced and, later, changed the eccentric? H ow  did the 
eccentric change? Why? What cultural purposes has the figure served? 
How does the discourse of eccentricity intersect with other discourses, such as 
those of madness, sentimentality, politics, class, and gender? W hat can the 
discourse of eccentricity as shaped over two centuries tell us about the 
relationship between hegemonic pow er and dissent? W ith historical 
difference erased, there is nothing to do but tell anecdotes—so that's what 
Weeks and James, and most of us, do. W ithout a historical contextualization 
of the concept of eccentricity, the most we can accomplish is to be more 
tolerant than amused. We will be both, as long as we perpetuate the 
dom inant discourse of eccentricity.
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Erasing historical context creates one fu rther problem: the expansion of 
the category into meaninglessness. W ithout further elaboration of the 
definitive criterion of b o u n d a r y - c r o s s i n g ,  13 the category of eccentrics could 
legitimately include, for exam ple, criminals, hom osexuals, the exceptionally 
ugly, communists, and so on. People in those groups cross cultural 
boundaries, so how exactly are they not eccentric? Virtually anyone not 
absolutely adhering to the standards of the dom inant culture (and 
paradoxically, even adherents, if they adhere too absolutely) could be 
considered eccentric. Weeks and James, too, recognize this possibility, 
acknowledging that "eccentricity is a trait that everyone partakes of to a lesser 
or greater extent: absolute, uniform  conformity, if it existed, would itself be a 
kind of eccentricity" (11). A nd when everyone is eccentric no one is eccentric. 
The category loses all meaning.
These are the problem s built into an ahistorical, essentialist m ethod, 
the method suggested by our usual conception of eccentricity. To avoid such 
problems, this study does no t seek eccentricity's timeless essence. As Foucault 
(after Nietzsche) observes, there is no such thing, no m atter w hat the object of 
study; one "finds that there is 'som ething a ltogether different' behind things: 
not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or 
that their essence was fabricated in a piecem eal fashion from alien forms" 
(142). The object of this study is to trace the ways in which the eccentric's 
essence was fabricated in piecem eal fashion from  alien forms: in a w ord, to 
construct w hat Foucault calls a genealogy.
My study, then, is in part an im itation of Foucault's own works
13 The list of quasi-psychiatric sym ptom s seems to provide the m eans to further elaborate this 
criterion, but taken individually, those sym ptom s are even  m ore generally applicable than the 
criterion of boundary-crossing, and and therefore even more m eaningless. Very many people 
whom no one would ever describe as eccentric, and many eccentrics, too, could accurately be 
described as curious, idealistic, creative, bad spellers, oldest children, single, and so on. And 
the first quality listed, "nonconforming," is fust another w ay o f saying "boundary-crossing."
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classifiable as genealogies; for instance. M adness and Civilization, Discipline 
and Punish, The Birth o f  the Clinic, and  The History o f  Sexuality. Like 
Foucault, I focus upon  questions of d iscourse and assume discourse to have 
great productive power. However, as explained above, I do not assign all 
power to discourse. I try  to do w hat R aym ond Williams does so w ell in, for 
example. The Country and the City, Culture and Society: 1780-1950, and 
Keywords: account for the ways specific social and  material forces shape 
discourse. 1 try to account for the dialectic interaction between discourse and 
material conditions, between ind iv idual authors and broad discursive 
m ovem ents.
Like Foucault and  Williams, I seek the origins, plural, of the discourse 
of eccentricity; to seek a single unified origin w ould amount to a search for 
essence. As Foucault explains, such a search "is an attem pt to capture the 
exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected 
identities, because th is search assum es the  existence of immobile form s that 
precede the external w orld of accident and  succession" ("Nietzsche" 142). 
That assum ption m akes the search m isguided , for in  fact, "[w]hat is found at 
the historical beg inn ing  of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; 
it is the dissension of other things. It is d isparity" (142). It is "num berless 
beginnings" (145), generally m utually hostile. Such disparities and 
dissensions form the objects of this study, for a good genealogy will "cultivate 
the details and accidents that accom pany every beginning; it w ill be 
scrupulously a tten tive to their petty m alice" (144). The concept of the 
eccentric d id  not ap p ear fully formed, unified, and harmonious, as a happy, 
generally available alternative to social conform ity; instead, it arose slowly, 
gradually, out of bickering political factions, irrationally  fear of m adness, and
14 (But, given the conditions o f m adhouses and the w oefu l state o f legal rights for the mad, 
also em inently rational.)
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invidious class distinctions.
Once invented, the eccentric did not rem ain  static, unchanged. 
Various cultural and  discursive forces—for exam ple, the rage for 
sentim entality, the increasing m edicalization of m adness, the madness of 
King George III, the popularity  of "sketch-books," the Industrial Revolution, 
and the Victorian dem and for social conformity—changed the eccentric. The 
task of my genealogy of eccentricity is to "delineate this interaction, the 
struggle these forces w age against each other or against adverse 
circumstances, and  the a ttem pt to avoid degeneration and  regain strength by 
dividing these forces against themselves" ("Nietzsche" 149). My genealogy is 
to
maintain passing events in their proper d ispersion; it is to 
identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the 
complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and  the faulty 
calculations that gave b irth  to those things that continue to exist 
and have value for us; it is is to discover that tru th  or being do 
not lie at the root of w hat we know, and w hat w e are, but the 
exteriority of accidents. (146)
Cultural phenomena such as "the eccentric" do change over time, and they 
do not change w ithout social, cultural, and discursive struggle, nor without 
chance or error.
In dispersing misplaced piety toward supposedly sacred origins; in 
show ing the pettiness and  random ness behind our h istory  and our most 
deeply held current beliefs; and in dem onstrating the "em pty synthesis" of 
selves such as the eccentric's which we presum e to be eternally  unified, the 
genealogy, "from the m om ent it stops being pious . . , has value as a critique" 
(Foucault, "Nietzsche" 146). If nothing else, it shows that things have been
22
otherwise and that things could have been otherw ise. To move from  there to 
the position tha t things can be otherwise then comes to seem more possible.
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Chapter 2 
The Eccentric's Quixotic O rigins
i. M adness and the Eccentric 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century in  England "the eccentric" 
d id  not exist. Oddballs and misfits abounded then, as always, but there was 
no familiar category, no nom inative to apply. U ntil the nineteenth century, 
the word "eccentric" was used  as an  adjective, or a  noun  substantive, applied 
to the orbits of heavenly bodies and other circular m ovem ents:
1. Of a circle: Not concentric with another circle . . . [l]n the 
Ptolemaic astronom y, an orbit not having the  earth  precisely in 
its centre (afterw ards sometimes used in a Copernican sense: an 
orbit not having the sun  precisely in its centre). . . .
5. Of orbital motion: N ot referable to a fixed centre of 
revolution; not circular. Of a curve, an elliptic, parabolic, or 
hyperbolic orbit: Deviating (in greater or less degree) from a 
circular form. (Oxford English Dictionary)
We can see intuitively how  this description of p lanetary  motion also fits 
hum an behavior, because we have a category and a nam e for the eccentric. It 
is in fact difficult for the twentieth-century reader to read these definitions 
and not  think of people "deviating . . .  from a circular form." But back then a 
solid conception of "the eccentric" d id  not yet exist.
In England circa 1700 there were commonly assum ed to be two kinds of 
people, which were easily distinguishable: the m ad  and the sane. As Michel 
Foucault reports in Madness and Civilization, "The G reat Confinement," 
which began in "1656, [with] the decree that founded, in Paris, the Hôpital 
Général" (39), sw ept Europe in the second half o f the seventeenth century. 
The poor, the unemployed, and  the putatively m ad w ere locked up en masse
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and pu t to w ork, in  hopes that labor w ould prove "a general solution, an 
infallible panacea, a rem edy to all forms of poverty"" (55). Like lepers before 
them, and often in the same locations, the m ad were separated physically and 
symbolically from reasonable, sane society. In 1675 London's Bethlehem  
Hospitalts m oved to Moorsfieldstô and significantly increased its inm ate 
population, caging and chaining the m ad and exhibiting them  "for a penny, 
every Sunday" (68) until 1815. A report to the House of Commons reports 
earnings that year of "alm ost four hundred  pounds, which suggests the 
astonishingly high num ber of 96,000 visits a year" (68). Such spectacles of 
madness were "offered as a diversion to the good conscience of a reason sure 
of itself. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century . . . m adm en 
remained m onsters—that is, etymologically, beings or things to be show n" (69- 
70). To show the mad so was to impute difference and hierarchy: there  are 
the poor mad, and here  are we. Madness and disorder reign inside asylum  
walls, reason and order outside. And so a "sensibility was bom  which had 
draw n a line and laid a cornerstone, and which chose—only to banish." In the 
newly cleansed city, "order no longer freely confronted disorder, reason no 
longer tried to m ake its own way among all that m ight evade or seek to deny 
it. Here reason reigned in the pure state, in  a trium ph arranged for it in 
advance over a frenzied unreason" (64).
British law, reflecting this popular understanding, recognized m adness 
and sanity as a binary pair—either one or the other, and not both, was possible. 
In 1700 John Brydall published a pamphlet. Non Compos Mentis, or, the Law 
Relating to Natural Fools, Mad-Folks, and Lunatick Persons, Inquisited, and
15 Bethlehem, pronounced "bedlam," is the origin of the latter word, which denotes chaos, 
unrestrained madness.
16 Bethlehem H ospital had existed since the M iddle A ges, having originally been founded as 
a priory for the order o f the Star o f Bethlehem. In 1547 H enry VIII seized  it (it w as Catholic 
church property) and placed it under the jurisdiction o f the City of London.
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Explained fo r  Common Benefit, which explains for the lay reader "such Laws, 
with the Cases, Opinions, and Resolutions, of our common Law  Sages, as do 
properly concern the Rights of all such, as are wholly destitu te  of Reason" 
(A2). Those partially destitute of reason are never m entioned; the 
implication is, they do not exist. As far as the law was concerned, anyway, 
they d idn 't. The law  concerned itself strictly w ith determ ining w hether or 
not a person w as sane during the process of composing a docum ent or taking 
an action such as selling land. If so, then the docum ent or action was legal. If 
not, then  not.
B rydall's explanation of how to prove madness am ounts to saying that 
people are m ad  w hen they act m ad, which is to say that m adness is self- 
evident—again, obviously and com pletely different from reason:
[l]t is no t sufficient for the W itnesses to depose, that the Testator 
was m ad, or besides his Wits, unless they yield a sufficient 
Reason to prove this their Deposition; as that they d id  see him  
do such Things, or heard speak such W ords, as a Man having 
Wit, or Reason, would not have done, or spoken; nam ely, they 
d id  see him  throw  Stones against the W indows; or d id  see him  
usually to sp it in Mens Faces; or being asked a Question, they d id  
see him  hiss like a Goose, or bark  like a Dog, or play such other 
Parts as Mad-folks use to do. (68)
Such m adness, though, was most unexpected: "Every Person is presum ed to 
be of perfect M ind and Memory, unless the contrary be proved" (66). This 
was true not only legally, but also in everyday circumstances; reason was 
presum ed "m ore agreeable to the D isposition of Nature; for every Man is a 
Creature reasonable" (69). This dom inant conception lends w eight to Swift's 
famous prom ise to w rite "a Treatis proving the falsity of that Definition
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animal rationale [rational creature]; and  to show it shou ld  be only rationis 
capax [capable of reason]" (letter to Alexander Pope, 29 Sep. 1725; Writings 
585). Sw ift w ould  not have to prove hum an unreason if it w ere generally 
assum ed; in fact, reason was assum ed.
Nevertheless, a special lim ited  recognition and to lerance of madness 
still rem ained, a residual ideology yet lingering from the M iddle Ages and the 
Renaissance, w hen fools and m adm en were tolerated, even r e v e r e d .  17 This 
tolerance never completely disappeared , and it w ould ultim ately  enable the 
advent and institutionalization (not being locked up in Bethlehem , but being 
m ade a fond, familiar tradition) of the eccentric.
The law  circa 1700 recognized four different categories of the mad:
Some w hereof are become so by a perpetual Infirm ity, as Idiots, 
or Fools Natural: Some, w ho were once of good and sound 
Memory, but by the Visitation of God, are deprived  of it, as 
Persons, in a high Degree, Distracted: Some, that have their lucid 
Intervals, (sometimes in their Wits, som etim es out,) as Lunatick 
Persons: And some, who are m ade so by their ow n Default; as 
Persons overcome w ith  D rink, who during  the tim e of their 
Drunkenness, are com pared to Mad-Folks. (Brydall A2)
True, all four groups were equally lim ited by law, unable, for example, to 
write a b inding will, buy or sell land, or hold public office. But the madman 
could not be punished for a felony, because in his case, "the Punishm ent of a 
Man, who is deprived of Reason and U nderstanding, cannot be an Example 
to others." 18 He furtherm ore could not be punished because guilt is not 
possible where reason is absent: as Brydall cites the famous legal
17 See "Stultifera Navis," Madness and Civiliza tion  3-37.
18 See, o f course, the first chapter of Discipline and Punish. Brydail's reasoning here follows 
the line described by Foucault. It is the reasoning ultimately replaced by the system  of 
discipline and surveillance: namely, punishm ent as exemplary spectacle.
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commentator Sir Edw ard Coke (famed for the standard  legal text Coke upon  
Littleton), "altho' he [the felon] hath broken the w ords of the Law, yet he hath 
not broken the Law; for that he had no M emory, nor U nderstanding, but 
m eer Ignorance" (76). Additionally, as Brydall comments, "his ow n Furor, or 
M adness, is a sufficient Punishm ent to himself" (77). U nreason is thus not 
considered punishable in itself, and it is also grounds for w aiving 
punishm ents for other, legal offenses. The m ad deserve pity and sym pathy, 
for there but for the grace of God go we all: "Take no Pleasure in the Folly of 
an Idiot, nor in the Fancy of a Lunatick, nor in the Frenzy of a D runkard; 
make them the Object of thy Pity, not of thy Pastime. W hen thou beholdest 
them, behold, how thou art beholding to Him, that suffered thee not to be 
like them" (A3).i9 To feel such sym pathy seem ed only common sense, even 
in this time and place, because the second and th ird  categories of the m ad, the 
once-sane-but-now-m ad and the som etim es-m ad-som etim es-sane, alw ays 
rem ained open to new  members. One could alw ays be im pressed unw illingly 
into the Stultifera Navis.
Enter Don Quixote. Cervantes first published the novel in 1605 (Part I) 
and 1615 (Part II), and  Thomas Shelton first translated Part I into English back 
in 1612. It became widely  popular in Great Britain, though, w hen Peter
Motteux published an English translation in 1700-1703.20 Cashing in on
Motteux's success, Ned W ard published a popular version in "H udibrastic
19 Brydall ascribes this quote to "an ingenious Author" w hom  he never names, and w hom  I 
have not been able to discover.
20 Donald F. Bond d tes an advertisement for a book published "this day," from the Daily  
Courant for 17 Dec. 1702:
The History of the Renowned Don Quixote de la Mancha: Written in Spanish 
by Miguel de Cervantes de Saavedra; Translated from the Original by several
Hands, and publish'd by Peter Motteux. In 4 Volumes in 12°, w ith Sculptures. 
Printed for Sam. Buckley at the Dolphin in Little Britain, and Sold  by the 
Booksellers of London and Westminster. Those that have the T w o First 
Volum es already, may have the Two Last apart. {Tatler 1:125 n. 3)
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verse" in 1711. Don Quixote arrived anew in a Britain obsessed with 
m aintain ing reason and banishing unreason, concom itantly anxious about its 
ow n sanity, and mildly sym pathetic tow ard madness. So the "Knight of the 
W oeful Countenance's" mad exploits struck a resounding  chord. Many of 
the best-known and most influential early-eighteenth-century British writers, 
including Pope, Swift, A ddison, and  Steele, knew the book well, referring to it 
frequently in their publications and private correspondence.2i
The nation wholeheartedly em braced the book but experienced a more 
complex reaction to its protagonist. Don Quixote served  as the primary 
literary m odel for the British eccentric, including two key early examples, 
A ddison and Steele's Sir Roger de Coverley and the Scriblerus Club's 
M artinus Scriblerus. Both these characters, created by W hig and Tory writers, 
respectively, closely resemble Quixote in several significant ways discussed 
below. However, in the British versions, his m adness is conspicuously toned 
dow n. A pparently British readers, or at least the British w riters who modeled 
after Don Quixote characters w hich  became well know n, loved the Don and 
w anted  to see more of him—m ore of everything but h is m adness. The 
dom inant culture's will to reason m ade them unw illing  to indulge true 
quixotic madness. At the same time, residual tolerance for madness made 
the Don's figure attractive. In M artinus Scriblerus, the Scriblerus Club 
transm uted Quixote's violent m adness to the m erely self-damaging 
enthusiasm  of the virtuoso. In Sir Roger de Coverley, A dd ison  and Steele 
transform  Quixote's elaborate, anachronistic, and therefore (to those around 
him) bizarre chivalric behavior and speech into slight, barely detectable
21 A ddison and Steele also knew M otteux personally and w ished him  w ell publicly in The 
Spectator,  giving him lots of free advertising. A  letter ostensibly from M otteux but probably 
written by Steele takes up half of N o. 288 (30 Jan. 1712); in this letter M otteux g ives notice that 
he has quit literary endeavors for trade, and then he goes on to puff his wares. In N o. 552 (3 
Dec. 1712), Steele writes glow ingly o f h is (i.e., Mr. Spectator's) personal visit to Motteux's 
warehouse.
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oddities of m anner and  social graces. Foucault describes the eighteenth 
century's first response to unreasonable characters as "amused indulgence" 
QAadness 200). The dom inant culture silenced and  dism issed the pow er of 
m adness by laughing it off—by producing the eccentric, who was only slightly 
"unreasonable" and largely funny and sym pathetic. Madness became 
am using oddity. By means of the eccentric, "[ujnreason reappeared as a 
classification, w hich is not much; but it nonetheless reappeared, and slow ly 
recovered its place in  the familiarity of the social landscape" (200).
Eccentrics w ere not the first literary oddballs, of course. The genre of 
the "character," a brief sketch no more than a couple of hundred w ords long, 
describes a type of person, usually in am using a n d / or satirical terms. The
character was in fact "a genre of great antiquity  which, however, achieved its
final definition in the seventeenth century" (W itherspoon and W arnke 196), 
not as an invention of the eighteenth century. Characters generally focus on 
the type's most prom inent characteristics, as the brevity of the genre 
dem ands; this often m eans spotlighting strange or abnorm al characteristics. 
For example, this very brief character w ritten in  1616 by Sir Thomas O verbury 
describes "A PEDANT":
He treads in a rule, and  one hand scans verses, and the other
holds his sceptre. He dares not th ink  a thought, that the
nom inative case governs not the verb; and  he never had 
m eaning in his life, for he traveled only for w ords. His am bition 
is criticism, and  his example Tully. He values phrases, and  elects 
them by the sound, and the eight parts of speech are his servants.
To be brief, he is a heteroclite for he w ants the plural num ber, 
having only the single quality of words. (199)
Aside from the obvious difference of length and  dep th  of description, there
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are two significant differences betw een literary eccentrics such as M artinus 
Scriblerus and Sir Roger de Coverley, and characters such as this one. First, 
the character lacks the eccentric's singularity. Unlike the character, the 
eccentric has a particu lar name, history, and personality, even if at the same 
time he resembles a common type. W hat m atters about the eccentric is his 
difference from  the dom inant cu ltu re 's norms. W hat m atters about 
characters is their sim ilarity  to others in their group, their recognizability as a 
type. By these standards, "A Tavern" can be a character—and it w as, w ritten by 
John Earle. Second, w hereas the cultural function of the eccentric—at least 
early in the eighteenth century, in  the instances of Scriblerus and  Coverley—is 
prim arily didactic, the character sim ply displays the author's wit. Overbury 
describes the character as "a quick and soft touch of many strings, all shutting 
up in one m usical close; it is w it's descant on any plain song" (W itherspoon 
and Warnke 203). The subject is "plain": for Overbury, "A Good Woman," 
"A Courtier, "An Am orist," "An Old Man"; for Earle, "A Child," "A Young 
Raw Preacher," "An A ntiquary," "A Blunt Man." The task in  d raw ing  a 
character is to make even a "plain song" w itty and interesting, by means of 
exaggeration ("never had  m eaning in his life"), m etaphor ("the eight parts of 
speech are his servants"), and w ord  play ("he is a heteroclite for he w ants the 
plural num ber"). A successfully d raw n character dem onstrates the author's 
w it and skill. Eccentrics such as Scriblerus and Coverley, in contrast, teach 
"proper" behavior, by negative and positive example, respectively. Their 
interest or pow er lies less in their portraits, in authors' wit, than  in their 
function as centerpieces of program s for social change.
By March 1711, w hen Sir Roger de Coverley first appeared  in The 
Spectator, and certainly by 1714, w hen the Scriblerus Club form ed and began 
to compose their daft creation's fictional M emoirs, the stage w as set for the
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appearance of the British eccentric. The reading public was already fam iliar 
with "characters" and their oddities; a complex mixture of impatience, 
disgust, and sym pathy w ith  m adness reigned; and Don Quixote had provided 
a popular if distastefully m ad m odel for a new  kind of character.
ii. Sir Roger de Coverley, Eccentric Exemplar 
Sir Roger de Coverley first appeared in this milieu via the pages of The  
Spectator No. 2 on March 2, 1710/11. Sir Roger's popularity w as both a cause 
and an effect of The Spectator's legendary popularity and influence. The 
paper had a run of three to four thousand copies, a very large readership by 
the standards of the day,22 and one that included most of the nation 's 
educated and powerful. Peter Gay writes that "no daily paper before, and  few 
daily papers after The Spectator reached so w ide an  audience; certainly none 
influenced so m any, and  such influential people" (qtd. in Bloom and Bloom 
7). It w as collected into volumes while still in print, as well as long 
afterwards, so its readership even increased over time. In the 1760s, long after 
Addison and Steele's deaths, H ugh Blair observed that The Spectator was "in  
the hands of every one" (Ketcham 3). As M aximillian E. N ovak sum s it up, 
"the influence of the Spectator on English m anners and taste has been 
described as being only slightly less than that of the Bible" (iii-iv). This 
powerful influence is not only apparent in hindsight; A ddison and Steele's 
contemporaries felt it, too. One published an  anonymous pam phlet shortly 
after the paper began its run, insisting that the
22 Addison estimated in N o. 10 that there were twenty readers of the Spectator  for each copy 
sold. This is probably w ay too high an estimate, but it serves as a reminder that papers did  
circulate around coffeehouses and that there were more readers than papers. Even granted  
Addison's high estimate, Ian Watt estim ates the entire newspaper-buying public at about one 
in eleven o f the entire population, and points out that early in the eighteenth century there 
was "very limited distribution o f literacy . . .  in the m odem  sense of a bare capacity to read and 
write the mother-tongue" (37). Literacy then meant proportionally much more in terms of 
power than literacy does today.
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Tyranny that he [Mr. Spectator] pretends to exert over the Sense 
and  Discretion with which he lays his Daily B urthen  of 
Speculations upon them, makes it necessary to stop h im  in  the 
beginning, and  let him  know, that the Foundations of his Pow er 
are only imaginary, and his Notions are of the same N atu re , as 
the clouds and Mist that he pretends to cast over his Actions.
(Qtd. in Bloom and Bloom 27)
Such attacks, however, were merely gnats to a rhinoceros. The paper 
continued unfazed to provide "an image of society tha t influenced 
representations of social life for fifty years" (Ketcham 163).
A central feature of A ddison and Steele's image of society was 
characters. The authors created m any but gave none such lengthy, 
affectionate, and  purposeful treatm ent as Sir Roger. For instance, they 
in troduced a Club in  The Tatler very sim ilar to the later Spectator Club but 
never developed it further. Tatler No, 132, p rin ted  ten m onths or halfway 
th rough  that paper's run, describes its six surviving m em bers (the "Club 
consisted originally of Fifteen" [2:265]). In addition to the Tatler himself, 
there was Major Matchlock, "who served in the last Civil W ars, and  has all 
the Battles by Heart," and who regales the Club w ith his part in  them  at every 
m eeting; the piquantly but m eaninglessly nam ed "Dick Reptile . . .  a good 
na tu red  indolent Man, who speaks little himself, bu t laughs a t ou r Jokes, and 
brings his young Nephew along with him , a Youth of Eighteen Years old"; an 
unnam ed  "Bencher at the neighbouring Inn," who "pretends to have been 
in tim ate  w ith  Jack Ogle," apparently a fam ed rake and wit; an d  "Sir Jeoffrey 
N otch ,  who is the eldest of the Club, . . .  a Gentleman of an an tien t Family" 
(2:266). After this introduction, Dick Reptile only reappears three m ore times, 
do ing  and saying nothing suggested by his name, and nothing unusual. He
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bewails the em ptiness of current speech in No. 137, claim s he "w ould hate no 
M an out of pure Idleness" (3:83) in No. 203, and  advises m en not to heed 
"being laughed at for any T hing that is not in the M ode" (3:260) in  No. 246. 
N either Reptile's nephew , the Bencher, nor M atchlock ever reappears a t all. 
A few pointedly odd  characters—in the generic, seventeenth-century sense of 
the w ord—do make one or two appearances apiece: for exam ple, Tom Folio, "a 
Broker in  Learning," a pedant "of deep Learning w ith o u t common Sense" 
(No. 158; 2:386); N ed Softly, "a very pretty  Poet, an d  a great A dm irer of easy 
Lines" (No. 163; 2:406); and the "political U pholsterer," a m an obsessed w ith 
news to the detrim ent of his business (Nos. 155, 160, and  232).23 These are 
brief, one-dim ensional, exaggerated portraits of fam iliar types—in a w ord, 
characters. They m ostly appear in one cluster w ith in  a few weeks of each 
other, beginning about two months after the Club w as introduced. I do not 
w ant to insist upon this point too much, because no one can say confidently 
w hat A ddison and Steele intended; how ever, this tim eline suggests that 
A ddison and Steele recognized the potential significance and  interest of the 
Club's characters, experim ented with a few  other, non-Club characters, and 
finally gave up characters altogether due to lack of direction or purpose.
But characters form ed a significant part of The Spectator from the very 
beginning. In the first num ber Mr. Spectator describes himself and his 
background, then prom ises "a more particular Account" (1:3) of his Club 
friends in the next num ber. The Club includes a T em plar (i.e., lawyer) who 
knows his classics better than the law he is supposed  to practice; Sir A ndrew  
Freeport, a prosperous London m erchant and W hig; C aptain  Sentry, an early- 
retired soldier and the "next heir to Sir Roger" (1:16); W ill Honeycomb, a
23 In No. 180 the Tatler  cites a letter probably written by Steele that ascribes the Upholster's 
going broke not because he overindulged his news addiction but because noblemen didn't pay 
their bills. A lecture then fo llow s on the unethical nature o f stiffing tradesmen.
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superannuated beau and  walking encyclopedia of the history  of fashions; an 
unnam ed Clergym an; and  m ost prom inently . Sir Roger de Coverley himself.
A lthough characters occupy more space, and  more prom inent space, in 
the Spectator than they  did in the Tatler, they still tend  to fade into the 
woodwork—except for Sir Roger. The C lergym an and Tem plar virtually 
disappear after their introduction. Sir A ndrew  is featured in about half a 
dozen further num bers, bu t generally as the represen tative  of a position, such 
as support of free trade (No. 174) or the v irtues of labor over charitable 
donations (No. 232); he is not so m uch a character (even in  the seventeenth- 
century sense) as a m outhpiece. The in troduction  of his nam e m erely gives 
Addison or Steele24 the means to a ir the ir W hig views w ithou t doing so 
directly, under their ow n names. Will H oneycom b is a character in the 
seventeenth-century sense, a caricature of the Vain Old Beau. In No. 359 he 
boasts, "I think that w ithout Vanity I may p re ten d  to know  as much of the 
Female W orld as any Man in  Great-Britain" (3:343), and  only when he is 
m arried at last does he adm it that he is not 48 years old, a fact all his friends 
know very well, but in fact over 60. C aptain Sentry never quite steps out of 
the shadows; he show s no kind of peculiarity  or even particularity. He 
appears in only a sm all handful of num bers, an d  w hen he does, he functions 
mainly to point up Sir Roger's good qualities. For instance, in No. 544, Sentry 
writes Mr. Spectator from  Sir Roger's estate, w hich Sentry has now  inherited, 
to lament his uncle's irreplaceability.
Sir Roger, on the other hand, figures p rom inently  in thirty-five 
num bers—more than  one in tw enty of the 635 total, m ore than one starring
24 Granted, other writers contributed to the Spectator,  Eustace Budgell foremost. But Addison 
and Steele exerted strict editorial control over all numbers, very few  o f w hich  featuring Club 
characters were contributed by other writers. Even Budgell w rote only three numbers featuring 
Sir Roger: 331, which has the Knight admiring beards' tendency to make m en look wiser; 359, in 
which Will Honeycomb points Sir Roger to a relevant passage in Paradise Lost  regarding the 
perversity of women; and 116, discussed below.
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appearance per m onth—and  is m entioned in passing  as p a rt of the Club in 
m any more. Mr. Spectator w rites m ore than  th ree  weeks^^ w orth  of num bers, 
106-131, from Sir Roger's country estate, m uch in  the way American 
television program s today travel to other cities to boost ratings. I would 
argue that there are two im portant reasons A ddison  and  Steele featured Sir 
Roger so prom inently. One 1 just alluded to: the K night was well-loved, and 
he was well-loved in large part because he so closely resem bles Don Quixote. 
Much of Don Quixote's interest lay in the complex of responses to madness 
described above; he is the  perfect illustration of the once-sane-but-now-mad 
man, as well as the som etim es-m ad-som etim es-sane m an. He once was sane, 
bu t "by sleeping little, and  reading much, the M oisture of his Brain was 
exhausted to that Degree, that at last he lost the Use of his Reason" (Cervantes 
2). As nearly everyone who meets him rem arks, in nearly  identical words, 
"in all his Words and Answers he display 'd  an excellent Judgm ent; and . . . 
only rav'd when the Discourse fell upon K night-Errantry" (416). Similarly, 
Sir Roger: rejection by the w idow  forty years ago unfastened his reason, and 
w hen she comes to his m ind, he, too, loses his reason. Second, Sir Roger 
embodies the m anners and  values A ddison and Steele w ere explicitly trying 
to prom ulgate by means of their paper. By spotlighting  Sir Roger they 
spotlighted their program  for society; by m aking him  attractive they made it 
attractive.
Certainly the resemblance between Sir Roger de Coverley and Don 
Quixote de la Mancha is close, w hether or not A ddison  and Steele intended it 
consciously. Evidence suggests, though, that the parallels were consciously 
drawn. Steele describes h im s e l f  as a Quixote figure in  the preface to the 
octavo edition of the Tatler:
[Njever Hero in  Romance was carried aw ay w ith  a more furious
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A m bition to conquer Giants and T yrants, than  I have been  in 
extirpating Gamesters and Duellists. A nd indeed, like one of 
those Knights too, tho' I was calm before, I am apt to fly out 
again, w hen the Thing that first d istu rbed  me, is presented to my 
Im agination. I shall therefore leave off w hen I am w ell, and 
fight w ith  W indm ills no more. (Qtd. in  N ovak vii)
Sir Roger apparently  represents the w riters' values (as I discuss below), and 
one of the w riters casts himself as Quixote; therefore, to d raw  the th ird  leg of 
the triangle and  read  Sir Roger as a Quixote figure seems to follow. The 
likeness is supported  by Sir Roger's characteristics, in any case. M any of these 
characteristics w ere institutionalized as core characteristics of the eccentric, 
and so in m any ways, to describe Quixote and  Sir Roger is to describe the 
eccentric of three hundred  years later.
Specifically, both knights are members of the landed gentry. This fact 
enables their eccentricity both practically and socially. On a purely  practical 
level, they can afford it: "eccentric behavior has always been m ore frequent 
among the leisured classes, for eccentricity itself is essentially a leisure 
activity. Some eccentricities require m oney to be m aintained, and  a person 
who m ust hold dow n a job in order to pu t food on the table is not in  a good 
position to tell the w orld  to go to the devil" (Weeks and Jam es 50). As 
Thorstein Veblen ironically observes in The Theory o f the Leisure Class,25 
the ability to w aste tim e and money, to consum e them  conspicuously, is w hat 
sets apart the upper classes, and w hat classes below try to em ulate (in the
25 In this work Veblen focuses so exdusively (and so amusingly) upon wastefulness as an 
honorific category (the other one being archaism) that is easy to overlook his rationalistic 
bias. That is, im plicit in his position regarding w astefu lness is that anything not purely 
"practical," i.e., productive o f unquestionably useful, tangible goods such as food and plain 
clothing—for exam ple, art and literature—serves only the purpose of providing falsely based  
dignity to the (upper-class) consumer. O bviously that aspect o f his position can be attacked in 
a number of ways. Nevertheless, his insights regarding conspicuous consumption still ring true 
and remain relevant.
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eighteenth century, the m idd le  class in particular). Upper-class status, 
conspicuous consum ption, and  eccentricity form  a conceptual triangle: 
conspicuous consum ption signifies high class; eccentricity, requiring large 
am ounts of leisure tim e a n d  m oney, is a form  of conspicuous consum ption; 
eccentricity is taken to signify h igh  class. Practically, the  concepts form a 
chain of causes and effects: high class enables the p u rsu it of impractical 
hobbies, which in tu rn  p rov ide  presum ptive evidence of eccentricity. For 
exam ple, Don Quixote can afford to sell "many Acres of Arable-Land to 
purchase Books" (2), w hich w ere several times m ore expensive, relatively, 
than  they are today. He has leisure time to spend on reading: "when our 
G entlem an had nothing to do (which was alm ost all the  Year round) he 
pass 'd  his Time in reading Books of Knight-Errantry" (2). Reading the books 
feeds his chivalric obsession, placing a "world of d iso rderly  Notions, pick 'd  
ou t of his Books . . . into his Imagination" (3), and  placing  him astride 
Rozinante in his a ttem pt to restore knight-errantry to the fallen world. 
Finally his exploits as self-appoin ted  knight-errant convince observers of his 
oddity  or madness.
The process w orks sim ilarly  w ith Sir Roger. His social position enables 
him  to m aintain excellent h u n ting  hounds and horses, as w ell as the time to 
em ploy them. H unting generally  demonstrates high social status by means of 
conspicuous consum ption, for "the fast horse . . .  m uch like . . . the dog . . .  is 
on the whole expensive, o r w asteful and useless" (Veblen 104). A nd Sir 
Roger's consum ption w ith  regard  to these anim als is particularly 
conspicuous: "His H unting-H orses were the finest and  best m anaged in all 
these parts: His Tenants are still full of the Praises of a g rey  Stone-horse that 
unhappily  staked himself several Years since, and w as buried  with great 
Solem nity in the orchard" {Spectator No. 116; 1:475-76). He chooses to bury
40
his dead  favorite rather than suffer it to be eaten, even by his own tenants— 
conspicuous consum ption  (or nonconsum ption) indeed. His impracticality 
w ith regard  to hunting-hounds is equally notorious:
He is so nice in this Particular, th a t a Gentlem an having made 
him  a Present of a very fine H ound  the other Day, the Knight 
re tu rn 'd  it by the Servant w ith  a great many Expressions of 
Civility, b u t desired him to tell his M aster, that the Dog he had 
sent was indeed a most excellent Base, bu t that at present he only 
w anted a Counter-Tenor. (1:476)
If such highly w astefu l consum ption is no t sufficient evidence of eccentricity 
in itself, then  Sir Roger's manner of in d u lg in g  him self in  his hobby provides 
m ore:
The constant Thanks and good W ishes of the N eighbourhood 
alw ays a ttended  him on A ccount of his rem arkable Enmity 
tow ards Foxes; having destroy 'd  m ore of those Vermin in one 
Year, th an  it was thought the w hole  C ountry could have 
produced. Indeed the Knight does not scruple to ow n among his 
m ost in tim ate Friends, that in  o rd er to establish his Reputation 
this Way, he has secretly sent for g rea t N um bers of them  out of 
other Counties, which he used to tu rn  loose about the Country 
by N ight, that he might the better signalize him self in their 
Destruction the next Day. (^Spectator No. 116; 1:475)
He clearly illustrates Veblen's observation that far from "love of nature" 
motivating the hunter, "It is, indeed, the m ost noticeable effect of the 
sportsm an's activity to keep nature in a state of chronic desolation by killing
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off all living things whose destruction he can compass" (171).26
In any case, he did that w hen young; now, in  late m iddle age, he 
practices a d ifferent but equally odd  m ethod of hunting  th a t still shows his 
(selective) benevolence. In com pany w ith  Mr. Spectator, Sir Roger pursued a 
hare to the po in t of capture, stopped his dogs,
and alighting , took up the H are in  his Arms; w hich he soon after 
delivered  to one of his Servants, w ith an O rder, if she could be 
kept alive, to let her go in his great Orchard, w here, it seems, he 
has several of these Prisoners of War, who live together in a 
very comfortable Captivity. I was highly pleas'd  to see the 
D iscipline of the Pack, and the Good-nature of the Knight, who 
could no t find in his H eart to m urther a Creature th a t had given 
him  so m uch Diversion. (1:478)
The hare becom es another pet—yet further conspicuous consum ption, and 
further proof of Sir Roger's eccentricity. (Rabbits were not commonly kept as 
pets in early-eighteenth-century England; almost invariably, they served 
culinary or "sportsm anlike" purposes.)
Sir Roger's hunting also proves his masculinity. As I discuss below. Sir 
Roger's haplessness at love makes him  ridiculous, even calling his manliness 
into question. His devotion to hunting, however, is "a meritorious 
em ploym ent and  an expression of the honorable p redato ry  im pulse" (Veblen 
103). It m akes up  for his otherwise suspicious haplessness, for in popular 
tradition real m en hunt, and one w ho hunts is a real m an. Note in this 
connection the detail that the horse everyone singles ou t for special praise, 
and that Sir Roger insisted upon burying, is a "Stone-horse," a stallion. The
26 Hunting also confirms his class status: it performs the important sym bolic function of 
publicly dem onstrating the nobleman's ability to survey, manage, and order his estate. This 
includes the right and practice of riding upon tenants' land during the hunt, in pursuit of game.
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horse confers m asculinity by association.
High class standing enables eccentricity on a practical level. High class 
standing also enables eccentricity on the social level by setting the terms for 
perceiving and in terpreting  it. T hat is, all people's circum stances determine 
how they will be "read" or understood by others; the same personal 
characteristics will be read  differently in different contexts—particularly in 
different classes. This w orks the other way, too; perceivers' circumstances 
determ ine their reading. These are hermeneutical com m onplaces, but they 
are worth repeating for the purpose of understanding The Spectator's take on  
eccentricity. Mr. Spectator's visit to Sir Roger's parish show s that one must be 
of a certain rank even to perceive eccentricity: the congregation, mostly Sir 
Roger's tenants, "are not polite enough to see any th ing  ridiculous in his 
Behaviour" (1:461). His social equals, however, can see w hat is different 
about him, and they appreciate it: "the general good Sense and  Worthiness of 
his Character, make his F riends observe these little Singularities as Foils that 
rather set off than blem ish his good qualities" (1:461). On the part of both 
perceiver and perceived, the perception of eccentricity is a function of class. 
W hen the Political U pholsterer persistently awakens the Tatler before daw n 
to tell him about a m ilitary victory, the latter finds it annoying; w hen early in 
the m orning Sir Roger w alks "upon  the Terrace hem m ing tw ice or thrice to 
himself w ith great Vigour, for he loves to clear his Pipes in  good Air (to make 
use of his ow n Phrase) and  is not a little pleased w ith  any one who takes 
Notice of the Strength w hich  he still exerts in his M orning H em m s" (No. 269; 
2:549), Mr. Spectator feels only "a secret Joy" (2:549).
On this point of the eccentric's lovability: it is im portan t to note that 
Sir Roger is "lovable" in large p a rt because Mr. Spectator says he is. This is 
im portant because the response authorially indicated as p roper in Sir Roger's
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case is very different from the "proper" response to M artinus Scriblerus, 
despite the fact that both are eccentrics w ith  m any characteristics in  common. 
In other w ords, m erely being an eccentric does not autom atically m ake a 
character sym pathetic, especially at this tim e of his introduction. Sir Roger is 
explicitly in tended  as an exemplar; Scriblerus is clearly m eant as an  anti­
exemplar, an  exam ple of w hat no t  to be. The Knight's actions—hunting, 
traveling to the assizes, failing to declare his desire for the w idow , and  so on— 
are not obviously or inherently cuddly; the reader requires A ddison  and 
Steele's cues to respond  positively to Sir Roger. For instance, Mr. Spectator 
observes that the Knight is "the best M aster in the W orld"; his servants love 
him so that upon  his return to the country  they "could not refrain from  Tears 
a t the Sight of their old Master" (No. 106; 1:439-440). Even strangers instantly 
take to him —the serving-boys at Squires coffee-house, u tter strangers, 
"seemed to take Pleasure in serving him " (No. 269; 2:552). In short, everyone  
loves him: "My w orthy  Friend Sir ROGER is one of those who is not only at 
Peace w ithin himself, but beloved and  esteem ed by all about him. He 
receives a su itab le  T ribute for his un iversal Benevolence to M ankind, in  the 
Returns of Affection and Good-will, w hich  are paid him by every one that 
lives w ithin his Neighbourhood" (No. 122; 1:498). Addison and Steele, aware 
that they cannot count upon a favorable response to Sir Roger's odd ity , thus 
carefully and insistently  guide our response to the benevolent Knight. They 
cannot write, for example, "Sir ROGER am idst all his good Q ualities, is 
som ething of an H um ourist; and th a t his Virtues, as w ell as his 
Imperfections, are as it were tinged by a certain Extravagance, w hich makes 
them particularly  his, and distinguishes them  from  those of o ther Men" (No. 
106; 1:440), and  count upon the reader to love him. They m ust tell us th a t Sir 
Roger is to be loved, so they continue: "This Cast of Mind, as it is generally
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very innocent in itself, so it renders his Conversation highly agreeable, and 
more delightfu l than the same D egree of Sense and Virtue w ould  appear in 
their com m on and ordinary Colours" (1:440).
To re tu rn  now to the connection betw een eccentricity and  high class 
standing: A ddison and Steele found  the  poin t that circum stances determine 
understand ing  im portant enough to begin  the paper w ith it. Mr. Spectator 
begins No. 1 by writing:
I have observed, that a Reader seldom  peruses a Book with 
Pleasure 'till he knows w hether the W riter of it be a black or a 
fair Man, of a mild or cholerick Disposition, M arried or a 
Batchelor, w ith other Particulars of the like nature, that conduce 
very  m uch to the right U nderstanding  of an Author. To gratify 
this Curiosity, which is so natu ra l to a Reader, 1 design this 
Paper, and the next, as Prefatory Discourses to my following 
W ritings . . .
I was born to a small H ereditary  Estate, which, according 
to the T radition of the Village w here it lies, was bounded  by the 
sam e Hedges and Ditches in W ill ia m  the Conqueror's Time that 
it is at present, and has been delivered down from Father to Son 
w hole and entire, w ithout the Loss or Acquisition of a single 
Field or Meadow, during the Space of six hundred Years. (1:1-2)
Mr. Spectator does not explicitly nam e class as one of the "Particulars" 
affecting readers' responses, but he does acknowledge generally here that who 
he is w ill determ ine the way he is read. A nd the fact that he proceeds from 
m aking the  general point straight to telling  his class and noting  the extreme 
age of his family strongly implies class's importance. Mr. Spectator later 
reinforces his general point: in No. 131, he writes that people who don 't
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know  him  invent various readings for w hat they can  see of his personality - 
all of which m ust strike the reader, who knows m ore abou t Mr. Spectator, as 
w ildly unsupported.
[S]ome look upon  me as very proud, some as very  modest, and 
some as very m elancholly. Will. Wimble, as m y Friend the 
Butler tells me, observing me very much alone, and  extremely 
silent w hen I am  in Com pany, is afraid 1 have k illed  a Man. The 
Country People seem  to suspect me for a Conjurer, and  some of 
them  hearing of the Visit to Moll. White, w ill needs have it that 
Sir ROGER has brought down a Cunning M an . . .  A Justice of 
the Peace, who lives about five Miles off, . . . w ishes Sir ROGER 
does not harbour a Jesuit in his House . . .  (19-20)
To preclude m isreadings, he presents impeccable class and  family credentials- 
-entirely fictional27—to insure the broadest possible tolerance for his own self­
professed oddity (which m ainly includes not speaking), and incidentally for 
the oddity of his friend. Sir Roger de Coverley. "O dd and uncommon 
characters are the Game that I look for, and most delight in" (No. 108; 1:448), 
writes Mr. Spectator, and  he encourages readers to do  the sam e—at least, to 
look for and delight in  upper-class odd and uncom m on characters, anyway.
In addition to upper-class status. Sir Roger shares w ith  Don Quixote a 
certain haplessness in sexuality. This has the effect of softening or making 
more palatable—particularly for The Spectator's m any middle-class readers— 
upper-class power, thereby widening the eccentric's appeal. Quixote is a late- 
m iddle-aged virgin, as he proudly  informs everyone w ho will listen. He is 
absurdly  protective of his intact status, frequently im agining nonexistent
27 A side from the obvious fact that a biography of one man must be fictional when three  were 
impersonating him, the pointedly ancient landed family Mr. Spectator describes matches none 
of his creators' actual circumstances (notwithstanding Addison's strong political connections, 
and both men's upper-class status).
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threats to it. For exam ple, in  Book I, he foolishly believes th a t the dwarfish 
M aritornes, sneaking into his room  in  search of her lover the m ule drover, is 
coming to seduce him  (Quixote).28 In Book 4, w hen  the beautiful young 
noblew om an A ltisidora  p retends for am usem ent th a t she loves him 
desperately, he takes it as one of the ineluctable and  unfortunate 
consequences of being a knight-errant, protesting how ever, "still I am 
Dulcinea's, and hers alone, dead  or alive, dutiful, unspotted , and  unchanged" 
(736). Dulcinea29 is key to his madness: Quixote's chivalric ideals dictate that 
he devote him self sp iritually  to a woman, singing her praises, perform ing 
heroic deeds in her nam e, sending  conquered foes to pay  hom age to her, and 
m ost im portantly, never expecting her to grant him  sexual favors. Thus he 
imagines sexual threats w here clearly none exist, and  sublim ates any actual 
sexual urges he m ight have into sp iritual/ chivalric form. (There is an 
obvious Freudian sublim atory quality to his rid ing  a round  w ith  lance held 
high for the honor of Dulcinea.) Furthermore, the very  idea that Quixote 
m ight be sexually attractive strikes most of the w om en in the book—for 
instance, A ltisidora and the Duchess (who puts A ltisidora up  to feigning love 
for him)—as utterly  rid iculous, unthinkable.
Sir Roger's oddity , too, has roots in sexual haplessness. In fact, whereas
28 The other m istake he m akes here, which further points up his sexual haplessness (as well 
as, more generally, h is mad, chivalry-addled perception), is in taking M aritom es for a 
sexually attractive princess. C ervantes describes her as grotesquely as possible: she is "a 
Broad-fac'd, Flat-headed, Saddle-nos'd  Dowdy; blind o f one Eye, and t'other alm ost o u t . . .  
She w as not above three Feet high from her H eels to her Head; and her Shoulders, which  
somewhat loaded her, as having too much Flesh upon 'em, made her look dow nw ards oftner 
than she could have wish'd" (96).
29 Dulcinea, like M aritomes, is not w hat Quixote imagines her to be. C ervantes describes her 
as "a good likely Country Lass, for w hom  he had formerly had a sort o f Inclination, though 'tis 
believ'd, she never heard o f it, nor regarded it in the least" (6-7). Even the nam e is an 
invention o f Quixote's: "Her nam e w as Aldonza Lorenzo . . .  he studied to find her out a new  
N am e, that m ight have som e A ffinity w ith  her old one, and yet at the sam e tim e sound  
som ewhat like that of a Princess, or Lady of Quality" (7). H e does not really care w hether or 
not she even exists: "Heaven know s whether there be a Dulcinea in the W orld or not, and 
whether she be a Notional Creature or not. These are Mysteries not to be so  narrowly enquir'd 
into" (657).
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Q uixote's odd, sexless devotion to Dulcinea seems m ore a sym ptom  than a 
cause of his madness, "the w idow " clearly caused Sir Roger's. Our first 
glim pse of Sir Roger in  Spectator No. 2 reveals th a t "he keeps himself a 
Batchelour by reason he w as crossed in Love, by a  perverse beautiful Widow 
of the next County to him " (1:8). The d isappoin tm ent caused more damage 
than  m erely keeping him  single: Mr. Spectator asserts "that the Widow is the 
secret Cause of all that Inconsistency which appears in some Parts of my 
Friend 's Discourse" (No. 113; 1:466). Sir Roger agrees: at no prompting from 
Mr. Spectator, he says, "I am pretty  well satisfied such a Passion as 1 have had 
is never well cured; and  betw een you and me, I am  often ap t to imagine it has 
had  some whimsical Effect upon my Brain" (No. 118; 1:486).
W hat makes th is hapless instead of just sad  is that Sir Roger was not 
really "crossed in love" so m uch as sim ply unable to speak his desire. His 
ow n passivity, not the w idow 's "perversity," caused his failure. Certainly the 
desire was there, and if it can be m easured by the w edding  gifts he planned to 
give her, it was prodigious. The gifts included "an  hundred Acres in a 
D iam ond-R ing,. . .  on her H ead fifty of the tallest Oaks upon his Estate . . .  a 
C olepit to keep her in  clean Linnen, . . . the Profits of a WindmilDO for her 
Fans . . . [and] the Sheering of his Sheep for her Under-Petticoats" (No. 295; 
3:54). His failure came about like this: forty years ago, having heard reliable 
gossip that "this accom plished Mistress of mine ha[d] distinguished me above 
the rest, and ha[d] been know n to declare Sir ROGER DE COVERLEY was the 
Tam est and most H um an of all the Brutes in the C ountry" (No. 113; 1:465), he 
"set out from hence to make [his] addresses" (1:465). But having been 
"adm itted to her Presence w ith great Civility," he began to fumble: "she 
discovered new Charms, and  1 at last came tow ards her w ith such an Awe as
30 N o  reference to windm ills in The Spectator,  including this one, is innocent (i.e., not to be 
considered as a subtle reference to Don Quixote) .
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m ade me Speechless" (1:465). She sent the encouraging signal of speaking 
philosophically of Love and Honor, then asking "w hether she was so happy 
as to fall in w ith [his] Sentiments on  these im portant Particulars" (1:466). He 
sim ply could not speak: "after I had  sate half an H our m editating how  to 
behave . . .  I rose up and took my leave." In forty years he never once has told 
the w idow  of his lasting passion, w hich he deeply regrets, lam enting, "1 am 
angry that her Charms are not m ore accessible, that I am more inclined to 
worship than salute her" (1:466). He tries to blame the w idow 's female 
companion for spoiling his success, bu t gives us every reason to believe it is 
all his own fault. It's certainly not the w idow 's; apparently she rem ained 
receptive to his addresses all those years. Even when he's on his deathbed 
she sends a "kind message" that gives his family and servants "great Hopes of 
his Recovery" (No 517; 4:340); unfortunately, so long as Sir Roger keeps his 
feelings to himself, her affection m ust prove ineffectual. Perhaps most 
hapless of all: he never pursued another wom an. One failure w arped  his 
m ind forever.
Sir Roger's inability to speak about his feelings due to being 
overwhelm ed by them has an honorific aspect: his tongue-tiedness is 
supposed to prove the depth  and sincerity of the emotion, and thereby the 
depth and goodness of the man. In this way. Sir Roger's exploits can be read 
as an early example of the literature of sentimentality,3l particularly given 
that it is not the effects of excessive reading (as w ith Quixote) but of 
sentiment, of undying frustrated love, from w hich he suffers. Sir Roger's 
visits to W estminster Abbey, w here he shows not only an encyclopedic 
knowledge of British history but a laudably "honest Passion for the Glory of 
his Country, and such a respectful G ratitude to the Memory of its Princes"
31 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of sentim entality.
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(No. 329; 3:216); to the play, where he ingenuously responds to the play as 
deeply as if the fictional events on stage w ere actually happening to real 
people (No. 335); and to a London tavern in  a rainstorm , in the company of 
Will H oneycom b and a w om an everyone bu t Sir Roger recognizes as a 
prostitute, w hom  he innocently feeds and  tries to assist (No. 410)—all such 
events show  the BCnight at his deeply feeling best, and  provide the reader 
w ith an em otional model. He appears just a b it ridiculous for the naivety of 
his responses, true, but even this naivety show s the dep th  and thoroughness 
of his goodness (see below). He may be silly, bu t his feelings  are exemplary.
Sir Roger's sentim entality is the site of an  im portant nexus betw een 
oddity and  adm irability. That is, it causes his sexual haplessness, which lies at 
the root of his oddities, as well as at the root of his admirable qualities. 
Unable to couple w ith the widow, he instead  rem ains innocently obsessed 
with her, acknowledging, "It is, perhaps, to this dear Image in my H eart 
owing, tha t I am  apt to relent, that I easily forgive, and that many desirable 
things are grow n into my Temper, which I should  not have arrived at by 
better M otives than the Thought of being one Day hers" (No. 118; 1:485). Like 
Quixote, Sir Roger is too innocent for this w orld , w hich is to his (and the 
Don's) credit. Sexual innocence serves as a kind of iceberg tip, a prom inent 
sign of m uch deeper, broader innocence. A nd that broad, deep innocence is 
honorific; it is proof that he has not been corrupted by decayed m odern 
manners. Quixote seeks to restore the now -defunct system of chivalric 
manners, refusing to acquiesce to their loss from  the world. Similarly, Sir 
Roger, w ho "continues to wear a Coat and D oublet of the same Cut that w ere 
in Fashion at the Time of his Repulse" (No. 2; 1:8), is visibly a throwback to 
better, o lder days. "There is now," observes Will Honeycomb, "an Evil under 
the Sun w hich  [is] intirely new, because not m entioned by any Satyrist or
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M oralist in any Age: Men, said he, grow Knaves sooner than  they ever did 
since the Creation of the W orld before" (No. 352; 3 :3 1 3 ).32 Sir Roger is the 
rare m an w ho has both  aged and m aintained his innocence. Innocence, in 
the general sense of the w ord, is perhaps his very best quality ; Mr. Spectator 
notes that Sir Roger's conversation "left me at a Loss w he ther I w as more 
delighted w ith  m y Friend 's W isdom or Simplicity" (No. 109; 1:452).
Thus A ddison  and  Steele reproduce in  Sir Roger d e  Coverley most of 
Don Quixote's character, including the letter's noble innocence. The two 
characters d iffer m ost in madness: quite simply, Quixote is m ad and Sir Roger 
isn't. How m adness is defined is famously contingent and  debatable; 
however, Cervantes him self constantly refers to the D on as "m ad," suffering 
from "m adness," "absolutely mad and distracted," and  sim ilar expressions, 
w ithout apparen t irony. The Don seems clearly in tended  as m ad, in any case. 
His understanding  is fundam entally flawed: where Q uixote sees long-arm ed 
giants he m ust conquer, others see windm ills.
But in Sir Roger, that madness has been softened to a slight oddity  of 
manners. His "m ad" qualities, the symptoms of the w idow 's lasting 
influence upon his brain, prim arily include innocence and  deep  sentiment. 
Addison and Steele endorse these qualities, so their presence in  Sir Roger 
show him actually to be especially sane. His benevolence m anifests itself in 
his m anners, his social interactions. He is so kind to his servants, the butler 
writes Mr. Spectator, that his death "afflicted the whole C ountry, as well as 
his poor Servants, w ho loved him, 1 may say, better th an  w e d id  our Lives" 
(No. 517; 4:340). Coverley talks to servants kindly and personally:
W hen a Servant is called before his Master, he does not come
32 See Raymond W illiam s's The Country and the City  on the "w ell-know n habit of using the 
past, the 'good old days,' as a stick to beat the present" (Country 12). Q uixote and Coverley do 
so implicitly by adhering to "old-fashioned" values and manners, refusing to adopt the 
"artificial" new  ones.
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w ith an Expectation to hear himself rated for som e trivial Fault, 
threatned to be s tripp 'd , or used with any other unbecom ing 
Language . . . But it is often to know, what Road he took th a t he 
came so readily back according to Order; w hether he passed by 
such a Ground; if the old M an who rents it is in  good H ealth; or 
w hether he gave Sir Roger's  Love to him, or the like. (No. 107;
1:443)
In fact. Sir Roger is always inquiring after people 's health—that of his 
neighbors and  acquaintances, the ir uncles, and so on. H e even has a "Custom 
of Saluting every Body that passes by him, with a Good-m orrow, or a Good­
night. This the Old-Man does out of the Overflowings of his H um anity  . . . 
He cannot forbear this Exercise of Benevolence even in Tow n, w hen  he 
m eets w ith  any one in his M orning or Evening Walk" (No. 383; 3:437).
That Addison and Steele tone dow n Quixote's m adness in to  oddity  of 
m anners is itself significant. The transform ation comprises an uneasy  treaty 
betw een reason and m adness, a  fencing-off of a m iddle ground w here minor 
differences, m inimal deviations from  the norm  in the form  of m anners, can 
be allowed. But the significance of m anners in them selves—as opposed to 
m anners as symbols of incom pletely repressed m adness—is not to be 
underestim ated. "[T]he apparently  superficial reform ation of m anners is in 
fact one of the most pow erful ways in which a culture inculcates its 
m etaphysical, moral and  political scheme of things," as Peter Stallybrass and 
A llon W hite argue (88). Pierre Bourdieu holds that w hen societies
set such store on the seem ingly most insignificant details of 
dress, bearing, physical and  verbal manners, the reason is that, 
treating the body as a m em ory, they entrust to it in  abbreviated 
and practical, i.e. m nem onic, form the fundam ental principles of
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the arbitrary content of the culture. The principles em-bodied in 
this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence 
cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transform ation . . .
(94-95)
So-called basic points of good breeding, then, have great power. "Placed 
beyond the grasp of consciousness," they seem  only  "natural," mere common 
sense or reason. As such they dem and adherence; not to follow them  w ould 
seem  unreasonable, even m ad.
The im portance of m anners proves particu larly  great when, as was the 
case with the dom inant culture of early-eighteenth-century Great Britain, the 
self is presum ed to be transparent, to be plainly visible by means o f  
appearances and m anners. I w ant to em phasize that this presum ption was 
not necessarily objectively true or accurate—in fact, as my introduction states, I 
w ould argue definitively that it is not  the case; instead, I simply observe that 
it was the dom inant presum ption and tha t th is p resum ption  bore indirectly 
bu t significantly upon  the tim e's conceptions of eccentricity. The presum ed 
ability to see the self directly through appearance and  manners provided a 
putative guarantee of the eccentric's (in particular. Sir Roger's) goodness: he 
looked good, and acted as if he were good, therefore he m ust be good. That 
the eccentric could be presum ed really, thoroughly good was key to his being 
accepted by early eighteenth-century society; thus, the presum ption of a 
totally visible self indirectly but significantly a ided  the institutionalization of 
eccentricity.
To explain the basis and functioning of this assum ption, which is 
revealed and solidified in The Spectator: one 's m anners ostensibly show ed 
w hat one was; the outw ard and  the inw ard corresponded, so the inw ard self 
was readable to the public. Ketcham notes th a t th is system  of beliefs comes
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from "Descarte's mechanistic psychology^' (35). According to this system, 
stim uli encountered in the w orld m ake im pressions upon the soul; the soul 
affects the em otions; the emotions shape and  m ove the muscles o f the body; 
and the muscles of the body determ ine facial and  other bodily features. The 
chain of cause and effect was direct and  unbroken, so one could read the 
"real," "natural" inner self by means of outw ard  appearances. A ddison and 
Steele perpetuate  this belief in The Spectator. Mr. Spectator asserts its truth, 
observing, "every one is in some Degree a M aster of that A rt w hich is 
generally d istinguished by the Name of Physiognom y; and  naturally  forms to 
himself the C haracter or Fortune of a Stranger from the Features and 
Lineaments of his Face" (No. 86; 1:365). G ranted, Mr. Spectator leaves some 
slight room  for doubt: the "Characters or Fortunes" spectators form  m ay or 
may not be strictly accurate. He does allow  that it is (barely) possible for a 
person to "give the Lie to his Face, and  to be an honest, just, good-natured 
Man, in spite of all those Marks and Signatures w hich N ature seem s to have 
set upon him for the Contrary" (1:367). Still, on the whole, accurate readings 
are the norm, for we cannot dissemble how  we look:
I think w e may be better know n by our Looks than by our 
Words; and that a Man's Speech is m uch more easily disguised 
than his Countenance. In this Case how ever, I think the A ir of 
the w hole Face is much more expressive than  the Lines of it;
The T ru th  of it is, the Air is generally  nothing else bu t the 
inw ard Disposition of the Mind m ade visible. (1:366)
Appearance and m anners converge, or b lu r here: the "Air of the w hole Face" 
includes more than  just "the Lines of it"—namely, other significant 
circumstances, for example, manners.
54
A  correspondent, one Tom  Tweer,33 qualifies his claims for the science 
of physiognom y even less. He has the reading of selves dow n  to an almost 
m athem atically precise operation:
[T]here is a very close correspondence betw een the O utw ard  and 
the Inw ard Man; that scarce the least D aw ning, the  least 
Parturiency tow ards a T hough t can be stirring in the  M ind of 
Man, w ithou t producing a su itab le  Revolution in  his Exteriors, 
w hich w ill easily discover it self to an A dept in  the T heory of the 
Phiz. . . . The Practitioners in  this Art often m ake use of a 
G entlem an's Eyes, to give 'em  Light into the Posture of his 
Brains; take a handle from  his Nose, to judge of the size of his 
Intellects; and  in terpret the over m uch Visibility and  Pertness of 
one Ear, as an infallible m ark  of Reprobation, and  a Sign the 
O w ner of so saucy a M em ber fears neither God nor Man. In 
Conform ity to this Scheme, a contracted Brow, a lum pish  dow n­
cast Look, a sober sedate Pace, w ith both H ands dangling quiet 
and steddy in Lines exactly parallel to each Lateral Pocket of the 
Galligaskins, is Logic, M etaphysics and M athem atics in 
Perfection. So likewise the  Belles Lettres are typified by a 
Saunter in  the Gate, a Fall of one W ing of the Peruke backw ard, 
an Insertion of one H and in  the Fobb, and a negligent sw ing of 
the other, w ith a Pinch of righ t and  fine Barcelona betw een 
Finger and Thumb, a due Q uan tity  of the sam e upon  the  upper 
Lip, and a Noddle-Case loaden  w ith  Pulvil. (No. 518; 4:345)
Tweer's confidence is too great to allow  the reader to take him  seriously:
33 Bond notes that Addison probably wrote the other letter in this number, one that mourns the 
death of Sir Roger, since "the account of Sir Roger's death was published only on the preceding 
day" (4:342). (N o. 518 is dated Friday, 24 Oct. 1712.) Addison may also have written "Tom 
Tweer's" letter.
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concluding total reprobation  from  "the over-much Visibility and Pertness of 
one Ear"? Still, this is the  logical end of Mr. Spectator's line of thought, 
w hich replicates the dom inant culture 's, and to w hich no apparen t signs of 
irony are attached. T hat is, a lthough Mr. Spectator likely views w ith  ironic 
am usem ent Tw eer's certainty, T w eer's general line of argum ent essentially 
duplicates Mr. Spectator's own. Additionally, Tw eer's first, general point 
regarding "the O utw ard and the Inw ard Man," for exam ple, very closely 
resembles Mr. Spectator's unironic position. W ith some sligh t qualification, 
then, it seems safe to assert th a t for Addison and Steele, m anners reveal the 
man, which, again, is key to Sir Roger's being accepted as an eccentric 
exemplar.
Hence the em phasis on Sir Roger's odd bu t natural m anners; according 
to the sensibilities and assum ptions of A ugustan culture, C overley 's manners 
prove the special, unfeigned benevolence of his na tu ra l self. Addison 
recom mends such m anners in  No. 119, on the grounds th a t they are actually 
m ore fashionable now:
1 m ust observe a very  great Revolution that has happened  in 
this Article of Good Breeding. Several obliging Deferencies, 
Condescensions and  Subm issions, w ith m any ou tw ard  Forms 
and Ceremonies tha t accom pany them, were first of all brought 
up am ong the politer Part of M ankind who lived in  Courts and 
Cities . . . These Forms of Conversation by degrees m ultiplied 
and grew  troublesom e; the M odish W orld found too great a 
C onstraint in them , an d  have therefore th row n m ost of them  
aside. . . .  At present therefore an unconstrained Carriage, and a 
certain Openness of Behaviour are the height of G ood Breeding. 
(1:486-87)
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This w ould come as good news to the thousands of m iddle-class Spectator 
readers. "N atural" m anners w ould  be w ithin th e ir  m eans to adopt. The 
kinds of m anners A ddison describes here as be ing  rejected, on the other 
hand, require a lifetime of leisure to acquire. A nd  so Sir Roger recommends 
him self to a wide audience by shedding the inim itable, off-putting, "artificial" 
m anners of the upper classes.
In The Country and the City, Raymond W illiam s delineates sets of 
association, ideas people have historically linked, w h ich  are relevant to the 
passage above. O n the one side are the city, artificiality of manner, and 
general corruption. O n the other are the country, na tu ra lness of m anner, and 
honesty. Obviously Sir Roger, a country squire, represents the latter side. He 
describes himself as "so whim sical in a corrupt A ge as to act according to 
N ature and Reason" (No. 6; 1:29). Mr. Spectator records that the Knight is 
"unconfined to Modes and Forms," which "makes h im  bu t the readier and 
m ore capable to please and oblige all who know him ," and  while he "is very 
singular in  his Behaviour," "his Singularities proceed  from  his good Sense" 
(No. 2; 1:7). Mr. Spectator further observes that the K night possesses a '%lunt 
way of saying things, as they occur to his Im agination, w ithout regular 
Introduction, or Care to preserve the appearance of C hain of Thought" (No. 
109; 1:449); i.e., he speaks naturally, extem poraneously, and therefore,
obviously, honestly. A nd an anonym ous letter-w riter claim ing to have sat
near Sir Roger at the play in L o n d o n 3 4  calls the K nigh t's ingenuous responses 
such "as pure Nature suggested" (No. 338; 3:252).
Reason (that superficially resembles unreason), benevolence, natural 
m anners, and innocence all join, then, in the eccentric personality of Sir 
Roger. As Ketcham observes, in The Spectator A dd ison  and Steele "do not
34 A ddison or Steele wrote the letter. N o  one sat near Sir Roger a t the play.
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test conventions or test language in o rder to exam ine the ir inadequacies or 
h idden potentials. Instead, they create conventions w hich  will, in turn, 
create a self-confirm ing system  of values" (5). C entral to the prom ulgation of 
these conventions and  values is the positive exam ple of Sir Roger de 
Coverley. For better or worse, the "people in  the Spectator . . . served as 
dynam ic symbols of customs to endorse or reject" (Bloom and  Bloom 22), and 
this is m ost true of the starring character. One "R. 0 . ," 3 5  a correspondent in 
No. 424, w rites to Mr. Spectator, "your Friend . . . cannot therefore (1 m ean as 
to his dom estick Character) be too often recom m ended to the Im itation of 
others. H ow  am iable is that Affability and Benevolence w ith  w hich he treats 
his N eighbours, and  every one, even the m eanest of his ow n Family! And 
yet how seldom  im itated?" (No. 424; 3:590).
W hat w ere these conventions and values A dd ison  and  Steele were 
trying to solidify? "N aturalness" and benevolence, for tw o, as discussed 
above. For another—and as an extension of naturalness and  benevolence— 
freedom from political parties. To value one's alliance w ith  a party, an 
artificial construct associated with the corrup t c i ty  ,36 over general 
benevolence or particu lar friendships, w ould be "unnatu ra l,"  and certainly 
the opposite of benevolent. Sir Roger denounces the "M ischief that Parties 
do in the Country; how  they spoil good N eighbourhood, and  make honest 
Gentlemen hate one another" (No. 125; 1:509). Mr. Spectator frequently 
denounces parties for the sam e reasons. In his self-in troduction  in No. 1, he 
declares, "1 never espoused any Party w ith Violence, and  am  resolved to 
observe an exact N eutrality  between the Whigs and  Tories, unless 1 shall be 
forc'd to declare m y self by the Hostilities of either side" (1:5), and he
35 Steele w rote this num ber, w hich  "R. O /s"  letter entirely fills.
36 This is so despite the Tory party's connections w ith  the country, in  that Parliament and the 
Court convene in the d ty . See W illiams, The Country and the C ity  Chapter 5 on the 
association of city and governm ent/adm inistration.
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exemplifies that neutrality  throughout the entire paper. Sir Roger de 
Coverley and  Sir A ndrew  Freeport, too, m odel appropriate (i.e., neutral) party 
behavior. Despite the fact that they represen t (in both the political and  the 
symbolic senses of the word) T o ry /lan d ed  and W hig /trade  interests, 
respectively, 'T h is  H um our is so m oderate  in  each of them , th a t it proceeds 
no farther than  to an agreeable Raillery, w hich  very often d iverts the rest of 
the Club" (No. 126; 2:3). They never let their party  differences interfere w ith 
friendship and  good hum or; in fact, the  differences even add  to the social 
m irth and cohesion. A ddison proudly  declares (in Mr. Spectator's voice), 
"Among those A dvantages which the Publick m ay reap from  this Paper, it is 
not the least, that it d raw s Mens M inds off from  the Bitterness of Party, and 
furnishes them  w ith Subjects of D iscourse that may be trea ted  w ithout 
W armth or Passion" (No. 262; 2:519).37
1 d o n 't m ean to take all this disclaim ing of party affiliations at face 
value. Even an ideology that disclaims ideology is ideological in its ow n way: 
it implicitly critiques all opposing parties as blamefully "ideological," thereby 
dism issing all opposition to its ow n position. Besides, as Terry Eagleton 
observes, "Ideology, like halitosis, i s . . .  w hat the other person has" (2): people 
tend to find other  positions ideological, b u t not their own. Still, that The  
Spectator disclaims ideology is an im portan t point, one to be taken  cautiously 
at its ow n representation—because it em phasizes the ind iv idual, and
37 On the subject o f the Specta tor's  good effects. N o . 547 provides an interesting exam ple. There 
are printed several mock advertisements, ostensibly sen t in by readers, that extol the 
Spectator's curative effects. To g ive one example:
Remedium efficax & universum; or. An effectual Rem edy adapted to all 
Capacities; shew ing how  any Person m ay Cure him self of 111-Nature, Pride, 
Party-Spleen, or any other distem per incident to the Human System, w ith  an 
easie w ay to know w hen the Infection is upon him. This Panacea is as innocent 
as Bread, agreeable to the Taste, and requires no Confinement. It has not its 
Equal in the Universe, as abundance o f the N obility  and Gentry throughout the 
Kingdom have experienced.
N. B. N o Family ought to be w ithout it.
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individual sociability, over the party  and party  squabbling. This emphasis 
enables further the acceptance of the eccentric.
O ne last convention A ddison and Steele solidify by m eans of The 
Spectator is self-control. "R. O." (actually Steele) describes in  a letter to the 
paper a rem arkable, and rem arkably F o u c a u ld ia n ,3 8  institu tion  of self-control: 
[A] set of Company of m y Acquaintance, who are now  gone into 
the Country, and have the Use of an  absent N oblem an 's Seat, 
have settled  am ong them selves, to avoid  the Inconveniences [of 
fighting among themselves]. . . . [Tjhere is a large W ing of the 
House w hich they design to em ploy in the N ature  of an 
Infirm ary. W hoever says a peevish thing, or acts any  thing 
which betrays a Sowerness or Indisposition to Com pany, is 
im m ediately conveyed to his Cham bers in  the Infirm ary; from 
whence he is not to be relieved, till by his M anner of 
Subm ission, and the Sentim ents expressed in his Petition for 
that Purpose, he appears to the Majority of the Com pany to be 
again fit for Society. You are to understand, that all ill natured 
W ords or uneasy Gestures are sufficient Cause for Banishm ent; 
speaking im patiently to Servants, m aking a Man repeat w hat he 
says, or any thing that betrays Inattention or D ishum our, are also 
crim inal w ithout Reprieve: But it is provided , that w hoever 
observes the ill na tu red  Fit com ing upon him self, and 
voluntarily  retires, shall be received a t his Return from  the 
Infirm ary w ith  the highest M arks of Esteem. (No. 424; 3:592)
Correction is assum ed; self-correction is preferred. The offender is deemed 
not "fit for Society," and is separated from it, until his behavior qualifies
33 See particularly the section "Discipline" in Discipline and Punish.
60
under its stringent norm s. This is very much like the disciplinary form  of 
punishm ent, or d iscip linary  discourse, which Foucault show s in Discipline 
and Punish was at this tim e m aking great discursive gains. Later letters in 
Nos. 429 and 44039 offer stories of people who are volun tarily  committing 
themselves for cure: Thom as Sudden, Esq., who w ishes to be cured of arguing 
w ith  everyone; Frank Jolly, of his excessive hearty loudness; John Rhubarb, of 
his hypochondria; and  so on. The project meets w ith Mr. Spectator's am used 
approval.
The Spectator's valuation of self-control, along w ith the stress it lays 
upon sociability,
is p a rt of a larger m ovem ent of m anners in W estern Europe 
from the six teenth  to the eighteenth centuries, a m ovem ent 
which N orbert Elias has dubbed "the civilizing process." In this 
movement, there is an increase in the degree and  scope of self- 
restraint called for in a num ber of matters, w hich include . . .  our 
"behavior at table," our "attitude toward the natural functions," 
"blowing one's nose," and "spitting." (Leites 69)
The new emphasis on self-restraint reflects two related principles:
First, each of us is called upon to show an interest in  the well­
being of others by restraining the extent to w hich we m ake our 
bodies, our sm ells, our d irt, and more generally, our feelings, 
present to them. Second, we are called upon to reduce our self­
involvem ent, ou r concern w ith  our own bodies and  feelings, 
and increase ou r concern for, and interest in, w hat is of general 
value to the com pany of which we are a part. (Leites 69-70)
The Spectator as a w hole prom otes self-restraint. One of the prim ary means
39 Steele wrote N o. 429; A ddison, N o. 440.
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by which it does tha t is the example of Sir Roger de Coverley. H e both 
exemplifies self-restraint, and, w ithin his fictional w orld, enforces it.
One w ou ld  th ink  tha t eccentricity in  general is proof of the absence of 
self-restraint, the indulgence of odd personal whims. H ow ever, in  Sir 
Rogeirs case at least, he does in fact practice great self-control. For all the 
Knight's supposed  oddity , Steele specifies tha t "his Singularities proceed from 
his good Sense, and  are Contradictions to the M anners of the W orld, only as 
he thinks the W orld is in the wrong" (No. 2; 1:7). That is, he know s and 
controls his differences from  the norm , enacting  only those that have some 
social value. All of his departures from  social n o rm s-h is  benevolence, his 
sentim entality, his anachronism —m ust be acknow ledged as u ltim ately  in 
society's interest (as defined by A ddison and  Steele). Take as one brief 
exam ple his eccentric behavior in church: "Som etim es he w ill be lengthening  
ou t a Verse in  the Singing-Psalms half a M inute after the rest of the 
Congregation have done w ith it; som etim es, w hen  he is p leased w ith  the 
M atter of his D evotion, he pronounces A m e n  three or four times to the sam e 
Prayer" (No. 112; 1:461). First, the deviation from  the norm is of m inor scope 
and  consequence. Second, his eccentric responses seem to stem  from  an 
honorific naturalness and  depth  of feeling (see above); he says "A m en" extra 
times because he is especially moved by the serm on. Here is fu rther proof of 
his amiable sentim entality. To respond as he does sets an  exam ple of deep, 
spontaneous religious feeling that still stops w ell short of "enthusiasm ," 
w hich was anathem a to the dom inant cu lture of eighteenth-century  Britain. 
His eccentricity, then, ultim ately has a social end , strengthening the church.
This is an  im portan t point, for as A ddison  makes clear in  No. 576, 
"Singularity is laudable, when, in C ontradiction to a M ultitude, it adheres to 
the Dictates of Conscience, Morality, and H onour. . .  . Singularity in  Concerns
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of th is K ind is to be looked upon  as heroick Bravery, in  w hich  a M an leaves 
the Species only as he soars above it" (4:569). But as for those "who are 
rem arkable for their Singularity in  things of no Im portance, as in Dress, 
B ehaviour, Conversation, and  all the little Intercourses of Life": in  "these 
Cases there is a certain Deference due  to Custom; an d  no tw ithstanding  there 
m ay be a Colour of Reason to deviate from  the M ultitude in  some Particulars, 
a M an ought to sacrifice his private Inclinations and O pinions to the Practice 
of the Publick" (4:570). Eccentricity for its own sake, perform ed out of self- 
indulgence, has no value and  ought not to be practiced; one ought to follow 
the crow d in all but its "vicious" customs (e.g., p a rty  passion; overrefined, 
"u n n atu ra l"  m anners; insufficient benevolence). But there  is a distinction 
d raw n  betw een that kind of eccentricity and eccentricity like Sir Roger's, 
w hich deviates from  "im proper" customs for the good of society. Addison 
and  Steele suggest that the latter k ind, which requires discrim ination and 
self-restraint, ought to be encouraged.
A tendency of Sir Roger's that is perhaps m ore obvious than  his self- 
restra in t is his insistence upon that quality in others. His eccentricity is 
enabled by his upper-class status; m anners are changed from  the top down. 
O nly he is allowed to deviate from the standard: he "w ill suffer no Body to 
sleep in [church] besides himself; for if by chance he has been surprized  into a 
sho rt N ap at Sermon, upon recovering out of it he stands u p  and  looks about 
him , and  if he sees any Body else nodding, either w akes them  himself, or 
sends his Servant to them " (1:461). Generally speaking, "As Sir ROGER is 
Landlord to the whole Congregation, he keeps them  in  very  good O rder" (No. 
112; 1:461). "At his coming to his Estate he found his Parishioners very 
irregular" (1:460), but he systematically changed that. H e taugh t them  proper 
physical self-control, provid ing  the means to make it possible: "in order to
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m ake them  kneel an d  join in the Responses, he gave every one of them  a 
Hassock and a Com m on-prayer Book; and at the  sam e Time em ployed an 
itinerant Singing-M aster, who goes about the  C ountry for that Purpose, to 
instruct them  rightly  in the Times of the Psalm s" (1:460-61). D uring a service, 
writes Mr. Spectator, one John Matthews, w ho "is rem arkable for being an 
idle fellow," "was kicking his Heels for his D iversion"; "I was . . .  surprized to 
hear my old Friend, in the M idst of the Service, calling out to [him] to m ind 
w hat he was about, and  not disturb the Congregation" (1:461). Matthews does 
not show the proper degree of self-control, so Sir Roger corrects him. He 
keeps careful w atch over who attends: he "som etim es stands up  w hen every 
Body else is upon their Knees, to count the C ongregation, or see if any of his 
Tenants are m issing," and "every now and  th en  inquires how such an one's 
Wife or M other, o r Son, or Father do whom  he does not see at Church; which 
is understood as a secret Reprimand to the Person tha t is absent" (1:461). In 
short, he dem ands total self-control of his tenants: get yourself to the service, 
sit there quietly, kneel w hen you 're  supposed to, and  d o n 't sing out of tune.40 
Thus, A ddison  and Steele employ Sir Roger de Coverley in several 
im portant cultural functions. The K night registers the complexity of 
eighteenth-century responses to madness. A kind of Quixote Lite, he 
exemplifies a new state, eccentricity, in w hich both reason and limited, 
purposeful unreason can coexist. He em bodies the increasingly im portant 
value of sentim entality. A nd he models, an d  even m ore so, dem ands the 
kind of self-control central to the "civilized" society of the Enlightenment. In 
doing all this, by shedding the "artificial" m anners of the upper classes and
40 It is hard for us twentieth-century readers not to see the despotic aspect o f these demands. 
Veblen's acidic comments upon the subject of "devoutness" seem  relevant here: "[Tjhis devout 
attitude marks a type of human nature which is more in consonance with the predatory m ode of 
life . . .  It is in large m easure an expression of the archaic habitual sense of personal status—the 
relation of mastery and subservience" (216).
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supposedly revealing his "natural," good self, he appeals to a broad cross- 
section of society.
iii. Martinus Scriblerus, Cracked Head^i 
M artinus Scriblerus, on the other hand, represents a d a rk e r side of the 
Enlightenm ent—the unreason lingering  on despite the rage for reason. Sir 
Roger's eccentricity exemplifies a controlled unreason that is paradoxically 
more reasonable than reason; his deviations are for the betterm ent of society, 
which ultim ately makes them  acceptable to his reason-obsessed society. He 
produces a cultural space where being different means being especially good. 
The negative example of Scriblerus reinforces the sam e lim itations of 
eccentricity and  unreason that A ddison  and Steele w ould insist upon, but 
from the o ther side. That is, Scriblerus and  Coverley bear close resemblance 
in several im portan t respects. But Scriblerus's oddities push  h im  beyond the 
desirable space inhabited by the likes of Sir Roger, into the realm  of clearly 
ridiculous unreason. Addison and Steele's descriptions of Sir Roger (and of 
their social values) show that eccentricity is desirable i f  it is of a particular 
subtle, lim ited, socially constructive type. The Scriblerus C lub 's descriptions 
of M artinus Scriblerus make the sam e point negatively—they satirize a man 
gone too far into unreason, the opposite  of the ideal. The satire serves as a 
warning: d o n 't go this far.
The Memoirs o f  the Extraordinary Life, Works, and Discoveries of
41 The appellation comes from Foucault's M adness and C iviliza tion . In the chapter "The Great 
Fear," he cites Louis-Sébastien Mercier's description o f a puzzling eighteenth-century avatar 
of unreason: "very good p eop le . . .  w ho have warm  hearts, eager for the public good; but 
unfortunately they have cracked heads; that is, they are short-sighted, they do not know  
what century they are in, nor what men they are dealing with; more unbearable than idiots, 
because with pennies and false lights they start from an impossible principle and reason 
falsely therefrom" (201; emphasis in original). The description fits Scriblerus m ost aptly, as is 
discussed below.
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Martinus Scriblerus w ere the joint creation, beginning  in 1714,42 of several of 
the most politically and  literarily influential m en in  England: A lexander 
Pope; Jonathan Swift; Doctor John A rbuthnot, physician to Queen Anne; 
Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford and Mortimer, and  Lord Treasurer; Thomas 
Parnell; and John Gay. As Charles Kerby-Miller notes, it is impossible to 
decipher exactly w ho in the Club wrote or suggested which parts. John Cay, 
who acted as secretary for Club meetings, d id  not make attributions. Aside 
from  the them atic links betw een the M em oirs  an d  the Spectator, there were a 
num ber of other d irect ones. For instance. Swift had  been friends w ith  Steele 
and Addison, but sp lit w ith  them after joining the Tory party. By January 
1710/11, Swift was hatching a plan "to form a group of Tory wits that w ould 
eventually match in repu ta tion  and influence A ddison 's band of W hig 
writers" (Kerby-Miller 3); the plan had to be postponed, however, because the 
spectacular success of The Spectator p u t success in  such a rivalry out of reach. 
In 1713, Swift accepted Pope's proposal to form  the Scriblerus Club largely for 
just this reason, "the opportun ity  which Pope's schem es provided of w inning 
over Pope and his follow er Cay from their connections w ith  A ddison and 
Steele. If such a rising  young poet as Pope w ere to change his allegiance 
publicly, the balance of prestige in London literary circles w ould shift" (Kerby- 
Miller 22).
My point in tracing all these party  m achinations and  rivalries is that 
the eccentric, in add ition  to arising out of a b road  cultural need for the 
m adness/reason  dichotom y to be softened, also arose ou t of petty political 
bickering. The texts in  w hich appear Sir Roger de Coverley and M artinus 
Scriblerus, founding exam ples of the eccentric, w ere produced in significant 
part to outdo the political opposition. Eccentricity, then, has no holy, pure
42 For purposes of comparison. The Spectator ran from March 1 ,1710/11 through December 6, 
1712, then resumed between March 18 and December 17,1714.
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origin, as Foucault argues concepts never do; instead, eccentricity's origins are 
divisive, hostile, and  competitive.
Despite the party fighting, there are several interesting points of 
conjunction betw een the Scriblerus Club and The Spectator. For instance, in 
spite of his political and  personal differences w ith A ddison and Steele, Swift 
m ay have contributed to the Spectator: he most Ukely suggested the idea for 
No. 50 and w rote a paragraph of No. 575 (Bond, Spectator l;lvi). Parnell, who 
m aintained good relationships w ith  the Spectator's editors, w rote Nos. 460 
and 501, two frequently anthologized "dream -visions." Pope, w ho also had 
less anim us against the Spectator's editors than Swift, surely w rote parts of 
Nos. 378, 406, 532, and 527, and probably wrote Nos. 452 and 457 (Bond, 
Spectator Irxlviii). In No. 457, Pope introduced the p lan  of the Scriblerus 
Club:
[Tjhere are several A uthors in  France, Germany, and  Holland, as 
well as in  our own C ountry, w ho Publish every M onth, w hat 
they call A n  Account o f  the Works o f  the Learned, in  w hich they 
give us an Abstract of all such Books as are Printed in  any Part of 
Europe. Now, Sir [Mr. Spectator], it is my Design to Publish 
every M onth, A n A ccount o f  the Works o f  the Unlearned. 
Several late Productions of m y ow n Country-m en, w ho m any of 
them  m ake a very Em inent Figure in the Illiterate W orld, 
Encourage me in this U ndertaking. {Spectator 4:113-14)
"An Account of the Works of the U nlearned" pretty well describes the works 
later ascribed to Scriblerus, the best know n of which include Peri Bathos: O f  
the A r t  o f  Sinking in Poetry (1728); A n n u s  Mirabilis: Or, The Wonderful 
Effects o f  the approaching Conjunction o f  the Planets Jupiter, Mars, and 
Saturn  (1722); the M emoirs  (1741), of course; and best know n of all. Pope's
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Dunciad Variorum  (1729).
The Scriblerus Club form ed in 1714, m eeting on Saturdays w hen all the 
members w ere in London (which was by no m eans all the time). From the 
start they planned to ridicule into nonexistence all form s of unreason. The 
attack was to have three phases:
The principal w ork of the club was to be a full dress biography of 
their hero in w hich they would introduce him  to the public and 
lay the foundation for any future exploits they m ight devise. In 
addition, they plarm ed to publish a series of w orks by their hero 
either under his ow n name or under pseudonym s. And finally, 
as a sort of cream  of the jest, they proposed  from  time to time to 
claim as his w ork  various publications, discoveries, and projects 
advanced by others they wished to ridicule. (Kerby-Miller 29)
Like The Spectator, the putative works of Scriblerus w ere to engage directly 
w ith real social problem s; the authors hoped to change not merely taste but 
also society. The Scriblerians hoped by means of satire to create in readers a 
finer discrim ination of the ridiculous, the unreasonable:
By the double process of putting out apparently  serious works by 
their hero u n d e r his own name and o ther nam es, and at the 
same time claim ing for him  things actually done by real people, 
they planned further to obscure the already dubious line 
between authentic and spurious publications . . . [T]he critical 
would learn to scan every new production in the learned and 
literary w orld that seemed in any way ridiculous w ith  a skeptical 
eye, ready to charge it with being another w ork  by the mysterious 
Scriblerus. (Kerby-Miller 29-30)
The plan never w ent quite as draw n, however. The m ain  problem was the
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order of Scriblerus's works: w hereas the plan called for his biography first, to 
lay the foundation (or m ore accurately, to loosen it—to make readers more 
skeptical), in fact the M em oirs  w ere the last of the  Scriblerian works 
published. A lthough they w ere composed m ostly just after the Club's 
formation in 1714,43 they w ere first published  in Pope's Miscellanies in 1741, 
after his "drastic" editing ("w hat w e now have of the  M emoirs  is only a 
fraction of the materials p iled  up for it"—Kerby-Miller 78) and under Pope's 
name. W ithout the M em oirs  to introduce Scriblerus's ridiculous character 
before, for example. Peri Bathous (1728) or The Dunciad Variorum  (1729), the 
works attribu ted  to him  had  m uch less im pact th an  they m ight have. 
Readers had to infer from Scriblerian texts that Scriblerus's learning is a joke, 
which was not as easy for the C lub 's contemporaries as it is for us today.
This was the very reason Scriblerus was created—because "true" and 
"false learning," learning based upon sound reason, or not, and serving 
useful functions, or not, w ere hard  to tell apart. Science and pseudo-science 
tended to look equally bizarre or valid, depending up o n  one's view. "The 
im petus which produced the g rea t advance in science also gave rise to much 
that was useless and ridiculous. . . . New systems an d  theories based upon 
inadequate evidence and unsound  in reasoning w ere offered in a steady 
stream, while projectors, proprietors of magic nostrum s, and  quacks of many 
sorts im posed upon the public" (Kerby-Miller 34). But not only new ideas 
were suspect; in addition, "the  follies of a form er tim e continued to flourish 
with apparent health" (34). For instance:
43 The Memoirs took further shape in  three later periods: "the Pope-Arbuthnot-Gay revival in 
1716-18 ,... the second revival during and following Swift's visits [to England] in 1726 and 
1727" (Kerby-Miller 57), and Pope's editing in early 1741. Most o f the original brainstorming 
and compilation o f ideas took place in  1714; the later meetings m ostly revised and/or cut out 
the original material. I em phasize th is  point to em phasize the M em oirs' close 
contemporaneity and competition w ith  The Spectator, which in turn em phasizes the eccentric's 
divisive, chaotic origins.
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In the days of Q ueen Anne there still w ere  learned  m en w ho 
believed th a t the w orld  had declined since ancient times and  
that the m odem  could not hope to equal the wonders created 
d u ring  the you th  of m ankind . . . [T]he philosophy still being 
taugh t was A risto telian  logic and m etaphysics, though for m ore 
than a generation  there had  been a general recognition that this 
type of reasoning had become sterile; the sm all am ount of 
science being taugh t was Cartesian in character, though some of 
the m en th a t tau g h t it were them selves Newtonians; and  
classical learning was heavily burdened  by pedantry and 
antiquarianism . (34 )44  
As a rem edy for this general confusion, the Scriblerians concocted their 
scheme for m aking readers more critical. A  critical, skeptical reader w ould  be 
less likely to sw allow  unreason of any vintage.
To illustrate briefly the mélange of old an d  new, of cracked-headed and 
reasonable that prevailed  in early-eighteenth-century Great Britain: Sir Isaac 
Newton, au thor in 1687 of Principia Mathematica, spent much of his career 
searching for the ph ilosophers ' stone, the m eans of turn ing  base m etals to 
gold. W hereas now  we can easily laugh at the latter pursuit, to m any of his 
contem poraries the law  of gravity m ade just as little, or as much, com m on 
sense. In the sam e vein, a t the end of the seventeenth  century and beginning 
of the eighteenth, John Partridge published an annual almanac which offered 
vague. National Enquirer-like  predictions ostensibly based upon scientific 
observation of the positions of stars and planets. For example, for January 
1690, Partridge predicts, "At the New [Moon] there w ere no material Rays nor 
Positions, and  therefore 1 judge, that things are p reparing  for some"; for June
44 See the discussion above regarding how the Spectator's (and the dominant culture's) 
conception of the totally readable se lf reflects Cartesian science.
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of that year, "a Soldier for his Merit, receives considerable H onor and 
Preferment, bu t I think, he does not keep it w ithout som e Blemish by ill 
report; and  it is w ell if he do th  not deserve it too" (qtd. in M erlin i  6, 9). The 
almanac was so popular and w idely  trusted—partly because its vagueness, like 
that of tw entieth-century horoscopes, made a w ide varie ty  of eventualities 
seem to fit the predictions—th a t it d rew  several responses, both serious and 
satiric. For instance, the anonym ous pamphlet Merlini Liberati Errata, or, the 
Prophecies and Predictions o f  John Partridge, published in 1692, 
systematically attacks the alm anac's language (suggesting, e.g., that the 
accidentally violent phrase "run  the country through" be replaced by "run 
through the country"), astrological accuracy, predictive accuracy, and 
patriotism. U nder the nam e of Isaac Bickerstaff, Swift published no fewer 
than three pam phlets attacking Partridge: Predictions for the Year 1708, which 
satirically adopts Partridge's owm form to ridicule it, and predicts Partridge's 
death; The Accomplishment o f  the First o f  Mr. Bickerstaff's Predictions (1708), 
which reports the astrologer's death; and A Vindication o f  Isaac Bickerstaff 
(1709), which insists that w hatever Partridge himself m ight say, he is indeed 
dead. Such attacks attem pted  to caution a public which authors like Swift 
perceived to be too w illing to believe any "scientific" rep o r t.4 5
The same difficulty in  distinguishing the reasonable from the 
ridiculous existed in  the area we now call scholarship—editing and 
commenting upon texts. Some of the Scriblerians attacked w hat they saw  as 
quacks there, too, again  hoping  to instill reason and discrim ination in 
readers. Pope, for instance, aw arded Lewis Theobald the dubious distinction 
of King of the Dunces in the Dunciad (1729) and Dunciad Variorum  (1729), 
because "Tibbald" had published a heavily footnoted, m ore "scholarly"
45 See Book 3 of G ulliver's Travels for further, more wide-ranging attacks by Swift upon the 
new science.
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edition of Shakespeare's works after Pope's ow n appreciative edition 
appeared  in 1725. Pope's goal was to contribute to the appreciation of 
Shakespeare; Theobald's, to "restore" Shakespeare textually. Pope found that 
pedantic , countering w ith the Dunciad Variorum, w hich in  barbed jest was 
heavily  and  pedantically footnoted by M artinus Scriblerus. Similarly, Swift 
frequently  ridiculed the critic W illiam W otton, w ho published a serious- 
m inded, systematic explication of passages in  Swift's A Tale o f  a Tub. He also 
targeted  Richard Bentley, for overlooking the beauty  and m eaning of the 
Greek and  Roman classics in favor of m inutiae such as the D ig a m m a .4 6
This was the intellectual atm osphere into w hich the Scriblerus Club 
p lanned  to release their w eapon against unreason, M artinus Scriblerus. 
A gain, their scheme would have been even more effective had  they released 
the M em oirs  first, given the difficulty even a sophisticated, well-read person 
could easily have inferring Scriblerus's cracked-headedness only  from texts 
such as Peri Bathous. Other people praised Grub Street poetry; why should 
one not believe this praise was unironic? N evertheless, in the M em oirs  they 
created a character who took the worst from both w orlds, old learning and 
new , w ith  the plan of ridiculing into exile both forms of unreason.
Certainly Martinus Scriblerus's name conveys his ridiculous character. 
As Kerby-Miller writes, "Since [the Scriblerus Club's] hero was to be above all 
a 'scrib ler,' they chose a last name for him  by sim ply latinizing that much
46 Bentley proposed the former existence o f a Digamma, which resembled the m odem  English 
capital F, in  an attack upon Charles Boyle's 1695 edition of the letters o f Phalaris. Swift, 
am ong others, w as incredulous that Bentley could spend so much time and effort on meaningless 
scholarly/editorial concerns such as that at the cost of understanding and appreciating the 
w orks them selves.
B entley appears briefly in the Memoirs. The Club describes a nonsensical critical 
m eth o d —"assembling parallel sounds, either sy lla b les , or words, [which] m ight conduce to the 
Emendation and Correction of Ancient Authors" (129)—and then ascribes it to Bentley: 
"[Scriblerus's] Terence and Horace are in every body's hands, under the nam es of Richard B—  
ley, and Francis H[a]re. And w e have convincing proofs that the late Edition of Milton 
publish'd in the name of the former of these, w as in truth the Work o f no other than our 
Scriblerus" (129).
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used term  of contem pt, and  for a first nam e to m atch they selected that of Sir 
M artin Mar-All, the famous figure in D ryden 's comedy, whose amiable 
absurdities had  m ade 'S ir M artin' a com m on nam e for the comic blunderer" 
(30-31).47 M artinus Scriblerus: "he who m ars all and  writes worthless texts." 
The description fits.
Scriblerus possesses the flaws of Don Quixote and Sir Roger de 
Coverley w ith o u t their other redeem ing qualities. A pparently  the 
Scriblerians h ad  C ervantes's novel in m ind  w hen  they created Scriblerus; 
"Cervantes w as a favorite author of Swift and  probably of several other 
Scriblerians; and  there are some resem blances betw een the two works" 
(Kerby-Miller 69). To begin with, Scriblerus, like Quixote (and Sir Roger, and 
even Mr. Spectator), descends from a very old landed family. His father 
Cornelius Scriblerus "traced the ancient Pedigree of the Scribleri, w ith all 
their A lliances and  collateral Relations (am ong w hich w ere reckon'd 
Albertus M agnus, Paracelsus Bombastus, and  the famous Scaligers, in old 
time Princes of Verona) and deduced even from  the Times of the Elder Pliny 
to Cornelius Scriblerus" (95). As w ith Quixote and Sir Roger, M artinus's 
social position allow s him  the leisure, m oney, and  license to pursue his 
learning. But in  M artinus's case, the list of a n c e s to r s 4 8  is an em barrassm ent 
to people of reason, and it provides an indication early in the book of the 
unreason he inherits. Albertus M agnus, a m edieval alchemist, had claimed 
to observe the soul of a loadstone escaping, a claim ridiculed by A ddison in
47 The m ost com m only accepted explanation for the origin o f the name "Martinus" comes from 
S w iff s  letters to Stella: Oxford had been calling him  "Dr. Martin, because martin is a sort o f a 
swallow , and so  is a sw iff '  (cited in Kerby-Miller, 31). But as Kerby-Miller points out, "it does 
not seem  likely that the Scriblerians would resort to so  feeble a jest or that they w ould adopt 
any name w hich w ou ld  link Sw ift with their learned fool" (31). Martin Mar-All makes more 
sense as a model: he spoils all his own plans—e.g., to have M illisent, w hom  he is wooing, stay 
in his house w ith ou t his rival's or her father's know ledge—by forever speaking too freely to 
the wrong people.
48 This information about Scriblerus's ancestors com es from  Kerby-M illef s  amazingly thorough  
notes to the M emoirs.
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Spectator No. 56. Paracelsus Bombastus was a real person  despite  the name so 
fitting it looks like a joke; in the early sixteenth cen tu ry  Bombastus had 
boasted loud ly  of m aking gold, the eternal quest of alchem ists. The Scaligers, 
Julius C aesar and Josephe Juste, self-proclaimed descendants of the Della 
Scala fam ily of Verona, were as famous for their quickness to quarrel as for 
their learning. A nd the Elder Pliny, an incredibly pro lix  and  indefatigable 
author, d ied  as a result of his ow n scientific curiosity: he w an ted  to get a close 
look at M ount Vesuvius erup ting , and  did.
From  Cornelius him self M artinus imbibes a foolish  credulity  in the 
c la ss ic s .4 9  (M artinus learns foolish n ew  ideas on his ow n.) "Cornelius, it is 
certain, had  a m ost superstitious veneration for the A ncients; and if they 
contradicted each other, his Reason was so pliant an d  ductile, that he was 
always of the opinion of the last he read" (Memoirs 124). Cornelius accepts 
literally, for example, Galen's prescription of goat's m ilk and  honey for 
conceiving children; A ristotle 's recom m endation to copu la te  du rin g  westerly 
w inds if a m ale child was desired; and Pliny's conjecture that cauterizing the 
spleen w ou ld  im prove one's runn ing  speed. He d ru m s as m uch of this 
nonsense as he can into M artin 's head as the boy grow s up , lim ited only by 
his brother A lbertus Scriblerus, who "was a d iscreet m an, sober in his 
opinions, clear of Pedantry, and  know ing enough bo th  in  books and in the 
w orld, to p reserve a due regard for w hatever was useful o r excellent, whether 
ancient or m odern. If he had not always the authority, he had at least the art, 
to d ivert C ornelius from m any extravagancies" (113), includ ing  the plan to 
cauterize M artinus's spleen. If not for A lbertus's explicitly reasonable 
influence, M artinus w ould have becom e even m ore rid icu lous.
49 Veblen classifies learning, like hunting, manners, and devoutness, as a particularly leisure- 
class pursuit: "K nowledge for its ow n sake, the exercise of the faculty of com prehension without 
ulterior purpose, should, it might be expected, be sought by men [sic] w h o m  no urgent material 
interest diverts from such a quest" (247).
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M artinus's m other's side contributes m ore of the same cracked- 
headedness the father's side gives. She "was related  to Cardan on the father's 
side, and to A ldrovandus on the m other's: Besides which, her Ancestors had 
been professors of Physick, Astrology, or chem istry, in  German Universities, 
from generation to generation" (96). Jerome C ardan  was famous for w riting 
huge amounts and for stealing much of it. A ldrovandus, like the Elder Pliny, 
exhibited an incredible energy for gathering scientific knowledge; in The  
Battle o f  the Books, Swift refers to his massive, decades-consum ing volume 
on natural history as "A ldrovandus's Tomb." Astrology was suspect, as the 
discussion of Partridge above shows, and "chem istry" largely meant 
"alchemy," which was at least as suspect as astrology. O n both sides, then, 
M artinus's family tree bears several nuts. The inheritance of family traits, 
something upper-class families often boast about, is in M artinus's case the 
m ark of doom. He inherits the family traits, all r igh t—unfortunately for him.
Also like Quixote and Sir Roger, Scriblerus is sexually hapless. He 
even outdoes the other two in this way: w hereas Quixote mentally 
transforms a plain farm  girl into a haughty, ravishing princess, and Sir Roger 
carries a torch for the w idow  forty years running, Scriblerus falls in love w ith 
a side-show freak ,50  the "double mistress" L indam ira/ Indamora. Apparently 
she, or they, are w hat we would now call Siamese twins,5i but as far as 
Scriblerus could tell, she is one wom an w ith two heads. He loves just one of 
them, Lindamira. His scientific curiosity contributes greatly to his feelings: 
"For how much soever our M artin was enam our'd  on her as a beautiful
50 This is an interesting point, given the fascination with freaks and the connection between  
freaks and eccentricity o f the early 1800s. See Chapter 4.
51 To settle the legal question of whether she was one w om an or two, which would settle the 
question of whether or not Scriblerus's marriage to her/them  constituted bigamy, a group of 
women w as appointed to make a physical examination. 'T he Jury o f Matrons having made 
their Report, and it appearing from thence that the Parts of Generation in Lindamira and 
Indamora were distinct" (162), they were pronounced two w om en joined.
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Woman, he w as infinitely m ore rav ish 'd  with her as a charm ing Monster" 
(146-47). Alas for Martinus, he never gets to enjoy her physical charms, about 
which (the charms) he rhapsodizes, "[H]ow 1 w onder at the Stupidity of 
m ankind, who can affix the opprobrious Name of M onstrosity to w hat is only 
Variety of Beauty, and a Profusion of generous N ature? If there are charms 
in one face, one mouth, one body; if there are charms in two eyes, two breasts, 
two arms; are they not all redoubled in  the Object of m y Passion?" (147). He 
marries Lindamira, but Mr. Randal, the sideshow 's m anager, has the pygmy 
Black Prince m arried to Indam ora "w hile her Sister w as asleep" (155). Then 
the Black Prince disputes the legality of Scriblerus's m arriage in  court, on the 
grounds that it is bigamy or adultery. Ultimately the m arriage is annulled, 
never having been consummated, "as proceeding upon  a natural, as well as 
legal A bsurdity" (163). Scriblerus, like Coverley and Quixote, then remains a 
virgin all his life.
Scriblerus's sexual m isadventures do much to reveal w hat is w rong 
with his singularity as the Scriblerus Club w ould have it. Sir Roger's 
haplessness is at the root of his fine qualities; his inability to speak his desire 
shows his heart to be good and pure, and  the resulting disappointm ent makes 
him even better—kinder, more forgiving and benevolent. Scriblerus's case is 
very different. His desire is as grotesque as its object—"he was infinitely more 
ravish 'd  w ith her as a charm ing M onster"—and he has no trouble speaking it. 
This indicates a bizarre, kinky lewdness: w hat kind of m an is turned on by a 
monster, and says so? In contrast w ith the case of Sir Roger, his 
disappointm ent does not redeem  this quality. He dem onstrates none of Sir 
Roger's com pensatory sentim entality. In fact, he has m uch the opposite 
reaction: "perhaps his D isappointm ent gave him also a Dis-inclination to the 
Fair Sex, for whom  on some occasions he does not express all the Respect and
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A dm iration possible" (164). Instead he sublim ates his desire into fu rther 
projects of bogus learning:
A nd here it seem s b u t natural to lam ent the unfortunate End of 
the A m our of our Philosopher. B ut the  H istorian  of these 
Memoirs on the contrary cries out, "H appy, thrice happy day! 
celebrated in every language, learned and  u n lea rn ed !. . .  since to 
this w e owe such immense discoveries, not only of Oceans, 
Continents, Islands, w ith all their Inhabitants, m inute, gigantick, 
m ortal and  im m ortal, but those y e t m ore enlarged and 
astonishing Views, of worlds philosophical, physical, moral, 
intelligible and unintelligible!" (166)52 
True, his intentions are good: "under this m acerated form  [Scriblerus's] w as 
concealed a M ind replete w ith Science, burn ing  w ith  a Zeal of benefiting his 
fellow-creatures, and  filled w ith an honest conscious Pride, mixt w ith  a scorn 
of doing or suffering the least thing beneath the d ignity  of a Philosopher" 
(91). But his studies, the sublim ated form of his w arped  desires, have no 
reason in them . The Scriblerus Club makes the projects' ridiculous nature  
unm istakable by grouping them  all together to fill the M em oirs' last chapter; 
the sheer bulk of nutty ideas, of scientific w ild  goose chases, makes it p lain  
even to the m ost obstinate virtuoso that Scriblerus's learning is not in the  
least based upon reason. Scriblerus, unlike Sir Roger, is obviously daft. A  
few examples of his discoveries:
[Tjhis Prodigy of our Age . . .  by a Sagacity peculiar to him self,. .  . 
hath discover'd Effects in their very Cause . . .
He hath enrich 'd  Mathematics w ith  m any precise and
52The references to "immense discoveries" and "their Inhabitants" are to the people and 
places of G u lliver's Travels, one of many works attributed to Scriblerus in the Memoirs. Others 
include A M odest Proposal and the Dunciad Variorum  (w hich w as attributed to Scriblerus 
when it w as published).
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G eom etrical Quadratures of the Circle. He first discover'd the 
Cause  of G r a v i t y and the intestine M otion  o i  F lu id s .. . .
He it w as, tha t first found out the Palpability of Colours; and by 
the  delicacy of his Touch, could d istingu ish  the different 
V ibrations of the  heterogeneous Rays of Light.
H is w ere the Projects of Perpetuum Mobiles, Flying Engines, and 
Pacing Saddles; the Method of discovering the Longitude  by 
Bomb-Vessels, and  of increasing the Trade-W ind  by vast 
p lan tations of Reeds  and Sedges. (166-67; em phases in  original)
His pu tative  w orks, similarly, are the productions of an obviously cracked 
head: for exam ple, "A complete Digest of the Laws of N ature, w ith a Review 
of those th a t are obsolete or repealed, and of those that are ready to be renew 'd 
and p u t in  force" (167)—as if "natural law" operated like British civil law.54
Scriblerus, then, proves just as hapless sexually as Quixote or Coverley, 
but w ith  none of their associated redeem ing qualities. In both direct and 
sublim ated forms, Scriblerus's desire show s him  to be odd in an 
unreasonable, undesirable way. The "Sagacity peculiar to himself" truly is, in 
the m odern  pejorative sense of the w ord, peculiar. To add  one final insult: 
Scriblerus even looks like the Don, looks being one of Quixote's least 
attractive attributes: "by the Gravity of his D eportm ent and Habit, [he] was 
generally taken for a decay'd Gentleman of Spain. His stature was tall, his 
visage long, his complexion olive, his brows w ere black and even, his eyes 
hollow yet piercing, his nose inclin'd to aquiline, his beard neglected and 
mix'd w ith  grey" (M emoirs  91).
53 The joke here is that even  Newton never claimed to understand the cause o f  gravity—only its  
existence and operation. Finding the cause of gravity w as in the Club's time the equivalent of 
finding the philosophers' stone, or the perpetual-motion m achine (w hich the Club also 
credited Scriblerus w ith discovering).
54 See Chapter 4  fora further discussion of the concept of natural law.
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Thus Scriblerus closely resembles both Don Q uixote and Sir Roger de 
Coverley. Scriblerus, however, is in im portant ways Q uixote's and  Coverley's 
opposite. He is a "darkened m irror" of the Enlightenm ent, "a sort of double 
in which it both recognized and revoked itself" (Foucault, M adness  201,202)— 
recognized the potential cracked-headedness of its new  paradigm s of reason; 
revoked the unreason that lived on despite British society 's m ost strenuous 
efforts. Scriblerus represents the other side of limits em bodied by the two 
Knights. His double likeness and unlikeness to them  reinforces the 
argum ent m ade above: in the first half of the British eighteenth century, 
eccentricity was not generally valued for its ow n sake. Scriblerus's eccentricity 
was clearly not to be valued, for it had gone too far. H ow ever, Sir Roger's was 
to be valued, because it was cast as a consciously lim ited, self-controlled, 
socially beneficial form  of unreason practiced by a generally sym pathetic 
upper-class man w ho also insisted upon others' self-control. By the 
principles of the Cartesian science still dom inant a t the tim e. Sir Roger's true 
self was assumed to be plainly visible, and its readily, reassuringly apparent 
benevolence and sentim entality more than com pensated for its oddity. 
Under these very lim ited terms, eccentricity was adm itted  to British society as 
a third option to the w idely insisted-upon yet notoriously difficult-to-place 
binary of reason and m adness.
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Eccentricity as Disease and Cure 
i. Colley Cibber's Apology: N ot Accepted 
D uring the second half of the eighteenth century—or m ore precisely, 
after 1740—British society fundam entally changed the w ay it view ed m adness, 
reason, and w hat lay between, eccentricity. The passage of one law, the 
Vagrant Act of 1744, signifies m uch in this regard. As Roger A lan 
HambridgeSS explains, the Act of 1744 mostly restated that of 1714, w hich had  
provided that "'furiously m ad, and  dangerous' lunatics" could be "safely 
locked up, in such secure place...as . . .  justices shall...direct and  appoint" (406), 
at the expense of m adfolks' home parish. The new  Act, however, added a 
provision for treatm ent; previously  people thus confined w ere offered no 
treatm ent but w o r k .5 6  The goal had  been prim arily to h ide them  from the 
horrified eye of civilized society—except during Sunday visits. Treatm ent, 
though, im plies that "cure" or im provem ent is w idely thought possible, and  
it indicates a grow ing conception of madness as disease. Disease, as opposed 
to folly, is essentially blameless. Also, the concepts of disease and cure im ply 
gradations of m adness and sanity—a continuum  or spectrum  rather than  a 
binary. The Vagrant Act of 1744 indicates that even then  the lim inal cultural 
space inhabited by the eccentric w as expanding.
But this is not to say that the change occurred as quickly o r dram atically 
as the passage of one law. Early-eighteenth-century conceptions of m adness, 
reason, and eccentricity did not disappear without debate and outrage. Early 
in the century the rage for reason was such that Pope and Swift could say all
55 H is Appendix V: "Lunacy, Legality, and Private Madhouses in the Eighteenth Century" 
explains the legislation relevant to confinem ent for madness in detail.
56 See Foucault's discussion o f the use of labor as treatment or salvation in the "Great 
Confinement" chapter of Madness and C iviliza tion , 38-64. In V isits  to Bedlam, Max Byrd 
points out that in Pope's im itations of Horace, he associates m adness w ith  w illful idleness, and  
that the logical "treatment" of the tim e w as to put the mad to work.
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England w as m ad and  confidently expect a grave nod in response. The 
Scriblerus C lub could count upon the autom atic satiric rejection of its folly- 
ridden  eponym ous antihero. Don Quixote, the half-m ad-half-sane direct 
ancestor of the  British eccentric, was rarely "anything other than  a figure of 
mockery or, a t best, a symbol of w rongheadedness in general" (Tave 154). 
Ideas so firm ly entrenched could only be changed w ith time and effort—like 
the effort A dd ison  and Steele exerted to m ake their quixotic hero Sir Roger de 
Coverley lovable and  not merely ridiculous. They kept Q uixote's uper-class 
status, w hich licensed his oddity socially, b u t converted the D on's elaborate 
m adness to laudab le  "naturalness" of m anner and  sentim ental benevolence; 
emphasized Sir Roger's self-control; and  app lauded  his ability to get along 
w ith people of all classes and political parties—in short, valued his good heart 
despite his m udd led  head. To the tw entieth-century reader Sir Roger's head 
seems scarcely m uddled  at all, bu t the A ugustan standard  for reason was 
more absolute. Any deviation w hatever w as considered w illful (and 
therefore self-correctable) folly or m adness, two essentially interchangeable 
terms. Sir Roger's w idely beloved oddity  may have helped change this 
conception, b u t not dramatically. Not yet.
A n Apology for the Life o f Colley Cibber, published in 1740, challenges 
the Augustan conception more directly and  totally. Cibber's autobiography 
registers g row ing  discontent w ith that understand ing  of m adness and the 
se lf-a  discontent that took legal form  in the Vagrant Act of 1744—and 
dem ands a new  understanding, a b roader tolerance of m adness and 
singularity. By 1740 Cibber was very m uch a figure of the establishment: 
seventy-two years old, he was a retired popular playw right and theatrical 
m anager who had, after decades of struggle, at last experienced financial 
success. As poet, he had been the royally appointed Poet Laureate for ten
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years, du tifu lly  cranking out odes upon  the king's b irthday  and  similar 
occasions. H e therefore had  im m ense popular, royal, and  cu ltu ral authority, 
which w as reflected in  the sales of his book: despite its high price of a guinea, 
it sold ou t w ith in  a few  weeks. A  new  edition  costing five shillings appeared 
soon afterw ards. C ibber him self m ade fifteen hundred  pounds from  the 
Apology  in  its first year alone.
Given C ibber's popularity  and authority , his attack up o n  the prevailing 
understanding  of folly and  singularity carried considerable weight. And 
because the attack did carry so much weight. Fielding and Pope m ade attacks 
upon C ibber that are now  better know n than  w hat they attacked. In The 
Dunciad in Four Books (1742) Pope famously dethrones Theobald (Tibbald) as 
King of the D unces and replaces him w ith the Laureate. In the  Preface to the 
Dunciad, speak ing  in  the voice of M artinus Scriblerus, Pope ironically praises 
Cibber's vanity, as proof of laudable self-sufficiency; his bravery, for 
em bracing his ow n follies; and his love, for keeping a w hore. Pope supports 
all these attacks w ith  direct quotes from  the Apology, using  Cibber's own 
w ords against him  (as he had used other w riters ' words against them  in the 
Dunciad Variorum). Fielding characteristically satirizes C ibber's Apology  
more subtly and indirectly. In Chapter 1 of Joseph A ndrew s  (1742), he 
ironically lists the Apology  as "an adm irable Pattern of the  Am iable" in a 
m an (Sam uel R ichardson 's Pamela was his pa ttern  for a w om an), observing 
sardonically, "The form er of these which deals in  M ale-Virtue, w as w ritten by 
the great Person himself, who lived the Life he hath  recorded, and  is by many 
thought to have lived  such a Life only in  o rder to write it" (16). Then, much 
in  the vein of Pope, Fielding critiques by mock applause:
H ow  artfu lly  do th  the former, by insinuating that he escaped 
being prom oted  to the highest Stations in Church and  State,
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teach us a C ontem pt of w orldly  Grandeur! how  strongly doth he 
inculcate an absolute Submission to our Superiors! Lastly, how 
completely doth he arm us against so uneasy, so wretched a 
Passion as the Fear of Shame; how clearly do th  he expose the 
Emptiness and V anity of that Fantom, Reputation! (16)
Even seven years later, C ibber's Apology  stuck in  his craw  enough to prom pt 
Fielding to specify that Tom Jones was "a history, and not a life; nor an 
apology for a life, as is m ore in  fashion" (2.1; 87).
What was all the fuss about? One characteristic passage from the 
book's earliest pages should  show several ways in which Cibber directly 
challenged and so offended the dom inant culture.
Now the Follies 1 frankly confess, 1 look upon  as, in some 
measure, discharged; while those 1 conceal are still keeping the 
Account open betw een me and my Conscience. To me the 
Fatigue of being upon  a continual G uard to h ide them , is more 
than the Reputation of being w ithout them  can repay. If this be 
W eakness, défendit num erus,  I have such com fortable Numbers 
on my side, that w ere all Men to blush, that are not Wise, 1 am 
afraid, in Ten, N ine Parts of the W orld ought to be out of 
Countenance: But since that sort of Modesty is w hat they don't 
care to come into, w hy should 1 be afraid of being star'd  at, for 
not being particular? Or if the Particularity57 lies in  ow ning my 
Weakness, will m y w isest Reader be so inhum an as not to 
pardon it? But if there should  be such a one, let me, at least, beg 
him to shew  me th a t strange Man, who is perfect! Is any one
57 N ote Cibber's play on the w ord "particular." In the phrase "not being particular," he means 
"not being ashamed or backward" about his shortcomings. In the next phrase, "Particularity" 
means "difference," "oddity" or even, to stretch a bit, "eccentricity."
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more unhappy , m ore ridiculous, than  he w ho is always laboring 
to be though t so, or that is im patient, w hen  he is not thought 
so? (5-6)
Here (as in the book at large) Cibber specifically defends folly, by name. Recall 
that the "equation of m adness with folly had, of course, been a staple of satire 
since the tim e of A ristophanes; but satirists in  the eighteenth century came to 
exploit the Stoic parado j^s w ith special vehem ence and ingenuity" (De Porte 
55). Swift and  Pope, am ong others, had  claim ed in  their satires that everyone, 
or virtually everyone, is m ad /g iven  over to folly, which for them  was a self- 
evidently bad  thing. Pope saw in folly the horror of encroaching darkness, 
the awful im age w ith  w hich he ended all versions of the Dunciad. "But we 
must try  no t to be m ad," concluded their line of thought. Cibber, however, 
uses the very universality  of folly and the difficulty of fighting it that earlier 
writers deplored, to defend  his own. Instead of saying that everyone has 
follies and it's a sham e, he claims that everyone has follies so there 's no 
reason he shou ldn 't.
Closely tied  to this defense of folly is C ibber's subtle changing of the 
terms by which folly is discussed and understood. "If this be weakness," he 
writes, then défendit numerus. Not to forgive this "weakness" w ould be 
"inhuman." Syntax suggests that "this" refers to his finding the effort of 
hiding follies m ore difficult than rew arding. But the next phrase suggests 
that "this" means possessing the follies in  the first place: "were all Men to 
blush, that are no t Wise" only one in ten  could hold up their heads. To 
betray folly (or just to possess it) is not necessarily to be mad, it is merely not 
to be wise. Later in  the passage he rem oves the concept of folly even further
58 N am ely, that "knaves and fools are mad, because every deviation from reason is a deviation  
into madness" (De Porte 55). For the British Augustans as for the classic authors they 
consciously emulated, m adness = indulgence of passion =  imperfect reason.
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from the concept of madness: "shew  m e /' he dem ands rhetorically, "that 
strange Man, w ho is perfect!" No one is, he indicates, and  no one is "more 
unhappy, [and] m ore ridiculous" than  one "who is always laboring to be 
thought so, or tha t is im patient, w hen  he is not thought so." This sally 
conflates folly w ith  imperfection, w hile deflating the seriousness and 
possibility of achieving perfection. T aken w ith  his earlier reference to the 
unrew arding effort of hiding follies, the total effect is to suggest that a) 
everyone possesses and attempts to h ide  follies (i.e., imperfections) and 
thereby appear perfect; b) to hide them  takes effort; c) the effort is not w orth it, 
for it may fail and  if perceived will m ake one appear hypocritical and 
ridiculous. Just in  the brief space of this passage, then, Cibber shifts folly all 
the way from som ething awful to rem ove by self-correction to a k ind  of badge 
of honesty and norm alcy—a long w ay from  m adness.
This take on folly suggests a very different view  of the self from  that 
evident in the Spectator. Addison and  Steele posited a transparent self that is 
thoroughly visible in both physical appearance (e.g., "the over-m uch 
Visibility and Pertness of one Ear") and action (Sir Roger's generosity); 
goodness or badness w ill out. C ibber holds ou t the possibility of unknown, 
unseeable dep ths—those follies/im perfections the great mass of people 
conceal. Insofar as h id ing  one's follies is possible—and Cibber claims only that 
it is unrew arding , not impossible—one can dissem ble one's very self. "And 
now you will say, the W orld will find me, under my own H and, a weaker 
Man than perhaps 1 m ay have p ass 'd  for, even am ong my Enemies," he 
writes (Apology  5). W ithout confession his true self w ould lie h idden ; even 
those m ost concerned w ith descrying his faults could not see them . The 
performative quality of Cibber's life is only a professional exaggeration of 
everyone's circum stances—i.e., that everyone's public self is to some degree a
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w illed perform ance. He writes of himself, "A M an w ho has pass 'd  above 
Forty Years of his Life upon  a Theatre, where he has never appear'd  to be 
Himself, m ay have naturally  excited the Curiosity of his Spectators to know 
w hat he really was, w hen in  no body's Shape but his ow n" (6). The Tryal of  
Colley Cibber, a 1740 pam phlet attacking Cibber's A pology  to which H enry 
Fielding m ay have contributed, responds, "tho ' some im agined  it w ould be 
confined only to the Theatre, yet certain it is that this valuable Work hath 
much greater Matters in View, and may as properly be stiled  an Apology for 
the Life of One Who ha th  played a very comical Part, w hich, tho ' Theatrical 
hath been acted on a m uch larger Stage than Drury-Lane" (qtd. in Fone xix).
In The History o f  Sexuality, Volume I, Foucault argues, "Since the 
M iddle Ages at least. W estern societies have established the  confession as one 
of the m ain rituals we rely on for the production of tru th "  (58). "[0]ne
confesses one's crimes, one 's sins, one's thoughts and desires, one's illnesses 
and troubles; one goes abou t telling, with the greatest precision, whatever is 
most difficult to te l l . . . .  O ne confesses—or is forced to con fess .. . .  [I]t is driven 
from its h iding place in the soul, or extracted from the body" (59). By 
revealing these h idden  caches of shameful tru th  to an au tho rity  we "come 
clean," as in the Catholic sacram ent of confession or on the couch of 
psychoanalysis. We feel relief, believing we have fulfilled the natural urge of 
revealing the w orst about ourselves, the repressed, the secret.
The obligation to confess is now relayed th rough  so many 
different points, is so deeply ingrained in us, tha t w e no longer 
perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us; on the 
contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged in ou r m ost secret 
nature, "dem ands" only to surface; that if it fails to do so, this is 
because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power
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weighs it dow n, and it can finally be articulated only at the price 
of a kind of liberation. (60)
However, Foucault argues, this urge to confess is no t  an inherent, natural, 
liberating urge; rather, the need to confess and the m ateria l we believe we 
m u s t  confess are produced as complementary parts of the same discourse. 
The concept of confession dem ands the concept of tha t which is confessed; 
the presum ption that the hidden exists and m ust be revealed produces the 
hidden.
Cibber's Apology  clearly illustrates Foucault's thesis. Cibber professes 
happiness at the thought of subjecting himself to readers ' authoritative gaze: 
"I am content to be gaz'd  at, as I am, w ithout lessening m y Respect, for those, 
whose Passions m ay be more soberly cover'd" (3). As confessor, he does not 
"soberly cover his Passions"; he submits them  to the scrutiny of those who, as 
spectators, do not in  tu rn  reveal themselves. Confession—in the form  of the 
Apology—seem s only natural: "But why m ake m y Follies publick? Why 
not?" (5). "[W ]hy should I scruple (when it is so easy a Matter too) to gratify 
their [readers'] particular Taste, by venturing upon  any Error, that I like, or 
the W eakness of m y Judgm ent misleads me to comm it?" (286). By the rules 
of confessional discourse, only through total revelation can Cibber show  an 
accurate and complete picture of himself and thereby achieve absolution. He 
writes:
[W jhether flat or spirited, new or common, false or true, righ t or 
wrong, [my reflections] will be still my own, and consequently 
like me; I w ill therfore [sic] boldly go on; for I am  only oblig'd to 
give you m y ow n ,  and not a good Picture, to shew  as well the 
W eakness, as the Strength of my U nderstanding. . . .  At w orst, 
tho' the Im partial may be tir'd , the 111-natur'd (no small num ber)
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I know will see the bottom  of me. (10)
'T h e  bottom" here has two m eanings: "all," as in "getting to the bottom  of 
things," and "the worst," as in  "the bottom of the barrel." Note, too, Cibber's 
use of the word "oblig'd": he feels obliged to show his bad side, just as 
Foucault argues we feel obliged to confess—even if the obligation seems to 
come from  inside rather than out.
Cibber is well aware, even joyous, that confessing makes him self look 
worse; he exclaims, "W ith all m y Heart! my Enemies w ill then read  m e w ith 
Pleasure, and you, perhaps, w ith  Envy, w hen you find that Follies, w ithout 
the Reproach of Guilt upon them , are not inconsistent w ith  H appiness" (5). 
In this sentence Cibber suggests that it is the guilty repression of folly, rather 
than folly itself, that is "inconsistent w ith  Happiness." W ithout our h iding 
follies and attaching to them  "the Reproach of G uilt"—w ithout relegating 
them  to the realm  of secret tru th  w hich m ust be confessed—they w ould cause 
no pain. In fact, he claims, everyone w ould be happier if they w ere only as 
revelatory and unrepressed as he:
Nay, there are some frank enough to confess,59 they envy w hat 
they laugh at; and w hen I have seen others, whose Rank and 
fortune have laid a sort of Restraint upon their Liberty of 
pleasing their Company, by pleasing themselves, I have said 
softly to myself,—  Well, there is some A dvantage in having 
neither Rank nor Fortune!60 (15-16)
W hat Foucault writes regarding our understanding of "sexuality," Cibber
59 N ote Cibber's use of this word to describe a generally secret, unacknowledged, shameful 
feeling shared by many.
60 Here is an interesting reversal of the usual license granted by aristocracy. Eccentrics such as 
Sir Roger de Coverley and the Shandy m en indulge their singularities under the financial and  
cultural protection of their status. Cibber claims to indulge his singularity under the protection 
of having no money or status to lose. O f course, Cibber greatly exaggerates his lack of access to 
money and power—he w as Poet Laureate w hen he wrote the paragraph dted, for starters.
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w rites regarding folly: w e w ould  "naturally" like to confess these secrets but 
w e repress them for fear of society's disapproval. A nd that which is repressed 
seem s like natural desire  unfulfilled; therefore, confession m ay make us look 
worse but feel better.
A long these lines—the ostensible naturalness and  liberation of 
indulg ing  folly—Cibber continues: "he that does not chuse to live his own 
way, suffers others to chuse for him. Give me the Joy 1 alw ays took in the end 
of an old Song, M y M ind , m y M ind is a Kingdom to me! If 1 can please 
m yself w ith  my ow n Follies, have 1 not a p len tifu l Provision for Life?" (16). 
This passage makes p lain  w hat lies implicit in all of C ibber's defense of folly: 
that the authority of the inner, the private, is to be valued  over the authority 
of the public. One rules the  kingdom  of one's ow n m ind; one is ruled in 
public. So what if the public objects? It is the private  th a t m atters most. Here 
is a profound challenge to the A ugustan preference for public consensus over 
p rivate  enthusiasm s.
Again, though, C ibber justifies the subjective on the grounds of its 
naturalness. "If 1 am  m isguided," he believes, " 'tis N ature 's Fault, and 1 
follow her, from this Persuasion; That as N a tu re  has d istinguish 'd  our 
Species from the m ute Creation, by our Risibility, he r Design m ust have been, 
by that Faculty, as evidently to raise our Happiness, as by our Os Sublime (our 
erected Faces) to lift the D ignity of our Form above them " (20). Folly is 
natural, even biologically determ ined. One cannot cast off one's follies, as 
A ugustan society had presum ed: "1 can no m ore p u t off my Follies, than my 
Skin; I have often try 'd , b u t they stick too close to m e" (15), Cibber claims. If 
this is so, then to confess folly is merely to acknow ledge one's true nature. It 
is society w ith its dem and th a t one repress folly th a t is unnatural. This is a 
later, som ewhat expanded  version of A ddison  and  Steele's argum ent
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regarding Sir Roger de Coverley's manners: those, too, were "natu ra l"—not 
strictly conventional, an d  in  their very unconventionality, constant p roo f of 
his unaffected, instinctive, natural benevolence. O n such grounds, folly even 
becomes a source of pride: "I own m yself incorrigible: I look upon m y Follies 
as the best p a rt of m y Fortune, and am  more concern 'd  to be a good H usband 
of Them, than  of T hat" (Apology  16).
W hat C ibber's alleged follies are hard ly  matters; in fact, I w ould 
challenge anyone w ho has read the Apology  to state from memory precisely 
w hat they are. (Most of the book covers the subject described in the subtitle: 
"With an Historical View of the Stage D uring  His Own Time." C ibber's 
defense of folly appears almost solely in the first chapter, as a k ind  of 
warning.) Still, just to clarify exactly w hat it is Cibber so strenuously defends, 
this is really his only specific statem ent on tha t subject:
[E]ven [at school] I remember I was the same inconsistent 
C reature I have been ever since! alw ays in full Spirits, in som e 
small Capacity to do right, but in a m ore frequent Alacrity to do 
wrong; and consequently often under a worse Character than  I 
wholly deserv 'd: A giddy Negligence always possess'd me . . .
And (w hatever Shame it may be to ow n it) 1 have observ'd the 
same odd  Fate has frequently a ttended the course of my later 
C onduct in  Life. The unskilful openness, or in p lain  Terms, the 
Indiscretion I have always acted w ith from  my Youth, has d raw n 
more ill-w ill tow ard  me, than Men of worse Morals and m ore 
Wit m ight have m et with. My Ignorance, and w ant of Jealousy 
of M ankind has been so strong, that it is w ith  Reluctance 1 even 
yet believe any Person, 1 am acquainted w ith, can be capable of 
Envy, Malice, or Ingratitude: (9)
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The elements of confessional discourse delineated above are here: the secret 
self different from the public self ("a worse C haracter than I wholly 
deserv 'd"); the sham e and compulsion associated w ith  revealing all 
("w hatever Shame it m ay be to own it"); the perceived repression from 
w ithout ("unskillful openness . . .  has d ra w n . . .  ill-w ill tow ard  me").
Boiled down, Cibber's folliesGi are really one folly, essentially the same 
one afflicting Sir Roger: he is too natural and benevolent for this world. He 
will  speak his mind,62 and he w ill not believe ill of his friends. Throughout 
the book he em phasizes this quality; he is determ ined "we see Cibber the 
wise, Cibber the generous, Cibber the patient. W hether he is quite literally 
giving the shirt off his back, or making up a deficit ou t of his pocket" (Fone 
xxii), his natural benevolence takes center stage.63 M uch like Addison and 
Steele did w ith Sir Roger (and the Scriblerus Club pointedly  d id  not do w ith 
M artinus Scriblerus), Cibber gives his "particularity" the sanction of excessive 
goodness. He legitimizes eccentricity by m aking the eccentric—himself, in this 
case—not only different bu t actually better than the o rd inary  run  of mortals. 
Even though Cibber makes relatively wild and shocking claims in favor of 
the eccentric in the Apology—that the subjective o r private is to be valued 
over the public; that folly is not only not m adness, b u t alm ost the opposite; 
that everyone has a little folly stashed away som ew here, and might as well 
show it—despite these claims, Cibber recognizes that peculiarity for its own
61 By his ow n account, of course.
62 See, in that connection. A pology  17: "I find a strong im pulse to talk impertinently; if 
therefore you are not as fond o f seeing, as I am of shewing m yself in  all m y Lights, you may turn 
over two Leaves together, and leave what follows to those w ho have more Curiosity, and less 
to do with their Time, than you  have."
63 His attack upon Fielding—calling him a "broken wit"—is a rare exception. Even there, 
though, he refers to Fielding only as "This enterprising Person. . .  w hom  1 do not chuse to name, 
unless it could be to his Advantage, or that it were of Importance" (155). Cibber's original 
readers apparently had no difficulty figuring out who he meant, desp ite the periphrasis, and  
Cibber's show  of politeness and concern for the "broken wit" only support his case for his own  
benevolence.
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sake was generally despised. That explains in large part w hy Cibber argues his 
case so directly and  strenuously: in 1740, w ith  Augustan values still solidly in 
place (if slipp ing  inconspicuously out of date), he had to.
Pope responded the way Cibber^s brash self-defense had anticipated. 
Partly, and obviously. Pope's chagrin was personal and professional: he hated 
the fact tha t C ibber rather than he had  received the Laureateship. In the 
Dunciad in Four Books's new advertisem ent,64 for instance. Pope breathes a 
mock sigh of relief tha t Cibber has provided the Dunciad
a more considerable Hero. He [i.e.. I] was always sensible of its 
defect in th a t particular, and ow ned he had let it pass w ith the 
Hero it had, purely  for want of a better; not entertaining the least 
expectation th a t such an one was reserved for this Post, as has 
since obtained  the Laurel: But since that had happened, he could 
no longer deny  this justice e ither to h i m  or the Dunciad. 
(Works  709-10)
But as Pope goes on, this was only part of his complaint: "A nd y e t . . . there 
was another m otive which had still m ore w eight w ith our Author: This 
person was one, w ho from every Folly (not to say Vice) of which another 
would be asham ed, has constantly derived a Vanity-, and therefore was the 
man in the world who would least be hurt  by it" (710). To be so unashamed 
of folly, so unm indfu l of self-correction for the good of society, is a species of 
"blasphemy" to the Augustan Pope: "And can we say less of this brave man's, 
who having told us that he placed 'h is S u m m u m  b o n u m  in those follies, 
which he w as not content barely to possess bu t would likewise glory in,' adds, 
'If l a m  misguided,  'TIS NATURE'S FAULT, and I follow  HER'" (714).65 For
64 Although initialed  "W. W.," for William W arburton (Pope's friend), John Butt w rites that 
the advertisement w a s probably written by Pope him self.
6 5 1 should note that P ope's quotation o f Cibber adds all these capitals and emphases; they 
were not in the original text. Pope was upset.
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Pope, the will to reason is natural, so Cibber's excusing unreason under 
N ature's name is precisely backwards. Cibber's sp irited  defense of the private 
over the public, and the aggravation of that offense by "solem nly protest[ing] 
that lie will never change or am end"  outraged Pope so m uch that he declares 
the Laureate outlaw: "H aving then  so publickly declared  him self incorrigible, 
he is become dead in law, (I m ean the law Epopceian) an d  descendeth to the 
Poet [Solon] as his property: who may take him, and  deal w ith  him, as if he 
had been dead as long as an  old Egyptian hero; that is to say, em bowel  and 
embalm him fo r  posterity"  (718). As Pope understands it, Cibber's anti- 
A ugustan reasoning leads to a w orld in which people "Find V irtue local, all 
Relation scorn,/ See all in Self, and but for self be bom " {Dunciad 4.479-80). 
Broad-based cultural standards will die out in favor of ind iv idual standards, 
which m ust by nature be different. No m atter how d ifferent, or dow nright 
m ad, the individual may be, each person becomes h is o r her own God, in 
effect—"W rapt up in Self, a G od w ithout a T hought,/ R egardless of our m erit 
or default" (4.485-86). In short, Cibber's reasoning w ould, if generally accepted 
(and not morally opposed by cultural guardians such  as Pope), not only 
countenance  universal subjectivity and individual difference but virtually 
dem and  it. To Pope Cibber's line of thinking is not abou t allow ing for a little 
eccentricity, as it may seem to us today; it is about destroying  all social bonds 
and standards. Chaos and  "universal darkness," n o t the acceptance of 
whim sical oddballs, hang in the balance.
That is why Pope refuses Cibber's Apology. Pope perceives the 
profound implications of C ibber's new argum ents concerning the self: to 
confess all, seem ingly under compunction, to value every th ing  to ld  because
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it is ostensibly true and naturaI66—to do so is fundam entally to alter the 
relation betw een the individual and  society. For the early eighteenth century, 
the self was transparent and u ltim ately  u n im p o r ta n t;^ ?  w hat m attered  m ost 
was its deference to the larger social body, except perhaps in cases of special, 
socially approved virtue such as Sir Roger de Coverley's. But C ibber's line of 
thinking, which w ould become dom inan t by the end of the century, reverses 
that relation. If all selves are secret, then all public faces are perform ances. 
(Recall that Cibber was a lifelong actor and theater manager.) If all public 
faces are performances, then general hypocrisy reigns; w hat w e show  each 
other is affected, not "natural." A nd if general hypocrisy reigns, then  social 
standards are bankrupt, based on lies. W hat is true and natural is w hat is 
private and  subjective; therefore, the indiv idual has precedence over society. 
Society is the lie, and the individual is the truth. In Cibber's Apology  this 
view  is im plicit and emergent, but it becomes more explicit and gains broader 
support after the m id-eighteenth century.
ii. The Medicalization of M adness, the Apotheosis of Don Quixote, 
and  the Crum bling of the Opposition 
1 have suggested that texts such as the Spectator, the M emoirs  of 
M artinus Scriblerus, the Dunciad (in all its versions), and Cibber's Apology  
in teract w ith  their cultural surroundings: they voice opinions that are "in  the 
air," so to speak, and may represent hegem onic views or challenge them ; and 
a t the same time, they make argum ents of their own which can significantly
66 Cibber's defense of the "naturalness" of fo lly  throws light on the paradoxical quality of 
"natural" manners. Sir Roger de Coverley's manners, for instance, are applauded for their 
naturalness, and Cibber boasts about the naturalness o f his own. But manners are by definition  
social conventions, even the most "natural" manners. "Being oneself" as per Cibber is as much a 
convention as the Augustan self-abnegation he argued against.
67 W ith Cibber (and later writers, particularly Laurence Stem e) to contrast w ith  early- 
eighteenth-century authors, a correlation becom es clean the more com plex and hidden the self 
is  understood to be, the greater that self's value.
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influence the opinions of the culture at large. The texts discussed here are 
im portant causes and  effects of the discourse of eccentricity.
1 make this observation here because it seem s so plainly true at m id­
eighteenth century. From  th a t time to the end of the century, there was an 
increasing tendency to understand  madness as a m edical, not a m oral m alady; 
Don Quixote gradually gained respectability; and eccentricity was increasingly 
valued for its own sake. These cultural forces interact w ith  and strengthen 
each other; they form a com plex system of causes and  effects. Quixote's newly 
perceived valor, as expressed in texts of the t im e ,6 8  wins eccentric people new  
respect, and vice-versa. The m edical model of m adness lends countenance to 
the personal quirkiness of literary characters—they are understood to be "just 
naturally that way"; they cannot be blamed for w hat is physically beyond their 
control. And so on. T hat ind iv idual authors and  broad cultural forces both 
influence each other is particularly  plain in  m id-eighteenth century, 
especially where this complexly intertw ined trio of issues is concerned.
Stuart M. Tave argues convincingly that "the ridiculous and lovable 
Don Quixote was a creation of the eighteenth century, mostly the later 
eighteenth century" (151; em phasis added). Before that, as noted in the 
previous chapter, Quixote was almost solely ridiculous. Pope, for instance, 
could only appreciate him  slightly, and at tw o removes. In a letter to 
Lyttelton in 1739, Pope w rites that his friend Dr. George C h e y n e 6 9  is "so very a 
child in true Simplicity of H eart, that 1 love him ; as He loves Don Quixote, 
for the Most Moral & Reasoning M adman in the w orld . He is, in the 
Scripture language, an Israelite in whom there is no Guile, or in 
Shakespear's, as foolish a good kind o f  Christian Creature as one shall m eet
68 See especially Tristram  Shandy  and Launcelot Greaves, discussed below.
69 See below. That Cheyne should be an important medicalizer of the concept of m adness and 
love Quixote, is most significant.
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with" (qtd. in  Tave 155; emphasis in original). As Tave puts it, "Pope loves 
Cheyne, w ho, him self a Quixote, loves Quixote" (155). T hat seems as close as 
Pope could come to loving Quixote himself. As W illiam  W arburton noted at 
the time of the M em oirs '  publication. Pope and  the Scriblerus Club w rote 
them  "in the manner o f  Cervantes" (qtd. in  Tave 153; em phasis in  original)— 
that is, as obviously and exclusively satire. If the M em oirs  are "Cervantic," 
then the C lub 's reading  of Cervantes indicates no adm iration  or sym pathy 
w hatever for the Don; they certainly have none for the  quixotic Scriblerus.
But Q uixote's fortunes changed significantly after the 1740s, w ith the 
rise of sentim entality  (a new sensibility of w hich the quixotic Sir Roger gives 
a foretaste in the 1710s). In the second half of the eighteenth century, as 
Edward L. N iehus observes, readings of Quixote "tended to be replaced by 
softer and m ore to leran t interpretations . . . [which] frequently evolved into 
sentim entality o r even pathos. And from  this po in t it w ould  not be far to the 
Romantic view  of the Quixote as idealistic o r tragic hero" (232). Frances M. 
Bothwell del Toro m akes a similar point: "a new  in terpretation  of Don 
Quixote was gradually  presented which was to be accepted by many tow ard 
the end of the eighteenth  century and alm ost universally  by the nineteenth. 
The Don w as becom ing som ething of a m irror of all m en and, even m ore 
gradually, a hero" (16-17). The Don came to be loved for his good heart 
despite his cracked head. He
flourished in  a w orld where m orality w as located in  goodness of 
heart not action; and . . .  he had noble desires and  an assortment 
of gentlem anly virtues. As his good im pulses came to weigh 
m ore heavily  than the crazy unreality  of his perceptions and 
actions, he became an amiable m ixture of odd ity  and  hu m an ity ,.
. . not m erely the object of mirth. (Tave 158)
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For example, in the 1744 pam phlet Essay towards Fixing the True Standards 
of W it 70 Corbyn M orris likens Don Quixote to Falstaff7i and  to Sir Roger de 
Coverley. All three, M orris argues, suffer hum iliation an d  disaster in the 
course of a ttem pting  great things. But Don Quixote is no t only  a comic butt, 
for after his rid iculous failures, "he rises again and forces y o u r Esteem, by his 
excellent Sense, Learning and  Judgm ent, upon any Subjects w hich are not 
ally 'd to his E rran try ; These continually act for the A dvancem ent of his 
Character" (39). A nd m ost im portantly, his honorable ideals always shine 
through his shortcom ings: "The Foibles which he possesses, besides giving 
you exquisite Pleasure, are wholly inspir'd  by these w orthy  Principles" (38-39). 
In the early 1750s, H enry Fielding—who had w ritten  his ow n sympathetic 
version of Q uixote in  173372—praised Charlotte Lennox (author of The 
Female Q uixote,  1752) and  Cervantes equally, for taking care "to preserve the 
Affection of their Readers for their principal Characters, in  the m idst of the 
Follies of w hich they are guilty." Arabella and the Don, w rites Fielding, "are 
accordingly represented as Persons of good Sense, and of great natural Parts, 
and in all Cases, except one, of a very sound Judgem ent, and  w hat is much 
more endearing, as Persons of Great Innocence, Integrity  and  H onour, and of 
highest Benevolence" (qtd. in Tave 159). They are a t least as admirable as 
they are silly. Laurence Sterne and Tobias Smollett, too, considerably
70 This essay provides an interesting instance o f Augustan standards on the wane. As its title 
indicates, it pursues the very A ugustan goal of fixing "the true standard" absolutely and 
lastingly. At the sam e time, it expresses a very un-Augustan admiration o f D on  Quixote.
71 In the letter from P ope to Lyttelton just d ted . Pope likens C heyne to Falstaff, as well.
72 N am ely, Don Quixote in England. In Fielding's version o f  the Q uixote story, the heretofore 
satirized becom es the satirist. H e is  as mad as in Cervantes's novel, but every Brit he meets 
seems even madder, and he says so. W hen Dr. Drench calls Q uixote m ad to his face, Quixote 
replies, "I have heard thee, thou ignorant wretch, throw that w ord in  m y  face, w ith  patience. 
For alas! could it be proved, w hat w ere it more than almost all m ankind in  som e degree 
deserve?" Then he begins nam ing names. Sir Thomas Loveland responds, "Ha, ha, ha! I don't 
know whether this knight, by and by, may not prove us all to be m ore m ad than himself" 
(W orks 11:69-70).
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im proved the D on's status (and by extension, the eccentric's), as discussed 
below. By 1781, it was possible for John Bowie to w rite in the Gentleman's  
Magazine, of Cervantes:
Sure I am, that good-nature and candour, charity, hum anity, and  
compassion, for the infirm ities of man in  his m ost abject state, 
and consequently an abhorrence of cruelty, persecution, and  
violence, the principal m oral he seems to inculcate in his great 
work, were the glorious virtues and  p redom inan t good qualities 
of his soul, and  m ust transm it his name to the latest ages w ith  
every eulogium  due to so exalted a character. (Qtd. in Tave 160)
The idea that not satirical finger-pointing but values such as "good nature," 
"compassion," and "abhorrence of cruelty, persecution, and violence" were 
the "predom inant good qualities" of Cervantes and, by extension, of his 
novel, was fundam entally different from  the standard  reading of Don  
Quixote at century 's beginning. In 1785, W illiam  W allbeck wrote even m ore 
adm iringly of the Don in  his translation of De F lorian 's Life of Cervantes:
His very failings, (if by so harsh a nam e w e should  choose to 
d istinguish the ebullitions of Philanthropy,) rendered  him  bu t 
more amiable. Even w hen his too arden t and  generous feelings 
betray him  into ridiculous excesses,—and  w e are tem pted to 
laugh at him, it is im possible to w ithhold  from  him  our love, 
and pity. (Qtd. in Tave 162)
A nd James Beattie observed in 1783 that the D on is a man "w hom  it is 
impossible not to esteem  for his cultivated understand ing  and the goodness 
of his heart" (qtd. in Niehus 238). In the course of the eighteenth century, 
then, Quixote was transform ed from fool to hero. The benevolent Don 
"became a m an w ith an inner ligh t that shone th rough  his seem ingly cracked
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head, an im agination  that opened a m ore im m ediate glim pse of the 
possibilities of hum an greatness than  a m erely logical understand ing  could 
attain" (Tave 161). A nd concomitantly, as the Don gained respect, so d id  the 
eccentric, his genealogical descendant.
M uch as popular views of Quixote a ltered  over the course of the 
eighteenth century, so did popular understandings of m adness. N ot that the 
latter happened  suddenly, or only after 1740; certain earlier texts had  claimed 
medical bases for madness. These texts w ere instances of the emergent 
conception th a t w ould a t m id-eighteenth century becom e d o m in a n t .7 3  
Thomas W illis concluded back in 1664, in  Cerebri Anatom e,  that the 
prevailing system  of h u m o rs7 4  m ust be flaw ed because treatm ents (emetics, 
purges, and  bleedings) administered flawlessly according to that theory 
seem ed useless or actually harmful. This observation only gained much 
serious credence w hen it was made by W illiam Battie alm ost a hundred  years 
later. W illis p roposed  in place of the hum oral system  the concept of "animal 
spirits," w hich  were "rarefied vapors commonly believed to circulate in the 
vessels of the brain" (De Porte 7). In a norm al person these sp irits circulate 
through the w hole body in their proper channels. However, various forces— 
diet, strong emotions, heredity—can drive the spirits ou t of those proper 
channels, causing  m ental disorders. Nicholas Robinson's conception of m ind 
and body in A  New System o f  the Spleen (1729) bears resemblance to Willis's 
system: nerves control behavior and thought because they are the  conduits of 
inform ation betw een the brain and the rest of the body; if they are disordered, 
then behavior and thought will be, too. (Robinson takes the  idea to its
73 For a concise but full overview o f pre-1740s view s o f madness, see De Porte's Chapter 1, 
"Abnormal Psychology in England 1660-1760." That chapter led me to these exam ples.
74 Black bile, y e llo w  bile, blood, and phlegm. Literary and medical references to the humors, 
and treatments based upon this understanding, did not generally disappear until around the end  
of the eighteenth  century.
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literalistic, logical end: he claims tha t some people "talk w ell but write 
poorly" because w hen their excessively springy brain nerves receive ideas, 
they can grip  the  ideas well enough to discharge them  in the form  of "Vollies 
of choice Epithets, or sm art Repartees," bu t cannot "retain  them  in that 
natural O rder necessary to supply the Discourse w ith  Distinctness and 
Clearness" [qtd. in De Porte 9].) George Cheyne's The English Malady (1733) 
essentially endorsed  Robinson's understand ing  of the brain  and nerves, 
cautioning those w ith  particularly sensitive nerve fibers not to indulge in 
passions or o ther sensations w hich w ould  excite them . Furtherm ore, 
Cheyne, w ho perhaps desired to flatter his num erous w ealthy and  aristocratic 
patients (or w ho perhaps d id  so unaw ares), argues that nervous disorders 
mainly afflict "those of the liveliest and  quickest natural Parts, whose 
Faculties are the  brightest and  most sp iritual, and whose Genius is most keen 
and penetrating" (qtd. in Byrd, Bedlam  127). A lthough such view s were not 
imm ediately em braced by British culture at large, they had their impact. They 
participated in  a discourse that m ore and  more spoke of madness as an 
illness—som eth ing  im posed undesired  upon the m ad from  w ithout (not 
willfully, from  within), by m undane, mechanistic forces (not by God), to 
which no blam e attached, and  w hich could under m any circumstances be 
cured or im proved. The proper response to willful m adness is w illing reason 
instead; the p ro p er response to faulty nerve fibers is a strengthening program  
and the avoidance of shock.
In 1750 W illiam  B a ttie ,7 5  then  supervisor of Bethlehem  Hospital, 
became exasperated  w ith the system  he nom inally controlled, and he 
resigned. (Perhaps, too, he felt undercom pensated; he m oved on to found St.
75 Byrd speculates that Battle's name is the origin of the English w ord "batty," meaning "a bit 
mad" {B edlam  44). The OED neither confirms nor denies this speculation, defining "batty" 
only as "Of or belonging to a bat, bat-like."
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Luke's, a  private, for-profit m ad-hospital.) He cited as his reasons, first, the 
"inhum ane" practice of exh ib iting  patients like anim als in  a z o o ,7 6  and 
second, doctors' system atic cruelty  to patients under the nam e of treatm ent— 
blisterings, beatings, cold-w ater dunkings, emetics, purges, and above all, 
confinement. He set about changing  the way the m ad w ere understood and 
treated. In so doing, he articulates ideas very sim ilar to W illis's, Cheyne's and 
Robinson's; the difference is. Battle's society was more ready  to accept them, 
partly as a result of the earlier works.
Battle's Treatise on Madness, published in 1758, w as his major 
contribution to that effort. T h is text, emblematic of the increasingly m edical 
conception of m adness after m id c e n t u r y ,77 sees m adness as an essentially 
physical ailm ent that is lim ited  and  whose sym ptom s (and often its causes, 
too) are treatable. To begin w ith  its physical nature: Battie argues that flaws in 
the "m edullary  m atter," the nerve  fibers centered in the brain  and branching 
out through the body, a re  the  ultim ate cause of m adness. As Battie 
understands it, all sensation causes some pressure on the nerves/ m edullary 
matter. The difference betw een "true" and "false" perception—i.e., reason and 
m adness—is the difference betw een  properly functioning and m alfunctioning
76 Byrd reports that after Battle's resign ation , Bethlehem "significantly abolished the 
practice of opening its door to sightseers" {B edlam  133). Just how  "significantly" the practice 
w as abolished is not dear; Byrd d o es not specify, and estimates of the number of visits (see, 
e.g.. De Porte and Foucault) cover th e eighteenth century as a w hole and then up to 1815, w hen  
visits were discontinued altogether. T he v is its  did at least live on in art, although they may 
or may not have been curtailed in life. H ogarth returned in 1763 to add the Brittania coin to 
the final p late o f Rake's Progress—th e  num erous titillated visitors in that engraving remain 
unchanged. In 1794 Richard N ew to n  m ade a well-known engraving titled "A Visit to  Bedlam," 
which depicts four m en peering into sm all Bedlam cell-windows at three inmates. Tw o visitors 
appear enraged at an inmate g iv ing  th em  the fig, and the tw o other visitors express shock at 
another inm ate's hat—a cham berpot.
77 Foucault's The Birth o f the C lin ic  fam ously  discusses the rise o f m edicalization in the 
eighteenth century and afterwards. In that work he shows how  the body came to be understood 
as totally knowable, transparent. T he body, yes: I argue here that in popular understanding 
the self—the som ew hat intangible personality , as distinct from the w h olly  tangible physical 
body-becom es more m ysterious and elu sive  as the eighteenth century progresses, and that this 
conception indirectly affected conceptions o f eccentricity.
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nerves. Im properly functioning nerves undergo pressure that in  tu rn  causes 
perception in the brain of objects that do not exist. Because the brain  m erely 
registers the im pulses of the nerves, false ideas are accurate responses to 
inaccurate nerve im pulses. Battie explains:
N ow  no external cause w hatever can be supposed capable of 
exciting delusive any more than  true perception, except such 
cause acts materially upon the nerve thereby disordered, and  
that w ith  force sufficient to alter the form er arrangem ent of its 
m edullary particles. Which force necessarily im plies im pulse 
and pressure in delusive Sensation, in the sam e m anner and  
order as it does in the perception of objects really corresponding 
thereto. (44)
The sim ilarity betw een Battie's conception of nerves and perception and the 
theories of Cheyne and Robinson is plain. For Battie, m alfunctions of the 
nerves can either be classified as "Original Madness," which is "solely owing 
to an internal d isorder of the nervous substance" (m ainly congenital defects), 
or as "Consequential Madness," w hich "is likewise ow ing to the same 
nervous substance being indeed in the like m anner d isordered , but 
disordered ab extra-, and therefore is chiefly to be attributed to some remote 
and accidental cause" (43-44). Obviously a congenital m adness is inherited, 
and weak nerve fibers, or a liability to consequential m adness, can be, too. 
W hether heredity  or circumstance (or both) is to blame for consequential 
madness, the significance of this new  understanding of m ental illness to the 
understanding  of eccentricity is trem endous: madness is not blam ew orthy, 
and that w hich is not blam ew orthy is not unacceptable. M adness after 1740 is 
not a lapse of reason but merely a physical m isfortune largely beyond one's 
control, like a strained ankle. Eccentricity—m inor m adness—can be explained
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away in physical term s, as Steme spends much of Tristram Shandy  doing.
As for m adness's new  lim itation: A ugustan Britain defined  m adness as 
the deviation from  reason, w hich m eant there was little th a t could not  be 
called m adness. Battie, in contrast, seeks to lim it significantly tha t which can 
truly be called m adness. He writes, in the opening chapter of the Treatise, 
M adness ha th  m oreover shared  the fate common to m any other 
distem pers of not being precisely defined. Inasm uch as not only 
several sym ptom s, w hich frequently and accidentally accom pany 
it, have been taken into the account as constant, necessary, and 
essential; bu t also the supposed cause, which perhaps never 
existed or certainly never acted with such effect, has been 
im plied in the very names usually  given to this d istem per. No 
w onder therefore is it, w hilst several d isorders, really 
independent of M adness and of one another, are thus b lended 
together in our bew ildered imagination, that a treatm ent, 
rationally indicated by any of those disorders, should  be 
injudiciously directed against Madness itself, w hether attended 
w ith such sym ptom s or not. (3)
The only way to define m adness clearly and accurately is by its essence. 
Sym ptom s such as anxiety and  insensibility cannot be a part of that essence, 
because they are present or absent in  w ildly varying degrees in  different cases. 
For example, "W itness the m any instances of happy M ad m en, who are 
perfectly easy under w hat is esteem ed by every one bu t them selves the 
greatest m isfortune hum an nature is liable to" (5). Sim ilarly, not all 
madfolks are insensible; the opposite is often true. So for Battie, the essence 
of madness is its w orst case:
[N]o one ever doubt[s] w hether the perception of objects not
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really existing or not really corresponding to the senses be a 
certain sign of M adness. Therefore deluded imagination, which 
is not only an indispu tab le  bu t an essential character of Madness,
. . . precisely discrim inates this from all other anim al disorders: 
or tha t m an an d  th a t m an alone is properly  m ad, w ho is fully 
and unalterably persuaded  of the Existence or of the appearance 
of any thing, w hich either does not exist or does no t actually 
appear to him, and  w ho behaves according to such erroneous 
persuasion. (5-6)
A nything less is just a s y m p to m ,7 8  probably treatable. This understanding of 
m adness is both sim ilar to and different from  the A ugustans'. Similar, in  
that Battie appeals to public perception over private, in  a double sense: he 
bases his definition u p o n  observations that "no one ever doubts," i.e., 
allegedly universal opin ion  (not his own); and  the difference between the 
ind iv idual's perception and  the perception of others is considered the very 
essence of madness. Different, though, in the specifically m edical way this 
perceptual difference is understood: the individual's faulty understanding is
78 On the subject of madness and its sym ptom s, and in light of Chapter 2, cf. the following  
telling exchange in Fielding's Don Quixote in England:
DR. DRENCH. If this madman be not blooded, cupped, sw eated, blistered, 
vom ited, purged, this instant, he will be incurable. I am w ell acquainted with  
this sort of frenzy; h is next paroxysm will be six  tim es as strong as the former.
MR. BRIEF. Pshaw! the man is no more mad than I am.—I should be finely off 
if he could be proved non compos mentis; 'tis an easy thing for a m an to  pretend 
madness, ex post facto .
DR. DRENCH. Pretend madness! G ive m e leave to tell you, Mr. Brief, I am not 
to be pretended with; I judge by symptoms, sir.
MR. BRIEF. Symptoms! Gad, here are symptoms for you, if you com e to that.
DR. DRENCH. Very plain sym ptom s of madness, I think.
MR. BRIEF. Very fine, indeed; very fine doctrine! very fine, indeed! A man's 
beating of another is a proof o f madness. So that if a man be indicted, he has 
nothing to do but to plead non compos mentis, and he's acquitted of course: so  
there's an end of all actions o f assaults and battery at once. {W orks  11:68)
Here in microcosm are the v iew s o f madness competing at midcentuty: the Augustan, which saw  
madness as a condition possible to w ill away by reason (or w ill to be present); and the new  
medical, which saw  m adness as involuntary illness, difficult to fake, transparent to the 
doctor's diagnostic gaze.
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not w illful, as in cases of religious enthusiasm , bu t ra ther the innocent, 
undesired effect of bad nerves.
This narrow er definition for m adness, like m adness's less 
blam ew orthy status, makes eccentricity m ore acceptable. W hen, as in the 
early part of the century, m adness and reason are sharply  divided, and the 
aw ful w astelands of m adness menace the (much sm aller) happy  realm of 
reason, there is very little room  in betw een for the eccentric. In such a 
geography he is alm ost bound, statistically, to be an exile. But w hen the 
geographic proportions shift, alm ost to the point of reversing—true madness 
now  occupying only a small corner—the eccentric has m ore social latitude in 
w hich to move freely. Also, to d rop  the geographic m etaphor, w hen only the 
m ost delusional are considered tru ly  m ad, slight m adness is not really 
m adness at all. U nder those conditions, the m inor m adness of eccentricity is 
barely noticeable, let alone objectionable.
Finally, Battie (et al., after 1740) understood m adness to be medically 
treatable, m ost  of the time, and he sought to fit the cure precisely to the 
illness. O riginal m adness, which Battie argues is rela tively  uncommon, 
causes him to throw  up his hands: "Original M adness, w hether it be 
hæ reditary  or interm itting, is not rem ovable by any m ethod, which the 
science of Physick in its present imperfect state is able to suggest" (61). 
"Consequential M adness," on the other hand, "is frequently m anageable by 
hum an art" (72). Therefore, "our endeavours are to be em ployed in 
preventing rem oving or w eakning [sic] those other external accidents before 
enum erated, w hich by occasioning in term ediate pressure are the remoter 
causes of Consequential M adness" (73). (His means of do ing  so bear close 
resem blance to the same Bethlehem treatm ents he objected to: for instance, 
in cases of insensibility and "Idiotism " [congenital brain  m alfunction] he
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recom m ends "general evacuations," "constant discharges of the fluids from 
the head and neck by perpetual blisters, setons, an d  issues," "vomits, 
cathartics, errhines, and  all sorts of tolerable irritation," and  "the concussive 
force of the cold-bath or sea-water" [92]. It was the nonm edical nature of 
treatm ents at Bethlehem, their nonspecific, nonscientific application, rather 
than the treatm ents in them selves, to which Battie objected earlier.) His goal 
is to counteract the causes of pressure on the m edullary substance by opposite 
influences. Excessively stim ulated fibers require relaxation, preferably by 
such gentle means as w ine or opium; excessively lax fibers require 
stimulation, preferably by exercise and occupation. Only extreme cases of 
insensibility require the doctor to "shake the whole solid  frame" (92) by 
purges, etc., thereby decongesting the fibers. Like Willis, he seeks to apply to 
illnesses only those cures that his experience—to which he appeals again and 
again in the Treatise—shows  him  will work.
Battie does not object to confinement per se any  m ore than other 
traditional treatm ents; in  fact, he claims that in trea ting  m ental patients, 
"confinem ent alone is som etim es sufficient, but alw ays so necessary, that 
w ithout it every m ethod hitherto devised for the cure of M adness would be 
ineffectual" (68). His justification for confinement (w ith in  doors only, in 
most cases, not in chains) is, again, medical:
M adness then, considered as delusive Sensation unconnected 
w ith  any other sym ptom , requires the patient's being  rem oved 
from  all objects tha t act forcibly upon the nerves, and  excite too 
lively a perception of things, more especially from  such objects 
as are the know n causes of his disorder; for the sam e reason as 
rest is recom m ended to bodies fatigued, and  the not attem pting
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to walk when the ancles are strained.79 (68)
As Cheyne had argued earlier, patients w ere to be kept from straining their 
already-fragile nerves, which unrestricted access to stimuli out in  the w orld  
would risk.
Curability dem ands sym pathy at the same tim e it takes the horror out 
of madness:
Madness is, contrary to the opinion of some unthinking persons, 
as manageable as m any other distem pers, which are equally 
dreadful and obstinate, and yet are not looked upon as incurable: 
and that such unhappy objects ought by no means to be 
abandoned, m uch less shut up in loathsom e prisons as criminals 
or nusances [sic] to the society. (Battie 93)
This is especially true in cases of m inor m adness—such as eccentricity. At the 
same time, the concept of curability dem ands  a cure, even in cases of 
eccentricity. Oddballs m ay seem less odd and more sym pathetic than 
previously, but the urge to cure them  rem ains. Individuality and  conform ity 
are inculcated at the same time: all b u t the worst cases of m adness are 
forgivable and curable, so eccentricity gains license; but cure is presum ed 
possible and therefore desirable. M adness is, after all, an illness now. 
Foucault uses the w ord "norm alization" to describe this paradoxical effect 
upon individual difference:
In a sense, the pow er of norm alization imposes homogeneity; 
but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to 
determ ine levels, to fix specialities and  to render the differences 
useful by fitting them  one to another. It is easy to understand 
how the pow er of the norm  functions w ithin a system of formal
79 Note the comparison betw een brain and ankles. For Battie they are all bodily fibers; 
madness is nothing special, no more than an accidental, physical ailment.
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equality, since w ith in  a hom ogeneity that is the  ru le , the norm  
introduces, as a useful im perative and as a result of 
m easurem ent, all the shading of ind iv idual differences. 
(Discipline and Punish  184)
Just as the concept of necessary confession accompanies the concept of that 
which is confessed, the concept of curability, of restoring  to normal, 
accompanies the concept of ind iv idual difference. C urab ility  sim ultaneously 
dem ands acceptance for eccentricity and seeks to abolish it.
That is precisely w hy eccentrics have never been taken  seriously. The 
British eccentric is the direct descendant of Don Quixote, w hich means that 
eccentricity has always been understood as a dollop of m adness. Madness, in 
turn, has been experienced as illness by Western societies since the m id­
eighteenth century. Thus, eccentricity is commonly understood  as a minor 
illness, the psychological equivalent of a common cold—a m inor ailm ent that 
m any (or even most) people "catch" sooner or later. Eccentricity is not 
serious enough as illness to instill deep pity or concern; the only response 
that rem ains is the seem ingly natural desire to cure the m inor illness. 
Eccentricities can only be taken seriously as symptoms, and  no t very seriously 
then; that is, the content o( the eccentricity, the oddity itself, is to be humored 
or tolerated at best. One does not value a cough qua cough; by the same 
principle, one does not value oddity  qua oddity. One does, how ever, note the 
presence of the cough /odd ity  and  begin plotting how to rem ove it and  restore 
the afflicted body to health. There is no essential difference between, say, the 
delusive bearing of paper m itre and w ooden triple cross by the Bethlehem 
"pope" in the Rake's Progress, and  the compulsive w argam ing of Toby 
Shandy; both are sym ptom s. The difference, a quantitative not qualitative 
one, is that the form er sym ptom  indicates greater illness. O ne does not take
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seriously the actual content of a m adm an's ravings, b u t the fact that he is 
raving—th a t he has lost his health  and reason—m akes us look to our ow n 
safety. W hen a mere eccentric m ounts his hobbyhorse, w e take his prattle no 
more seriously than we do the m adm an's raving, an d  since the eccentric is 
harm less, w e also seek a w ay to dism ount him.
As is the case w ith any new  discourse, the a ltered  understanding of 
m adness (and implicitly, by extension, eccentricity) of w hich Battie's Treatise 
is em blem atic d id  not becom e hegemonic overnight. There was inevitably a 
transition period. The final tipp ing  of the balance to w ard  the new  paradigm  
has to be the madness of King George III. In June 1788, "for the first time the 
fifty-year-old King lost his reason" (Macalpine a n d  H unter xv). His 
sym ptom s lasted steadily from  June 1788 until February 1789, then returned 
briefly in 1801, 1804, and from 1810 until his death  in 1820. He presented 
w hat had  heretofore been considered unm istakable sym ptom s of true 
m adness, even by the now -lim ited definition articu lated  by Battie and other 
physicians: delusions, delirium , and mania. King George was subjected to 
that fam ous m odern icon of m adness, the straitjacket. H ow ever, few besides 
his prim ary  physicians, Drs. Francis Willis, Richard W arren, and Henry 
R ey n o ld sS O  were actually w illing to diagnose m adness—the patien t was, after 
all, the kingl  In such a case onl]»^  a physically based diagnosis would do; to say 
that the king 's sym ptom s w ere the effects of a bodily ailm ent seemed 
infinitely less dam aging and heretical than the reverse, that the king's fever
80 Although these men did ascribe m adness to the British king, th ey  essentially  accepted the 
medical m odel; they were p h ysic ia n s, after all. They approached the m adness as an illness 
that w as curable—by symptom-treatments such as blistering, confinement, and purges. The 
recent m ovie The Madness o f K ing George (1995) depicts the painful regim en pretty thoroughly.
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was a sym ptom  and  effect of his m a d n e s s .  81 Thus, Dr. Robert Jones, am ong 
others, criticized the royal treatm ent program  on  the grounds that the doctors 
should be strengthening, not purging (and straitjacketing) the king, because 
the illness was "neither more nor less than  a nervous fever" (qtd. in 
Macalpine and H unter 100), and the sym ptom s resem bling m adness were 
merely results of that bodily fever. Jones was outraged by the "use of the 
word insanity, as applying to his Majesty's disease," for in
the inferior conditions of life, the expression alluded to is 
equivalent to the destruction of a m an's cred it and happiness for 
ever. But in  the more exalted state of a  m onarch, it not only 
affects the credit and importance of the nation  he governs, but 
m ust fall upon  his offspring: and the m ore especially, as this 
disease is supposed, without any ground for such a supposition, 
to be hereditary. (Qtd. in Macalpine and H un ter 101)
Other physicians followed suit: Dr. W illiam Rowley distinguished between 
fevers and m adness and pronounced the k ing 's disorder "positively a 
symptomatic  or febrile delirium" (qtd. in M acalpine and H unter 103; 
emphasis in original); Dr. William Pargeter w rote, "Quid est insanitas? 
Insanitas est, delirium  sine febre—Erat aegro febris—ergo, Aeger non erat 
insanus [W hat is insanity? Insanity is delirium  w ithou t fever-H e  (the king) 
was ill w ith  a fever—therefore, the patient w as not in sa n e ]" 8 2  (qtd. in 
Macalpine and H unter 107). The high stakes involved in George Ill's
81 Ida Macalpine and Richard Hunter, from w hose thorough George III and the M ad-Business I 
cite the information and examples regarding George's madness, seem  to want to eradicate that 
heresy once and for all. In their introduction, for instance, they scoff at the "false image o f  
'mad King George'" (xv), "the picture every schoolboy learns, which every textbook teaches, 
and which pervades, more or less subtly, every study of h is long and complex reign" (xi); they 
em phasize that "the King w as fifty years old  w hen he first becam e deranged, and all periods 
of derangement added together up to his seventy-third year hardly amounted to six  months in  
all" (xii); and they denigrate medical science, which, they claim, could now properly diagnose  
and treat the king.
82 The translation is mine.
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diagnosis, as articulated by  Jones, dem anded that the affliction be considered 
in physical, not m ental term s. Eventually this consideration was extended 
more broadly, to those "in the  inferior conditions of life," as well.
But again, it took tim e and considerable cultural conflict for British 
society to reach this position. The career of Samuel Johnson roughly spans 
the period in q u e s t io n ,8 3  an d  i t  provides a microcosmic view  of the whole 
messy conflict—the lingering A ugustan ideals ceding ground unwillingly to 
the new m edicalizing, norm alizing discourse. One expects to find Augustan 
ideals in Johnson's work; he  is, after all, often called the "last Augustan," and 
with good rea so n .8 4  Like Swift and Pope, he expresses so intense a preference 
for the public/general over the individual/subjective that it m ight be called a 
horror of the latter. The astonom er in  Johnson's Rasselas (1759) exemplifies 
what Johnson saw as the logical (actually, mad) end of subjectivity. The 
astronom er follows his ow n  subjective reasoning to a clearly irrational 
conclusion—that he controls the globe's w eather by force of will. "I cannot 
prove it by any external evidence . . .  It is sufficient that I feel this power, that I 
have long possessed, and every day exerted it," he co n fe sse sS S  to Imlac 
(Johnson, W orks  404). Like the religious enthusiasts so loathed by the 
Augustans in general, the astronom er needs no further proof. Solipsistic 
reasoning is probably w rong  no m atter how  internally consistent. W hat 
Johnson said of Bishop G ilbert Burnet could stand for his opinion of all
83 Boswell records Johnson's earliest published work as a translation of Lobo's Voyage to 
Abyssinia,  in 1735 (when Johnson w as 26). Johnson wrote steadily and volum inously until his 
death in 1784 (at age 75).
84 See Byrd, inter alia: "Like Pope, like Swift, Samuel Johnson belongs temperamentally and 
intellectually to the Augustan generation; indeed he represents the culmination of that 
Augustan vision of madness w e have been tracing" {Bedlam  88).
85 "[Sjome painful sentiment pressed upon his mind. H e often looked up earnestly towards the 
sun, and let his voice fall in the m idst of his discourse. H e would sometimes, when we were 
alone, gaze upon me in silence w ith  the air of a man w ho longed to speak what he was yet 
resolved to suppress" {Works 402). Finally, w ith  great reluctance, as if the truth forces itself 
out ineluctably, he confesses his "power" to Im lac
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individualists: "H e w as like a m an w ho resolves to regulate his tim e by a 
certain w atch; b u t w ill not inquire w hether the w atch is righ t or not" 
(Boswell 510).
Johnson m istrusted  solipsism  so because, like a good A ugustan , he 
deeply m istrusted  the imagination; he saw  them  as inextricably bound 
together an d  b ound  to m adness. To Pope's generation, im agination was 
virtually the opposite  of reason, and  therefore anathem a. A  solitary  person 
cannot alw ays be busy, Johnson explains in the reasonable voice of Imlac, and 
in the intervals of unem ploym ent, im agination or fancy is ap t to seize the 
m ind. Then,
some particu lar train of ideas fixes the attention, all o ther 
intellectual gratifications are rejected, the m ind, in  w eariness o r 
leisure, recurs constantly to the favourite conception, and  feasts 
on the luscious falsehood w henever she is offended w ith  the 
bitterness of truth. By degrees the reign of fancy is confirm ed; 
she grow s first im perious, and  in tim e despotic. Then fictions 
begin to operate as realities, false opinions fasten upon the m ind, 
and life passes in dream s of rap ture  or of anguish.
This, sir, is one of the dangers of solitude . . .  (W orks  406)
The absence of society's steadying influence leads to overindulgence in 
imagination, and  as he told his friend Mrs. Burney, "m adness . . .  is 
occasioned by too m uch indulgence of im agination" (Boswell 1225). Johnson 
attributed W illiam  Collins's m adness to excessive im agination fed  by his 
youthful reading: "H e had  em ployed his m ind chiefly upon  w orks of fiction 
and subjects of fancy, and  by indulg ing  some peculiar habits of though t was 
eminently deligh ted  w ith  those flights of im agination w hich pass the bounds 
of nature" (Life o f  Collins 328). This led to Collins being "assailed
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by...insanity" (328). Johnson assigned the same cause to his ow n "unsettled 
tu rn  of m ind" (Boswell 36).
If solitude sickens, then  conversely, company cures. After some weeks 
of association w ith Imlac, Pekuah, and Rasselas, the astronom er returns to 
reason. Their company (and the reality check it offers) keeps at bay the 
w olves of m adness that are never far from his so lita ry  door: "'If I am 
accidentally left alone for a  few  hours,' said he, 'm y inveterate persuasion 
rushes upon my soul, and m y thoughts are chained d o w n  by som e irresistible 
violence, but they are soon disentangled by the prince 's  conversation, and 
instantaneously released a t the entrance of Pekuah'" {W orks  412). Note 
Johnson 's strong images of pow er and confinement: m adness "assails" 
Collins; im agination acts like a "despotic" ruler; solipsistic m adness "chains 
dow n" one's thoughts.86 Society, by contrast, brings freedom . Johnson found 
this especially true for him self, as Boswell records:
W henever he w as no t engaged in conversation, [self­
reproachful] thoughts w ere sure to rush into his m ind; and, for 
this reason, any com pany, any em ploym ent w hatever, he 
preferred to being alone. The great business of h is life (he said) 
was to escape from him self; this disposition he considered  as the 
disease of his m ind, w hich nothing cured bu t com pany. (105- 
106)
Personal experience and A ugustan  tradition taught h im  to shun  the private 
(insane) and seek the public (sane).
This last quotation w ith  its language of "disease" an d  "cure" shows the 
new  m edical understand ing  of m adness partially in sinuated  into Johnson's
86 See also Rambler  No. 85 (8 Jan. 1751): "It is certain that any w ild  w ish  or vain  imagination  
never takes such firm  possession o f  the mind,  as when it is found em pty and unoccupied" {Yale 
W orks  4:86; em phasis added).
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A ugustan conceptions. He is caught betw een the old-fashioned suspicion 
that m adness can be willed away by the exercise of reason, and the gloomy 
certainty that m adness attacks the body  from w ithout and that one can only 
try  to treat its symptoms. For instance, as Nicholas Williams points out, 
Johnson blurs physical and mental diagnoses of Collins's ailments: "H is life 
w as assailed by...dreadful calamities, disease and insanity" (Life o f  Collins; qtd. 
in Williams 24). He does not exclusively accept either the old reasonable or 
the new  medical explanation; he runs the tw o together.
On the one hand, he believed tha t Collins had spoiled his m ind by 
indulging his imagination since youth , and  "m ay yet recover," "by a very 
great temperance, or more properly abstinence" (Boswell 196). He thought 
tha t m adness could be prevented, recom m ending that "those w ho have 
heated imaginations live [near Bethlehem  Hospital], and take w arning" 
(1225-26). And in a letter to Boswell in 1776 he reproves him  for being 
melancholy, as Boswell puts it, w ith "a good deal of severity and reproof, as if 
it were owing to my own fault, or tha t 1 was, perhaps, affecting it from  a 
desire of distinction" (782).
But on the other hand, and  at the sam e time, Johnson understood  
m ental illness in m odern medical term s. A t twenty, "overw helm ed w ith  a 
horrible hypochondria, w ith perpetual irritation, fretfulness, and im patience; 
and  with a dejection, gloom, and despair, which made existence m isery" 
(Boswell 47), he sought the advice of Dr. Swinfen, "a physician in Lichfield, 
his godfather" (48). He had tried to cure himself by force of will, "walk[ingj to 
Birmingham and back again, and tr[ying] m any other expedients, bu t all in 
vain" (48), so he sought medical treatm ent. After this experience, he 
believed, "To attempt to th ink  them dow n  [distressing thoughts] is m adness"
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(6 9 0 )8 7  In the letter cited just above he instructs Boswell, "Read Cheyne's 
English Malady; b u t do not let h im  teach you  a foolish notion that 
melancholy is a proof of acuteness" (782). The rest of the book, w hich argues 
for purely physical origins of "the English m alady," he finds fit to 
recommend. In his next letter to Boswell, Johnson apologizes for his earlier 
reproaches: "If you  are really oppressed w ith  overpow ering and  involuntary 
melancholy, you are to be pitied rather than  reproached" (783). He frequently 
evinces a view of m ental illness as som ething beyond one's ow n control that 
attacks the body; he referred to the depression that plagued h im  all his lifeSS  
(and often harassed Boswell) as periodic assaults by the "black dog" (Boswell 
1042).
Boswell himself, thirty years Johnson's junior, born the year Cibber's 
Apology  was published, accepts the m edical explanation wholesale. Boswell 
confidently declares Johnson's m elancholy a d irect bodily inheritance from 
Johnson's father, in whom , "as in the m ost solid  rocks veins of unsound 
substance are often discovered, there w as . . .  a mixture of that disease, the 
nature of which eludes the most m inute inquiry , though the effects are well 
known to be a w eariness of life, an unconcern about those things which 
agitate the greater part of mankind, and  a general sensation of gloomy 
wretchedness" (27). The "disease" is identified  in  terms of its sym ptom s, in 
language much like a medical textbook's. Boswell's defin ition of true 
madness—as d istinct from less serious m ental illnesses such as Johnson 's—is 
virtually identical to Battie's:
87 Still, it m ust be em phasized that his Augustan conceptions were not utterly replaced.  In the 
same conversation d ted  here Johnson said, 'T o  have the managem ent of the m ind is a great art, 
and it may be attained in a considerable degree by experience and habitual exerdse" (690).
88 Madness as topic w as apparently never far from his mind. Even in such an innocuous exerdse 
as discussing apocryphal sayings with Boswell, the first tw o  that entered the conversation  
were Quos Deus vu l t  perdere, prius dementat (Those w hom  God w ould  destroy he first makes 
mad) and Semel insanivimus otnnes (We have all been  m ad once) (Boswell 1207).
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If . . .  a m an tells me that he is grievously disturbed, fo r that he 
imagines  he sees a ru ffian  com ing against him  w ith  a  d raw n  
sw ord, though at the sam e tim e he is conscious it is a delusion, I 
pronounce him to have a d iso rd e red  im agination; b u t if  a  m an 
tells me tha t he sees this, an d  in  consternation calls to  me to 
look at it, I pronounce him  to he mad. (49)89 
For Boswell, as for the best-regarded m edical authorities o f his day, only 
"d isordered  im agination" or hallucination  is madness. A ny th ing  else is a 
m inor illness (such as m elancholy), an d  therefore treatable.
To return  now to eccentricity specifically: Johnson's com m ents on 
eccentricity display essentially the sam e conflict of old and new  values as do 
his comm ents on madness. (As they  should , the form er subject being a 
subset of the latter, in a way, and in  any case tightly connected.) O n the one 
hand, Johnson famously sneered a t "singularity ." H ester T hrale Piozzi, his 
longtim e friend and benefactor, w rites, "Mr. Johnson was indeed  unjustly 
supposed to be a lover of singularity . Few people had a  m ore settled 
reverence for the world than he, o r w ere less captivated by new  m odes of 
behav iour introduced, or innovations on the long-received custom s of 
com m on life." In fact, she continues, he once said plainly, "Let us all 
conform  in ou tw ard  customs, w hich  are of no consequence, to the m anners 
of those w hom  w e live am ong" (464). Boswell records sim ilar Johnsonian 
expressions on the subject:
BOSWELL. "Is it w rong then. Sir, to affect singularity, in order 
to make people stare?" JOHNSON. "Yes, if you do  it by
89 Boswell credits one Professor Gaubius o f  Leyden w ith  this explanation. B osw ell offers it as 
proof that although Johnson always feared go in g  mad, and som etim es "was too ready to call 
[his] complaint by the name of madness" (49), he in fact w as only ailing. For, B osw ell explains 
(m uch in the vein  of Battie), "there is surely a d ear distinction betw een a disorder which  
affects on ly  the imagination and spirits, w h ile  the judgem ent is sound, and a disorder by which  
the judgem ent itself is impaired" (49).
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propagating erreur: and, indeed, it is w rong  in  any way. There is 
in  hum an nature a general inclination to m ake people stare; and 
every wise m an has him self to cure of it, and  does cure himself.
If you wish to m ake people stare by do ing  better than others, 
w hy, make them  stare till they stare the ir eyes out. But consider 
how  easy it is to make people stare by being absurd. I may do it 
by going into a draw ing-room  w ithout m y shoes." (Boswell 405) 
Johnson goes on to cite the example of the pseudo-M oor in The Spectator, 
who lived completely by reason—e.g., w earing  clothes that were more 
com fortable than those in fashion, eating only w hen  hungry rather than  
w hen custom  dictated, etc.—and as a result w as declared insane and 
institutionalized. Johnson begins on the subject of the contemptible ease 
w ith  w hich one may be thought "singular," then  proceeds to an example of 
the possibly dire consequences.
Part of him  was all for such consequences, on the grounds that the 
public m ust be valued over the private or subjective. No m atter that public 
conventions "have grow n up by chance, been started by caprice, been 
contrived by affectation, or borrowed w ithout any just motives of choice from  
other countries" (A dven turer  No. 131, 5 Feb. 1754; Yale Works 2:483); no 
m atter that "outw ard customs" in them selves "are of no consequence." In 
fact, those are good reasons to conform: if it d o esn 't m atter anyway, why not? 
N onconform ity or singularity , he argues, causes conflict: "All violation of 
established practice, im plies in its own natu re  a rejection of the common 
opinion, a defiance of common censure, and  an  appeal from general laws to 
private judgm ent"—the individual against society, implicitly criticizing it 
w ith  every singular act. Singularity is fu rtherm ore "in its own nature 
universally and invariably displeasing: in w hatever respect a man differs
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from others, he m ust be considered by them  as either worse o r better." If 
better, "approbation of his practice m ust necessarily condem n him  that gives 
it" (2:485); if w orse, he only pleases others insofar as he makes them  feel 
superior. Either w ay, equality and m utual respect dissipate. A nd always, the 
very fact of ind iv idua l difference annoys, for "nothing out of the  common 
order of nature can be long borne" {Rambler No. 115, 23 Apr. 1751; Yale 
W orks  4:250). As he famously said of Tristram Shandy, a novel th a t both 
enacts and requests tolerance for eccentricity, "N othing odd  w ill do long. 
Tristram Shandy  d id  not last" (Boswell 696).
But at the sam e time, Johnson seem s to recom m end tolerance for 
singularity. Even though he does not find it inherently  laudable—quite the 
opposite—in the sam e A dven tu rer  essay in which he tries to quash it, he at 
least recognizes its now-general self-licensing quality. He acknowledges that 
"hum ourists" (i.e., eccentrics) receive no "other reprehension from  m ankind, 
than that it is his w ay, that he is an odd fellow, and m ust be let alone" {Yale 
W orks  2:484). (A gain, the eccentric is never taken seriously as an  eccentric. 
His oddity, his sym p to m s ,  may meet w ith tolerance, bu t being sym ptom s, 
they are inherently  unwelcome. One tolerates eccentricity as one tolerates 
another's cough.) He does not blame society for responding tliis way; the 
observation is his p roof that eccentricity is not inherently valuable, that it is 
tolerable m erely. Some other statem ents he m ade, though, dem onstrate 
more actual sym pathy—at least indirectly—than  this g rudging  recognition. For 
instance, in Rasselas he makes the extraordinary claim that
if we speak  w ith  rigorous exactness, no hum an m ind is in  its 
right state. . . . All power of fancy over reason is a degree of 
insanity; b u t w hile this power is such as we can control and 
repress, it is not visible to others, nor considered as any
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d ep ravation  of the m ental faculties: it is no t pronounced 
m adness b u t w hen it comes ungovernable, and  apparently  
influences speech or action. {Works 405-406)
Discussing his friend C hristopher Smart, for w hose p ligh t he felt great 
sym pathy, Johnson said, "M adness frequently discovers itself merely by 
unnecessary deviation from the usual modes of the w orld"  (Boswell 2 8 1 ).90 
These tw o statem ents together indicate a real sym pathy  tha t the A ugustan 
side of Johnson w ould  perhaps prefer not to feel. I have been arguing that 
from the beginning  eccentricity has been understood  as m inor madness. 
Johnson understands eccentricity that way, too: he claim s everyone is a little 
mad and tha t only through singularities or eccentricities—"unnecessary 
deviation from  the usual m odes of the w orld"—does the  m inor madness 
reveals itself. A n eccentric is a person who is just a little less successful than 
most a t h id ing  the general disease. Thus this icon of reason, who feared 
going m ad above all else, betrays sym pathy for the eccentric, backhand.
One brief anecdote shou ld  strengthen this poin t. Johnson was 
conscious of his ow n eccentricity, and  in one am using incident, he refused to 
explain it away. (Remember, part of the discourse of eccentricity is the 
conception of the self as h idden , complex, and unfathom able.) Boswell 
writes:
It seem s he had been frequently observed at the C lub to p u t into 
his pocket the Seville oranges, after he had  squeezed the juice of 
them  into the drink  w hich  he made for him self. B eauclerk and 
G arrick talked of it to me, and seemed to th ink  tha t he had a
90 Cf. Boswell 1088: "Many a man is m ad in certain instances, and g o es  through life without 
having it perceived: for example, a  m adness has seized a person o f su p p osin g  him self obliged 
literally to pray continually—had the m adness turned the opposite w a y  and  the person  
thought it a crime ever to pray, it m ight not improbably have continued unobserved." Here, 
too, is the assertion of general m adness and the idea that singular b ehavior betrays it—which, 
as discussed above, indicates backhanded sym pathy for the eccentric.
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strange unw illingness to be discovered. . . .  1 saw on his table the 
spoils of the preceding night, some fresh peels nicely scraped and 
cut into pieces. . . . "A nd pray. Sir, w h a t do you do w ith them?
You scrape them , it seems, very  neatly, and  w hat next?" 
JOHNSON. "I let them  dry. Sir." BOSWELL. "And w hat next?" 
JOHNSON. "N ay, Sir, you shall know  their fate no further." 
BOSWELL. 'T h e n  the w orld  m ust be left in the dark. It m ust be 
said (assum ing a m ock solemnity,) he scraped them, and  let 
them  dry, b u t w hat he did  wdth them  next, he never could be 
prevailed upon  to tell." JOHNSON. "N ay, Sir, you should say it 
m ore em phatically:—he could not be prevailed  upon, even by his 
dearest friends, to tell." (603)
Perhaps he expected to be thought eccentric either way—eccentric for keeping 
such an odd thing a secret, or eccentric for doing whatever he confessed he 
d id  with the orange peels.
As w ith  the subject of m adness as m edically treatable disease, Boswell's 
ideas on the topic of eccentricity are very  m uch in accordance w ith  the 
grow ing general tolerance. He lists Johnson 's oddities, m any of them  
physical in nature, w ith  scrupulous, alm ost reveren t care:
[He had] an anxious care to out or in at a door or passage by a 
certain num ber of steps from a certain point, or at least so as that 
either his righ t or his left foot, (I am no t certain which,) should 
constantly m ake the first actual m ovem ent w hen he came close 
to the door o r p a s s a g e .  9 1 . . . T hat the m ost m inute singularities 
w hich belonged to him , and m ade very  observable parts of his
91 Today this w ould be considered a sym ptom  o f O bsessive-Com pulsive Disorder. It is 
astonishing h o w  strongly the mere m ention o f eccentricities—particularly in a cluster— 
stimulates the desire to d iagnose if not to cure.
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appearance and manner, m ay not be om itted, it is requisite to 
m ention, that while talking or even m using  as he sat in  his 
chair, he commonly held his head  to one side tow ards his righ t 
shoulder, and  shook it in a trem ulous m anner, m oving his body 
backwards and forwards, and rubbing his left knee in the same 
direction, w ith  the palm  of his hand. In the intervals of 
a rticu la ting  he made various sounds w ith his m outh, 
som etim es as if rum inating, or w ha t is called chewing the cud, 
som etim es giving a half w histle, som etim es m aking his tongue 
play backwards from the roof of his m outh, as if clucking like a 
hen, and  sometimes pro trud ing  it against his upper gum s in 
front, as if pronouncing quickly under his breath, too, too, too . . .
[He also] used to blow out his breath like a Whale. (342-43)
Boswell fully recognizes that in nam ing all of Johnson's singularities (a w ord 
he uses often, alw ays in a neutral or positive sense), he provides an  opening 
for the "sneering jocularity" (343) of Johnson 's enemies. H ow ever, Boswell 
desires to "write, not his panegyrick, w hich m ust be all praise, bu t his Life" 
(22). His Life requires completeness of description—"that the m ost m inute 
singularities . . . may not be om itted"—for tw o reasons. First, even the most 
m inute singularities m atter sim ply because they  belonged to Johnson, the 
great m an. In other words, Boswell has determ ined that Johnson w as a great 
m an (he d id  so before they even met); tha t general judgm ent being m ade, 
"singularities" do not vitiate it. Singularities are merely parts, or shades, of 
the general portrait. They provide necessary clues to Johnson's complex, only 
partially accessible self. Second, and as a corollary of the first reason, 
singularities become alm ost honorary in  them selves. Johnson w ould  not be 
Johnson w ithout his singularities. In a sense, they prove his greatness.
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Boswell finds one of Johnson 's most p rom inen t singularities—his self- 
contradictoriness—honorific and im portant enough to  feature in the grand 
sum m ary parag raph  of the Life. Johnson's self-contradictoriness gives proof 
of the greatness of h is m ind;
Man is, in  general, m ade up of contradictory qualities . . .  In 
proportion to the  native vigour of the m ind , the  contradictory 
qualities w ill be the more prominent, and  m ore difficult to be 
adjusted; and , therefore, we are not to w onder, that Johnson 
exhibited an  em inent example of this rem ark  w hich I have 
m ade upon  hum an  nature. (1399)
Boswell, then, finds Johnson's eccentricity no t only essential bu t even 
praiseworthy in  itself, as signifier of mental acuity.
Boswell and  Johnson represent in m icrocosm  the profound changes 
taking place after 1740 in British attitudes tow ard m adness and eccentricity. 
In the self-contradictory way m ade so much of by Boswell, Johnson, the last of 
the old-guard A ugustans, sim ultaneously evinces old-style disgust and new- 
style tolerance for those qualities. In Johnson's career one gets a glimpse of 
the gradual society-w ide change, of the competition betw een two paradigms. 
By Boswell's time, the old paradigm  has been squeezed aside by the new.
iii. Sir Launcelot Greaves, Quixotic H ero 
One of the clearest examples of the new parad igm  is Tobias Smollett's 
novel The Life and Adventures o f  Sir Launcelot Greaves, which was first 
published in 1760-61, serially. In this novel the m ain elements discussed 
above are plain to see: the Quixote figure inspires a t least as m uch adm iration 
and love as derisive laughter; to the degree that he is m ad, his affliction is 
portrayed in essentially medical terms; and his eccentricity is portrayed as
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largely acceptable and admirable. This novel was published ju st two years 
after Battlers Treatise and  nearly thirty years before King George Hi's madness, 
so its stance on these issues was not ye t fully  hegemonic; Launcelot Greaves is 
as much a cause as a result of the new paradigm , then  nascent.
That this is so is reflected in the novel's publishing history. As Peter 
W agner notes, Launcelot Greaves was not received well critically at first; 
critics tended to dism iss it as a poor im itation of Cervantes, and  even the 
Critical Review, edited  by Smollett himself, only praised  the novel's 
characters. Greaves d id  not sell nearly as w ell as Sm ollett's earlier novels 
Roderick Random  (1748), Peregrine Pickle (1751), or Ferdinand Count Fathom 
(1753), nor as well as his Complete FUstoiy o f  England (1757-58) or translation 
of Cervantes's Don Quixote (1755). H ow ever, unusually, Launcelot Greaves 
actually came m ore into dem and as the century  progressed—and  as the point 
of view it represented  grew  to dominance.
As N iehus observes, Smollett includes Quixote figures repeatedly in 
his works: for exam ple, M atthew Bramble and especially L ieutenant Obadiah 
Lismahago in The Expedition o f  H um phry  Clinker (1771); Commodore 
Hawser T runn ion  in Peregrine Pickle; and  in Ferdinand C ount Fathom, 
Theodore, King of Corsica and Sir M ungo Barebones (whose nam e certainly 
suggests Cervantes's Quixote physically). These Quixotes are presented with 
varying degrees of sympathy, Lismahago probably w ith the greatest. 
Certainly, considering  also his translation of Cervantes's novel, Sm ollett was 
profoundly influenced by Don Quixote. According to Paul-Gabriel Boucé, 
Smollett was w orking  on a translation as early as 1748, which he claimed to 
have finished in  1751, four years earlier than  the actual publication. A nd as 
Michael Charles Craddock shows, Sm ollett very directly influenced 
receptions of Don Quixote. In addition to continuing the quixotic tradition in
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his ow n original novels, Smollett translated Don Quixote  w ith  considerably 
greater earthiness and  colloquiality than  M otteux h ad  early  in  the century; he 
m ade the Don even m ore directly accessible and  sym pathetic for the British 
reader.
Sm ollett also created two female Quixotes: Miss W illiams, in Roderick  
R andom ,  w hose excessive reading of romance novels leads her to experience 
life like the heroines she studies; and  N arcissa's aun t (never otherwise 
named), w hose excessive reading of all kinds (novels, philosophy, science, 
etc.) m erely tu rns her into a scatterbrained pedan t—or sometimes, as she 
believes, a cat.
The first of these. Miss Williams, resem bles Lennox's Female Quixote, 
a novel published four years after Roderick R andom .  Lennox's heroine 
Arabella, too, grow s m ad by Battle's standard—her "deluded  imagination" 
causes her to in te rp re t all experience into the term s of her beloved rom antic 
novels. T hat is, she as w om an rightly possesses absolute pow er over her 
adm irers; lifelong absolute chastity is absolutely requ ired  of her, and of course 
of her suitors; and the strictest strictures of courtly  love m ust be obeyed 
w ithout com plaint. But Arabella, like Miss W illiam s and  Narcissa's aunt 
(and unlike Sir Roger de Coverley), represents the rid iculous side of Quixote: 
the entire goal and  action of Arabella's story is to cure  her female quixotry. 
She is only fit for society and  m arriage after being reasoned out of her 
delusion by the ra ther Johnsonian Doctor, in the penu ltim ate  chapter—which, 
because of the "cure," the author herself dubs "the best Chapter in  this 
History" (368).
A rabella's case dem onstrates the most im portan t reasons why, at least 
through the eighteenth century, the eccentric w as though t of strictly as male. 
For one, her readings in romance lead her to value sexual chastity above all
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else, and  to in terpret ail experience in terms of its po tential th rea t to that 
chastity. W hen Quixote does this, eighteenth-century British society finds it 
funny; b u t w hen Arabella does it, it's  more or less expected, only normal. 
The abnorm ality  comes in the degree—and in a cu ltu re  w hich adm ired 
Clarissa and  her obsession w ith chastity, it's a minute degree indeed. Fielding 
can count on a big laugh at the sto ry  of how "Mr. Joseph Andrews  was . . . 
enabled to preserve his Purity in  the midst of such great Tem ptations" 
(Joseph A ndrew s  16), because a m an need not worry about such a silly thing; 
in fact, a m an who did worry w ould  be considered silly, o r even a little mad. 
But a w om an  had to worry; her culture dem anded it of her, by the rules of the 
sexual double standard.
Furtherm ore, Lennox's title  reveals the incoherence of the  concept: A 
fem a le  Quixote? But Quixote is m ale ,  and the eighteenth-century eccentric is 
explicitly and  directly m odeled after h im .  Arabella is "quixotic" in the 
negative sense—she shares his delusion—and is thus unadm irable. But her 
being fem ale precludes her sharing Quixote's admirable qualities. The female 
part in rom ances, which she lives out, consists in stay ing  virtuous, not in 
actively doing  admirable things as male romantic heroes such as Quixote do. 
In p laying the chaste female part she does little more than  her social du ty— 
which takes us back to the first reason the eighteenth-century eccentric is 
male.
In any case, to return to Smollett and Launcelot Greaves: Sm ollett 
increases the Don's respectability in th is novel by actually splitting him  into 
two characters. One, the title character, embodies all Q uixote's best qualities; 
the other. C aptain Crowe, em bodies "all the grotesque elem ents com prised in 
the adventures and even in the character of Don Quixote" (Boucé 98). This 
makes quixotry admirable in two ways. First, the adm irable Quixote figure
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shows the social and sentim ental good a quixotic idealist can accomplish; he 
dem onstrates th a t quixotism  is not inherently rid iculous, but can even be a 
powerful positive force. Second, the bad  Quixote figure reinforces the first 
point: Captain Crowe looks ridiculous not because he imitates Quixote (via 
Greaves) but because he does it badly. Everything indicates that Crowe's goal 
of em ulating Greaves (= Quixote) is w orthy in  itself. For as Beattie w rote in 
1783, "Smollett's design was not to expose h im  [Quixote] to ridicule; but 
rather to recom m end him  to our pity and adm iration . He has therefore 
given him youth , strength, and beauty, and arrayed  him  in an elegant su it of 
armor" (qtd. in N iehus 238). Greaves shines all the m ore brightly for the 
darkness of his double.
Greaves represents Quixote's newly p rom inent admirable side. Like 
the Don (and his successor Sir Roger de Coverley), he is upper-class—Sir 
Launcelot Greaves—m em ber of an old fam ily, an d  son of "Sir Everhard 
Greaves, who possessed a free estate of five thousand  a year in [his] county, 
and was respected by all his neighbours, as m uch for his personal m erit as for 
his family fortune" (56). For Smollett, upper-class status was still needed to 
license eccentricity. When, for instance. C aptain Crow e decides to set up  as a 
Quixote, Smollett makes him look rid iculous by putting the contrary 
reasoning into his mouth: "[C]an'st tell, w hether a m an w ithout being ra ted  a 
lord or a baron, or a w hat d 'ye call um, d 'ye see, m ay 'n t take to the highw ay in 
the way of a frolick, d 'ye see? . . .  if so be as I can 't a t once be commander, 
mayhap I may be bore upon the books as a petty  officer or the like d 'ye  see" 
(88). Crowe's repetition of meaningless epithets ("d 'ye  see"), in addition  to 
his inability to speak w ithout resorting to seafaring  jargon ("com m ander," 
"petty officer"), signals Crowe's m istakenness—the answ er to his question is, 
no, not with the same honor reserved for lords and  barons and w hat d 'ye  call
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urns. As Tim othy Crabshaw , the Sancho Panza figure, observes, "[A ]'n 't vor 
such small gentry as [Crowe] to be mad: they m un leave tha t to their betters" 
(101-102).
C rabshaw 's observation is especially true in  light of the paternalistic 
nature of crusading  benevolence, the particular form  Greaves's quixotry 
takes. As Robert M arkley points out, the righting of w rongs and inequalities 
requires the existence o f social wrongs and inequalities. That is, w ithout a 
class system that makes Greaves a knight (by title as well as by  profession) and 
a man w rongly im prisoned by Justice Gobble, a shopkeeper (see Chapter 11), 
Greaves's crusading w ould not accrue honor because it w ou ld  be unnecessary. 
A society m ore egalitarian  than Sm ollett's w ould render paternalistic, 
aristocratic benevolence obsolete.
In Paul-Gabriel Bouce's words, "Launcelot is young  and handsome 
which is certainly not the case w ith Don Quixote" (94). Smollett describes 
Greaves this way: "His age d id  not seem to exceed thirty: he was tall, and 
seemingly robust; his face long and oval, his nose aquiline, his m outh 
furnished w ith  a set of elegant teeth white as the drifted  snow; his 
complexion clear, and his aspect noble. His chestnut ha ir loosely flowed in 
short natural curls; and his grey eyes shone" (49). His appearance "tends to 
inspire awe rather than  laughter" (Niehus 238), and even "set[sj many a 
female heart a palpitating" (LG 63). Crowe, in contrast, resem bles Quixote all 
too closely. His ridiculous, makeshift, and "very strange su it of arm or"92 
(175) contributes greatly to his ludicrousness: his helm et is
one of the caps used  by the light horse, w ith  straps buckled under 
his chin, and  contrived in  such a m anner as to conceal his whole
92 Though Quixote has an ancient fam ily suit of armor that he scours for use, he has no helmet, 
so he must fashion one out of beaverboard. The helmet is broken in "combat" immediately, and 
is replaced w ith "Mambrino's Helmet" (a barber's basin).
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visage, except the eyes. Instead of a  cuirass, mail, greaves, and 
the other pieces of complete arm our, he was cased in a 
postilion 's leathern  jerkin, covered w ith  th in  plates of tinned 
iron: his buckler w as a potlid, his lance a hop-pole shod w ith 
iron, and  a basket-hilt broad sw ord, like that of Hudibras, 
depended by  a broad buff belt, that g irded  his middle. His feet 
were defended by jack-boots, and his hands by the gloves of a 
trooper. (175-76)
This arm or, m ade up of implements p roper to lower-class functionaries- 
rank-and-file soldiers, postilion, cook, hops-farm er—betrays Crowe's essential 
unfitness for the aristocratic calling of knight-errant. His ridiculous 
appearance, next to G reaves's striking appearance, makes Greaves look all the 
better.
Greaves succeeds in love, ultim ately, desiring and at last actively 
w inning the hand  of A urelia  Darnel, w ho, like him  (and unlike Dulcinea) 
comes from an aristocratic family. Greaves equally succeeds in his idealistic 
social goals: in just over tw o hundred pages, he manages not only to free 
Aurelia from the clutches of her grasp ing  uncle Anthony Darnel, w ho 
confines her (legally) a t a private m adhouse in order to take aw ay her 
inheritance; he also m anages to defy, replace, redress, and extract an apology 
from an evildoing m agistrate; restore a long-lost son to the w rongly 
im prisoned friend of his late mother; tu rn  King's Bench prison into "a 
comfortable asylum  for the unfortunate" (LG 206); and arrest Mr. Bernard 
Shackle, bringing his shady  m ad-confinem ent business to a halt. 93 All th is in 
addition to a plethora of sm all or indiv idual acts of benevolence: bestow ing 
m uch-needed m oney upon  penniless poet Dick Distich, bringing together
93 In light o f the changing attitudes toward m adness, th is last is a telling detail.
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Thomas Clarke and Dolly Cowslip in m arriage, and on and  on. In fact, 
Greaves does not fail at any  of the num erous benevolent acts he attem pts, 
and unlike the original Quixote, he does no harm  to innocents (Quixote 
makes various innocent monks, m ourners, and sheep pay for h is delusions). 
Furthermore, as Boucé points out, the evils Greaves fights are real. Crowe, 
on the other hand , is completely ineffectual. W hen he goes knight-erranting  
w ithout G reaves's guidance, he is m istaken for a highw aym an and  beaten so 
badly by "a rabble of men and women, variously armed w ith flails, pitchforks, 
poles, and m uskets" (175) that his head  inside its crazy helm et swells 
grotesquely and  the helmet must be cut off. The best Crowe ever m anages is 
not interfering w ith  Greaves's good works.
Most im portantly, perhaps, Greaves is a sentim ental figure to a degree 
not even approached by other characters in  the novel. Launcelot Greaves was 
published squarely in the middle of sentim entality 's heyday, as identified by 
Janet Todd—namely, "from the 1740s to the  late 1770s" (9). As she describes 
the d is c o u r s e ,9 4  sentim ental works' sim ple plots exist prim arily  to p rovide a 
series of affecting scenes to which the hero or heroine can react benevolently 
and admirably. The hero exemplifies the proper w ay to feel and  to respond to 
those feelings.
Launcelot Greaves very much em bodies that literary discourse; the 
focus is very m uch on how  the hero fee ls  in a series of em otion-producing 
scenes. As M arkley explains, sentim entality is performative; one show s one's 
sentimental response by means of physical behaviors—tears, quickened pulse, 
gasps, swoons, sighs, blushes. By the rules of sentim ental discourse, such
94 Limited space predude a deeper discussion of this som ew hat complex topic; I acknowledge  
that I am giving the barest thumbnail sketch o f sentim entality, for which purpose Todd's book  
serves w ell. Other excellent recently published books w hich deal w ith sentim entality  in 
greater depth include The Poetics of Sensibility  by Jerome McCann and Sentiment and 
Sociability  by John Mullan.
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physical signs are taken to dem onstrate a deeply feeling, sensitive heart. The 
m ore rem arkab le  the physical response, the m ore sentim ental the heart; the 
m ore sen tim ental the heart, the better its p o s s e s s o r .95 By these criteria, 
G reaves is a  sentim ental m an am ong sentim ental m en. As W agner notes, 
even his nam e can be read as a sentim ental pun: Launcelot Grieves. 
Sentim ental scenes and intense sentim ental responses on G reaves's part 
abound. For example, w hen the reader first meets him, Greaves is treated to 
a lecture ab o u t the necessity of a knight-erranfs choosing a lady-love for 
inspiration; he  "started at this discourse. He tu rned  his eyes on the surgeon 
[Ferret] w ith  a fixed regard: his countenance changed: a torrent of tears gushed 
dow n his cheeks: his head sunk  upon his bosom: he heaved a profound  sigh; 
and rem ained  in  silence w ith all the external m arks of unutterab le  s o r r o w " 96 
(53-54). Soon we leam  that Greaves grieves for the loss of his beloved 
A urelia. To give just one more example, a scene evidently  in tended  to prove 
Greaves's benevolence, which appears just a few pages later: some years 
before the action  of the novel, young L a u n c e lo t9 7  discovers that a family of 
tenants on his father's land has had its cows seized for ren t and is now 
starving. L auncelot calls this d ire  fact to the attention of his innocent father 
(the bailiff d id  it), upon which the father, fairly benevolent in  his ow n right, 
replaces the cows with two of his ow n best and gives the family free rent for 
life. Sm ollett then writes: "This was a very affecting scene. Mr Launcelot
95 See Todd on th is point, as well.
96 There is som eth in g  suspicious about that phrase "with all the external marks." In an ironist 
such as F ield ing it should be read ironically, w ithout hesitation; i.e., the ironist w ou ld  be 
em phasizing th at Greaves looks sorrowful but really is not. In this largely unironic book, 
though, 1 take it  to mean two things. First, Smollett em phasizes the d iagnostic potential of 
Greaves's response—that just as illness can be diagnosed by m eans of physical signs, so can deep 
feeling. And second, there is perhaps a hint o f the sense of mystery about the self so  prevalent 
in Sterne (and in  Cibber)—the idea that only through external, physical signs can w e even  
partially understand another's com plex, hidden self.
97 The fact that Launcelot is young—probably not yet of majority age—indicates, too, that his 
benevolence is  "natural," "innate," and therefore all the better.
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took his father's hand and  kissed it, while the tears ra n  dow n his cheeks; and 
Sir Everhard em braced his son w ith great tenderness, crying, 'M y dear boy! 
God be praised for having given you such a feeling h eart" ' (59-60). A gain and 
again  in  the novel, Greaves, the adm irable Q uixote figure, dem onstrates the 
goodness of his heart w ith  a veritable barrage of groans, sighs, and  tears. His 
sentim ental benevolence carries on the best trad ition  of his predecessors, the 
Spanish Don Quixote an d  the British Sir Roger de  Coverley.
G reaves's perform ative benevolence fu rther solidifies the connection 
betw een benevolence and  eccentricity—a connection th a t still tends to hold 
today. The connection between benevolence a n d  eccentricity exists in 
Q uixote's adventures, bu t, as discussed above, un til w ell into the eighteenth 
century most readers glossed over the form er to focus upon  the latter. 
A ddison  and Steele m ade the connection explicit in Sir Roger: his 
benevolence and  his eccentricity spring from  the  sam e source, his 
d isappoin tm ent in love. Furtherm ore, given his tim e 's  in to lerance for even 
m inor m adness, his benevolence was necessary (and  w as insisted upon) to 
countenance his eccentricity. And now in Greaves, again , d isappoin ted  love 
engenders both benevolence and eccentricity, and  a lthough the same 
intensity  of justification is not required culturally, his tim e's literary-cultural 
taste for sentim entality does encourage Smollett to lay Greaves's good deeds 
on thick. Thus a connection that began because the tw o qualities happened to 
exist in Quixote solidified under the pressure of lite ra ry  and cultural forces 
into a cultural trad ition , into a habitual and seem ingly  natural association of 
two originally unrelated characteristics.
Greaves's m inor m adness or eccentricity does have the sam e cause as
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Sir Roger's, d isappoin tm ent in love,98 but this cause and  its effects upon 
Greaves take on the  aspect of the new  medical m odel of madness. That 
Smollett was a physician is most telling in this regard . Additionally, 
"Smollett was acquainted with the w ork of Dr Battie, and  m ade use of some 
of his ideas to have a 'scientific' explanation for L auncelofs insanity" 
(W agner 13). Greaves himself—w ith  no sign of irony or dem urral on 
Smollett's part—diagnoses his own condition in  term s essentially  identical to 
Battle's. W hen Ferret scoffs, "What! . . . you set up  for a m odem  Don 
Quixote?"
The Knight, eying this censor w ith a look of d isdain , replie[s], in 
a solemn lofty tone: "1 am neither an affected im itator of Don 
Quixote, nor, as I trust in heaven, visited by that sp irit of lunacy 
so adm irably displayed in the fictitious character exhibited by the 
inim itable Cervantes. 1 have not yet encountered a w indm ill for 
a giant; nor m istaken this public house for a m agnificent castle: 
neither do 1 believe this gentlem an to be the constable; nor that 
worthy practitioner to be m aster Elizabat, the surgeon recorded 
in Am adis de Gaul, nor you to be the enchanter A lquife, nor any 
other sage of history or romance. — I see and d istinguish  objects 
as they are discerned and described by other m en. I reason 
without prejudice, can endure contradiction, and, as the 
company perceives, even bear im pertinent censure w ithout
98 That is why, in the passage d ted  above, G reaves bursts into tears. T he last advice he 
needed was to find a lady-love for inspiration. He w as all set to m a n y  Aurelia Darnel, but a 
last-minute politically m otivated family quarrel canceled the w edding. "It w as then w e began 
to think Mr Launcelot a little disordered in his brain, his grief w as so w ild , and his passion so  
impetuous. He refused all sustenance, neglected his person, renounced h is amusements, rode out 
in the rain, som etim es bare headed, strolled about the fields all night, and becam e so peevish, 
that none of the dom estics durst speak to him, without the hazard of broken bones" (72). In 
short, he d isp lays all the symptoms  of (curable) illness. Afterwards, m uch like Sir Roger de 
Coverley, he disdains finding another mate—wliich, too, dem onstrates the steadfastness and 
depth  of his heart.
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passion or resentment. I quarrel w ith none bu t the foes of virtue 
and decorum , against w hom  I have declared perpetual war, and 
them  I w ill every w here attack as the natural enemies of 
m ankind." (50)
In other w ords, he does not suffer from "deluded  im agination"; his 
perceptions m atch other people's. He is not antisocial, but the opposite, 
engaged in  perform ing valuable social reform. He cannot be m ad because he 
doesn't d isp lay  the essential sym ptom s of madness, as Quixote did. Q.E.D.
To the degree that he can be considered m ad, though, his m adness is 
com m unicated in  medical term s. Smollett takes issue w ith  the improper use 
of m edical jargon, such as Dr. K aw dle's blathering justification of Greaves's 
unw arran ted  confinem ent in Shackle's private m ad-hospital:
[YJour disorder is . . . not absolute m adness—no—not m adness— 
you have heard, no doubt, of w hat is called a weakness of the 
nerves, sir,—tho' that is a very inaccurate expression; for this 
phrase, denoting a m orbid excess of sensation, seemes to imply 
that sensation itself is ow ing to the loose cohesion of those 
m aterial particles which constitute the nervous substance, 
inasm uch as the quantity of every effect m ust be proportionable 
to its cause . . .  (230)
But Smollett does appear to subscribe to the medical principles here garbled 
and m isapplied. For instance, he makes clear that Greaves's illness is at least 
partially genetic, or, as understood at the time, that it runs in Launcelot's 
family: his m other "was very whim sical, expensive, and  ill-tem pered, and, . .
. a little—upon  the—flighty order—a little touched or so" (56); his great uncle 
was a " lu n a tic ,. . . had cut his th roat from ear to ear, and  w as found dead on  
the com m union table" (81). A dditionally, G reaves's derangem ent betrays
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itself through ostensibly unm istakable physical sym ptom s; for example, "his 
eyes shone w ith  such vivacity, as plainly shewed tha t his reason was a little 
discomposed" (49). A t one point, he feels tem pted to diagnose h im se l f  mad  
as would befit his rapture: reunited w ith Aurelia, "he sat dow n by her; he 
pressed her soft hand in  his; he began to fear that all he saw  w as the flattering 
vision of a distem pered brain" (163). Such w ondrous visions could not be 
real; to see them  w ould  m ean his im agination was deluded ; he does see 
them; ergo, he m ust be going m ad. In the same scene, A urelia fears driv ing  
him m ad and takes appropriate  precautions: "The tenderness of this 
communication was too painful to be long endured. A urelia  industriously 
interposed other subjects of discourse, that his atten tion  m ight not be 
dangerously overcharged" (164). By the medical m odel, such overcharging 
was truly considered to be a danger. In fact, the derangem ent Greaves suffers 
up to this point is an effect of precisely this, Hattie's n in th  classes of secondary 
causes of m ental illness, "viz. unwearied attention to any one object, as also 
love, grief, and despair" (Battie 85; emphasis in original). Obsession w ith 
disappointed love literally cracks Greaves's brain. Requited love proves to be 
his cure, the cause of illness being rem oved—according to m edical principles. 
Smollett writes:
On a candid scrutiny of his own heart, [Greaves] found himself 
much less unhappy  than he had been before his in terv iew  with 
Aurelia; for, instead of being as formerly torm ented w ith  the 
pangs of despairing love, which had actually unsettled his 
understanding, he was now happily convinced tha t he had
99 Battie identifies tw elve in  all, ranging from "Internal exostoses of the cranium" (i.e., 
pressure on the brain) and sim ilar strictly physical causes (e.g., "Material objects external to 
the body, v i z .  poisons, medicines, and vinous spirits"), to gluttony and idleness (Treatise  78-79). 
O f the twelve causes, only gluttony, idleness, and "unwearied attention to any one object" have 
an arguably psychological (as distinct from  purely physical) quality; how ever, Battie focuses 
upon their tangible, p h y s ic a l  effects upon the body and mind.
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inspired the tender breast of A urelia  w ith  m utual affection . . .
(171)
Note the objective language here: G reaves, physician-like, m akes "a candid 
scrutiny of his ow n heart." He acts as bo th  patien t and  exam ining physician, 
and finds his own sym ptom s m uch im proved . The cause of illness rem oved, 
his sym ptom s easing away, it is not long  before that other effect of his illness, 
chivalry, begins to seem less desirable. H e accordingly resolves
to lay aside his arm our at som e distance from  the metropolis: 
for, ever since his interview  w ith  A urelia, his fondness for 
chivalry had  been gradually abating. As the torrent of his 
despair had disordered the cu rren t of his sober reflection, so 
now, as that despair subsided, his thoughts began to flow 
deliberately in their antient channel. (175)
Note here the physical description of m ental processes—thoughts "flow ing in 
their antient channel"—which also recalls the anatom ical theories of Willis 
and Robinson. In any case, Smollett p rov ides a doubly  happy ending: w ith 
Aurelia and Launcelot reunited, L auncelot's love is returned  and, by the 
sam e m eans, he is cured. Not defeated  and  punished  like Quixote—in fact, 
quite the opposite—but cured and rew arded . H is benevolence remains, 
however, for it is no t benevolence jjer se bu t specifically quixotic 
benevolence, acts of goodness perform ed in  arm or and  outside the law, that 
indicated illness. For their joint, postm arita l benevolence Launcelot and 
Aurelia are "adm ired, esteemed, and app lauded  by every person of taste, 
sentim ent, and benevolence; [and] a t the  sam e tim e beloved, revered, and 
alm ost adored by the common people, am ong w hom  they suffered not the 
merciless hand of indigence or misery to seize one single sacrifice" (254).
In Launcelot Greaves, Smollett balances the dem ands of society and the
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individual. W agner accurately describes the novel as Greaves's search for "a 
reasonable solution accommodating his public  duties (moral, social political) 
on the one hand , and  his private inclinations (love) on the o ther hand. 
Exaggeration on  either side will invariably produce m ental or social 
m adness" (16). O n the side of the ind iv idual, Smollett does m uch to 
countenance G reaves's eccentricity: he gives Greaves m edical and 
sentim ental excuses for his derangem ent; he makes the form  that 
derangem ent takes, crusading benevolence, the  object of universal gushing 
gratitude and awe; and he emphasizes G reaves's adm irable qualities to the 
degree that "the character ends up being m ore of a tedious bore than a 
delightful eccentric" (Niehus 241). A dditionally , Greaves, who is the only 
character w ho seem s fully to recognize and  a ttem pt to reform social evils, 
exemplifies the "device of 'not understanding '" described by M ikhail Bakhtin 
(164). T hat is, Greaves performs the valuable function of standing  outside a 
given set of social conventions and, from that critical, detached, and  therefore 
unusually observant point of view, noticing w hat is w rong w ith them . As "a 
man who neither participates in nor understands" his own society, he is, 
paradoxically, particularly qualified to reform  it" (Bakhtin 164).
A t the sam e tim e, on the side of society, Sm ollett portrays the quixotry 
that constitutes G reaves's individual difference as m adness and then  cures it; 
that is, he norm alizes  Greaves. Greaves's eccentricity, his sym ptom s, are 
show n not to be valuable in themselves bu t instead—by the rules of m edical 
discourse—flaws to be eradicated (like Arabella's in The Female Quixote). He 
m ust be dism ounted  from his hobbyhorse. For all its railing against various 
British institu tions (internecine party  politics, un just confinem ent of the 
sane as m ad, abuse of law by crooked magistrates, etc.), Launcelot Greaves is a 
fundam entally conservative text. Its structure and  accom plishm ent is the
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adjustm ent of Greaves to the  prevailing system, which he never radically 
attacks. W hat he attacks are  abuses of the prevailing system . After his 
symptoms recede, he begins to w ork  w ithin it. For instance, immediately 
after determ ining to hang u p  his arm or, he decides "to w ait w ith  patience, 
until the law  should supersede  the authority of her guard ian , rather than 
adopt any violent expedient w hich m ight hazard the in terest of his passion" 
(LG 175). True, he has a personal stake in working w ith in  the legal system— 
namely, "the interest of his passion"—but that has not stopped  him before, 
and besides, he always succeeded w hen taking m atters into his own hands.
Thus, Launcelot Greaves dem onstrates the self-lim iting logic, the built- 
in dialectic, of the newly m edicalized discourse of m adness and  eccentricity. 
Eccentricity cast as m inor m ental illness sim ultaneously justifies and seeks to 
cure itself. It insists upon its own right to exist, particularly w hen  associated 
with honorific qualities such  as sentim ental benevolence, w hile  at the same 
time it insures that it is ne ither taken seriously nor allow ed m uch latitude. It 
maintains its position on the  borders of respectable, hegem onic society, 
moving neither too near the center nor too far away.
iv. "Vive la Bagatelle": Tristram Shandy, the V iew  
from H obbyhorseback, and the Elusive Self 
Any study of eccentricity m u s t  cover Tristram Shandy, for this novel, 
first published in installm ents by Laurence Sterne betw een 1760 and 1767,100 
is surely the best know n, m ost direct, and most thorough apology for 
eccentricity in all of British literature. Sterne's novel w as from  the start 
wildly popular, even—ironically  enough—among survivors from  Pope's circle
100 According to Ian Watt, tw o volum es appeared in each of the years 1759,1761,1762, and 
1765, and the ninth and last volum e in 1767. The first publication date is often listed as 1760 
because the two volum es published in 1759 were cut and revised extensively, but were restored 
when published in greater numbers in 1760.
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(e.g.. Lord Bathurst). It rem ained so until the Victorian age, since which tim e 
m any bien-pensant critics such as W illiam M akepeace Thackeray have 
objected to its lew dness and  its lack of seriousness. Thackeray called Steme a 
"m ountebank," a "w orn-ou t old scamp," and a "foul satyr" w ho was "vain, 
wicked, w itty and false." F. R. Leavis brushed off Sterne's w ork as
"irresponsible (and nasty) trifling" (qtd. in W att xxxi). However, when 
Johnson dism issed the novel in 1776, he was speaking w ishfully , because it 
did indeed "last."
Like Smollett et al., Sterne clearly reads Don Quixote  w ith  sympathy 
and adm iration, encouraging a sim ilar response to his quixotic characters; he 
dem onstrates that he possesses a medical or physical understand ing  of the 
m ind, though he does infuse that understanding  w ith  occasional doses of 
irony; and more directly  than  any other eighteenth-century w riter (including 
Cibber), he pleads the acceptability, even the virtues, of eccentricity. In doing 
this Sterne subverts the  already-w aning A ugustan s tandards and  A ugustan 
epistemology, which, as I have show n, depend so m uch u p o n  a preference for 
the social over the ind iv idual. In Sterne's Shandean w orld , the subjectivism  
implicit in John Locke's philosophy is taken to (and perhaps past) its logical 
limit: all people are lim ited  to the view  from atop their ow n hobbyhorse; they 
m ust attem pt to com m unicate, to reach each o ther's elusive inner selves, 
across the intervening gap.
In covering the issues already discussed at length above, I will try not 
to belabor these points, w hich any reader of Tristram Shandy  (or of this study, 
by now) w ould know  w ell, bu t instead, try  prim arily to focus upon how  very 
directly Steme makes these argum ents. That he does so, again, indicates both 
how widely these positions were already accepted by the  tim e of Sterne's 
writing, and  how strenuously  he exerts him self to h a v e  them  accepted.
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To beg in  w ith  Sterne's trea tm en t of Quixote: as p lain ly  as Smollett 
adm ires Q uixo te 's character, Sterne expresses his adm iration  even more 
plainly. Del Toro notes that Steme possessed in  his library the 1743 edition of 
M otteux's transla tion  of Don Quixote, and  that he probably read  only that 
version ra th e r  th an  the original Spanish. O ne might say that the sp irit of 
Cervantes—as Cervantes was in terp reted  by m id- to late-eighteenth-century 
readers, m ost of w hom  also read  Cervantes via  M otteux—presides over 
Tristram Shandy; if it does, it is because Steme reverently and  directly 
invokes th a t sp irit:
GENTLE Spirit of sweetest hum our, w ho erst d idst sit upon  the 
easy pen  of m y beloved CERVANTES: Thou who g lided 'st daily 
th ro u g h  his lattice, and tu rn e d 's t the tw ilight of his p rison  into 
noon d ay  brightness by thy presence—tinged 'st his little u rn  of 
w a ter w ith  heaven-sent N ectar, and  all the tim e he w ro te  of 
Sancho and  his master, d id s t cast thy  mystic m antle o 'e r  his 
w ith e r 'd  stum p, and w ide extended it to all the evils of his life— .
. . —T urn  in hither, 1 beseech thee! (780)
The sp irit S terne calls upon is not the sam e "Cervantick" sp irit in  w hich the 
Scriblerus C lub com posed the M em oirs;  S tem e's spirit spreads sunshine and 
eases pain , it does not seek and pun ish  enemies. In fact, on this subject, 
Sterne explicitly distances him self from  Pope's personally attacking style: 
"Pope and  his Portrait are fools to me . . .  [T]ill gods and m en agree together to 
call it by  the  sam e nam e—the erran test TARTUFFE, in science—in  politics—or 
in religion, shall never kindle a spark  w ith in  me, or have a w orse w ord , or a 
more un k in d  greeting, than w hat he w ill read  in the next chapter" (657). 
Those w ords: "Bon jour!—good-m orrow !" etc. (657).
S terne 's narra tor, Tristram , adm ires poor Yorick, the Shandy fam ily's
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clergyman, because Yorick is so good-hearted he is reduced to riding a bony, 
Rosinante-Iike horse—he can never refuse giving his horse to a needy family, 
and rather than dribble away money which could  do more good spent 
otherwise, he determ ines to ride a horse no one w o u ld  ever w ant. Tristram  
writes:
1 have the h ighest idea of the spiritual and  refined  sentim ents of 
this reverend gentlem an, from  this single stroke in  his character, 
w hich I th in k  comes up to any of the honest refinem ents of the 
peerless knight of La Mancha, whom, by the bye, w ith  all his 
follies, 1 love m ore, and would actually have gone further to 
have paid a visit to, than the greatest hero of antiquity. (23)
There is noth ing  am biguous about that praise for Quixote. His "follies" are 
buried  in a brief, qualificatory clause; what T ristram  (and the implied author 
Sterne, who on this po in t is indistinguishable from  his narrator) emphasizes 
is the Don's "honest refinem ents." To liken Yorick to Quixote is high, 
unironic praise.
Sterne also explicitly compares Toby and W alter Shandy to Quixote, 
and makes them —especially Toby—admirable, as well. As De Porte observes, 
"Sterne leaves us no d o u b t that comparisons to the kn igh t of La Mancha are 
intended" (113). W alter, for instance, holds to his o d d  hypotheses—here, the 
im portance of nam es—w ith  truly quixotic vigor: "The Hero of Cervantes 
argued  not the point w ith  more seriousness,—no r had  he m ore faith,—or 
m ore to say on the pow ers of Necromancy in d ishonouring  his deeds,—or on 
DULClNEA's name, in shedding lustre upon them , than  m y father had" (58). 
W hen praising the thoroughness of Ernulphus's curse, W alter speaks "w ith 
the m ost Cervantick  gravity" (200). Toby is said to have "alm ost as many . . . 
books of m ilitary architecture, as Don Quixote was found  to have of chivalry.
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when the curate and  barber invaded his library" (102). A nd Tristram, 
prefiguring the subject of the last two volum es, prom ises that "the am ours of 
my uncle Tobi/ . . . are of so singular a nature, and so Cervantick a cast" (400) 
that they w ill m ake his book successful. Despite their quixotic eccentricities, 
though, W alter and  T oby's best qualities receive the emphasis, as in the 
passage praising Q uixote cited above. For instance, Tristram  often marvels at 
the agonies his father suffers out of concern for him  w hen W alter's intricate 
plans go aw ry—w hen the conception goes badly, w hen Tristram 's nose is 
flattened by forceps, w hen he is m isnam ed, and  w hen he undergoes 
inadvertent circum cision by way of w indow -sash cord. True, W alter's 
distresses are "som e of the oddest and m ost whimsical," because they come 
from "reading the oddest books in the universe" (256), but w hat m atters—to 
Tristram , to Sterne, and  to the tim e's connoisseurs of sentim entality—is that 
he feels them , and feels them  sharply. He tru ly  loves his son; he is "frank 
and generous in his nature" (132). Toby is even more obviously intended to 
be admirable. As De Porte writes, "Toby is a perfect example of w hat the 
eighteenth century was coming to see as a quixotic m adm an. He does 
outlandish things w hich others do not do, and  therefore seems unbalanced; 
yet he is devoid of the base passions w hich anim ate most m en and has 
virtues which m ost m en lack, so that in a sense he is sane and they mad" 
(116). Toby is obsessed w ith siegecraft—w ith perpetually recreating battles in 
his back yard—w hich is som ething most people do not do, but he practices and 
teaches to young  T ristram  universal benevolence:
-G o ,-say s  he, one day at dinner, to an  over-grown [fly] which 
had buzz 'd  about his nose, and torm ented  him  cruelly all 
dinner-tim e,—and  which, after infinite attem pts, he had  caught 
at last, as it flew  by h im ;-l'll not hurt thee, says my uncle Toby . .
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. ril not hu rt a hair o f thy  head . . .  go poor Devil, get thee gone, 
why should I h u rt thee? . . .  I was but ten  years o ld  w hen  this 
happened; . . . [Tjhis I know, that the lesson of universal good­
will then taught and  im prin ted  by my uncle Toby, has never 
since been w orn out of my m ind  . . .  1 often th ink  tha t I owe one 
half of my ph ilan th ropy  to that one accidental im pression. (130- 
31)
Toby brings out the best in  W alter, too: frequently, w hen  Toby's obsession 
annoys Walter, "the generous (tho' hobby-horsical) ga llan try  of my uncle 
Toby, [brings] him  into perfect good hum our . . .  in  an instant" (243). 
T ristram  feels moved by Toby's benevolence to gush, "[M ]y heart stops me to 
pay to thee, my dear uncle Toby, once for all, the tribute 1 ow e thy goodness.— 
H ere let me thrust my chair aside, and  kneel dow n upon  the ground , whilst I 
am  pouring forth the w arm est sentim ents of love for thee, and  veneration 
for the excellency of thy character, that ever ever v irtue  an d  natu re  kindled in 
a nephew 's bosom" (265). For Sterne, Toby's hobbyhorsical "flaw" matters 
m uch less, in the end, than  his goodness of heart. This is also true in 
W alter's case, just as it is in  Don Quixote's. Sterne continues and further 
solidifies the tradition of associating eccentricity w ith  benevolence; once 
again, the latter excuses the  form er, apparently m anifesting itself as an 
in h eren t part of eccentricity.
Sterne expresses a m edical understanding of the m ind  as directly as he 
tells his adm iration for Quixote. De Porte, for one, acknow ledges, "Sterne's 
psychology is indeed highly physiological" (125). In fact, Tristram Shandy 
begins w ith several statem ents regarding the physical na tu re  of the m ind's 
operation: Tristram  refers to the importance of hered ity  to "the happy 
form ation and tem perature of [a child's] body, perhaps [to] his genius and the
145
very cast of his m ind," and  to
the anim al spirits, as how  they are transfused  from  father to son 
. . . whose business it w as to have escorted and  gone hand-in- 
hand w ith the HOM UNCULUS, and  conducted him safe to the 
place destined for his reception . . . Now , dear Sir, w hat if any 
accident had befallen him  in his w ay alone? . . . [and] in this sad 
disorder'd state of nerves, he had laid  dow n a prey to sudden 
starts, or a series of m elancholy dream s and  fancies for nine long 
months together.—1 trem ble to th ink  w h a t a foundation had  
been laid for a thousand  weaknesses both of body and m ind, 
which no skill of the  physician or the philosopher could ever 
afterwards have set thoroughly  to rights. (1-3)
The belief in heredity 's im portance is perfectly in keeping w ith the forem ost 
medical authorities of Sterne's day. The reference to "animal spirits" is 
slightly outdated; it was largely discredited in favor of "fiber" theory by the 
tim e Tristram Shandy  was published. A nd the concept of the hom unculus, 
which has roots in the M iddle Ages, is clearly in tended ironically—as Sterne 
signals by acknow ledging th a t the hom unculus appears "low and ludicrous" 
nowadays, and by jokingly insisting that "he consists, as we do, of skin, hair, 
fat, flesh, veins, arteries, ligam ents, nerves, cartileges, bones, m arrow, brains, 
glands, genitals, hum ours, an d  articulations . . .  in all senses of the w ord, as 
much and as tru ly  our fellow-creature as my Lord Chancellor of England" (2- 
3). Thus, by using more or less outdated m edical explanations for the 
workings of the m ind, Sterne pokes som e fun  a t his tim e's increasingly 
m edical view of that subject. However, the overall im pression he gives is 
one of endorsing the new  discourse. For exam ple, Tristram  w orries in  an 
apostrophe to Toby that Toby's obsessive m ilitary reading will "exasperate thy
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sym ptom s,—check thy perspirations,—evaporate thy  spirits,—waste thy anim al 
strength,—dry  up  thy radical moisture,—bring thee into a costive habit of body, 
im pair thy  health,—and hasten all the infirm ities of thy old age" (104). In 
other w ords, the danger Tristram foresees is that Toby w ill crack his brain 
(and body) upon  books just like Don Quixote d id , in  the dangerous "unvaried 
attention to one object" Battie w arned against, loi M ental overexertion and 
obsession will cause serious damage to the m aterials of body and  mind; or to 
p u t it another way, the brain is just another part of the body, and as such, 
subject to m uch the same perils, w hich Sterne describes as "symptoms." He 
explains the very process of thought in physical terms: "millions of 
[thoughts], as your worship knows, are every day  sw im ing [sic] quietly in  the 
m iddle of the th in  juice of a m an's understanding , w ithout being carried 
backw ards or forw ards, till some little gusts of passion or interest drive them  
to one side" (197). Sterne takes the position, finally, that "A m an's body and 
his m ind, w ith the utmost reverence to both 1 speak it, are exactly like a 
jerkin, and  a jerk in 's lining;—rum ple the one—you rum ple the other" (189).
The new ly medicalized discourse underly ing  Tristram Shandy m eans 
that in this novel, as in the case of Launcelot Greaves, eccentricity possesses 
its own self-lim iting logic. On the one hand, it dem ands acceptance for itself— 
here, very directly. Tristram defiantly dedicates his account of his life and 
opinions (partly) to the moon, age-old folk source of lunacy. He reverently 
recom m ends Toby's tolerant philosophy as exam ple—"This world surely is 
w ide enough to hold both thee and me" (131); he asks, rhetorically, "so long 
as a man rides his HOBBY-HORSE peaceably and quietly along the King's
101 Thus does m onom ania become associated accidentally w ith eccentricity, even to the point of 
seem ing to be an essential sign of it. As the tradition of eccentric literature continues in Steme, 
he, like Sm ollett, A ddison , Steele, Cervantes, e t  al. before him, makes his eccentrics obsessed  
to the point o f m adness with one subject. As in the case of benevolence, what began by chance— 
because Q uixote happened to be obsessed w ith  chivalry—solid ifies by literary and cultural 
tradition into an apparent commonplace truth.
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highway, and  neither compels you or me to get up  behind him ,—pray. Sir, 
w hat have e ither you or I to do with it?" (12). He insists upon his right (and 
anyone's right) to set his own rules, in passages such  as this outburst: "The 
duce of any o ther rule have I to govern myself by in  this affair—and if I had 
one—as I do all th ings ou t of all rule—I w ould tw ist it a n d  tear it to pieces, and 
throw  it into the  fire w hen I had done— . . .  [I]s a m an to follow rules—or rules 
to follow him?" (337). He claims that eccentricity is timeless, u n iv e r s a l ,  102 
and no sham e a t all: "[Hjave not the wisest of men in  all ages, no t excepting 
Solom on  him self,—have they not had their HOBBY-HORSES?" (12). "I keep a 
couple of pads m yself," Tristram  writes, "upon w hich, in  their tu rns, (nor do 
1 care who know s it) I frequently ride out and take the air;—tho' sometimes, to 
my sham e be it spoken, 1 take som ewhat longer journies than  w hat a wise 
man w ould th ink  altogether right" (12-13).t03 Eccentricities are valuable in 
that they keep us from  worse occupations: "[L[et th em  ride on w ithout any 
opposition from  me; for were their lordships u nho rsed  this very night,—'tis 
ten to one bu t th a t m any of them would be worse m oun ted  by one half before 
to-m orrow m orning" (13). And finally, in a reverse tw ist on the idea that
102 N ow, Sterne's plea for universal self-determination or freedom from  social rules should be 
taken cum grano salis, because, like his predecessors in the literature o f eccentricity, Stem e 
really only extends th is privilege to those in the upper classes. T he last word o f the novel's  
full title is neither accidental nor unimportant: The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, 
Gentleman. Look, for exam ple, at the relationship between Corporal Trim and Uncle Toby. 
Trim actually m akes the original suggestion that Toby reenact battles in his (Toby's) back 
yard; however, it is T oby alone who becomes obsessed w ith the w argam es (Trim participates 
willingly enough, but remains capable of thinking about other subjects—his sexual desire for 
the W idow  W adm an's servant Bridget, for instance), Toby w ho habitually m ounts a 
hobbyhorse, Toby w h o possesses the means to maintain  the hobbyhorse in the first place (i.e., 
to purchase the books, maps, and newspapers necessary; to devote land he owns to miniature 
m odels of battlefields). Sterne's language is inclusive, but his exam ples  ind icate that 
eccentricity is still the privilege of the elite. Also, again in the tradition  of h is predecessors, 
Sterne's quixotic eccentrics are male. The W idow Wadman and Mrs. Shandy, the only female 
characters d evelop ed  in this novel, are thoroughly normal by the standards o f their time. In 
fact, next to the bizarre men in their lives, they look uninterestingly grey.
103 Cf. the discussion of Cibber's Apology above. D espite the defiance w ith  w hich  Tristram  
acknowledges his hobbyhorsical habits, as departures from societal norm s an d /or  sym ptom s of 
minor illness, those habits fe e l like shameful things that seem ingly m ust be confessed under 
duress.
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eccentricity is a m inor m ental illness to be cured, he even claims that 
eccentricity possesses curative pow ers itself. The adoption  and care of 
hobbyhorses proves curative to both W alter and Toby. T ristram  likens the 
effects upon  his father of considering the Catholic-theological question, 
"W hether the mother be o f  k in  to her child" (390), to "the anointing of a 
broken bone" (394). For a while, at least, Walter is able to forget his troubles 
and be "hugely tickled w ith  the subtleties of these learned discourses" (394). 
Toby benefits even more and  longer from his hobbyhorse. He originally takes 
up the study  of battlem ents to ease his mind of its perp lexity  in  regards to 
explaining how  he received his w ound; "[H]is recovery depending, as you 
have read , upon the passions and  affections of his m ind, it behoved him to 
take the nicest care to make him self so far master of his subject, as to be able 
to talk  upon  it w ithout em otion" (101). "The more m y uncle Toby drank of 
this sw eet fountain  of science, the greater was the heat and  impatience of his 
thirst" (102); he continues to gather m ilitary knowledge greedily  and to heal 
physically, until one day, im patient any longer to p u t off T rim 's suggestion 
that they reenact battles in Toby's backyard, Toby quits his bed and leaves for 
Shandy Hall. By raising his spirits and  giving him an activity to look forward 
to pursu ing  w hen he becomes well, Toby's hobbyhorse actually cures him. 
Tristram  even claims his book, em bodim ent of hobbyhorsery that it is, cures 
its readers. '"[T]is wrote . . .  against the spleen," he writes,
in  o rder, by a more frequent and a more convulsive elevation 
and  depression of the d iaphragm , and the succussations of the 
intercostal and  abdom inal m uscles in laughter, to d rive  the gall 
and  o ther bitter juices from the gall bladder, liver and  sweet­
b read  of his majesty's subjects, w ith  all the im icitious passions 
w hich belong to them , dow n into their duodénum s. (360)
149
The language is jocular, a slightly satirical exaggeration of medical jargon, but 
in context of the  whole novel (e.g., alongside Toby's case), the message 
appears sincere. Stem e really seems to m ean it w hen he writes, 'T ru e  
Shandeism , th ink  w hat you  will against it, opens the heart and lungs, and 
like all those affections which partake of its nature, it forces the blood and 
other vital flu ids of the body to run freely th ro ' its channels, and makes the 
wheel of like ru n  long and  chearfully round" (401). In Tristram Shandy, 
then, eccentricity justifies its right to exist on the familiar grounds of 
universality, th e  righ t to self-determ ination, and  harmlessness, as well as on 
the new  ground  of curativity. The novel says of eccentricity in general w hat 
W alter says of his odd hypotheses before he begins to believe them: "vive la 
Bagatelle" (60).
If one lays stress on the last w ord of th a t phrase, though, the other side 
of eccentricity's inherent dialectic becomes clear. A "bagatelle" is—and was 
during  Sterne's tim e—"A  trifle, a thing of no value or importance" (OED). 
Eccentricities, oddities, hobbyhorses, call them  w hat you will—in Tristram  
Shandy, as elsew here, they are bagatelles. They can be borne, as Steme asks us 
to do, b u t they are  finally worthless. For exam ple, take W alter's hypotheses: 
whenever he expresses a particularly strange one, good-natured Toby seeks to 
avoid the conflict he w ould  inevitably cause by  d ispu ting  with the vehem ent 
Walter. (V ehem ent adherence to his hypotheses is part of W alter's 
hobbyhorse.) Therefore, Toby "would never offer to answ er this by any other 
kind of argum ent, than  that of w histling half a dozen bars of Lillabullero" 
(78). He spends a lot of the novel w histling Lillabullero, expressing puzzled 
and distressed tolerance of W alter's bizarre ideas. Toby, Tristram, and Mrs.
150
Shandyi04 clearly do not value the hypotheses for themselves any m ore than 
they w ould  value bodily illness in W alter for itself; the best they  can m uster 
is m ere endurance, Sterne writes o f W alter's love of hypotheses like an 
illness or infection that begins as harm less bu t worsens, and  he  w arns others 
of its dangers:
1 m ention this . . .  as a w arning to the learned reader against the 
indiscreet reception of such guests, who . . .  at length claim a 
k ind of settlem ent there,—w orking  sometimes like yeast;—but 
m ore generally after the m anner of the gentle passion, beginning 
in jest,—but ending in dow nright earnest. (60-61)
Similarly, T oby's singleminded devotion to siegecraft causes frequent fits of 
annoyance in W alter, particularly w hen  som e phrase in the curren t topic of 
conversation rem inds Toby of his hobbyhorse and  he begins to ride. W ith all 
the clarity of hindsight, describing Toby still confined to bed and reading his 
m ilitary books, Tristram /Sterne w arns the doom ed Toby against that perilous 
pursuit:
[Sjtop! my dear uncle To6y,—stop!—go no one foot fu rther into 
this thorny and bewilder'd track,—intricate are the steps! intricate 
are the mases [sic] of this labyrinth! intricate are the troubles 
w hich the pursu it of this bew itching phantom , KNOWLEDGE, 
will bring upon thee.-O  my uncle! fly—fly -fly  from it as from a 
serpent. (103)
Sterne asks us to live and let live, to refrain  from  dism ounting others from 
their harm less hobbyhorses. But tha t is precisely the point: by eccentricity's
104 The one sm all hint o f eccentridty in Mrs. Shandy—her unfortunate association of the ideas 
of sexual congress and docks, and her consequent interrupting the former to inquire about the 
latter—causes no end o f consternation in Walter and Tristram. In fact, Tristram begins the book 
w ith a despairing w ish  that his mother and father "had m inded what they w ere about w hen  
they begot me" (1) rather than thought about docks.
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ow n self-lim iting dialectic, eccentricity has a decidedly unpleasant aspect that 
m ust he tolerated. "Am used tolerance" is Foucault's phrase for such a 
response, in Madness and Civilization. One tolerates the off-putting 
sym ptoms;i05 one is am used by  the exotic form of the hobbyhorse; but one 
does no t rejoice in others' hobbyhorse-riding per se. Vive la bagatelle, but in 
a sense, eccentricity is a mere bagatelle.
As M ikhail Bakhtin observes, however, eccentricity is also more than
that:
[l]ftternal man—pure "natural" subjectivity—could be laid bare 
only w ith the help of the clow n and the fool, since an adequate, 
direct (that is, from the point of view  of practical life, not 
allegorical) means for expressing his life was not available. We 
get the figure of the crank (cudak), who has played a most 
im portan t role in the history  of the novel: in Sterne, G oldsm ith, 
H ippel, Jean Paul, Dickens and others. A personalized 
eccentricity, "Shandyism" (Sterne's own term), becomes an 
im portan t means for exposing the "internal m an" and  his "free 
and self-sufficient subjectivity"—means that are analagous to the 
"Pantagruelism " that had served in the Renaissance to reveal a 
coherent external man. (164)
In portraying  eccentrics, Sterne (like other writers of the literature of 
eccentricity, including Smollett, Boswell, and Cibber) inculcates the concept of 
universal subjectivity: the idea th a t in  a sense, we all live in ou r ow n worlds; 
that w e all possess individual, subjective realities w hich are largely
105 On the subject of eccentricity as minor madness, and consequently, o f hobbyhorses as 
sym ptom s, cf. Byrd, "Continuities." He distinguishes the "literal degradation of [earlier) 
eighteenth-century insanity—the shocking excremental squalor" from "Sterne's vision, which 
domesticates fo l ly  to mere eccentricity or humor, . . .  harmless single-mindedness" (515; 
em phasis added).
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mysterious and inaccessible. I emphasize that this was a new, pow erful 
assum ption  or conception, not necessarily the objective truth. (In fact, I 
w ould argue, in  keeping w ith my introductory chapter, tha t it is n o t true—that 
as Foucault w ould  have it, the self is always a construction, not a naturally  
occurring entity of any kind.) This new  assum ption  indirectly affected 
conceptions of eccentricity by soliciting greater tolerance for individuality, 
individual difference (based on ineluctably unique perception and 
experience), and  eccentricity. I have argued that the  Cartesian assum ption of 
total externality and readability lasted up to the tim e of Sir Roger de Coverley; 
in the second half of the century, though, the Shandean  vision of universal 
subjectivity largely replaced it.
This relativistic vision is essentially Lockean. In his hugely influential 
Essay concerning Hum an Understanding, John Locke argues, first, that ideas 
are not innate. (This subject takes up all of Book I.) If tru ths were innate they 
w ould also be universally shared; we w ould all recognize and agree upon 
their truthfulness from  birth. However, continues Locke, our ideas are direct 
consequences of ou r experiences. The particular and  necessarily individual 
stimuli to which we are exposed provide our ideas; then, the particular ideas 
we possess combine w ith each other and with new  (and again, necessarily 
individual) ideas to form  our knowledge. Everyone's knowledge and ideas 
m ust therefore be unique, since they are built from  scratch—inscribed upon 
the tabula rasa 106 of our m inds—out of inheren tly  unduplicable stim uli. 
Complicating this process is the fact that we frequently associate or link ideas, 
sometimes "naturally" and "reasonably" and som etim es not. The association 
of ideas can be strengthened or weakened over tim e.
Although Locke tries in Book 4 to control the  relativ ist im plications of
106 Although that phrase is  often attributed to Locke, he n ever actually used  it. Still, it is an 
accurate description of h is m odel o f learning.
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the Essay's first three books, appealing prim arily  to those buttresses of 
A ugustan society, reason and popular opinion, the damage is a lready done. 
In debunking innate ideas (Descartes's argum ent), he removes the m ain 
grounds for universality  of thought and  experience; then he replaces this 
universal system  w ith  a vision of the m ind as fundam entally  ind iv idua l and 
em inently fallible. A nd this system  of universal subjectivity is the 
epistemology underly ing  Tristram Shandy. Sterne is upfront about it, 
making frequent d irect references to Locke and  Lockean concepts—for 
instance, favorably (and unironically) recom m ending "Locke's Essay upon 
the H um an U nderstanding" to the reader, because it is a valuable "history- 
book . . .  of w hat passes in a m an's ow n m ind" (98). A syllogism 
incorporating elem ents of Bakhtin, Locke, and  Sterne explains the 
epistemology underly ing  Tristram Shandy. 1. Eccentricity is subjectivity—i.e., 
to explore and explain the workings of the eccentric m ind is to posit and reify 
subjectivity itself (Bakhtin). 2. Everyone is eccentric, more or less (Sterne). 3. 
Therefore, everyone possesses individual subjectivity (Locke).
To re tu rn  to Bakhtin 's point: in a sense, for Sterne the hobbyhorse is 
the man. At least, Sterne writes,
doubtless there is a comm unication betw een them  of some kind , 
and my opin ion  rather is, that there is som ething in it more of 
the m anner of electrified bodies,—and  that by means of the 
heated parts of the rider, which come im m ediately into contact 
w ith the back of the HOBBY-HORSE.—By long journies and 
m uch friction, it so happens that the body  of the rider is a t length 
fill'd as full of HOBBY-HORSICAL m atter as it can hold;—so that 
if you  are able to give but a clear descrip tion of the nature of the 
one, you m ay form a pretty exact notion of the genius and
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character of the other. (86)
A hobbyhorse is not m erely a lim ited set of odd behaviors or thoughts but 
rather a total, idiosyncratic w ay of viewing the w orld . Thus, when one 
attacks another's hobbyhorse, as W alter attacks Toby's, "in striking the horse, 
[one] strike[s] the rider too" (552-53). W hat is true of W alter is always true of 
any eccentric—i.e., if everyone is eccentric, of any person:
The tru th  was, his road  lay so very far on one side, from that 
w herein m ost m en travelled ,—that every object before him 
presented a face and section of itself to his eye, altogether 
different from the p lan  and elevation of it seen by the rest of 
m ankind.—In other w ords, 'tw as a different object,—and in course 
was differently considered . . .  (456)
This is going Locke one better. As discussed above, Locke argued that 
experience in the form of sensory perception determ ines ideas, and ideas 
determ ine knowledge. Sterne, however, em phasizes the irrational, 
subjective elements and im plications of Locke's philosophy: the association 
of ideas, and the idea that one shapes experience to fit one's existing 
hobbyhorse (rather than the other w ay around).
The association of ideas is an im portant philosophical point in 
Tristram Shandy. Characters are forever suffering the ludicrous 
consequences of associating the oddest sets of ideas; it happens so much that 
Sterne seems to suggest this is the  primary way we organize experience and 
live life. The best and  certainly m ost volum inous exam ple is probably 
Tristram 's w riting itself: he defies predictability and structure, organizing his 
text strictly on the principle of association, w riting w hatever pops into his 
mind. One thing rem inds him  of another, and another, and  very quickly the 
narrative is far away from w here it was just a page before; then he must fret.
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for example, th a t "things have crow ded in so thick upon me, th a t I have not 
been able to get into that part of my work, tow ards which, I have all the way, 
looked forw ards, w ith  so much earnest desire" (400). O ther exam ples include 
Mrs. Shandy's association of sex w ith clocks; W alter's association of the name 
"Tristram" w ith  a huge host of disagreeable ideas; and the W idow  W adm an's 
gradually advancing  association of Toby w ith her household.
This last exam ple shows the other im portant w ay  in  w hich  Sterne 
stretches Lockean philosophy to em phasize subjectivity: for Sterne's 
characters, ideas (e.g., the W idow's association of Toby w ith  her house) 
determine experience (Toby should be her husband, so she pu rsues him), 
rather than the o ther w ay around, as Locke w ould have it. As T ristram  sums 
up the idea, "It is the nature of an hypothesis, w hen once a man has 
conceived it, th a t it assimulates [sic] every thing to itself as proper 
nourishment; and , from  the first m om ent of your begetting it, it generally 
grows the stronger by every thing you see, hear, read, or understand" (177). 
Once such an hypothesis has established itself, by w hatever rational or 
irrational m eans, "Euclid's demonstrations, could they be brought to batter it 
in breach, shou ld  not all have pow er to overthrow  it" (383). W alter, for 
instance, w ill to lerate no argum ents against the hypotheses by w hich  he lives 
(e.g., the value o f large noses, the determ ining pow er of names), for
he had spared  no pains in picking them  up, and the m ore they 
lay out of the common way, the better still was his title. . . . 
Accordingly he held fast by 'em, both by teeth and claws,—w ould 
fly to w hatever he could lay his hands on,—and, in a w ord , 
w ould in trench  and fortify them  round  w ith  as m any  
circum vallations and breast-works, as m y uncle Toby w ould  a 
citadel. (264)
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Not only does W alter go o u t of his way to pick u p  o d d  ideas, rather than 
passively receiving o rd inary  ideas from  ordinary experience; he then defends 
those bizarre ideas at all costs, and  orders his experience to fit them  rather 
than  the Lockean reverse. W hen T ristram 's nose is flattened, rather than  
observe Tristram  and learn  th rough  observation w h a t k ind  of person he is 
turn ing  out to be, W alter concludes T ristram 's ru in e d  nose w ill ru in  the 
child, interprets every new  event as proof of that d ire  om en, and sets to w ork 
w riting  the m assive and  never-fin ished  Tristrapaedia to salvage w hat he can 
of Tristram 's life.
Sterne's w orld, then, is a very subjective one. As Byrd puts it, "Each 
character perceives the life a round  him  through a n a rro w ly  subjective filter" 
(Bedlam  114). This "filter" is the view  from hobby horseback, which is doubly 
determ inative: everyone possesses hist07 hobbyhorse, and  can only see and 
experience life as it appears from  there; and, this hobbyhorse being in a sense 
one w ith its rider, everyone protects it, w hatever o d d  shape it may possess. 
Such a w orld could potentially  be very lonely. For one thing, hobbyhorses— 
total w orld views—cannot really  be shared. T rim 's in te rest in  siegecraft is the 
only instance of shared hobbyhorsery  in the novel, an d  even his interest, as I 
argue above, does not have nearly the depth or obsessive quality of Toby's. 
Norm ally, hobbyhorses are  strictly  an ind iv idual, subjective phenom enon. 
For all Toby's in troducing siegecraft into conversation, the  subject never 
arouses the slightest spark  of in terest in W alter; in  fact, W alter "thought it 
the m ost ridiculous horse th a t ever gentlem an m ou n ted , and  indeed unless 
my uncle Toby vexed him  abou t it, could never th in k  of it once, w ithout 
smiling about it" (248). Conversely, W alter tries ineffectually  to interest Toby 
in his hypotheses:
107 still "his," the idea of eccentricity still being associated w ith  m en  on ly .
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[W]hen my father's im agination was heated w ith  the in q u iry ,. . .  
no th ing  w ould  serve h im  b u t to heat my uncle Toby's too.
My uncle Toby w ould  give my father all possible fair play 
in  this attem pt; and w ith  infinite patience w ould  sit sm oaking 
his p ipe for whole hours together, w hilst m y father was 
practising upon his head, and  trying every accessible avenue to 
drive Prigtiitz and Scroderus's solutions into it.
W hether they w ere above my uncle Toby's reason,—or 
contrary to it,—or that his brain was like dam p  tinder, and  no 
spark could possibly take hold,—or that it was so full of saps, 
mines, blinds, curtins, and  such m ilitary disqualifications to his 
seeing clearly into Prignitz and  Scroderus's doctrines,—I say not,
(279)
but the fact rem ains, Toby sim ply cannot be brought to com prehend nor care.
A w orld peopled w ith  hobbyhorsem en calling unsuccessfully to each 
other to share the ride is potentially an isolated, m ysterious w orld. Selves are 
hard to descry and to understand from  a distance. "WE live in a w orld beset 
on all sides w ith  m ysteries and ridd les" (776), laments Tristram . We could 
easily see and understand  each o ther's selves if "the fixture of M om us 's  
g la ss" i0 8  were set up in every hum an  breast; "But this . . .  is not the case of the 
inhabitants of this earth;—our m inds shine not th rough  the body, but are 
w rapt up here in a da rk  covering of uncrystalized flesh and  blood; so that if 
we w ould come to the specifick characters of them, w e m ust go some other 
way to work" (83). As the rest of Tristram Shandy dem onstrates, the "other 
way to work" is sym pathetic understanding, exemplified especially by Toby.
108 A s the OED notes, M om us w as the "G reek. . .  god  of ridicule . . .  hence, a fault-finder, a 
critic." That the access w e  do not have is a lso  a critical, fault-finding v iew  is im portant to 
Sterne's would-be benevolent tolerance: he suggests that it is just as w ell w e  cannot see each 
other's selves dearly, for if w e could, w e w o u ld  just find fault.
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De Porte observes that
the isolation of the characters, their inability  to communicate 
verbally, w ould im ply an intolerably bleak view  of human 
relationships w ere there not the com pensation of sym pathetic 
understanding. W alter and Toby can hardly  exchange a single 
idea; yet they are united  by a bond of affection. No m atter how 
much they provoke one another, they are alw ays ready to be 
reconciled on a show  of sen tim en t. . .  (149)
Sentim ent or sym pathetic understanding does "shine through the body," as 
discussed above—by means of tears, sighs, facial expressions, and kind 
gestures. That is why Toby's (and the eccentric's) sentim ental benevolence is 
so im portant, so insisted upon; it helps bridge the interpersonal gap which 
eccentricity's subjectivity produces. We instinctively understand the 
language of the heart as expressed in the language of the body, suggests 
Sterne: "There are some trains of certain ideas w hich leave prints of 
them selves about our eyes and eye-brows; and  there is a consciousness of it, 
som ew here about the heart, which serves but to m ake these etchings the 
stronger—we see, spell, and put them together w ithout a dictionary" (413). 
For instance, w hen Toby annoys Walter into a coughing fit by mounting his 
m ilitary hobbyhorse, he "leap 'd  up without feeling the pain  upon his groin,-  
and, w ith infinite pity, stood beside his brother's chair, tapping his back with 
one hand, and holding his head w ith the other, and  from time to time, 
w ip ing  his eyes w ith a clean cambrick handkerchief, w hich he pull'd out of 
his pocket" (249). The gestures immediately and accurately communicate 
Toby's benevolence to W alter, who instantly d rops his complaint: "The 
affectionate and endearing  m anner in which my uncle Toby d id  these little 
offices,—cut my father th ro ' his reins, for the pain he had  just been giving
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him,—May m y brains be knock'd out w ith a battering ram  or a catapulta, I care 
not which, quo th  m y father to himself,—if ever I insu lt th is w orthy  soul 
more" (249-50).
Stem e, then, contributes significantly to the cultural changes taking 
place in the second half of the eighteenth century. Like Smollett (and 
Johnson and  Boswell, am ong others), he helps m ake quixotic eccentricity, 
understood as a form of minor, treatable m adness, socially respectable. He 
takes Lockean philosophy as far as it will stretch, and  then some, in positing 
universal subjectivity. And he takes away the alienating potential of that 
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Chapter 4
The Rom antic Era: Science M arches O n—O ver the Eccentric
By the Romantic era, the eccentric had  existed in Great Britain for a 
whole century. D uring  those years, by m eans of individual works and  broad 
cultural changes such  as those described in  earlier chapters, the concept 
became w idespread and  definite enough th a t it gained a name: "eccentric" 
was first used as a noun applied  to a person, as in  "the eccentric," by Walter 
Scott in 1832. W ithout elaboration—perhaps in tu iting  that the w ord w ou ld  be 
well enough understood  not to require any—Scott refers in the in troduction 
to St. Ronan's Well to "[m]en of every country playing the eccentric." 
"Eccentric" had been used since the m id-sixteenth century, b u t in an 
astronomical or geom etrical sense, describing planets, orbits, ovals, and
ellipses.t09
There is room  for debate about w hich generally comes first, a concept 
or a particular usage: does usage dissem inate a concept, or m ust a concept be 
widely shared before it can be expressed in w ords? In this case, the latter m ust 
be true; as earlier chapters have shown, a coherent concept of "the eccentric" 
certainly originated and  evolved long before it had  a name. D uring the 
eighteenth century the eccentric was assigned specific attributes—male, higher 
than middle-class, quixotic, m onomaniacal, sexually hapless, benevolent, 
sentim ental, and  "natu ra l"  in  m anners—b u t the figure rem ained nam eless. 
No term, even "Quixote" (as in "a Quixote"), w as applied consistently. The 
coining of "the eccentric" in  1832 only fixed a cultural process long a-m aking, 
labeling a figure and an  idea that had by then  become second nature.
The eccentric of 1832, though, differed significantly from the eccentric
109 During the Romantic era, the word took on a mechanical signification as well: "A circular 
disc fixed on a revolving shaft, som e distance out of centre, w orking freely in a ring." T he OED 
records examples of this sense from 1827 and 1838.
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of the late eighteenth century. W hat was fixed by the new  noun was a 
changed figure, thanks to the Romantic era 's two m ajor developments 
relevant to the genealogy of eccentricity. One such developm ent was the 
(som ewhat paradoxical) m ovem ent of science, increasingly viewed as 
technical, specialized, "fact"- and experiment-based know ledge, into all 
realms of life. The other, complexly linked w ith the first, w as the advent and 
huge popularity  in Great Britain of the "physiologies,"no which are 
collections of brief, often caricatural, verbal and pictorial sketches of 
interesting, unusual, a n d /o r  eccen trical characters. Together, these forces 
made the eccentric even m ore patently  harmless; broadened  the variety of 
possible eccentrics, but also system atized and objectified tha t variety; and 
assigned to their own codifying approach the unassailable authority of 
"natural law ." By the beginning of the Victorian era, science and the 
physiologies had rendered the eccentric considerably less admirable and 
powerful in  British culture than  he had  been forty years earlier.
i. Eccentricity and the Physiologies: The Importance of Being Harmless 
I borrow  the term  "physiologies" from W alter Benjamin. In Charles 
Baudelaire: A  Lyric Poet in the Era o f  High Capitalism, he describes a "special 
literary genre" that blossomed briefly in Paris in the early 1840s:
These books consist of individual sketches which, as it were, 
reproduce the plastic foreground of those panoram as (e.g.. Le 
Diable à Paris, Les Français peints par eux-mêmes] w ith  their 
store of inform ation. N um erous authors contribu ted  to these
HOThe term "physiologies" here w ou ld  perhaps more accurately be replaced by the term 
"freak books." I use the former because, as explained below, physiologies are really later, 
evolved forms 0/ freak books; the later term "physiologies," then, stands for the w hole  
historical sp ecies.
111 "Eccentric" in the specialized sense developed in previous chapters; "eccentric" more or less 
after the tradition of Tristram Shandy and Roger de Coverley.
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volumes. . . .  In this literature, the modest-looking, paperbound, 
pocket-size volum es called "physiologies" had p ride  of place.
They investigated types that might be encountered by a person 
taking a look a t the marketplace. From the itineran t street 
vendor of the boulevards to the dandy in the foyer of the opera- 
house, there w as not a figure of Paris life that w as not sketched 
by a physiologue. . . . After the types had been covered, the 
physiology of the city had its turn. There appeared Paris la nuit,
Paris à table, Paris dan I'eau, Paris à cheval, Paris pittoresque,
Paris Marié. W hen this vein, too, was exhausted, a "physiology" 
of the nations w as attem pted. Nor was the "physiology" of the 
animals neglected . . .  (35-36)
The French physiology, then, depicted familiar, com m on types—the dandy, 
the street vendor—in a w ould-be am using fashion, in ju st a few pages. Being 
"amusing" entailed being  uncontroversial, apolitical (to the average, rapidly 
scanning eye), witty, hum orous, and  fairly superficial. The subject matter was 
specifically not unusual; in fact, much of the p leasure  of consuming 
physiologies lay in the recognition of one's own pow ers of recognition: "I  
know that type!" A nd to elicit that response, the subject m atter had to be 
familiar to its petit-bourgeois a u d ie n c e ; t i2  it had to serve up well-known 
stereotypes and generalizations. As a genre, then, the physiologies shared 
many of the salien t characteristics of seventeenth-century British 
"characters," which are discussed earlier in this study.
Benjamin's description of French physiologies is a rare clue to the 
existence and significance of British physiologies; hence the description's 
prominence here. A fter their (British) heyday in  the first half of the
112 Benjamin: "It w as a basically petty-bourgeois genre" (36).
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nineteenth century, they  sank into oblivion w ithou t a bubble. Benjamin 
notes, "In 1841 there w ere seventy-six new physiologies. After that year, the 
genre declined" (35). In the British case, this is a massive understatem ent. A 
fair am ount of in teresting  w ork  has been done on  the Rom antic sketch—for 
instance, Richard C. Sha's recent article addressing  the sketch's generic 
unclassifiability. H ow ever, the physiology is an uncom m on m anifestation or 
subcategory of the sketch, and critically speaking, it is a forgotten one. No 
critic I could discover, including Sha, discusses the British physiology 
specifically. As valuable as Benjamin's analysis w ould be ordinarily , it 
therefore becomes doubly  so.
His analysis w orks equally well w ith British physiologies, even those 
that appeared decades earlier; and his observations get a t precisely what 
m atters most about them , culturally and in term s of eccentricity. I'll discuss 
w hat that is m om entarily. First, though, I w ill establish that British 
physiologies do resem ble the French, in o rder to dem onstrate Benjamin's 
relevance here. T hen I w ill show  that unlike the French version, the British 
physiology d id  not suddenly  appear around 1840. It has a history that extends 
back to the tu rn  of the century; thus, when I discuss its cultural significance, I 
refer to the entire Romantic period—forty years, no t four. For these reasons, I 
w ill now com pare British to French physiologies, sketch the nature  and 
history of the British version, and then  return  to the British physiology's 
cultural and eccentric significance.
To see how  sim ilar British physiologies are to French, examine, say, 
some of the form er tha t are flogged in the "N ickleby A dvertiser."113 (This
113 All references to the "Nickleby Advertiser" are to the U niversity of Pennsylvania Press's 
edition of N icholas N ick leby .  Only pages of Dickens's novel are numbered; pages of the 
"Advertiser" are not, although they are dated.
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was the collective name for advertising pagesH4 attached to monthly 
installm ents o f Nicholas Nickleby, the novel published by Charles Dickens 
between A pril 1838 and October 1839.) There, leading publisher Chapman 
and Hall invites the public to buy and  peruse Sketches o f  Young Ladies and 
Sketches o f  Young Gentlemen; Robert Tyas offers the new  collection Heads o f  
the People: Portraits o f the English. These prove upon  exam ination to be 
physiologies exactly after the Parisian plan. (Or just before it, by Benjamin's 
chronology.) Heads o f  the People, for instance, offers eight-page verbal 
sketches, w ith  accompanying pictures, of such familiar London types as 'T he 
Diner-out," 'T h e  'Lion' of a Party," 'T h e  Fashionable Physician," 'T he 
Factory C hild," 'T h e  Family Governess," 'T h e  Cockney," and 'T h e  Street- 
Conjuror." Tw enty-tw o different authorsHS describe the ostensible essence of 
forty-eight fam iliar figures—not a but the  fashionable physician, the  Cockney— 
in a bantering, glib tone. Controversy is not to be found; for instance, in the 
portrait of the  factory child, Douglas Jerrold makes a conventional appeal to 
the bourgeois reader's conventional pity, bu t does not criticize the economic 
conditions tha t caused the child to need  to work. In the same vein, Jerrold's 
"lion" of a party  is not a lion of a particular party  that is then singled out as 
the target of satire; rather, the  politician's (i.e., any politician's) supposedly 
essential self-im portance and untrustw orthiness are the comic butts.ti6
114Those w ho lam ent the proliferation o f advertising as a very recent developm ent may be 
surprised to see  the "Nickleby Advertiser"; its pages very nearly equal in number those of the 
novel it accom panies, usually about thirty per m onth to the novel's thirty-two.
115 One o f the authors listed, and to w hom  the single sketch "Captciin Rook and Mr. Pigeon" (a 
card sharp and h is dupe) is attributed, is W illiam  M akepeace Thackeray. The next chapter of 
this study addresses the significance of popular and influential Victorian authors'—e.g., 
Thackeray and D ickens's—creation of w holly one-dim ensional characters. In this sketch, for 
instance, the characters are given individual names but stand for a w hole type; they must 
therefore be (and are) without complexity or contour.
116 See, too, the sketch o f 'T he Cabinet Minister": "He w ants no attribute o f the diabolical 
being, except the cloven foot and a tail" (353). This because he is th e  Cabinet Minister—not a 
Minister belonging to a specific political camp.
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Superficiality and political inoffensiveness are the ru le  in  Heads o f  the People 
and its siblings, just as in  the French physiologies. The portraits are so 
innocuous, in  fact, that the volum e even claims it can reconcile inhabitants 
of the two perennially w arring  countries: the book is "to be seen gazing from 
the w indow s of French shopkeepers, at our 'natural enem ies'—a circumstance 
not likely to aggravate the an tipathy  which N ature had, for some mysterious 
purpose, im planted in the breasts of the Briton and the G aul" (iv). The tone, 
content, and approach of Heads o f  the People closely m atches those of the 
other physiologies advertised w ith it. Innocuous, fam iliar-type-based, brief, 
superficial, apolitical, w ritten  by m any authors: in a w ord, French.
British and French physiologies do, however, d iffer significantly in 
their respective origins. C iting E duard  Fuchs, Benjamin notes,
the beginning of the physiologies coincided w ith  the  so-called 
September Laws, the tightened censorship of 1836. These laws 
sum m arily forced a team  of able artists w ith a background in 
satire out of politics. If that could be done in the graphic arts, the 
governm ent's m anoeuvre w as bound to be all the more 
successful in literature . . .  (36)
In short, the French physiologies had an abrupt, pinpointable beginning in 
the late 1830s as an effect of governm ent censorship. To satirize w ith any 
kind of sharp edge, and especially to satirize politicians, suddenly became 
m uch riskier; artists and w riters therefore turned their talents to purposely 
uncontroversial, apolitical subjects—namely, their fellow  Parisian citizens. 
"Innocuousness was of the essence," in great p a rt due to political 
circum stances (Benjamin 36).
British physiologies, on the other hand, have earlier, more 
evolutionary, and less directly political origins. Britons, typically, claimed
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they invented the genre first. For example, Tyas's advertisem ent in the Oct. 1, 
1839 (i.e., final) 'TSiickleby Advertiser" boasts, "N ot only is the work [Heads o f  
the People] translated into French, and published weekly in Paris, but 
Frenchmen, copying its purpose as applicable to themselves, have pu t forth 
'Les François, ou Moeurs Contem poraines,' in  precisely the same vein as the 
English original."
In any case, the British physiology w as not so much invented as it 
evolved out of the "freak b o o k s " H 7  of the 1800s, 'teens and twenties. I use the 
term  "freak books" because it most succinctly describes their typical subject 
m atter and approach. See, for instance, the self-description of The Eccentric 
M zrror,ii8 first published in 1807, which stands well for the entire genre:
[A] series of lives of such individuals of either sex, as have been 
distinguished by any  extraordinary circumstances from the mass 
of society. They embrace authentic biographical accounts of 
persons rem arkable for longevity, unusual size, strength, 
singular habits and  manners, adventures, virtues and vices, in
117'Xhis term is mine; certainly no freak book billed itself that way.
On the subject of freaks, Leslie Fiedler's Freaks: M yths  and Images of the Secret Self  
remains a worthwhile and intriguing study twenty years after it w as written. Fiedler 
apparently read several o f the sam e freak books I did, although he nam es none. Several o f his 
accounts relate the same details in the same order and em phasis as are found in Romantic-era 
sources. It must be said, though, that he seems much more interested in displaying human 
oddities than in examining w hat the proliferation o f collections of oddities might mean. And 
when he does discuss oddities' significance, the significance he finds is  fundamentally 
personal, individual rather than cultural:
W hat monsters men have needed to believe in they have created for 
themselves in words and pictures when they could not discover them in nature.
And it is with that psychic need, then, that w e should  begin; seeking  
prototypes neither in history or anthropology, nor in em bryology or teratology, 
but in depth psychology, w hich deals w ith  our basic uncertainty about the 
limits of our b o^ es and our egos. (27)
118 The edition dted  here is that of J. and J. Cundee, 1813, primarily because, frankly, it w as  
the only one available. H owever, internal evidence—e.g., frequent references to "current" dates 
that w ere actually current for the original edition, page numbers (according to the National  
Union Catalog) that match the original edition's, and the w idespread practice of plagiarizing  
or just reprinting earlier editions o f physiologies—indicates that the 1813 Cundee edition cited 
serves just as well in terms of textual accuracy.
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short of all such as have gained celebrity or notoriety, by 
deviating in  a rem arkable degree from  the ordinary  course of 
hum an existence. [The collection] reflects the  image of the m ost 
surprising  hum an phenom ena, of the g reatest prodigies, in 
every age and  in  every country, th a t have com m anded the 
particular notice of their contemporaries . .  . (l:iii-iv)H9 
As this descrip tion  w ould indicate, the subjects are various in their 
"deviations." T here  are m isers of unim aginable w ealth  w ho chose to live in 
squalor; the world'^s fattest man, Daniel Lam bert; dw arves and giants; cross- 
dressing w om en w ho passed as men, usually  in  one of the British arm ed 
forces, and one transvestite man, "E lizabeth" Russell, w hom  Samuel 
Johnson thought w as a woman; self-taught arithm etical p rodig ies; daring 
seamen; participants in labyrinthine court in trigues; the extraord inarily  
absent-m inded; actors and  actresses; a "spotted negro"; fam ous historical 
figures including Joan of Arc and Jonathan Swift; a m an nam ed Mr. M athew 
famed for extravagant hospitality, whom Sw ift once visited; and  so on. 
Subjects are m ostly British, but do include—for the sake of 
comprehensiveness, apparently—a few French (e.g., Victor of Aveyron), 
Americans (Jem im a W ilkinson), Poles (Joseph Boruwlaski), Jam aicans 
(Charles M artin), Russians (Jemeljan Pugatschew ), Italians (Sixtus V), and
119 The Eccentric Mirror  is  paginated, well, eccentrically. Each o f its four volum es is about 360 
pages long; but other than the roman-numbered pages o f the preface in Volume 1, the rest of 
each volum e follow s an odd  system . Although the collection w a s apparently never published  
except as an entire bound collection, its pagination suggests a sew ing-together of installm ents. 
The pages are numbered from 1 to about 36; often the latter num ber is higher, som etim es lower, 
depending upon the length o f the portraits in the set. Because o f this odd system , by w hich a 
single volum e could for exam ple have several page 20s, citations not from the preface include 
volume, portrait name, and page number.
1 should add, too, that for reasons o f clarity and organization I am purposely saving  
discussion of this title and ones like it—titles containing the w ord  "eccentric"—for the second  
half of this chapter. There 1 further discuss how  and w h y  the term  m oved, w ithin  just a few  
decades, from referring to any "deviation...from the ordinary course o f human existence" to 
indicating specifically  f / ie  eccentric.
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citizens of a few  other nations. M any subjects lived or had  lived in large 
cities, usually  London. Most were still liv ing at the time of the freak books' 
publication or had d ied  during the eighteenth  century, but a very few  such as 
Joan of A rc had  lived in earlier centuries. H er story, though, is the only  one I 
have found th a t goes back in history beyond  the English Renaissance. Most 
date from  after the Restoration. Recency is definitely the rule.
Such is the freak books' subject m atter. Their approach can be sum m ed 
up in one w ord : exhibition. The title o f one early collection is very telling  in 
this regard: The Wonderful and Scientific  M useum, or. M agazine o f  
Remarkable Characters. This collection w as published in 1803, three years 
after the first freak book, Wilson's Wonderful C h a r a c t e r s W hat is the 
function of item s in a "wonderful an d  scientific m useum " bu t to be on 
exhibit? Later titles, too, indicate the spectacular (in both senses) na ture  of the 
freak books' subjects: Portraits and Lives o f  Remarkable and Eccentric 
Characters (1819), w hich manages to suggest both exhibitedness ("Portraits" 
are m ade to be gazed at) and deviance ("Remarkable and Eccentric"); The  
Eccentric Magazine; or. Lives and Portraits o f  Remarkable Persons (1812), 
which suggests a panoply of oddity, a "m agazine" in the sense of storehouse 
or w ide array, in  addition to its subjects' deviance and exhibitability; and  Life 
and Sketches o f  Curious and Odd Characters (1833), which doubly em phasizes 
its subjects' oddity  w ith  the adjectives "Curious" and  "Odd," in addition  to 
the w ord "Sketch," which again em phasizes the subjects' being placed on 
exhibit. See, too, the end of The Eccentric Mirror's long subtitle: "The whole
120 (First as far as I could discover.) As a note below  explains, Dickens knew Wilson's 
Wonderful Characters. T his collection hung around longer than most; it w as still in print, in a 
seventh edition, in 1850. This w as a new "edition" in name only; as w ith m ost o f the freak 
books, the production of n ew  editions entailed no or extremely minimal change, usually just the 
changing of the publication date and the unjustified tacking-on o f "new and improved" claims. 
Many collections appeared in multiple ed itions w ith in  a year, reflecting the fact that th ey  
were so popular they kept selling out, being reprinted, and selling out again.
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exhibiting an  interesting and WONDERFUL DISPLAY OF HUM AN ACTION 
in the G rand  Theatre of the W orld" (emphasis in  original). Speaking of 
exhibition, m any portraits make direct reference to subjects^ being o n exhibit, 
literally, for money. For example, Daniel Lam bert (fat man), Joseph 
Boruwlaski (dwarf), John Richardson Pimrose Bobey ("spotted  negro"), and 
Thomas T opham  (strong man) apparently  all lived on the proceeds of self­
exhibition for long portions of their lives. Thomas "O ld" Parr became an 
exhibit w illy-nilly: he was "in danger to have been stifeled [sic]," "they came 
in such m ultitudes . . .  (so greedy are the vulgar to hearken to, or gaze after 
novelties)" (M irro r 1: "Thomas Parr" 3). The freak books' exhibitions only 
perpetuated a position many of its subjects already knew  well.
G ranted, The Eccentric Mirror, for one, begins its preface w ith a 
statem ent of lofty educational purpose: "It has been justly  observed by the 
prince of British poets, that T h e  proper study of m ankind is M AN.' It is w ith 
a view to prom ote and facilitate this im portant study, that the Editor of these 
volumes presents [them] to the public" (l:iii). H ow ever, later in the 
collection it betrays the freak books' real attitude and approach: "Portraits of 
such persons, w ith some general traits of their character, are gratifying, not so 
much from  any useful lesson to be derived from  their history and 
adventures, as for their being objects of curiosity" (2: "Bampfylde Moore 
Carew" 1). To be on display, to be gazed at, to be strange and therefore 
interesting: that is the freaks' function. Hence the engraved portraits. The  
Eccentric M irror offers twelve portraits per volume, collected at the beginning 
of each. Later books such as Portraits and Lives offer "correct portraits o f each 
character" (l:iv ; emphasis in original). That is to say, the tendency to exhibit, 
to display "m onsters" (from the Latin monstrare, to show ), only increased 
over the period. It was not enough that freaks' lives be told; they had to be
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seen.
Such are the freak books, physiologies' d irect ancestors. The freak 
books are rem arkably sim ilar to each other. T heir titles, to name one 
connection, are so sim ilar as to render them  alm ost indistinguishable. 
A rranging several titles so they maximally overlap m akes the point m ost 
plainly: W ilson's W onderful Characters; The W onderful and Scientific  
M useum , or, Magazine o f  Remarkable Characters; The Eccentric Magazine; 
or. Lives and Portraits o f  Remarkable Persons; The Eccentric Mirror; Lives 
and Portraits o f Remarkable Characters, Drawn from  the M ost A uthentic  
Sources; Portraits and Lives o f Remarkable and Eccentric Characters; 
Biographical Sketches o f Eccentric Characters (1832); and The Life and 
Sketches o f Curious and Odd Characters (1833).
A second connection am ong the freak books is, again, their subject 
m atter and approach. The sim ilarity goes beyond publishers ' selecting the 
sam e stories and telling them  again and again in  the sam e ways, although 
that happened, too. For example, the stories of Lord Rokeby with his long 
beard and cold-water bathing, Thomas Parr of incredible old age, Bampfylde
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Moore C arew  of the thousand disguises, and  John Elwesi2i and  his wretched 
miserliness appear in virtually every freak book. The life stories were 
apparently  chosen originally for their odd ity , their in teresting deviance, then 
later collections included them because earlie r ones including  the stories sold 
well. The sketches became their ow n k in d  of canon, by m eans of a profit- 
driven closed circle of authority; once popular, alw ays collected. Again, 
though, the or rowings" w ent w ell beyond topics or life stories; close 
reading of a few collections reveals th a t publishers actually stole from  each 
other directly, wholesale. The Eccentric Magazine, published by  G. Smeeton 
in the sum m er of 1812, was the d irect source for both Lives and Portraits, 
published by W. Lewis, and Portraits and Lives, published by J. A m ett. The 
latter two publications take the en tire  text and pictures of the form er—
121 Several m isers turn up in collection after collection: Elwes, Daniel Dancer, W illiam  
Jennings, James Taylor, etc. It is these accounts that N od d y Boffin collects and stud ies in Our 
M utual Friend (1864-65), to Bella W ilfer's great distress. In one scene. Boffin asks Silas W egg 
to read som e o f the accounts aloud, and refers to actual freak books: "'And here's Kirby's 
Wonderful M useum,' said Mr. Boffin, 'and C aulfield 's Characters, and W ilson's. Such 
Characters, W egg, such Characters! I m ust have one or tw o  of the best of 'em  to-night'" (479). 
Boffin finally chooses the life of Dancer, as read from  "M enyw eather's Lives and Anecdotes of 
Misers" (481). This specialized offshoot o f th e freak books—a m iser book—actually  existed, 
and it continued the by then decades-long tradition o f "borrowing" heavily from earlier freak 
books. The passage Dickens quotes from M enyw eather very nearly m atches The Eccentric 
Mirror's. For exam ple, the Mirror:
It took many weeks to explore the contents o f his dwelling. One of his richest 
escrutoirs w as the dung-heap in the cow -house, which contained near 25001. 
and in an old Jacket, carefully tied, and strongly  nailed down to the manger, 
was the sum  of 5001. in gold and Bank notes. (1: "Daniel Dancer" 10-11)
D i ckens /  Merry weather:
It took many weeks to explore its w hole co n ten ts . . .  One o f Mr. Dancer's richest 
escretoires w as found to be a dungheap in the cowhouse; a sum  but little short of 
two thousand five hundred pounds w a s  contained in this rich piece of manure; 
and in an old jacket, carefully tied, and strongly nailed dow n to the m anger, in 
bank notes and gold were found five hundred pounds more. {Our M utual Friend 
483)
If Dickens's treatm ent of characters did not already strongly suggest great fam iliarity w ith  
freak books or physiologies, certainly this p assage should .
Significantly, too, Dickens notes that Boffin "pursued the acquisition o f those dismal 
records w ith the ardour of Don Quixote for h is books o f chivalry" (467). A lthough Boffin turns 
out to have been shamming all along in order to warn Bella by example, the reader has no clue 
of that yet. The idea that one overriding obsession—books of chivalry, d isappointed  love, etc.- 
-could literally crack one's brain survived the R om antic era, living on into the Victorian.
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unchanged except for the preface—add a new  title, and print "new '' 
collections. The page breaks even come at the sam e places, and  the latter two 
collections' p r e fa c e s i2 2  are identical (with each other). The Eccentric 
Magazine, in turn , h ad  w ithout acknow ledgem ent copied The Eccentric 
Mirror, which was produced by G. H. Wilson; the form er collection is really 
just a shorter version o f the latter. In cutting four volum es dow n to two. The  
Eccentric Magazine om its several of the M irror's shorter accounts, m ost of 
them  of foreigners' lives, and trim s several others; w hat text then rem ains is 
almost w ord-for-w ord identical to passages in the Mirror. The repeated 
engravings are all identical. Such "borrowing" was so w idespread and 
thorough that one can say, fairly literally, that to read  one freak book is to 
read them all.
The m ain difference between physiologies and  their parent freak books 
is clear: in one sense, they em phasize opposite qualities in their subjects. The 
former highlights subjects' unrem arkableness, the ir recognizability, their 
ostensible essence; the latter, subjects' difference from  the norm, their oddity, 
their incom m ensurable individuality . The question of how  and w hy the one 
emphasis changed for the other is taken up in the second section of this 
chapter. For now, though, it m ust be established th a t the two genres are in 
fact one, familially related. One powerful piece of prima facie evidence for 
this is format: the physiology includes the same kinds of contents as the freak
122 The Eccentric M agazine's preface is worth quoting here:
Mr. Lemoine w as editor of the first part o f this volume; a  man, unfortunately 
too eccentric blessed w ith  an education and abilities o f the m ost superior order, 
he passed the major part o f his life in selling books, w riting pamphlets, and 
sacrificing at the shrine o f Bacchus—but he is gone!—and w hile w e p ity his 
failings, let us snatch from oblivion, the name of a man, w h ose latter moments 
deserved a far better fate! H is Portrait and Life shall be g iven  in the second  
volum e. [They are not.] (l:v-vi)
In just a few  lines are packed elem ents now  familiar in the literature o f eccentricity, attributed 
here to the e d ito r  o f a book o f  eccentrics, by association: m isdirected education, impracticality, 
eccentricity as a kind of affliction, and lack of due appreciation by an unfeeling world.
177
book, in essentially  the same arrangem ent. Both are d iv ided  into verbal 
portraits of a few  pages each, which do not claim  to be com prehensive—to tell 
an entire life from  beginning to end—but ra ther focus upon  w ha t seems most 
prom inent, in teresting, or striking. Accounts of m isers in the freak books, for 
instance, relate the miser-as-child's financial circumstances, sources and 
extent of the eventual fortune, ind iv idual m anifestations of m iserliness, and 
disposition of the fortune after the m iser's death. Likewise, accounts of 
physically rem arkable people focus on physical details: w hether or not their 
parents were rem arkable in the same way, how  the subject eats, sleeps, and 
moves, and precise measurements. The physiologies, too, rem ain focused 
upon the subject's supposedly essential qualities: the Stock-Broker's greed and 
self-importance, the Cockney's vulgarity, the D iner-out's finicky 
im periousness at table.
Furtherm ore, both physiologies' and freak books' brief accounts 
feature, and usually  begin with (especially after the century's first decade), an 
engraved po rtra it that, much like the verbal sketch, aspires to convey all of a 
life in one sum m ary  image. For example, a commonly reproduced  portrait of 
Daniel Dancer show ed him clutching a sack, presum ably of gold, and looking 
around suspiciously from  under his hat's brim . Thomas Laugher is depicted 
pointing to his b irth  certificate, dated 1700. (The Eccentric Mirror, published 
in 1807, lists him  as still living.) Likewise, the physiologies. "The Hangman" 
in Heads o f  the People is shown grimly hold ing  a noose. 'T h e  Natural 
Young Lady" of Sketches o f Young Ladies can be seen grinning and leaping 
into a w agon in order to exhibit her "natural" high spirits; "The Manly 
Young Lady," rid ing a horse (not sidesaddle) and w earing foxhunting garb. 
Because the freak books and physiologies are so plainly sim ilar, in both 
format and the m ore telling way discussed im m ediately below, I will consider
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th em  all physiologies, early  an d  late, and use that te rm  for them  all.
To return now  to the subject of eccentricity specifically: the 
characteristic all physiologies share, the characteristic th a t m akes them vital 
to the history of eccentricity, is their innocuousness. A gain, "Innocuousness 
was of the essence" (Benjamin 36). In the British case, this was true for 
cu ltu ral reasons more than  for political or legal ones. W hereas French 
authors (at least after 1836) had  to adopt innocuousness to avoid  prosecution, 
British authors of the Rom antic period had few er such  restraints. Certainly 
they had  fewer than a century  before, when, for instance. Swift had to publish 
G ulliver's Travels anonym ously, with revisions, and  u n d e r care of his 
p rin te r George Faulkner, even though the book m ade only veiled satirical 
allusions: high-heels and  low-heels = Tory and W hig parties; Big-Endians 
and Little-Endians = Catholics and Protestants. Lord Byron, for one, freely 
and  frequently attacked the British government in the m ost direct, scabrous 
terms; see, in particular. The Vision o f Judgm ent and  Don Juan. He 
rem ained exiled from  E ngland for...other, nonpolitical reasons. As Raymond 
W illiams notes, "W ordsw orth w rote political pam phlets . . . Coleridge wrote 
political journalism  and  social philosophy, . . . Shelley, in  addition to this, 
d istributed  pam phlets in the s tre e ts ,. . . [and] Southey w as a constant political 
com m entator" {Culture 30-31). N one of them suffered  m uch at the hands of 
the governm ent; in fact, W ordsw orth  and Southey in  particu lar grew  fat off 
it. In short, the political climate in Great Britain w as m ore favorable than 
m any other European countries to frank dissent; therefore, the physiologies 
had relatively little political reason to be innocuous.
Benjamin explains the reason, with such econom y th a t he deserves to 
be quoted at length:
The long series of eccentric or simple, attractive or severe figures
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w hich the physiologies presented to the public in  character 
sketches h ad  one th ing  in common: they w ere harm less an d  of 
perfect bonhom ie. Such a v iew  of one 's fellow m an w as so 
rem ote from  experience that there w ere bound to be 
uncom m only w eigh ty  motives for it. The reason w as an 
uneasiness of a special sort. People had  to adap t them selves to a 
new and ra th e r strange situation, one that is peculiar to big cities. 
Simmel has felicitously form ulated w hat w as involved here. . . . 
"[PJeople had  never been in a position of having to look a t one 
another for long m inutes or even hours w ithout speak ing  to 
one another."  This situation was, as Simmel recognized, not a 
p leasant one. In his Eugene A ram  [1832], Bulwer-Lytton 
orchestrated his description of big-city dw ellers with a reference 
to G oethe's rem ark that every person, the best as well as the 
most w retched, carries around a secret w hich would m ake him  
hateful to all others if it became know n. The physiologies w ere 
designed to brush  such disquieting notions aside as insignificant.
They constituted, so to speak, the blinkers of the "narrow ­
m inded city anim al" which Marx w rote about. (37-38)
This situation, w hich  Benjamin ascribes here to Paris, obtained even  earlier 
in  the cities of G reat Britain, due to the nation 's leading role in  the Industrial 
R evolution.
That story, the  Industrial Revolution, is fam iliar enough. It is useful, 
though, to rem ind  ourselves of the orig inal im port of the phrase:
first used by French writers in the 1820s, and  gradually adopted, 
in the course of the century, by English w riters, [it] is m odelled 
explicitly on an analogy with the French Revolution of 1789. As
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th a t had transform ed France, so this has transform ed England; 
the means of change are different, but the change is com parable 
in  kind: it has produced, by a pattern  of change, a new  society. 
(W illiam s, Culture xiv)
Jam es W att invented the m odern  steam  engine in 1776. In Britain it was 
im m ediately  pu t to use m echanizing and  speeding up production  processes, 
p rim arily  those of m ining and  cloth. In 1784, for instance, British production 
of spun  cotton was tw enty-four tim es greater than that of tw enty years before 
(Johnson 309). After 1815 the rate of technological change was even faster: 
new  high-velocity cotton mills, first bu ilt in Manchester in 1818, speeded up 
the process ten times; and by the early 1820s, there were railroads carrying coal 
and o ther goods all over E ngland (Johnson 309, 189-92). They w ould soon 
carry passengers, as well. T hus w as produced a huge dem and for coal (to run 
the engines and to sell overseas) and  for m anufactured goods (especially 
cotton an d  linen cloth). There w as concomitantly a great dem and  for people 
to run  th e  machines and to m ine and  transport the coal. Therefore, workers, 
m any of them  already being crow ded off their farms anyw ay by the economic 
upheaval, moved to cities to seek wage labor. London's population 
skyrocketed, as did that of other cities, especially the industrial cities of the 
north, B irm ingham , Leeds, M anchester, and  Liverpool. A nd so, during  the 
Rom antic era, hundreds of thousands of Britons found them selves, for the 
first tim e in  their lives, in the situation  Benjamin describes: staring  silently at 
great m asses of strangers w hom  they could not help suspecting of terrible 
secrets. They were newly im m ersed in a frightening, unsym pathetic crowd—a 
new society indeed, a terrifying, sw arm ing, hostile one.
Thom as De Quincey's w orks register this new  urban  fear. It seems 
w orth  no ting  that De Quincey w as born in 1785, and  that he was the son of a
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m erchant in M anchester. He was thus very  m uch a child of the Industrial 
Revolution, grow ing up in one of industria lism 's epicenters. In such a 
position he could not help but share in  the period 's anxieties, which he 
recorded in great detail. In 1834, for instance, uncharacteristically w riting in 
second person, evidently counting upon his reader's sympathy, he describes 
one's grow ing trep idation  upon  even approaching  London, then one's total, 
unnerving  invisibility once there:
A lready at three stages' distance (say, 40 miles from London), 
upon some of the greatest roads, the d im  presentim ent of some 
vast capital reaches you obscurely, and like a misgiving. This 
blind sym pathy w ith  a mighty but unseen object, some vast 
m agnetic range of Alps, in your neighbourhood, continues to 
increase, you know not h o w .. . .  [Y]ou soon begin to feel yourself 
entering the stream  as it were of a N orw egian maelstrom) and 
the stream  at length becomes the rush  of a cataract. . . . This 
trepidation  increases both audibly and  visibly at every half-mile, 
pretty  m uch as one m ay suppose the roar of Niagara and the 
thrilling of the g round  to grow upon  the senses in the last ten 
miles of approach, w ith  the w ind in its favour, until at length it 
w ould absorb and extinguish all o ther sounds whatsoever. . . . 
Everywhere else in England, you yourself, horses, carriage, 
attendants (if you travel with any), are regarded w ith attention, 
perhaps even curiosity: at all events you are seen. But, after 
passing the final post-house on every avenue to London, for the 
latter ten or tw elve miles, you become aw are that you  are no 
longer noticed: nobody sees you; nobody hears you; nobody 
regards you; you do not even regard  yourself. In fact, how
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should  you at the m om ent of first ascertaining y o u r ow n total 
unim portance in  the sum  of things—a poor sh iv e rin g  u n it in the 
aggregate of hum an life? (W orks  1:180-81; em phases in  original)
One can still see, and  the sigh t of the m ultitude unnerves, bu t one cannot be 
seen. A nd one who is not seen is necessarily d isconnected from  one's fellow 
citizens. In a passage cited by Benjamin, Friedrich Engels, writing in 
M anchester in the early 1840s, explains:
The hundreds of thousands of all classes and  ranks crow ding 
past each other, are they not all hum an beings w ith  the same 
qualities and  powers, and  w ith  the same interest in being happy?
. . . A nd still they crow d by one another as though  they had 
no th ing  in comm on, no th ing  to do w ith one ano ther, and  their 
only agreem ent is a tacit one, that each keep to his ow n side of 
the pavem ent, so as not to delay the opposing stream s of the 
crow d, while it occurs to no man to honour ano ther w ith  so 
much as a glance. The brutal indifference, the unfeeling 
isolation of each in his private interest becom es the more 
repellent and offensive, the m ore these ind iv iduals are crow ded 
together, w ithin a lim ited space. . . . The disso lu tion  of m ankind 
into m onads, of which each one has a separate p rincip le  and a 
separate purpose, the w orld  of atoms, is here carried  out to its 
most extreme. (37)
One loses all one's identity  and  com m unity amid the b lind , busy throng; one 
becomes "but one wave in a total Atlantic, one plant (and  a parasitical p lan t 
besides, needing alien props) in a forest of America" (De Quincey, W orks  
1:181-82).
In such a situation, as Benjamin (via Goethe an d  Bulwer-Lytton)
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observes, everyone in  the city seems to possess aw ful secrets. The secrets 
might be specifically sinister or criminal, bu t they need not be; the  mere fact 
of everyone's follow ing "a separate principle and  a separate purpose" which 
is neither know n nor assisted by others indicates a perpetual "w ar of each 
against all" (Engels 37). In other words, the sim ple fact that city dw ellers carry 
out their daily  business w ith little or no know ledge or concern for others' 
daily business m eans that strangers very well m ight be the enemy: the 
stranger one ju st m et (or rather, saw on the street) m ight well be about 
principles and business that directly conflict w ith one's ow n—particularly if, 
say, the stranger w ere competing with one for scarce jobs, or attem pting to 
gain additional capital by underselling others, creating m onopolies, and 
breaking w orkers ' unions. W hat you don 't know  about others can hurt you. 
Paranoia, particu larly  in the city, 123 may be perfectly justified by m undane 
facts such as the  keeping to one's own side of the pavem ent.
In any case, w hatever the nature of people 's secrets, by the end  of the 
eighteenth cen tury  and  now  on into the nineteenth , there w as a general 
sense of m ystery regarding the self: w hat had seem ed transparent a century 
ago now appeared  inaccessible, complex, deep. This w as thought true even of 
one's ow n self, and  so doubly true of another's. De Quincey, for example, 
reports n ightly  journeys into his own m ysterious m ental depths: "I seemed 
every night to descend, not metaphorically, but literally to descend, into 
chasms and  sunless abysses, depths below depths, from  w hich it seemed 
hopeless that I could ever reascend" (103). W hat he found in those depths, 
awful n ightm ares, filled him  with horror and  loathing. People sim ply 
"were" m ysteries, even to themselves, and som etim es m ysteries better left
123 This is not to conclude that the country is innocent and the d ty  is guilty, as W illiam s's The 
Country and the C ity  cautions us against doing. It is just to say, as Engels does, that the "war of 
each against all" "is now here so  sham elessly barefaced, so self-conscious as just here in the 
crowding of the great dty" (37).
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unsolved. (I em phasize: "w ere/' not were.)
This could seem so if one accepted De Q uincey's new  theory of 
memory, which now , post-Freud, we tend to accept as natural fact. "[Tjhere is 
no such th ing  as forgetting  possible to the m ind," De Quincey claims; "a 
thousand accidents may, and will interpose a veil betw een our present 
consciousness and  the secret inscriptions on the m ind; accidents of the same 
sort w ill also rend  aw ay this veil; bu t alike, w hether veiled  or unveiled, the 
inscription rem ains for ever" {Confessions 104). Even the most banal mental 
impressions accum ulate in one's mental "depths," inaccessible perhaps but 
never erased. For
[w]hat else than a natural and m ighty palim psest is the hum an 
brain? Such a palimpsest is my brain; such a palim psest, oh 
reader! is yours. Everlasting layers of ideas, images, feelings, 
have fallen upon your brain softly as light. Each succession has 
seem ed to bury  all that went before. And yet, in  reality, not one 
has been extinguished. {W orks 10:346)
They merely lie stored, hidden away, "waiting to be revealed, when the 
obscuring daylight shall have w ithdraw n" {Confessions 104). (Note the 
repeated association of the hidden w ith the dark.) Such memories may not at 
first be recognizable as one's own, yet they undeniably are: "[l]f I had been told 
of them  w hen w aking, I should not have been able to acknow ledge them as 
parts of my past experience. But placed as they were before me, in dreams like 
intuitions. . . 1 recognized  them instantaneously" (104; em phasis in original). 
If the m ind really  w ere like this, then the volume of h idden, inaccessible 
inform ation and m em ories w ould have to be m assive in relation to those 
consciously know n and remembered. Hence the sense of mystery. The brain, 
now generally understood to be a medical or physical rather than a
185
m etaphysical entity, hides m ost of its contents from  its very  owner.
Surely this sense of the self's hiddenness an d  potential awfulness 
drives many of the w idely read British Rom antic narratives of self: a 
fundam ental function of such works, at some cultural and  individual-psychic 
level, is to get to the bottom  of who these people, and  by  extrapolation people 
in general, really are deep down. Such attem pts w ou ld  of course include 
W ordsw orth 's Prelude, in w hich he traces the "G row th  of a Poet's Mind" 
from  childhood, and  Byron's Childe Harold's Pilgrimage'^^^ and the 
autobiographical interpolations of Don Juan, just to nam e a few  prom inent 
examples. Nearly all of De Quincey's oeuvre perform s the function of 
exploring and confessing the m ysterious depths of the h idden  s e lf .  125 Note, 
in this connection, the key w ord "Confessions" in his best-known work.
124 In N ightm are A bbey, published in 1818, soon after the fourth canto of C h ilde  Harold, 
Thomas Love Peacock satirizes Byron's never-ending exploration o f  the gloom y mazes of his 
ow n soul, sketching him as the funereal Mr. Cypress, forever roam ing around the dank Abbey 
drinking w ine from a cup fashioned from a human skull—amernento mori—w h ile  lamenting the 
irreparable loss of youth, the im possib ility  of achieving lasting happ iness, etc.: all the 
familiar Byronic themes. The satire works partly because because it resem bles Byron, or a 
certain side of him as presented in his poetiy; but it also works because "Byronism," or a 
determination to sound one's own sorrowful depths, was already a w idespread phenomenon. 
Sketches o f Young Gentlemen (1838) makes reference to it: "Time w as, and not very long ago 
either, when a singular epidemic raged among the young gentlemen, vast numbers of whom, 
under the influence of the malady, tore off their neckerchiefs, turned dow n their shirt collars, 
and exhibited them selves in the open streets with bare throats and dejected countenances, 
before the eyes of an astonished public. These were the poetical you n g  gentlemen" (81). 
Peacock's epigraph from Samuel Butler is an unavailing attempt to sneer aw ay a culture-wide 
impulse:
There's a dark lantern of the spirit.
Which none see by but those w ho bear it.
That makes them in the dark see visions 
And hag them selves w ith  apparitions.
Find racks for their ow n minds, and vaunt 
O f their ow n misery and want. (37)
125 Alina Clej acknowledges this basic point: "Throughout his adult life Thom as De Quincey 
pursued the project of 'self-revelation' initiated by his first Confessions, a task he never 
seem ed able to com plete or abandon" (19). However, she quarrels a  bit w ith  this reading— 
hence the quotation marks around "self-revelation"—pointing out that for every bit of his 
secret self he reveals. De Q uincey teasingly  hides another. Clej h o ld s that he always hints at 
more he could be saying but isn't, and argues that his overriding m otive w as not philosophical 
or self-therapeutic but financial.
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Confessions o f an English Opium-Eater (1822). 126 There, he m eticulously 
traces the sources of his opium  addiction, horrific  dream s, and  im aginative 
habits back to childhood; he does so in even greater detail later in the 1856 
revision and in  the abortive sequel, Suspiria de Profundis. (Note the 
significance of this latter title, too: "Sighs fro m  the depths.") He also records 
the concomitant sense, that others—in particular, city dw ellers—possess 
strange and potentially  sinister secrets. For exam ple, while describing in the 
Confessions his ha rd  tim es in  London, he observes: T h e  inner economy o f . .
. a man's daily life w ould  present a m ost strange picture . . . Even w ith my 
limited opportunities for observing w hat w en t on, I saw  m any scenes of 
London intrigues, and  complex chicanery, 'cycle and epicycle, orb in orb '" (48). 
Certainly one cannot convince oneself tha t the city crowd is friendly: "it 
cannot be denied that . . . London society is harsh, cruel, and repulsive" (50- 
51). Only opium  allow s him comm union w ith  the people. Only intoxicated, 
on Saturday night—m ost w orkers' day for spending  their pay, as he specifies— 
can he enjoy and no t fear the company of strangers encountered in the street. 
Opium provides a rare m eans of breaking dow n the fears and barriers 
imposed by urban  society, of reaching o thers ' elusive selves and speaking 
w ith them:
G radually I became familiar w ith their w ishes, their difficulties, 
and their opinions. . . . W henever I saw  occasion, or could do it 
w ithout appearing  to be intrusive [for others m istrust us as
1261 cite the 1822 edition rather than the 1856 for tw o reasons. First, obviously, the 1822 
edition fails w ithin the period  covered by this chapter, w hereas the later edition w ou ld  not. 
Second, the 1856 text is thoroughly altered—to begin w ith , it is three times the length o f the 
1822—and very m uch a book o f its later time. De Q uincey really entered into the Victorian 
spirit of the age in revising his Confessions: he added further deta ils o f his relationship w ith  
family and guardians (fam ily values), reminiscences o f h is tim es w ith  W ordsworth and  
Coleridge (literary mem oirs), additional pseudoscientific d iscussion of the use and effects of 
opium  (scientific explanations), and—see Freud, a few  decades afterwards—greater em phasis 
on the effects of h is early childhood experiences in shaping his im agination and dreams 
(psychoanalysis).
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m uch as we do them], I joined their parties . . .  I d rew  from 
op ium  som e means of consoling myself. For opium  (like the 
bee, that extracts its m aterials indiscrim inately from roses and  
from  the soot of chimneys) can overrule all feelings into a 
com pliance w ith  the m aster key. (81)
O pium  can do w hat even sincere good will could not: bring  the dwellers 
am id "the soot of chimneys" w ithin  sym pathetic  reach.
The very plan of the city, too, the labyrinthine urban  geography so 
different from  the open vistas of the country, inspired confused alienation. 
De Q uincey records that frequently, w hen walking home, he w ould come 
"suddenly  upon such knotty problem s of alleys, such enigm atical entries, and 
such sphinx 's riddles of streets w ithou t thoroughfares, . . . [that] 1 could 
alm ost have believed, at times, that I m ust be the first discoverer of some of 
these terræ incognitæ , and doubted, w hether they had yet been laid down in 
the m odern charts of London" (81). To live in London, or by extension any 
city, was to be a stranger in a strange and  hostile land.
A ll these related terrors—the hostile crowds, the feelings of utter 
insignificance, the tw isted, m ysterious streets—deeply bruised his psyche. He 
laments, "1 paid a heavy price in d istan t years, when the hum an face 
tyrannized  over my dream s, and  the perplexities of my steps in  London came 
back and  haunted  my sleep" (81). He m eans quite literally th a t "the human 
face tyraim ized over [his] dream s": in  them , upon oceans of water, "the 
hum an face began to appear: the sea appeared  paved w ith innum erable faces, 
up turned  to the heavens: faces, im ploring, wrathful, despairing, surged 
upw ards by thousands, by myriads, by generations, by centuries" (108). He 
blames his terrors conjecturally on city life: "Perhaps some p a rt of my London 
life m ight be answerable for this" (108). In the same passage from  the 1856
188
edition, the blame for the nightm ares becomes m ore pointed: "Perhaps some 
part of m y London life (the searching for Ann am ongst fluctuating crowds) 
m ight be answerable for this" (W orks  3:441).
Such were the fears newly faced by British society in  the Romantic era. 
So, such w ere the fears physiologies functioned to soothe: "The physiologies 
were designed to brush  such disquieting notions aside as insignificant" 
(Benjamin 38). If looking at the surrounding crow ds of m ysterious and 
terrible strangers w as the problem, then the physiologies provided the 
solution. The solution was obvious and twofold: m ake the strangers seem 
less m ysterious, and  m ake them appear less terrible. Convince readers that 
the people they saw  w ere easily and thoroughly "readable" in  a glance, and 
that everything read  in this fashion was utterly benign. This double 
am elioration w ould reconcile British citizens to the new  urban  order of 
existence.
The first p a rt of the solution is easily seen in  the physiologies' format. 
As discussed above, individual lives are brief and focused, relating only the 
"interesting" portion. Compare the few-page physiology with late 
eighteenth- and early  nineteenth-century biography and autobiography: 
Boswell's Life o f  Johnson fills nearly two thousand pages; autobiographies by 
Coleridge and De Quincey (especially De Quincey) ram ble on for several 
hundred apiece. The tendency was to collect and relate every possible detail, 
for it all seem ed relevant. In the physiological sketch, though, only the 
oddity seem ed to m atter, so that is all that is discussed. Along the same line, 
and especially by the 1840s, physiological sketches frequently include pictures 
that, like the accom panying words, sum  up all of a life, a self, in one quickly 
consum able image.
These tactics subtly  instill the belief that "w hat you see is what you
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get"—that one can see all in a glance, and  tha t the objects of one's gaze do not 
possess disquieting secrets after all. In response to the perceived elusiveness 
and secrecy of the self, the physiologies reclaim  its instant, u tter readability. 
As Benjamin pu ts it, "They assured people that everyone was, 
unencum bered by any factual knowledge, able to make out the profession, the 
character, the background, and the life-style of passers-by" (39), Better yet, the 
physiologies suggest that this valuable skill need not even be learned or 
cultivated: "In these writings this ability appears as a gift w hich a good fairy 
bestows upon an inhabitant of a big city at birth" (39),
The second part of the comfort physiologies offer is that they render 
their subjects innocuous. Even sketches of potentially  rough or 
unsym pathetic characters—for example, the misers, w ho often brought 
families into unnecessary squalor and m isery  along w ith  them selves, or 
daring adventurers such as the nobleman bully  Lord Cam elford—in balance 
show their subjects in a positive light. H ow ever m uch atten tion  people's 
awful qualities receive, their more am using, benevolent, and  above all, 
harm less ones are a t last insisted upon, som etim es w ithou t m uch apparent 
justification. The physiologies raise the specter of potentially  terrible
difference—all these strange people m assed together in one book!—only to 
tame it, to reveal it as a mere harmless, am using  poltergeist sum m oned for 
our entertainm ent,
Camelford's story, as told in Th e Eccentric Mirror, concisely illustrates 
the position the physiologies encourage and  the means by w hich they do it. 
Namely, the M irror arranges details and  com m entary in such a w ay that the 
reader really cannot help bu t overlook traits such as C am elford 's violence 
and cruelty in favor of his more sym pathetic or am using characteristics. 
Confronted w ith potentially unnerving oddity , the reader is brought to find
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that odd ity  excusable o r even kind of cute.
The opening parag raph  provides a striking m icrosm ic example of how  
this works. It begins: "We cannot survey the circumstances of the life of this 
eccentric and  unfortunate  noblem an w ithout regretting th a t the virtues and  
good qualities which he occasionally manifested, w ere obscured by passions 
often dangerous to the peace and welfare of society" (4: "Lord Camelford" 3). 
The pronoun "we" w as probably intended to m ean "w e the people who 
assem bled this collection," bu t it m ust be read also or p rim arily  to m ean "you 
the reader and I the author," or even sim ply "everyone." The very first w ord, 
then, solicits the reader's  complicity w ith  the sketch's position. "We cannot 
survey . . . w ithout": w e  cannot help but adopt the follow ing position; it is 
ineluctable, like natural law. Camelford was an "eccentric and unfortunate 
noblem an." "Eccentric" here (as in the collection's title) bears a neutral 
signification, much like the astronom ical one discussed above—out of the 
common road; different; variant, and  not necessarily in  a bad  way. The 
second section of this chapter will further discuss the period 's use of the w ord  
"eccentric"; but for now , to move on to the w ord  "unfortunate," the 
suggestion is subtly m ade that Camelford suffered from  sim ple bad luck, that 
he has suffered enough w ithou t our condem ning him, too. A dditionally , the 
fact that he was a "noblem an" ("great grandson of the fam ous Governor Pitt" 
[4]) grants him some license. He also had "virtues and  good qualities"— 
definitely a point in his favor—even they were som etim es "obscured" by his 
"passions." Note the suggestion here, too, that insofar as Camelford had  a 
secret self—"obscured" qualities, traits sometimes unavailable to view—those 
qualities are specified to have been good.
Still, the sentence ends on an om inous note: "dangerous to the peace 
and welfare of society." (N ot all that ominous, though: his offenses w ere
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against the abstract "peace and  welfare of society" rather than against 
particular, living indiv iduals.) So the next sentence dism isses the potential 
evil: "At the sam e time these mischiefs were not the resu lt of a bad heart; for 
when reason and reflection recovered the dom inion w hich the  love of every 
species of extravagance had  usu rped  in his mind, he though t no sacrifice too 
great, to repair the in juries which the gratification of his hum our had 
occasioned" (3). He d id n 't  in te n d  harm; his "heart" was not bad (again, the 
hidden is specified to have been good). Besides, he tried  hard  to rectify his 
mistakes—"no sacrifice w as too great"—which were in any case only brought 
about by the "gratification of his hum our." That m akes it sound as if his 
offenses sp rung  from (again) natural, ineluctable urges, "hum ours" as in the 
four hum ors theory of the body—i.e., an excess of choler m ade him  do it. The 
later phrase "usurped in his m ind" reinforces this hint th a t he was blameless: 
hey, the im pulse just took him  over. The phrase "gratification of his 
hum our" also m akes C am elford  sound  like a whim sical ra th e r than a violent 
man, like his offenses w ere  harm less caprices on the o rder of donning armor 
or playing wargam es in his back yard. Too, how m any bad  things can one say 
about one whose "reason and reflection" eventually "recovered [their] 
dom inion," w hich suggests tha t his "hum ours" w ere short-lived and 
therefore nugatory? O r about one possessing a "love of every form of 
extravagance"? Isn 't "extravagance," particularly of em otion, w hat the 
Romantic era was all about?
The paragraph concludes:
He exhibited a tru ly  singular com pound of hum an virtues and 
frailties; being d istinguished  for eccentric boldness and 
intrepidity of spirit; for m any acts of noble, bu t oddly  irregular, 
beneficence; for a love of frolic; and a passion for national and
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scientific pursuits; a t one time, for uncom m on dignity , good 
sense, and enlargem ent of sentim ents; at another, for 
unreasonable positiveness; for liberality of expence w ithou t 
foolish vanity or m ad profusion; so that those who stu d ied  his 
character w ith  the greatest attention, knew  not w hether they 
ought to adm ire his virtues and rectitude of understanding , or to 
lament his dangerous eccentricities. (3-4)
By my count there are six clearly or subtly positive qualities listed here 
(counting "eccentric boldness and intrepidity of spirit" as one), w ith  only one 
negative one. Even the latter, "unreasonable positiveness," m akes him 
sound merely stubborn in an innocuous way, a bit of a crank a t worst. 
Together w ith the other subtle rhetoric discussed above, this list m akes the 
choice of w hether to "adm ire his virtues and rectitude of u nders tand ing  or to 
lam ent his dangerous eccentricities" a non-choice. The latter becomes 
impossible. His eccentricities seem as dangerous as Toby Shandy's.
That said, let us examine on a broader level w hat "dangerous 
eccentricities" this sketch reveals, and how they are glossed over. Early in his 
naval career Camelford was found guilty of "refractoriness and disobedience 
of orders" (5); the resulting discipline "he w ould not endure" (6). However, 
the M irror is quick to reassure us, again, that the infractions w ere "the result 
rather of a certain peculiarity of temper, than of either badness of heart or 
w ant of understanding" (5). Later, serving on a different ship, Camelford 
"sent a challenge to C aptain Vancouver, for the ill treatm ent he a lledged he 
had received while under his command," ignoring V ancouver's response 
that "the measures of which he complained . . . w ere absolutely necessary for 
the preservation of discipline" (6). Camelford paid  for it in  the end, though, 
as the Mirror states in  undeniably  sym pathetic terms: "The chagrin  of this
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unm erited disgrace [a conclusion reached w ithout any presentation of 
evidence] is said to have preyed  w ith  such violence on the spirits of that 
m eritorious officer, as to accelerate his death, w hich happened  not long 
afterwards" (6-7). This is quite a stretch, given that Cam elford actually died 
from a duel w ith  a d ifferen t man.
Soon after the challenge, Camelford attem pted to com m andeer 
another British ship officially under a superior (but absent) officer's control. 
The absent captain 's lieutenant persisted in resisting C am elford 's commands, 
so "Lord Cam elford im m ediately p u t the pistol to his breast, and  shot him 
through the body" (8). Extraordinarily, particularly since the incident 
happened before a large crow d of witnesses, Camelford w as acquitted of 
m utiny. The M irror cites the court-m artial's exonerative decision at length— 
at m uch greater length than  the offense. Summing up C am elford 's character 
as captain, the physiology states, "In his professional duties he w as a severe 
disciplinarian, and to his honor be it m entioned, he was particu larly  attentive 
to the com fort and relief of the sick" (10). The second statem ent, together 
with the specification that it is "to his honor," takes all possible sting out of 
the first.
W ithout such clockw ork reassurance of his adm irable qualities, it 
w ould be hard  to m ain tain  a positive view of the man; w ithou t praise he 
comes off like a hot-tem pered bully. Even the M irror m ust acknow ledge that 
"[h]is irritable disposition . . . involved him in num berless quarrels and 
disputes" (21). For instance, he acted as ringleader at a riot in the D rury Lane 
Theatre, du ring  w hich he repeated ly  punched one Mr. H um phries w ithout 
provocation until he "at last left him  w ith  one of his eyes alm ost beaten out, 
and w ounded  over the eye near the tem ple" (15). One night Cam elford and a 
friend "took it into their heads to chastise the guardians of the  night, for not
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exercising due vigilance" (17); thereupon, they  attacked four watchmen, 
severely w ounding two. Camelford was know n for picking fights w ith 
unoffending coffeehouse patrons; in  fact, it w as one such fight that led to his 
death. H aving heard  a rum or that one Mr. Best had said som ething against 
him, Cam elford perem ptorily  challenged Best to a duel, ignoring  the letter's 
strenuous denials and pleas for peace. T hat duel killed Camelford, quite 
senselessly.
Yet every tim e a shadow  of criticism  begins to lower over the sketch, it 
is exorcised by a sunny, glowing detail. For instance, to m ake Camelford's 
rather idiotic death  m ore sym pathetic, Th e Eccentric Mirror dilates upon his 
protracted death  agonies, and chooses them  for its sum m ary engraving. 
(Above the legend "Death of Lord Cam elford," he appears semi-reclining, 
supported by tw o friends, sadly shaking the hand of his killer in 
f o r g iv e n e s s . ! 27) The incident is even m ade in to  a lesson in piety:
"I wish," says Mr. Cockburne [Cam elford's clergyman], "w ith all 
my soul, tha t the un th inking  vo taries of d issipation  and 
infidelity could have been present at the death  bed of this poor 
man; could have heard his expression of contrition after 
m isconduct, and of reliance on the m ercy of his Creator, could 
have heard his dying  exhortation to one of his intim ate friends, 
to live in fu ture a life of peace and  virtue: I think it w ou ld  have 
m ade im pressions on their m inds, as i t  d id  on mine, not easily 
to be effaced." (26)
Even his m ost m em orable and foolhardy exploit—singlehandedly  "to repair
■>27 The engraving is not strictly accurate: Camelford d id n o t die on the "field of honor" but at 
home, several days later, from complications of the bullet w ound—which Best tried to decline 
to inflict, after Camelford's shot m issed. This factual inaccuracy underscores the picture's 
ameliorative function; the point is not to sh ow  h ow  the incident really happened but to make 
Camelford look better, less im pulsive and threatening.
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to Paris, and  in the m idst of their capital to attack the  rulers of the hostile 
country" (10)—makes Camelford seem  a kind  of Quixote, in the admirable 
sense of one pursuing lofty if impractical goals. To storm  a foreign capital all 
alone: to dream  the impossible dream! In add ition  to the task's impossibility- 
-he m ade the attem pt in 1799, during  w artim e—"the  m ere act of embarking 
for France [was] a capital crime" (13). But again, the M irror and the crown 
laud his patriotism  and verve, reasoning tha t "he had  been influenced by no 
other m otive, than the w ish to render a service to his country" (12). Ah, well, 
then.
Such are the more subtle w hitew ashing techniques employed by the 
physiologies. Frequently, though, the collections m ore explicitly declare 
subjects good at heart, or visibly benevolent, in  spite of personal oddities— 
especially subjects who on the face of things a lready  look fairly innocuous 
(unlike Camelford, for instance). In this w ay, the physiologies continue the 
defense of eccentrics epitomized by late eighteenth-century writers such as 
Sterne and Smollett: "they're w eird bu t they 're  harm less. You've got to love 
them." Take, for example, the case of H enry  Lee Warner, Esq., an 
"extraordinary but truly amiable m an" {M irror 1: "W arner" 23; emphasis 
added). The "but" here, like the qualificatory clauses highlighted just below, 
reveals the (continuing) underly ing belief tha t odd ity  is not valued in itself; 
that despite being "extraordinary" he m anaged also to be "amiable." Warner 
slept all day and walked his grounds all night, dressed—like Sir Roger de 
Coverley—after the fashion of "the English gentlem an of the last age: a gold- 
laced coat and waistcoat, w ith deep slash-worked sleeves, and richly embossed 
buttons, a deep chitterlin of rich yellow lace, curve-toed shoes, and oblong 
buckles" (23). He often found trespassers depredating  his forests, because it 
was well know n that he w ould not prosecute; "yet w hen  during his m idnight
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walk any of the offenders were perceived by him, he would m ildly exclaim. 
T ake care how  you get dow n that tree, or you m ay hurt yourse lf' (24). The 
Mirror reiterates, in sum m ary, "Mr. W arner, w ith  all his peculiarities, was 
endowed w ith  a thousand  qualities which do  honour to the heart of m an" 
(25; emphasis added). The Mirror's sim ilar defense of playw right Charles 
Macklin even uses the w ord  "eccentricities": "Such was Macklin, to whom , 
notw ithstanding all his eccentricities, may be applied the character given by 
Dr. Johnson of Mr. T hom as Sheridan, that w ere m ankind d iv ided  into two 
classes of good and bad , he would stand considerably w ithin the former" (4: 
"Macklin" 39; em phasis added).
Even people w ho were "eccentric" only physically are generally 
specified to have been good-hearted. Even their bodily difference is 
domesticated for the reader's  comfort. For instance, it is said (in racist 
fashion) of John R ichardson Pimrose Bobey that "for one of the African race, 
[he] may be considered handsom e," and that "there are m any w h ite  characters 
who would be found m ore black and fuller of blem ishes than this Spotted 
Negro (Mirror 2: "Bobey" 33; emphases in original). Patrick Cotter, 
"commonly called Patrick O'Brien; or. The Irish Giant," reached the alarm ing 
height of eight feet; he is pictured reaching dow n tow ard the three-foot 
Joseph Boruwlaski, w ho only comes up to his knees. But this potentially 
monstrous character is described as "unoffending and amiable in his 
manners to his friends and  acquaintance, of w hom  he had, in the last years of 
his life, a pretty  extensive circle, as he was neither averse to a cheerful glass 
nor to pleasant com pany" (1: "Cotter" 32). Daniel Lambert, the w orld 's fattest 
man, is said to have been so hum ane in his w ork  as prison-keeper that "[fjew  
left the prison w ithout testifying their gratitude, and  tears often bespoke the 
sincerity of the feelings they  expressed" (1: "Lambert" 11). The M irror even
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puns that Lambert was "the greatest m an in the British em pire" (34). No 
m atter w hat the nature of subjects' oddities, the physiologies found  a way to 
make them  seem  less th rea ten ing  an d  strange.
Frequently physiologies' pleas for amused tolerance of eccentricity are 
m ade in term s that had  becom e traditional by 1800: sketches often  employ the 
word "hobby-horse," w hich Tristram  Shandy had lastingly associated with 
eccentricity;!28 or else they describe eccentrics in specifically quixotic detail, in 
the m anner of A ddison, Steele, Smollett, and Sterne. For exam ple, the 
Fairlop Fair became Daniel D ay's (see below) "principal hobby-horse" {Mirror 
3: "Day" 31), and as Stem e m ight have written, "no m an w as ever injured by 
[it]" (33). The following characterization of ph ilan th rop ist Mr. M athew 
sounds equally  Sternean: "There are very few m en w ho have not some 
hobby-horse, but yet it w ould  be extremely difficult to find one who would, 
like Mr. M athew, sacrifice the  enjoym ent of a princely fo rtune to the pleasure 
of riding his favorite nag" (3: "M athew" 22). References to D on Quixote 
similarly abound. The addle-pated  Reverend George H arvest, for instance, 
had an unfortunate accident w hich  destroyed his chances of m arrying, while 
riding "upon the road upon  his Rosinante" (1: "H arvest" 18). H arvest was 
also, like the Knight, though t m ad w hile abroad (in Lyons), and  consequently 
was briefly confined for treatm ent. The eccentric barber Robert Forster 
possessed a "famous silver M am brino 's helmet, decorated in  its centre w ith 
the barber's arms" (2: "Forster" 36; emphasis in original). "Dicky" Dart, "the 
wooden grocer" is a kind o f third-generation Quixote: like the quixotic Sir 
Roger de Coverley, Dart lost his sanity by "his having, in  early  life, been 
d isappoin ted  in his honourable overtures" tow ard a w om an.
128 According to the OED, Stem e d id  not coin the word; it had been in u se  since the late 
sixteenth century, and since the late seventeenth in the sense Stem e m eans. S tem e infused the 
word with eccentric significance.
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The preceding examples show how physiologies plead for am used 
tolerance of eccentricity, in both the specialized ("f/ze eccentric") and general 
("deviant") senses. In  addition, the physiologies p resen t certain benevolent 
lives quite plainly for readers' adm iration. For example, readers are 
encouraged to venerate one Mr. Mathew, who, d u rin g  Jonathan Swift's time, 
spent all his "princely fortune" (Mirror 3: "Mr. M athew " 22) on keeping a 
huge, hospitable house for any visitors who w ished to stop by. There, like 
King A rthur, M athew insisted upon no order of precedence at table. In like 
m anner, Daniel Day—w ho also "had many other eccentricities, [which] were 
unoffending in their nature" (3: "Day" 33)—exem plified benevolence in 
founding and funding an  annual fair, for w hich he p rov ided  beans and bacon 
for all comers. Day w as "a devout Christian, a sincere friend, a good master, 
and an honest man; he w as just w ithout austerity , liberal w ithout profusion, 
free w ithout intem perance, and lively w ithout excess: in  fine, he lived m erry 
and wise, and d ied  universally  revered and lam ented" (35). H ugh Smith, the 
doctor who published Essay on the Blood in 1759, "benevolently set apart two 
days for the poor in each week; from those tha t w ere very  poor he never took 
a fee" (4: "Hugh Sm ith" 16), and from m iddle-class patients, no more than 
half a crown. Lives such as these are rem arkable m ainly  for their exemplary 
benevolence, and are included in physiologies for readers ' edification and 
adm iration.
The link betw een eccentricity and benevolence seems to have been 
forged so lastingly in the  eighteenth century that it  continues to hold in the 
nineteenth, even w here there is little ap p aren t support. That is, 
"eccentricity" in the specialized sense became associated w ith benevolence in 
the ways described in previous chapters. "Eccentricity" in the more general 
sense featured in physiologies becomes conflated w ith  the other sense, and so.
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with som ew hat lim ited success, adopts or continues the o ther sense's 
conventions and  traditions. Consequently, misers, prim arily , are  routinely 
declared to have been benevolent in their own way. The reasoning appears 
to be: they are "eccentric," i.e. deviant, so they m ust have been benevolent, as 
well. For example, a sketch of John Elwes's life describes him  as irredeem ably 
tight-fisted and  unkind, b u t then, in  a poem, refers to his "v irtue and vice in 
firmest tints com bin 'd / . . . A nd av'rice coupled with benevolence" {Mirror 3: 
"Elwes" 35). W here, again, were the virtue and  benevolence? Similarly, 
Daniel Dancer ate long-rotten meat, w ore his unw ashed clothes un til they fell 
off him, and refused his dying  sister medical care rather than  spend any of his 
several-hundred-thousand-pound hoard. Nevertheless, the M irror's editors 
visibly strain  to redeem  him  as benevolent:
N otw ithstanding his great penury, Mr. Dancer possessed some 
praisew orthy qualities. He observed the most rig id  in tegrity  in 
every transaction, and  he was never averse to assist those of 
whom  he enterta ined  a good opinion, and  w hose 
em barrassm ents required  a tem porary aid; but, at the same time, 
it m ust be confessed, he d id  not lend his m oney w ithout 
expecting the usual interest. (1: "Dancer" 11)
In other w ords, yes, he 'd  help a person in a jam—for a price. If he liked him. 
And, well, he was always punctual...about collecting the interest. That is the 
best that can be said of Dancer, by the M irror's ow n account; these are 
"praiseworthy qualities"?
Much of w hat I've described in the last ten pages as characteristic of the 
physiologies is really m ore  characteristic of early than late ones (obviously, 
since my prim ary exam ple is the often-pirated Eccentric Mirror). The 
im portant distinction betw een early and late physiologies is that late ones did
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not even need to w ork  to domesticate their subjects' po ten tially  unnerving 
characteristics. Later subjects are not whitew ashed before our eyes, as in the 
early physiologies, bu t rather, they com e  that way. The m ost threatening 
character in  Sketches o f Young Ladies, for example, is the "m anly young 
lady." H er most frightening quality: she skillfully rides a horse. The most 
th reaten ing  character in Sketches o f Young Gentlemen  is probably the 
"political young  gentlem an," who argues about political issues in public— 
mostly w ith  other political young gentlemen. He can som etim es be a bit of a 
bore: the horror, the horror. No tru ly  aw ful quality ever appears; as 
Benjamin sum m arizes, physiological subjects circa 1840 are completely 
"harm less and of perfect bonhomie" (37).
If a som ew hat frightening or unsym pathetic character from  the recent 
past, m ade innocuous, could provide comfort, then one from  the present 
w ho is innocuous th rough  and through could offer th a t m uch  more. The 
form er m ight do a little to help reconcile readers to difference in  general; the 
latter, could do m uch to reconcile readers to their particular, cu rren t situation. 
Thus, as social conditions in Great Britain grew  to resem ble those Engels and 
De Quincey describe, and as general anxiety consequently mounted, 
physiological subjects came more and more to resem ble the very people one 
saw right then, every day, on the city streets. Those  people w ere worrisome, 
so those people w ere presented in a thoroughly  unw orrisom e manner. 
Physiologies, focusing their attentions to fit their tim es' cu ltu ral needs, cut 
ou t foreign and  rural portraits, along w ith the m erely in teresting (e.g., tales of 
court in trigue and of am azing survivals) and, m ost im portan tly , all 
unsettling characteristics from all subjects. Furtherm ore, the physiologies 
deeply generalized, tu rn ing  portraits of indiv iduals into even shorter 
sketches of types, abstractions being by nature less threatening than  particular
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cases. One can be directly an d  unw elcom ely menaced by the latter, whereas 
one can sim ply  choose not to th ink  abou t the former.
In these ways, physiologies functioned to make the industrial era 's new  
society m ore bearable. Because it w as, as Benjamin explains, the act of 
looking at strangers in cities th a t fed anxiety, physiologies w ere shaped!29 so 
as to m ake that act more com fortable, even enjoyable. They assisted readers 
in the a r t of convincing them selves th a t w ha t they saw  w ould  not hu rt them.
ii. Science, Codification, and  the Eccentric as Species 
The physiologies w ere one m ajor influence upon  the eccentric's 
developm ent during the Rom antic era; the progress of science was the other. 
In o rder to set up my discussion of the ways in which this force changed 
conceptions of eccentricity, I w ill first describe the tim e's scientific climate. 
So: in this time, and particularly  "[i]n the years after W aterloo, scientific 
invention w as of passionate in terest to a rapidly  expanding British and 
in ternational public" (Johnson 543). A nd  not only scientific invention, or 
technological advances, but science in  general. Really, for the moment, 
science w as  general, in two senses. It was widely accessible: "it was still 
possible for a moderately w ell-educated m an or even w om an . . .  to grasp the 
latest scientific developm ents" (543). A nd it was as yet 
uncom partm entalized: despite  som e m inority  d issent,!30 the dom inant 
British culture "saw art and science, industry  and nature as a continuum  of 
creation and  the quest for know ledge as a common activity, shared by
129 By...whom ? Physiologies circa 1840 have (several) authors' nam es attached; early ones 
have none. O bviously particular p eop le  rather than the culture at large w rote the early 
physiologies. H owever, with anonym ity being the standard, and the physiologies so  plainly 
speaking to  general cultural needs, it is difficult to avoid  speaking in passive voice upon  
occasions such as this. To say definitively, "X and Y shaped the physiologies," as opposed to 
"physiologies w ere shaped,"is difficult on  m ultip le levels.
130 See, for instance, Wordsworth's Preface to L yrica l Ballads.
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chemists and  poets, pain ters and engineers, inventors and  philosophers 
alike" (583). In o ther words, the Enlightenm ent ideal still obtained: 
knowledge of all k inds should (and could) be shared by all. As Raymond 
Williams show s, the  Rom antic concept of "science" had  not yet come to 
resemble our ow n—nam ely, "as expressing physical and  experim ental science, 
to the exclusion of theological and m etaphysical"; involving "a particular and 
highly successful m odel of neutral m ethodical observer an d  external object of 
study" (which "became generalized, not only as science, bu t as fact and truth  
and reason o r rationality"); and performed by a "scientist," i.e., a specialist 
trained to perform  such  studies. These m eanings w ere fairly solidly in place 
by the end of the Rom antic period, and w ere "perhaps more complete in 
English than in m ost com parable languages" ^Keywords 278-79; emphases in 
original). Still, early in  the period especially, this was not the case; it was only 
beginning  to be so.
Science, then, w as both relatively nonexclusive and  essentially of one 
piece. To illustrate: H um phry  Davy, who w as credited w ith  inventing the 
safety lamp that saved  thousands of m iners' lives, gave a series of scientific 
lectures during the first decade of the century. His first "Introductory 
Chemistry" course w as delivered to over 300 people, "including many society 
ladies who sent D avy sonnets and love tokens"; he became a kind of sex 
symbol. Thereafter, he "gave lectures on m inerology, on geology, on the 
applications of chem istry to agriculture," and on other scientific topics, always 
to large, enthusiastic audiences (Johnson 546). Earlier, in 1800, he had 
published Researches, Chemical and Philosophical,^^^ a com bination of topics 
that strikes the tw entieth-century  reader as incongruous.
Charles Lyell's w ork  similarly illustrates early  nineteenth-century
131 Along these lines, the term  "natural philosophy" w as still used, for "science.'
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science's accessible and  unified qualities. In the Principles o f  Geology, which 
was published betw een 1830 and 1833 and  read by a large and diverse British 
a u d ie n c e ,i3 2  Lyell relates the history of the w orld  as gleaned fi"om observing 
geologic form ations and  the characteristics of anim als and hum ans, and  
reading and verifying previous scientific w riters' accounts. Respectively, its 
three volum es detail geologic change over tim e, developm ents in  the p lan t 
and anim al kingdom s,133 and the form ation of geologic features such as 
m ountains and of the globe itself. Lyell recognizes no boundaries betw een 
these diverse regions of science, which are now  fairly rigidly d iv ided  into the 
separate "fields" of geology, botany, anthropology, hum an m edicine, and 
zoology. As M ary Somerville, w riter of the popular science text On the 
Connection o f  the Physical Sciences observed in 1834, "in all [branches of 
science] there exists such a bond of union, that proficiency cannot be obtained 
in any one w ithout a know ledge of the others" (Preface; unpaginated).
Likewise, m ost of the icons of Rom anticism —Coleridge, W ordsw orth, 
Percy and Mary Shelley, and Byron—did  not recognize or perpetuate 
disciplinary boundaries. Coleridge and W ordsworth, for instance, were 
longtime friends of Davy's, and held frequent philosophico-scientific 
discussions. M ary and  Percy Shelley knew  o f  Davy and adm ired his work.
132 Martin J. S. Rudwick calls the book "on any reckoning one of the m ost important books ever 
published in the earth sc ien ces . . .  [Lyell's] concept o f'th e  uniformity of nature' that the  
Principles embodied and exem plified gave the book a seminal influence on nineteenth-century 
culture in general, and helped to define what it m eans to be 'scientific'" (Principles l:v ii) .  
"Uniformity of nature" m eans view ing natural history as a long, uniform, slow ly incremental 
process, as opposed to "catastrophism," the belief in  naturally or supem aturally caused  
cataclysms (the sudden  appearance o f mountains, N oah's flood). Forming natural-historical 
narratives that accord w ith  the uniform view  requires "the scientific method" as described by 
Williams, above—not the reading o f scripture, and not the exercise of reason independent of  
meticulously gathered evidence (e.g., arguing by first causes).
133 See the discussion of Cuvier, below.
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Paul Johnson w rites, "When Byron, Shelley and his w if e l3 4  sat dow n by the 
shores of the Lake of Geneva, their them e was the beauty  and poetry of 
electricity" (583). Percy Shelley, perhaps the most esoteric of Romantic poets, 
was bitten particularly hard by the science bug:
In 1808, while a schoolboy in  Dr. Bethel's house in  Eton, he had 
electrified the doctor, who p u t his hand on a doorknob Shelley 
had connected to a Voltaic pile. He also blew  up a tree stum p 
w ith  gunpow der he had m ade, and  the doctor claim ed he found 
him  sitting  in an alarm ing blue circle of spirit-flam e try ing  to 
conjure up the devil. . . . [A]t Oxford, . . . Shelley connected 
him self to an electrical battery charged by  turn ing  a handle 
rap id ly  and made his hair stand on end, and  he to ld  his friend 
H ogg he was building an "enorm ous" electrical kite, "or rather 
com bination of kites, that w ould  d raw  dow n from  the sky an 
im m ense volume of electricity, the w hole am m unition  of a 
m ighty thunderstorm , and this being directed to som e point 
w ould there produce the m ost stupendous results." It was 
Shelley 's noisy, smelly and dangerous experim ents in  his rooms 
at U niversity College, alm ost as m uch as his public avowal of 
atheism , which led to his expulsion. (Johnson 547)
According to  Maurice Hindle, Mary Shelley read D avy 's 1812 book Elements 
o f  Chemical Philosophy (that w ord  "philosophy" again) and 1802 A  
Discourse, Introductory to a Course o f  Lectures on Chemistry, both during  the 
fall of 1816. These books underlie Frankenstein, w hich was com posed shortly 
afterw ards. There, Shelley has Victor successfully assemble his "secret of life"
134 Johnson's earlier comment that even  a moderately well-educated wom an could grasp the 
latest scientific advances can be read to mean that w om en's educations at the time tended not to 
be as extensive as men's. But to dism iss M aiy Shelley as sim ply "[Percy's] wife" is undeniably 
gender-biased.
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out of bits of learning from  diverse fields: the alchem y of the ancients 
(Paracelsus, Albertus M agnus, et al.—the same au thors Pope, Swift, and 
company scoffed at in  Scriblerus's M emoirs), m athem atics, anatomy, and 
chemistry, Victor's best friend Henry Clerval "was deep ly  read  in books of 
chivalry and r o m a n c e "  135 (36), and  later studies Ind ian  languages and culture 
in  preparation for a career as a colonist, enlisting V ictor's help. The two men, 
respective em bodim ents of science and of art, are the  closest and most 
compatible of friends. O nly m any years after Frankenstein 's  composition 
w ould the conditions be appropria te  for W ordsw orth to lam ent of Davy, "His 
scientific pursuits had  h u rried  his m ind into a course w here I could not 
follow him, and had d iverted  it in proportion  from  objects w ith  which I was 
best acquainted" (Johnson 626). For only later, gradually , d id  the rift between 
art and  science appear and  w iden  for the dom inant culture.
Early in the n ineteen th  century, then, science appeared  to be fully 
compatible w ith all other know ledge and accessible to anyone; and it had, in 
the preceding few decades, achieved astonishing technological advancements. 
Many of these new  m echanical w onders—particu larly  the  railroad and the
‘135 In the 1831 edition, Mary Shelley  adds an intriguing detail: one o f  C lerval's favorite 
fictional characters is specified to  be Am adis. The other fam ous literary character who loves 
Amadis is Don Quixote. H indle notes that "Don Quixote w as one o f  the books Mary Shelley 
w as reading during the com position of Frankenstein," and furthermore, that "[b]oth Don 
Quixote and Frankenstein start w ith  the noble intention of helping their fellow-creatures, but 
their aspirations are doom ed by their pursuit of a 'single vision,' one that takes them further 
and further away from satisfying the moderate needs of the com m unity, and nearer and nearer 
to a personally tragic denouement" (xxxiv). See the Author's Introduction from 1831, too: 
"Every thing must have a beginning, to speak in Sanchean phrase" (8). Cervantes's novel w as 
evidently on Shelley's m ind both w h en  she originally com posed Frankenstein  and years later 
w hen she revised it. And so here is  another instance o f the now -attenuated  but still persisting 
Q uixotic influence upon the history o f eccentricity: Frankenstein as Q uixote.
One other detail supports this connection: as a child, Robert W alton, w ho shares 
Frankenstein's scientific fervor, "read w ith  ardour the accounts o f the various voyages which  
have been made in the prospect o f  arriving at the North Pacific O cean through the seas which  
surround the pole." He found these accounts in a library as m onom aniacally focused as 
Quixote's: "a history of all the voyages made for purposes of discovery com posed the w hole of 
our good uncle Thomas's library." W alton comments, "These volum es w ere m y study day and 
night" (14). As w ith  Q uixote, the constant, monomaniacal study inspired  W alton's later quest.
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amazingly fast factory machines—were new ly and strikingly visible every day 
to most of the British population. No w onder science's possibilities looked 
unlim ited. It looked  like hum ankind w as on the brink of learning 
everything about everything—about the physical w orld, about plants and 
animals, about the hum an body and hum an nature. Scientific and literary 
authors alike registered this sense of excitem ent and power. For instance, 
Davy writes:
Science has . . . bestowed upon [man] powers which may be 
called alm ost creative; which have enabled him  to change and 
modify the beings surrounding him, and  by his experiments to 
interrogate nature  w ith  power, not sim ply as a scholar, passive 
and seeking only to understand her operations, but rather as a 
master, active w ith  his own instrum ents . . . [Wjho would not be 
am bitious of becom ing acquainted w ith  the most profound 
secrets of nature; of ascertaining her h idden  operations; and of 
exhibiting to m an  that system of know ledge which relates so 
intim ately to the ir own physical and  m oral constitution? 
(Chemistry  16)
In Mary Shelley's novel, Victor Frankenstein 's im agination is fired by a 
speech very sim ilar in  content and tone, delivered  by Professor W aldman: 
[M odern chem ists], whose hands seem  only m ade to dabble in 
dirt, and  their eyes to pore over the m icroscope or crucible, have 
indeed perform ed miracles. They penetrate into the recesses of 
nature, and show  how  she works in her hiding-places. They 
ascend into the heavens: they have discovered how  the blood 
circulates, and  the nature of the air w e breathe. They have 
acquired new  and  alm ost unlim ited pow ers; they can command
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the th u n d ers  of heaven, m im ic the  earthquake, and even mock
the invisible w orld w ith its ow n  shadow s. (46-47)
Inspired, Victor vows to himself, "So m uch has been done, . . . —m ore, far 
more, w ill I achieve; treading in  the steps already marked, I will p ioneer a 
new w ay, explore unknow n pow ers, and  unfold to the w orld the deepest 
mysteries o f creation" (47).
T h a t was the crux: exploring u n k n o w n  powers and unfo ld ing  the 
deepest mysteries  of creation. As in  the above quotations. Nature tended  to 
be cast as possessing hidden m ysteries w hich the searching scientist!36 w ould 
find and reveal. Scientists d id  not construct knowledge; rather, they 
discovered it. Scientific discoveries w ere  just that, in the older sense of the 
w ord—dis-covering, uncovering, revealing that which objectively existed a 
priori: nam ely, "natural law," the unbreakable rules by which the universe 
governs itself. The mystery was, how , precisely, was the law  form ulated? 
How d id  it work? What d id  it dem and? Once decoded by the help of 
methodical, "scientific" experim ents and  observations—not composed, not 
invented, b u t deciphered—it could be as stated as confidently as one could 
read aloud a law  from  the Magna Carta. N atural law simply was—m uch as it 
is for us today.
As W illiam s notes, the conception of N ature as "constitutional 
lawyer" actually originated in the previous century (Keywords 222). Pope, for 
instance, w rote, "N ature and N ature 's law s lay hid in night;/ God said. Let 
Newton be! and  all w as light!" In other w ords, Newton found, decoded, and
136 As many critics have observed, there is a  distinct masculinist slant to the era's scientific 
tropes: the scientist w as assum ed to be male, w ith  N ature generally cast as female; scientists 
masterfully "probe" "her" innermost secrets, w hich  she unavailingly attempts to "veil." See, 
for example, G eorges C uvier "Calculation, if w e  m ay so express it, thus commands nature, and 
determines her phenom ena more exactly than observation can make them known; experiment 
compels her to unveil; w h ile  observation pries into her secrets when refractory, and endeavours 
to surprise her" (1:3). For one good study of this trope, see Easlea.
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revealed a priori facts and laws previously shrouded  in  mystery. Still, this 
trope becam e m uch  m ore common, even stan d ard , during  the Rom antic 
period; w hat w as just emergent in Pope's day  w as p a rt of the dom inant 
culture by the  beg inn ing  of the nineteenth century.
Thom as M althus 's  hugely influential 1798137 Essay on the Principle o f  
Population, for instance, employs "natural law " to justify unequal division of 
property. The fam ous "principle" or natural law  he discovered is that a 
civilization's ability  to produce food for its m em bers increases arithm etically 
(i.e., by addition), by means of steadily im proving technology; bu t the same 
civilization 's p o pu la tion  w ill, if unchecked by na tu ra l th inning m echanism s 
such as famine, overcrowding, and disease, increase geometrically (i.e., by 
multiplication), doub ling  itself every tw enty-five years. (For M althus, an 
Anglican m inister, b irth  control and abortion  w ere not viable options 
although they w ere available.) By this "law ," a civilization that could now  
produce exactly enough  food to support all its m em bers w ould also have 
exactly enough tw enty-five years later; tw enty-five years after that, only three- 
fourths could be fed; in another tw enty-five years, one-half; in another 
twenty-five years, five-sixteenths. The gap betw een population and  food 
supply steadily  increases, necessitating the starvation of well over half the 
population in ju s t a century. Under this ineluctable law , com m unal sharing 
means com m unal starvation: because there w ill eventually  be insufficient 
resources for the civilization as a whole, if  all m em bers share ow nership 
equally then  all m em bers w ill own increasingly sm all shares or "w arrants." 
By this reasoning, it is only reasonable and natu ra l that some should possess 
more than  others. Since some m u s t  starve, they m ight as well do so; better
137 Here is an interesting and telling coincidence: M althus's Essay w as published in the same 
year as W ordsworth and Coleridge's Lyrical B allads. Even w hile a new  emphasis upon the 
individual, the em otions, and the mystical or irrational w a s  com ing into being, so w as a  new  
emphasis upon science, the technological, and the system atic.
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that than  th a t all should  starve together. To help the  needy  is only to worsen 
the problem , because that only keeps m ore people alive, w hich  in  tu rn  drains 
the general pool of resources even further. Those people  w ill continue to 
reproduce, too, m aking the problem  exponentially w orse over time.
T hus, M althus justifies an entire social and  econom ic system  w ith all 
its injustices as m erely conform ing to a natural law  tha t he has discovered. It 
is im possible to exaggerate the frequency of his references to the "laws of 
nature" (159), "the inevitable laws of nature" (206), "the book of nature" (158), 
the "fixed law s of our nature" (11), etc., plus the concom itant "musts" and 
" n e c e s s a r ie s ." i3 8  He claims merely to read this law , th is "book of nature," not 
to w rite it; th is is "just the w ay things are."
The search for natural law  could be, and  w as, carried even farther, into 
a search for a total natural system. Max H orkheim er and  Theodor W. 
A dorno have a rgued  tha t this is in  fact the u ltim ate goal of all Enlightenm ent 
science; "its ideal is the system  from which all an d  every th ing  follows" (7). 
For an excellent exam ple, examine Georges Cuvieris landm ark  study. The  
Animal Kingdom Arranged in Conformity w ith  Its Organization. A lthough 
this influential w ork  was first published in France in  1817, it was read by 
m any Britons—by several thousands more after it w as transla ted  into English 
in 1827. N ew  English editions and abridgem ents appeared  almost yearly 
through the thirties- There, Cuvier states directly: "N atu ra l history then 
should be based on w hat is called a system o f  nature~or, a great catalogue, in 
which all created beings have suitable names, m ay be recognized by
138 Interestingly, M althus argues that while natural law  rules our lives, and w e  constantly 
struggle against it, w e  can never know  more than a tiny fraction o f  it. Understanding a 11 
natural law  w ou ld  "repress future exertion, a n d . . .  damp the soaring w in gs o f intellect" (384); 
therefore, G od keeps total understanding forever beyond our grasp. W e sh o u ld  try to learn all, 
but w e never w ill. This v iew  aligns Malthus more w ith  eighteenth-century thinkers than w ith  
the more scientifically sanguine ones o f the nineteenth century; w ith  the believers in mystery, 
rather than w ith  th ose w ho believed  they w ould find the secrets to all m ysteries.
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distinctive characters, and  be arranged in divisions and  subdivisions, 
themselves named and characterised, in which they m ay be found" (1:3-4; 
em phasis in original). The A n im a l Kingdom  attem pts to p rovide just such a 
system: elaborating upon Lamarck's classifications and Linnæus's two-word 
species-nam ing system , Cuvier divides all creatures in to  four divisions 
(Mollusca, Articulata, Vertebrata, and Radiata), then into the  "genera, tribes, 
familes, orders, class[es] . . . and  divisions which constitute the community of 
the animal kingdom" (l:xxi). As is generally the case w ith  natural law, 
Cuvier claims merely to catalogue and explicate "the conditions of existence" 
(1:4)—i.e., simple, objective facts, the way things are—not to im pose a system of 
his ow n invention.
By Cuvier's system, a creature identified and placed according to its 
"distinctive character" is determined:  the system and process of identification 
m arks the creature's place w ith in  the hierarchy of all creatures. As Cuvier 
explains, " [W ]ei3 9  employ an assiduous comparison of beings, directed by the 
principle of the subordination o f  characters" (1:4; em phasis in  original). His 
is indeed a system "from  w hich all and everything follows": an individual 
creature's form and habits reveals its species, tribe, family, order, class, and 
division, and these qualities reveal its natural, p roper niche in  the animal 
k in g d o m ,t4 0  and concomitantly, the way it should be v iew ed and treated. 
Cuvier sums up his scientific goals thus: "There can be bu t one perfect 
m ethod, which is the natural method. . . . This m ethod is the ideal to which 
natural history should tend; for it is evident that if we can reach it, we shall 
have the exact and complete expression of nature" (1:5; em phases in original). 
Everything in the w orld will be known and disposed of properly.
139 The royal "we"; he worked and w rote alone, and here refers only to him self, as far as I can 
discover.
140The metaphor of the kingdom , w ith  its implications of rigid, intricate hierarchy, is quite 
apt.
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M althus's appeal to natural law as a sanction for bad  news has a slight, 
insincerely apologetic ring  to it—something like a  bank clerk^s saying he's 
sorry, bu t bank policy forbids his granting a loan to one in your 
circum stances; it's not his decision to make. W hen later Romantic-era 
w riters discuss natural law , however, they tend to do so trium phantly , w ith a 
sense of proud excitement in their own or science-in-general's progress. They 
sound m ore like Cuvier than  like Malthus. For instance. De Quincey found 
David Ricardo's fam ous book Principles o f Political Economy and Taxation 
(1817) so invigorating that it gave him  "a pleasure and  an activity which I had 
not know n for years"—all because "Mr Ricardo had  deduced, à priori, from 
the understanding  itself, laws which first gave a ray  of light into the unwieldy 
chaos of materials, and had constructed what had  been bu t a collection of 
tentative discussions into a science of regular proportions, now  first standing 
on an eternal basis" (100-101; emphasis added). M erely reading another's 
translation  of the book of nature stirred De Quincey from  the torpor in  which 
he w as then  m ired. Som erville reports w ith  ev iden t satisfaction in  the 
Connection's  Preface, "The progress of m odem  science, especially w ithin the 
last five years, has been rem arkable for a tendency to sim plify the laws of 
nature" (unpaginated). She proudly contributes directly to that worthy cause, 
"endeavour[ing] to m ake out the laws by w hich the m aterial w orld is 
governed" (Dedication; unpaginated). A nd M ary Shelley's Victor 
Frankenstein rhapsodizes:
The world w as to me a secret which I desired  to divine. 
Curiosity, earnest research to learn the hidden laws o f  nature, 
gladness akin to rapture, as they were unfolded to me, are 
am ong the earliest sensations I can rem ember. . . .  It was the 
secrets of heaven and earth that 1 desired to learn; and  w hether it
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was the ou tw ard  substance of things, or the inner sp irit o f na ture  
and the m ysterious soul of m an that occupied me, still my 
enquiries w ere directed to the m etaphysical, or in  its highest 
sense, the physical secrets of the w orld. (36-37; emphases added)
He accomplishes his goal: he divines the secret of life itself. A lthough 
Shelley w arns against the consequences of learning and exploiting hidden 
natural laws, she does show Victor unquestionably able to do so. His 
difficulty is to keep the secret from the questing Robert W alton, not to find 
the secret in the first place. Mary Shelley^s husband Percy, w riting as the 
author of the novel, argues that far from its describing an im possible fantasy, 
"The event on  w hich this fiction is founded, has been supposed , by Dr 
Darwin, and  som e of the physiological w riters of Germany [i.e., the scientific 
experts], as not of impossible occurrence" (11). For the Shelleys as for Great 
Britain generally, in Somerville's w ords, "Science [was] regarded  as the 
pursuit of tru th "  (2)—a thrilling, em inently successful and productive  pursuit.
As indicated above, science was already widely accessible before and 
into the Rom antic era; bu t now, seen as p roducing  am azing new  technologies 
and eternal natural laws, science dem anded  new  high levels of prestige and 
influence. "Scientific" thinking—e.g., the assum ption that neutral, detached, 
systematic, expert observation yields tru th  statable in the form  of objectively 
existing natural law; the search for a total system, particu larly  one of 
classification; the equation of "the scientific approach" w ith  reason itself— 
entered all areas of the dom inant culture. As Thomas Carlyle puts it in 
"Signs of the T im es" (1829), "It is adm itted, on all sides, that the  M etaphysical 
and Moral Sciences are falling into decay, while the Physical are engrossing, 
every day, m ore respect and attention" (63). Furtherm ore, he writes, 
"Intellect, the pow er m an has of know ing and believing, is now  nearly
213
synonym ous w ith Logic, or the mere pow er of arranging and 
comm unicating" (74). Cuvier, for one, recognizes this process already 
underw ay, and welcomes it. He reassures the reader th a t he has personally 
verified all changes to o ld  systems by means of careful experiments and 
observation; then, pleased w ith  him self and w ith  science, he continues:
This habit, necessarily acquired in the study  of natural history, of 
the m ental classification of a great num ber of ideas, is one of the 
advantages of tha t science w hich is seldom  observed, and  which, 
w hen it shall have been  generally introduced into the system  of 
comm on education, w ill become, perhaps, the principal one. By 
it the student is exercised in that part of logic w hich is termed 
m ethod . . . N ow  this a rt of method, once well acquired, may be 
applied, w ith  infinite advantage, to studies the m ost foreign to 
natural history. Every discussion im plying a classification of 
facts, every inquiry w hich dem ands a d istribu tion  of m aterials, is 
perform ed according to the same laws; and  the young  m an who 
had cultivated this science m erely for am usem ent, is surprised, 
w hen he makes the experim ent, at the facilities it affords him  in 
disentangling all kinds of affairs. (l:xxiii-xxiv)
N othing could not be approached "scientifically"—so everything was.
A lthough Cuvier w as French, he perfectly describes developments in 
Great Britain, as well. For example. De Quincey, w ho w as certainly no 
scientist, refers frequently to his opium  experiences as "experim ents." In fact, 
in the brief article "M adness," part of his Notes from  the Pocket-book of a Late 
Opium-Eater series (1823-24), he supports his theory tha t the liver, not the 
brain, produces m adness, w ith  "m y own experiments d irected  to this very 
question, under the use of opium " (W orks  10:446). H aving  systematically
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varied dosage sizes and periods betw een doses, he comes to the conclusion 
that "the pow er of the biliary functions to affect and  to m odify the pow er of 
thinking according to the degree in w hich they w ere themselves affected, and 
in a way far different from the action of good or bad  spirits, was prodigious, 
and gave me a full revelation of the w ay in  w hich  insanity begins to collect 
and form  itself" (10:447). (Note the w ord  "revelation," which again 
communicates the assum ption that he is not constructing bu t m erely finding 
and uncovering an eternal, a priori na tu ra l law.)
Carlyle saw  the growing influence of science and systems, and 
expressed his repugnance towards it. His opinion, which was shared or even 
entertained by decreasing numbers of Britons during  the period, is that 
whereas "m achinery" broadly conceived—not only mechanical devices but 
also areligious systems of thought tha t purport to explain all by means of 
experim ent and  logic—was once a useful servant, it has now  become a 
tyrannical m aster. Machinery horribly and th o ro u g h ly -b u t unnecessarily— 
rules everyone's lives. "[Now] is the Age of m achinery, in every outw ard and  
inward sense of that word," Carlyle writes. "N ot the external and physical 
alone is now m anaged by machinery, b u t the in ternal and spiritual also. Here 
too nothing is left to be accomplished by old natural m ethods" (59-61). (In 
appealing to the "old natural m ethods," he actually bolsters the concept of 
"natural law" w hich  formed a cornerstone of the scientific thought he hated 
so much.) "These things, which we state lightly enough here, are yet of deep 
import, and  indicate a mighty change in  our w hole m anner of existence. For 
the same habit regulates not our m odes of action alone, bu t our modes of 
thought and feeling" (62).
All this has happened because "a new trade . . . has arisen among us, 
under the name of 'Codification,' or codem aking in the abstract; whereby any
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people, for a reasonable consideration, may be accom m odated with a patent 
code;—m ore easily than  curious individuals w ith  paten t breeches, for the 
people does not  need to be m easured first" (68). Codification seems natural, 
"as if it could never have been otherwise," but, Carlyle insists, "it has been 
and m ight again be otherwise" (68). The dam age need  not be permanent, for 
"[t]his deep, paralysed subjection to physical objects comes not from Nature, 
but from  our own unw ise m ode of view ing  N ature" (80-81). Change our 
mode of view ing and  we change our thought an d  feeling; stop thinking 
scientifically, mechanistically, and we can escape our current slavery to 
machinery, to science, to Codification.
Again, however, this w as a minority view expressed by an unusually 
prescient individual. The dom inant culture's tendency w as to embrace the 
m achinery enthusiastically. A nd so—to return at last to the eccentric—science 
deeply altered the concept of eccentricity d u rin g  the Romantic period. 
Perhaps the best way to begin detailing just how  the concept changed is to 
return to the w ord itself. As noted above, "eccentric" was not used as a noun 
until 1832; before then, it only appeared as an adjective, usually describing an 
astronomical orbit or geometric shape. To be m ore precise now, before 1800 
the word was rarely used to describe people, but after then it was used that 
way w ith increasing frequency. The physiologies quite frequently do so, for 
example, in  titles like Portraits and Lives o f  Remarkable and Eccentric 
Characters (1819) and Biographical Sketches o f Eccentric Characters (1832). 
(The Eccentric Mirror [1807] and The Eccentric Magazine  [1812], earlier titles 
published before "eccentric"'s new  usage had com pletely solidified, use the 
adjective bu t only point to "the  eccentric" indirectly, by way of a "mirror" and 
a "m agazine.") The sketches, too, employ the adjective this way. The 
Eccentric Mirror says of Lord Rokeby that he "indu lged  himself in the
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gratification of those eccentric whim s, for w hich he afterw ards becam e so 
distinguished" (1: "Rokeby"^ 9). C hristopher Pivett was an "eccentric artisf^ (2: 
"Pivett" 8) w ho never slept in a bed; the m iser Thomas Day, Esq., an  "original 
and tru ly  eccentric character" (2: "Day" 20). Inventor M artin V an Butchell 
was "one of the most eccentric characters to be found in  th e  British 
m etropolis" (3: "Van Butchell" 16).i4i As the last two exam ples show , the 
adjectival "eccentric" often m odified the noun  "character." This explains a 
couple of things: first, the relative ease and  rap id ity  w ith w hich "eccentric" 
m oved from  its new  adjectival usage to the nom inative. S horten ing  "an 
eccentric character" to "an  eccentric" is a logical, convenient verbal shortcut, 
much like "blind people" to "the blind." A nd second, this accounts for the 
use of "character" as synonym ous w ith  the nom inative "eccentric," as in, 
"He's a real character." The OED lists O liver Goldsm ith as the first to use 
"character" this way, in his 1773 play She Stoops to Conquer: "bu t he 's a 
character, and  I'll hum our him." Still, significantly, the next listed  usage in  
this sense is dated  1832, from George D ow nes's Letters from  Continental  
Countries: "'A bi lassa,' added w ith a sigh the old man, who was a  b it of a 
character." In any case, the adjective "eccentric," like the concept, w as so well 
established by 1832 that it became a noun.
As I've indicated above, though, "eccentric" as in, say. The Eccentric 
Mirror m eans som ething very different from  "eccentric" in St. R onan's Well. 
The w ord was not really used in the eighteenth  century, but a very particu lar 
set of characteristics came to be clustered together; a definite concept  of "the 
eccentric" existed although a word  for it d id  not. In the first couple of decades 
of the nineteenth century, "eccentric"'s sense was still very  close to its 
original astronom ical/geom etrical sense. It carried  a m etaphorical m eaning
141 To reinforce the argument made in the first section: note the connection here b etw een  the 
city, eccentricity, and a physiology.
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so sim ple and direct it w as almost literal: ex-centric, outside the center of the 
dom inant culture; different; deviant. Hence it could and did describe a w ide 
variety of people of both genders and  from  all social strata who were 
different: dwarves, giants, court in triguers, actors, transvestites, misers, 
survivors of horrible ordeals, and now -fam iliar benevolent, quixotic 
"characters." Before long, though, by 1832, the w ord  became specialized to 
m ean a particular kind  of different person, a  species sim ilar in most ways to 
"the eccentric" as he appears in eighteenth-century w orks such as Tristram 
Shandy  or Launcelot Greaves. In sum m ary, the concept of "the eccentric" 
existed in the eighteenth century but h ad  no nam e; then after 1800 the 
adjective "eccentric" was used, but m uch m ore broadly  than the narrow ly 
defined, nameless eighteenth-century figure (the figure would have fit the 
adjective's signification, but would have been only one figure am ong a 
m ultitude); and finally, late in  the Romantic period , the w ord came to signify 
m uch the same concept it had  before 1800.
The explanation for this curious and  rap id  progress lies in science's 
developm ent during  the period. Specifically, the culture-wide scientific 
search for natural law, for total systems, cam e to bear directly upon the 
conception of eccentricity. The desire for such system s and laws was "in the 
air," as it were, from about the turn of the  cen tury  onwards. For instance, 
Bewick's History o f British Birds, which is m ore accurately described as an 
attem pt to catalogue all birds one m ight find anyw here in the world, was first 
published in 1797, then again in 1804.142 C uvier published his A n im a l  
K ingdom  in 1817, having published the p relim inary  studies Elementary  
Survey o f  the Natural History o f  Anim als  in 1797 and Lessons in
142 This book forms part o f young Jane Eyre's reading, in the first chapter of Charlotte Brontë's 
novel. Jane is struck w ith the H isto ry 's  description o f the clim ate in "Lapland, Siberia, 
Spitzbergen, N ova Zembla, Iceland, Greenland[, and] the Arctic Zone" (Jane Eyre 8). My 
information on B ewick's comes from Margaret Smith's editorial note.
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Comparative A n a tom y  from  1800 to 1805. Malthus published the Essay on 
the Principle o f  Population in 1797; Davy, systems of chem istry in 1802 and 
1812. Mary Shelley's character Victor Frankenstein finds the very  system of 
life in her novel of 1818. And the physiologies both express and  satisfy this 
same cultural d e s ir e .i4 3
As for expressing the desire for systems and laws: The Eccentric 
Mirror’s statem ent, for instance, that "[i]n the catalogue of eccentric misers 
may with justice be ranked  Mr. Samuel Stretch" (3: "Stretch" 17), implies that 
somewhere exists, or should exist, or m ight as well be w ritten dow n because 
it exists in fact, a complete catalogue of eccentric misers. Heads o f  the People, 
published after the desire for systems had taken even firm er cultural hold, 
addresses the issue more directly. Heads's editor explains that he will add to 
his now-partial catalogue later, indicating an assum ption that the audience 
would expect comprehensiveness: "John Bull [i.e., England] has a num erous 
family; all m ore or less distinguished by the virtues, the hum ours, the follies, 
and the droll and m elancholy constitution of their papa. We give here some 
fifty of his children: we shall present the w orld with at least half-a-hundred 
more" (v i) . i4 4  A nd the author of Sketches of Young Ladies ("Quiz," 
otherwise unidentifiable) frames his physiology in explicitly C uvierian terms, 
thoroughly in the language of science:
We have often regretted , that w hile so much genius has of late 
years been em ployed in classifications of the anim al and
■■43 This seem s like an appropriate place to acknow ledge that I am aware of the irony inherent 
in my situation as critic: I too am  looking for a system , for a network of general rules that 
explains the developm ent of the concept of eccentricity. My analysis of system s is  intended to 
be critical of those system s, to suggest that they could have been otherwise; and in  making this 
analysis, I create a system  o f m y own. All I can say  is that I don't know how  to g et out o f this 
loop. The ascension of scientific and systematic thinking described in  this chapter is even more 
the norm today. I'm describing the first trotting footsteps down a path we're far along now.
144 See the discussion o f the natural law  of eccentricity below. Here is a genealogy of 
eccentricity, indeed: Britons inherit it from "their papa," the nation itself.
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vegetable kingdom, the classification of young ladies has been 
to tally  and unaccountably neglected. And yet, w ho can doubt but 
th a t this beautiful portion of the creation exhibits as m any, if not 
m ore, varieties than  any system  of botany yet published? 
N atu re , indeed, seems to have exhibited here, m ore th an  in any 
o ther part of her works, her uncontrollable propensity  of ranging 
a t freedom  . . .  It was in  vain that we w aited for m ore than ten 
years in expectation of this philosophical them e being  taken up 
by Cuvier, Dr. L a rd n er ,t4 5  or Mrs. Somerville. . . . [T]he Linnæan 
[nam ing] system hath been observed in this classification . . .  (7-8)
None o f the acknow ledged experts would w rite  a comprehensive, 
classificatory catalogue, so he wrote one himself. A t the end  of the volume, 
he congratulates himself for having "described, to the  best of ourl46 
zoological powers, two dozen classes of young ladies." There are others, he 
acknowledges, half-apologizing (like Heads of the People's editor) for not 
presenting a complete  catalogue; still, he claims, "we have selected the most 
striking a n d  im portant classes at this present time existing in  Great Britain" 
(110). G ranted, this im position of Cuvier's system upon British young ladies 
is m ade largely in  jest; still, as Carlyle observes, "[cjonsidered as a metaphor, 
all this is w ell enough; but here, as in so many other cases, the 'foam  hardens 
itself into a shell,' and the shadow  w e have w antonly evoked stands terrible 
before us and will not depart a t our bidding" (66). Figures of speech become 
figures in  fact. Even a joking application of "science" is bo th  significant and 
effective; it both reveals the culture's desire (the joke only w orks in a context
145 D ionysius Lardner, whose doctorate degree was in letters, published several scientific 
texts, the later ones better known than the earlier. Among his w orks are S ystem  of Algebraic 
Geometry (1823), Popular Lectures on the Steam Engine (1828), Popular Lectures on Astronomy 
(1848), and A n im al Physics, or the Body and Its Functions Familiarly Explained  (1857).
146 The royal "we" again. The brief volum e's stylistic consistency does argue for one author.
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where system s such as Cuvier^s are  fam iliar and  welcome) and  satisfies it 
(even a hum orously applied system  is still a system).
Speaking of satisfying the  cultural desire for systems: the physiologies 
do so by  their very existence. They not only speak of catalogues as good 
things, they  are catalogues, inspired by the same beliefs and  needs as Bewick's 
Birds and  The Animal K ingdom . A s  catalogues, they  perform  a valuable 
cultural function. Specifically, in  addition  to am eliorating u rban  desire, as 
w as discussed above, and closely bound  up w ith  tha t function, they allow 
readers to believe they are v iew ing all possible hum an deviation. 
Physiologies provide the illusion, com forting on m ultip le  l e v e l s , i4 7  that 
readers can know  all—all they have to do is read on. In fact, the physiologies 
claim  as m uch. Remember the M irror's  claim to include portraits of "all such 
as have gained celebrity or notoriety, by deviating in  a rem arkable degree 
from  the ord inary  course of hum an  existence" (l:iii; em phasis added). The 
M irror fu rther claims, "There is scarcely any w him  or caprice so absurd and 
rid iculous tha t we shall not find instances of it upon  record" (1: "Prince of 
Palagonia" 31). Not only is there  nothing n ew  u n d e r the sun, there is 
nothing no t already on record u n der the sun. Later physiologies m ake 
im plicit claim s to com prehensiveness sim ply by covering so m any fam iliar 
types. As Benjamin puts it, again, "[f]rom  the itineran t street vendor of the 
boulevards to the dandy in the  foyer of the opera-house, there w as not a 
figure . . .  that was not sketched by a physiologue"  (35). W hether or no t this is
147 N am ely: there's no one so m ysterious and awful out there to worry about—here are all the 
weirdos, and see how  unmysterious and harm less they are? (see d iscussion  of this point, above); 
and, thanks to  science, humankind know s or w ill soon  know everything about everything—this 
can only be for the better.
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factually accuratei48 is unim portant; the  fact that com prehensive catalogues, 
total systems, were considered desirable and  were offered to the public is.
One basic requirem ent of the total system  was that it be based on 
scientific, verifiable fact. Hence the physiologies' insistence upon their own 
factuality. The Mirror, for instance, claims to describe "only such characters 
as have really existed, and such events as have actually happened" (l:iv). 
Portraits and Lives sim ilarly insists, "those docum ents only have been 
preserved which could be depended up o n  for authenticity" (l:iii). One finds 
frequent asides like th is one from the Mirror: "The reader m ight perhaps be 
inclined to doubt the authenticity of these particulars, d id  they not rest on the 
credit of persons of the highest respectability" (2: "Charles Dom ery" 24). As 
w ith  the claim to com prehensiveness, the tw entieth-century  critic can easily 
find ways to dispute this. One easy place to begin w ould be to point out that 
m any if not most sketches rely p rim arily  upon  inform ation gathered from 
the subject him- or herself—by the standards of scientific objectivity, the least 
reliable source possible. But again, the po in t is no t w hether or not the claim 
is true; the point is th a t it is made, th a t absolute factuality was considered 
im portant and desirable.
Ostensibly strictly factual and w holly  comprehensive, the physiologies 
veritably spout oracular generalizations in  the guise of natural law. Since the 
subjects of sketches are eccentrics broadly  defined, m any of these supposed 
natural laws relate to eccentrics or eccentricity. A nd since they are posed as 
natural laws, and as such unquestionably true, m any of them  are still w ith  us 
today. One law that is n o t  still current is p ropounded  in  the Eccentric Mirror:
148 Again, the irony: it is difficult-to-im possible to  avoid  em ploying the sam e term s and  
standards I'm engaged in critiquing—for instance, "factual accuracy." In any case ("case" being 
another scientific term), even the Mirror's four thick volum es could not include sketches of a l l  
w ho had deviated "in a remarkable degree from the ordinary course o f human existence." N ot 
even in 1807.
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'T h e  character of the British seam an is com pounded of undaunted  courage 
and whim sical eccentricity. H e performs the m ost ordinary  actions in a way 
so peculiar to himself as to m ake them  highly interesting, and by this 
singularity of m anner he frequently renders the gravest subjects irresistibly 
ludicrous" (3: "Daniel Bryan" 2). In short, British sailors are naturally 
eccentric. This law, w hich now  sounds just silly, exemplifies a pitfall built 
into the concept of natural law: supposedly eternal laws often prove 
themselves dated, and  pass in and  out of currency. W ho, today, believes this 
law  to be generally true? Certainly not as m any as w ould accept this one: "In 
no class of m ankind do we find more frequent instances of eccentricity than 
am ong m en of extraordinary genius" (3: "Jonathan Swift" 1).149 The Mirror 
uses Swift him self to exem plify the generalization. The following natural 
law, too, was first proffered du ring  the nineteenth century but quickly seemed 
like timeless, obvious, natural fact (and still does):
[N]o country affords so m any instances of eccentric hum or as the 
British islands, w here it is to be found equally among the lowest 
as am ong the highest classes of society. The reason of this 
undoubtedly  is, that each feeling him self perfectly independent 
of all others, gratifies the propensities and  indulges the caprices 
peculiar to himself, heedless of the censures or approbation of all 
the rest of the world. (3: "Richard Dart" 18).
This universal British feeling is "an indirect eulogy on the political 
constitution and  the law s u n d e r which the English enjoy the happiness of
149 For an excellent direct statement o f this law, see W eeks and James's recent "scientific" 
study of eccentricity:
[Sjtandard IQ tests were a part o f our procedure w ith all the subjects in the 
eccentrics project, and the results supported our a p r io r i assum ption that 
eccentrics tend to be above average in intelligence. The sam ple had an average 
IQ in the 115-120 range, more than one standard deviation above the norm; this 
places them  in the top 10-15 percent of the population. (38)
Not only is the law  true, they have the numbers to prove it.
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living;^ and  by which each indiv idual is suffered to gratify every whim , fancy, 
and  caprice, provided it be not prejudicial to his fellow-creatures" (1; "Henry 
Lee W arner, Esq." 22). That is, the superior British form  of governm ent 
grants freedom  and independence to all British citizens of all classes; feeling 
this freedom , everyone of course indulges his or her eccentricities. 
Eccentricity, then, is a natural consequence of Great B ritain 's constitutional 
monarchy, an adaptation to the environm ent, as it were. U nder a different, 
less perfect form of government, citizens would probably be as ordinary as 
those of o ther nations.^50
Foucault has argued that "[djiscursive practices are characterized by the 
delim itation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitim ate perspective for 
the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of 
concepts and theories" (199). A discourse sets the standards by which 
knowledge and truth can be defined, produced, and expressed. One can 
observe the operation of this principle in the above exam ples. First, the 
speaker indicates distance between him self and his subject; he speaks of those 
people out there, sailors and geniuses. Even w hen referring  to Britons in 
general, of which apparently he .is one, he uses a th ird-person descriptive 
mode; he does not, for example, speak of "us." As discussed above, 
"objective" distance, disinterestedness together w ith the ability to stand 
outside and look in upon "proper" objects of study, was (and still is) 
considered necessary for the production of scientific fact and natural law. 
These people constitute proper objects of (scientific) study  because they are 
"objective": they can be touched, seen, and heard, quantified and  measured, 
unlike "subjective" and therefore im proper objects such as m etaphysics and 
religion, the soul and Christian faith.
150 See also Heads o f the People, cited above, which calls the French Great Britain's "natural 
enemies."
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Second, the speaker im plies that he has perform ed system atic 
observations, also necessary to the discovery of natural law s. 'I n  no class of 
m ankind  do w e find m ore frequen t instances" of eccentricity he writes, 
im plying tha t a thorough observation of all possible "classes" has already 
been com pleted. Phrases such as "no country affords," "each feeling him self 
in d ep en d en t of all others," and  "caprices peculiar to him self" com m unicate 
sim ilar ideas. Com prehensive inform ation hav ing  been carefully gathered  
and system atically collated, natural law  can now  be confidently stated.
A n d  finally, the speaker poin ts to his belief in a priori, scientific fact, a 
belief w hich  it is assum ed the reader shares. Phrases such as "in no class...do 
we find" and "w here it is to be found" express im plicit faith  in that w hich is 
objectively lying there w aiting to be observed. Phrases like "do w e find" also 
appeal (like m odern scientific reports) to verification by  the reader—as in. 
Have y o u  no t also noticed th is to be so? Have y o u r own system atic 
observations no t found this sam e phenom enon to exist? A t the least, such 
phrases im ply that if readers did  perform  system atic observations they w ould  
surely find  the sam e thing to be true, for the speaker is only reporting sim ple 
fact.
T he ostensible na tu ra l law  th a t Great Britain is unusually  p roductive  
of eccentrics m ight, on the face of it, look like evidence tha t eccentrics w ere 
highly va lued , for it is otherw ise difficult to see the sense in  the dom inant 
cu ltu re 's claim , m ade so often after 1800, that the nation contained so m any 
of them . A nd yet eccentrics w ere not valued highly, not per se. Careful 
reading of law  shows w here their value did lie: "It is universally  adm itted  
that no country  in  the world  produces so m any hum orists and eccentric 
characters as the British islands. This acknow ledgem ent is an  indirect eulogy 
on the political constitution and  the law s under w hich the English enjoy the
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happiness o f  l iv ing"  {Mirror 1: "Warner^' 22; em phasis added). (Note, again, 
the subtle deploym ent of scientific discourse. "It is universally admitted": 
everyone can and  does see the sim ple facts. "[N]o country in  the world 
produces so m any": an extensive survey has apparently  been taken of these 
countable, calculable objects called eccentrics.) The idea of eccentrics, then, as 
distinct from  eccentrics themselves, perform ed a valuable cultural function. 
Specifically, the  id ea  tha t Britain's superio r governm ent allows people to be 
eccentric if they  so desire provided a sort of nationalistic comfort to the 
beleaguered ind iv idual during a tim e of great systematization. The 
unspoken a rgum en t w orks like this: eccentrics na turally  thrive here; the 
conditions that p roduce them persist, so anyone from  any class can at any 
time choose to be eccentric; these conditions do not exist in other countries; 
therefore, our nation  is best; therefore, we are lucky to live where we do, so 
never m ind the system atization proceeding apace. In a word: because 
eccentrics are m ost common in Britain, all o u r lives are pleasant, 
notw ithstanding contrary  evidence. O r to p u t it another way: eccentrics, 
common as sparrow s, provide scientific proof th a t w e live in  the greatest 
nation on earth. T hat is the logic by which the supposed natural law 
provides comfort.
This comfort w as sorely needed. As w riters such as Carlyle recognized, 
mechanic system atization both literal and  figurative proliferated 
astonishingly d u rin g  the Romantic era. Labor g rew  more specialized, 
m echanized, unp leasan t, and unrem unerative .isi "The scientific method" 
increasingly dom inated  all forms of thinking. British life in general became 
more unnerv ing ly  u rb an  and less am enable to indiv idual choice and 
difference. W hat H orkheim er writes of late tw entieth-century life was quite
151 E. P. Thompson's The M aking of the English W orking Class provides an excellent, highly 
detailed description of th is process.
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as true for early nineteenth-century Great Britain:
The factors in the contem porary situation—population growth, a 
technology tha t is becom ing fully autom ated, the centralization 
of economic and  therefore political power, the increased 
rationality of the ind iv idual as a result of his w ork in  industry— 
are inflicting upon life a degree of organization and 
m anipulation  th a t leaves the ind iv idual only enough 
spontaneity to launch h im self onto the path prescribed for h im ..
. . The w ord "m an" [sic] no longer expresses the pow er of the 
subject who can resist the status quo, however heavily it may 
w eigh upon him. (4)
Even De Quincey, w hose fam ily 's m oney sheltered him  from  m ost suffering 
that w as not self-inflicted, w rote in 1824, "[I]n m odem  life the whole derives 
its superiority  from the very circum stances which constitute the inferiority of 
the parts [namely, specialization w ithin  a total system]: for m odern life is cast 
dramatically" (W orks  10:452). Indiv idual difference and  individual choice 
are sacrificed for the advancem ent of the culture and its systems as a whole, 
even w hen indiv idual people d islike the whole and only advance it against 
their will. De Quincey elaborates, m aking a point ultim ately very similar to 
H orkheim er's:
[T]he progress of society brings w ith it a necessity of sacrificing 
the ideal of w hat is excellent for the whole. We need, therefore, 
not trouble ourselves (except as a speculative question) w ith the 
comparison of the two states; because, as a practical question, it is 
precluded by the overruling tendencies of the age—w hich no 
m an could counteract except in his own single case, i.e. by 
refusing to adap t him self as a part of the whole, and thus
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forgoing the advantages of either one state or the other. (10:452)
One can oppose the dom inant culture successfully, on a sm all scale, writes De 
Quincey, bu t one w ill gain little and lose m uch by the opposition; therefore, 
one m ight as w ell accede and so gain the benefits of "launching  himself onto 
the path  prescribed for him."
In this environm ent, eccentricity offered an apparen t w ay out. As in 
the early eighteenth century, the idea of eccentricity p rov ided  an escape valvey
for trem endous cultural pressure. T hat eccentricity was supposedly a 
particularly  British phenom enon makes perfect cultural sense, given that, as 
Williams argues, industrialization w as actually a particularly  British 
phenom enon. Eccentricity made m odern  life m ore bearable, much as 
physiologies m ade newly urban life m ore bearable.
Still, despite  eccentricity's cultural usefulness, it was not highly or 
unqualifiedly valued  per se. It couldn 't be: the sam e conditions that made it 
useful also m ade it nugatory. That is, in  the late eighteenth  century, the trope 
of eccentricity as m inor illness m ade eccentricity a t once m ore and less 
sym pathetic. In sim ilar dialectic fashion, the early  nineteenth-century logic 
of systems produced a need for eccentricity, while at the sam e time, that logic 
contained and organized eccentricity's potentially subversive energies.
One can observe this process at w ork in the physiologies. Even early 
ones organize eccentrics (broadly defined) into types or groups in a way that 
erases their difference. For example, Th e Eccentric Mirror claims to describe 
"all such as have gained celebrity or notoriety, by deviating in  a remarkable 
degree from the ord inary  course of hum an existence" (l:iii). If this were to be 
literally true, the volum es w ould have to include infin ite varieties of 
difference. W hat the M irror—which is the m ost com prehensive and wide- 
ranging physiology I have been able to locate—actually does include, however.
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does not even approach  the infinite. There are only abou t a dozen  categories 
of difference, and  every eccentric falls quite neatly in to  one and  only one of 
them. There are eccentrically shaped subjects (giants, dw arves, a "spotted 
negro," and the astonishingly obese); subjects with eccentric physical abilities 
(a strong man, an am azingly fast and durable runner and  w alker, long-lived 
m en and wom en, an d  a m an who could and d id  ea t v irtua lly  anything); 
subjects w ith eccentric intellectual abilities (self-taught m athem atical and 
m usical prodigies, artists, writers, and  actors); transvestites (several women 
who passed as m en and  one m an w ho passed as a w om an); survivors of 
horrible ordeals (a w om an who survived several n ights bu ried  in  snow, and 
a m an survived the Black Hole of Calcutta); nobility from  other lands; misers; 
absent-m inded, benevolent, harmless m en of the Quixote-Coverley-Shandy 
line (but, as previously , no wom en like this); court in triguers (whose 
difference consisted in  the unusual altitude and com plexity of their social 
connections); eccentric sailor-adventurers; and a few  already-fam ous 
historical personages (Joan of Arc, Lady Godiva, the philosopher Heidegger).
A nd that's all. Listed together hke that, this m ay  seem  hke a pretty 
broad variety of subjects, but held up against the vast possibilities of infinite 
difference, these few  well-defined categories look puny. A nd again, the use of 
such categories erases difference. For example, Joseph Boruw laski looks less 
unusual, less d ifferen t or eccentric, w hen  other dw arves appear in  the same 
collection, even w ith in  his own portrait. His portrait in  the M irror  spends 
five pages out of tw enty-five covering the rivalry betw een  Boruwlaski and 
the dw arf "Bébé" a t the French court. Thus, Boruwlaski m ust be understood 
as a dwarf, as one  ind iv idual exam ple of a large, fairly  hom ogeneous 
category—not as a tru ly  different, truly ex-centric person. H e m ay be ex-centric 
from dom inant society, b u t it is m ade clear that som ew here in nature exists a
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circle w ith  num erous mem bers, in  the m iddle of which Boruw laski belongs. 
Daniel Lam bert's portrait devotes a sim ilar proportion of pages to describing 
other large men, their m easurem ents, and  their eating habits. Misers are 
routinely com pared to other misers; and  so on. In the very act of describing 
difference, then, the physiologies employ clearly-bounded categories that 
describe creatures w ith very sim ilar characteristics, habits, and appearance.
That is to say, the physiologies effectively divide eccentrics into species. 
Species of eccentrics, like species of animals, may seem exotic w hen  com pared 
w ith other species (especially if the other species are significantly more 
"norm al"); bu t still, to see an ind iv idual animal as a representative of a 
species is to m easure it autom atically against certain norms, to erase its oddity 
and individuality . As Adorno and  H orkheim er explain, "W hat w as different 
is equalized" w hen it is view ed through  the microscope of science. Science 
"excises the incom m ensurable. . . . Abstracting, the tool of enlightenm ent, 
treats its objects as did fate, the notion of which it rejects: it liquidates them " 
(12-13). A platypus may seem like a strange animal, but any given platypus is 
not strange am ong other platypuses; and an unusual platypus is, at w orst (or 
best), a som ew hat atypical specim en—a blip on the graph, a m inor anom aly in 
calculation that is ultim ately averaged out. Merely to think in  terms of 
species, as the physiologies subtly m anipulate the reader to do, is to elide 
difference. The Mirror, for one, expresses pleasure in "advert[ing] sometimes 
to the delineation of any uncom m on object, to the sportive productions of 
nature, in her occasional deviations from  her general laws" (2: "Bam pfylde 
Moore Carew" 1); however, in  so adverting, the physiologies instantiate and 
enforce the  general laws m uch m ore than  they ever revel in the deviations.
Just to reinforce the valid ity  of com paring the specification of animals 
(i.e., the sorting of individual creatures into species) with the specification of
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eccentrics: examine C uvier's description of m ethod. N ote how  very closely it 
resembles the Mirror's statem ents regarding m ethod, quoted above:
[I created a table] in which I should . . . indicate the best 
authenticated  species belonging to each of the subdivisions, and 
in w hich, to increase the interest, I should add  some details 
regarding those species that are rendered remarkable  by their 
being so common in  this country, by their u tility  or mischievous 
practices, by the singularity o f  their habits and their economy, by 
their strange forms, their beauty, or their size. (l:xx; emphases 
added)
The connection is even clearer w hen viewed from  the other direction: 
Sketches o f  Young Ladies, Sketches o f  Young Gentlemen, and Heads o f  the 
People, for example, all employ starkly scientific, Cuvierian language. They 
do so jokingly, perhaps, ye t do so nonetheless. The subtitle for Young Ladies 
shows this: In Which These Interesting Members o f  the Anim al Kingdom  
Are Classified According to their Several Instincts, Habits, and General 
Characteristics. Furtherm ore, the author of that book speaks of different 
varieties of young ladies as if they were different anim al species:
[W]e used in form er times to consider this busy young lady as 
the only one of her class. By degrees, however, as we have 
enlarged our know ledge of things, we have discovered that she 
is only a type of a thousand others. There are now, w ithin  the 
range of our acquaintance, no less than five fine specimens.
Two of them  are sisters, and, in a zoological po in t of view, may 
be considered the noblest pair, yet discovered, of those useful 
anim als that practise the happy art of doing every thing and 
nothing at the sam e time. (18)
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Young Ladies, Young  Gentlemen, and  Heads habitually refer to 
representative examples of their species as "specim ens/' and Quiz goes so far 
as to use the pronoun "it" in  referring to them . Heads takes the com parison a 
step farther:
The Cabinet M inister is the paragon of anim als . . . [He] is 
descended (not in  a direct line, for all his ways are crooked) from 
the sm allest, m eanest, vilest, and m ost p itiful of all the creeping 
things that w ent up  w ith  N oah into the ark. N ot only has he 
sprung from the m ost w retched of the race of reptiles, bu t he is a 
disgrace to his family besides. . . . H is nature is an essence 
com pounded from  all that is m ost noisom e and noxious in 
other natures. . . . Instead of being the  "H ead of the People," he is 
only an insect prey ing  upon it. . . . Still it is not to be denied that 
the Cabinet M inister has been gifted by nature w ith talents of an 
extraordinary and  ennobling character. (3 5 3 -5 4 )1 5 2  
Heads's authors do no t merely speak of people as i f  they were animals, bu t 
directly (if som ewhat facetiously) call them  anim als.
Like animal species, or birds described in Bewick's, species of people 
can be identified by "their several instincts, habits, and general 
characteristics." For example. Heads's "Apothecary" can be identified by his 
"exuberantly p ruden t cheeks, the am plitude of the abdom inal curve, and  the 
loose, easy suit of sober black, which, com bining comfort w ith respectability, 
outvies the propriety of costume exhibited by the most affluent undertaker" 
(385). The "M anly Young Lady" "is found m ost in those counties where there 
is good hunting, and prefers the north to the south" {Young Ladies 43); she
152 N ote here the phenom enon discussed in the first scctiim: a w holly negative, critical sketch  
is not allowed to stand; positive qualities must be scraped together from somewhere, then they  
are thrown onto the canvas in the usual seemingly inconsi.stent way.
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talks frequently  of horses and dogs by gender, rides constantly, emphatically 
does not sew , wears hard shoes, alw ays wanted to be a boy, speaks 
uncom fortably directly, reads Isaac W alton and the Sporting Magazine, hates 
novels an d  love stories, and is beloved b y  the village neighbors. In this way, 
ostensibly natu ra l characteristics and habits reveal the species to w hich a 
given "specim en" or individual rightly belongs.
W hat is ironic about this system  of identification-by-natural- 
characteristics is that the characteristics are often plainly, even em phatically 
no t  natural. That is, the characteristics of m any types or species are affected, 
which is the  m ain thrust and jest of the sketch—yet these affected 
characteristics are those which provide the basis for identification. In other 
words, the discourse breaks its ow n rules requiring truth and scientific fact. 
For instance, of the "Extremely N atural Young Lady" Quiz w rites, "But there 
is a class w ho  like so m uch to have it sa id  of them  'how  very natural!' that 
they have becom e affected on purpose . . . [She is] always doing some out of 
the w ay thing, that she may appear sim ple and girlish" (100). The 
"Censorious Young Gentleman" has a repu ta tion  for being clever, "w hich he 
m aintains by receiving all intelligence and  expressing all opinions w ith  a 
dubious sneer, accom panied w ith  a h a lf  sm ile" (60). W ithout th is obvious 
affectation his actual ignorance w ould  appear more clearly. Thus, the 
discursive seam s show  from tim e to tim e; I he use of naturalistic-classificatory 
discourse in  the realm  of hum an beings makes itself visible upon  occasion, 
when it does not neatly fit, when it contradicts its own laws.
The application of scientific discourse—most especially the concepts of 
natural law  and  species—not only devalued  the individuality and  difference 
which eccentrics (broadly defined) potentially possessed and exhibited; it even 
destroyed these qualities. If the mere d ivision into species destroys difference.
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the destruction  is even more com plete w hen the num ber of species available 
as pigeonholes decreases. As noted above. The Eccentric Mirror describes a 
dozen types of oddballs; later physiologies, fewer and fewer. For instance. The 
Eccentric Magazine, published only five years later, and Lives and Portraits, 
published only a decade later, discard all foreign nobility, survivors, court 
in triguers, most physical and intellectual prodigies, an d  all transvestites. 
W omen virtually disappear altogether. By 1820 only half a dozen categories 
of male eccentrics remained, "the  eccentric" as in Sterne et alia prom inent 
am ong them .
Far from being valued in itself, then, eccentricity d u ring  the Romantic 
era was alm ost completely systematized, organized, and  classified out of 
existence. Paradoxically, perhaps, this was also accomplished by means of 
expanding  the concept of eccentricity. Everyone, or more precisely, every type 
or species became eccentric—amusing, odd, interesting in its own way. 
Physiologies moved rapidly from describing particular, actual individuals 
(albeit representative of categories, even in the earliest physiologies) to 
describing types or species—from John Elwes to "The Miser." And in these 
descriptions of species, am used tolerance became the norm, the prescribed 
attitude, no m atter w hat the subject. All "sketches had one thing in 
common: they were harmless and  of perfect bonhom ie" (Benjamin 37). 
W hen everyone is eccentric—the chim ney-sweep, the cabinet minister, the 
dom estic young gentleman, the eccentric—no one is eccentric.
To re turn  to the point m ade two paragraphs ago: physiologies of the 
late 1810s and  twenties included fewer species of eccentrics than in the 
'oughts. This made "the eccentric," which by now had a whole century of 
history and tradition behind it, more prom inent by default. A nd this fact 
provides the final piece of the puzzle, the puzzle being the question. How did
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the word "eccentric" m ove w ith in  thirty years from being an adjective not 
even applied to hum ans, to being a widely recognized nominative, "the 
eccentric"? My sum m ative answ er: at the tu rn  of the nineteenth century, 
odd, different people of m any kinds—"eccentric characters," people residing 
outside the dom inant cu ltu re 's  center—came to be of in terest to a large British 
audience. This happened prim arily  due to the progress of scientific thinking 
and of urban industrialization, w ith all of progress's a ttendant ills. These 
new pressures produced a cultural demand for eccentricity, which was 
expressed in general pride th a t Great Britain was the eccentric capital of the 
world. However, over tim e, and  by the specific m eans of the concepts of 
natural law and species classification, these pressures also ground away at 
eccentrics and eccentricity. The pressures were intense, so the grinding 
progressed quickly. Soon, v irtually  all that was left was the quixotic figure 
familiar from the e ighteenth  century, in Sterne, Sm ollett, et alia. This 
familiar figure was the only one of the few rem aining species of eccentric 
characters w ith a solid, definitive history; he was the one that looked most 
like a naturally occurring organism , like a creature w ho was "just that way." 
So, partly by the rules of scientific discourse and partly  by default, this figure 
looked most representative of eccentric characters in general. Thus, this 
eighteenth-century figure, the addle-pated, benevolent male quixote trotting 
harmlessly along upon his hobby-horse, came to be know n as the  eccentric.
In short, the British Rom antic era saw a brief, broad expansion of the 
term and concept "eccentric," followed by a rapid  narrowing-down or 
specification. It is w onderfully  apt that Dickens, in Sketches of Young 
Gentlemen  in 1837—the earliest days of his career—w ould  write, "[People] are 
perhaps a little too ap t to confound a great many heavier term s w ith the light 
word eccentricity, which we beg them henceforth to take in a strictly
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Johnsonian sense, w ithout any liberality or latitude of construction" (25). By 
1837 the w ord "eccentric" d id  indeed possess a "strictly Johnsonian sense." 
Dickens, the w riter perhaps most associated w ith eccentric characters, w ould 
further narrow  and solid ify  that sense d u rin g  the Victorian era.
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"A lone lorn creetur": Dickens, Darwin, and  the Eccentric's Demise
W hen we think of eccentrics today, w e tend  to th ink  of Victorian 
eccentrics.!53 Most of all we th ink  of Charles D ickens's colorful characters— 
how w onderfully odd, how delightfully different! H ow  hospitable the 
Victorian era m ust have been to eccentrics of all stripes. H ow  sad that we no 
longer practice such tolerance, nor encourage such ind iv iduality . That is our 
usual refrain.
How ever, as earlier chapters of this genealogy m ight now  lead one to 
expect, things were not actually this simple. G ranted, our usual 
understand ing  of Victorian eccentricity does contain considerable discursive 
truth. Eccentrics were indeed often portrayed in  a clearly positive light, by 
Dickens in particular: John Jam dyce of Bleak House,  for example; the 
Garlands of The Old Curiosity Shop; the Cheeryble brothers of Nicholas 
Nickleby. A nd the time saw the publication of tw o im portan t argum ents on 
behalf of individual difference: Charles D arw in's The Origin o f Species, 
w hich asserted  the necessity of indiv idual variety for the survival of all 
species; and  John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, which specifically pleaded hum an 
eccentricity's social usefulness.
But these discursive elem ents form ed only one side  of a dialectic. This 
dialectic had  existed as long as the figure of the eccentric, casting him, like his 
ancestor Don Quixote, as sim ultaneously "good" and "bad"—adm irable but 
tetched, benevolent but a little m ad, harmless bu t im possible to take 
seriously. N ot only did this dialectic of eccentricity continue into and 
through the Victorian era, but both sides of the dialectic intensified their 
respective claims. Scientific and philosophical argum ents such as Darwin's
153 See, for instance. Weeks and James's Eccentrics: the striking exam ple w ith  w hich they 
begin their book, "Emperor Norton," began his reign in 1856.
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and Mill's, as well as character portraits such as Dickens's and later, Gissing's, 
asserted more p lain ly  and urgently than ever before the value of eccentricity. 
But at the same tim e, these same texts also spelled  eccentricity's doom. This 
was true in two senses. First, they spelled it o n t, or (ostensibly) disinterestedly 
described how certain social and natural forces m ade eccentricity unviable, 
both in general and  particularly  at that time. A nd in the less innocuous 
sense, these texts caused  eccentricity's doom  by reifying the assimilatory forces 
that were assailing eccentricity.
In short, both the value and the valuelessness of eccentricity were 
asserted sim ultaneously and w ith increased v igor betw een 1840 and 1900. 
The eccentric's cultural dem ise resulted, as m uch a product of the "positive" 
side of the dialectic, finally, as of the "negative." Idealization and practical- 
m inded critique together stripped aw ay the eccentric's scant rem aining 
cultural power, his sm all store of oppositional potential. And so, to borrow 
the words of Mrs. G um m idge of David Copperfield, the eccentric truly 
became a "lone lo rn  creetur," ex-centric in the etymological sense, (cast) 
outside an increasingly homogeneous, in ternalized-rule-bound British 
society.
Right there, w ith  the famously ru le-bound V ictorian social milieu, is 
probably the best place to begin detailed discussion. I have divided previous 
chapters into convenient pieces in order to em phasize particular discursive 
developments and their relationship to eccentricity—e.g., the medicalization 
of madness, the innocuousness of physiologies. But now  I am trying to show 
how both sides of the dialectic of eccentricity—the tendency to idealize and 
admire the eccentric, and the tendency to cluck over him  as sick or culpable, 
respectively—intensify their argum ents and ultim ately  effect the eccentric's 
cultural downfall. My task here is to trace the back-and-forths of a dialectic
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and its cultural effects, a task that does not lend itself well to convenient 
divisions. Therefore, this chapter is of one piece.
And so, to begin with the tim e's social atmosphere: its rigidity, its 
pervasive control (and adm iration for sei/-control and  self-abnegation), and 
its devotion to punctilio, to class distinctions, and to being "proper," are 
proverbial.t54 We have all heard tha t piano and table legs w ere called 
"limbs," and underw ear became "unm entionables." We all know —and for a 
rem inder, we can consult virtually any  Victorian novel—that the m ixing of 
classes was regarded with deep horror. 155 We know  tha t the rules for 
behavior, dress, and conversation w ere both elaborate and absolu te .156 To 
illustrate just how  w ell known Victorian social control still is in late- 
tw entieth-century America, one need look no farther than  curren t American 
politicians and  social critics. G ertrude Himmelfarb, N ew t Gingrich, and 
William Bennett, am ong others, have recently been proposing, in essence, 
that America go back to those "good o ld  days." They m ake their arguments 
in full confidence that their audience w ill imm ediately recognize the tru th  of 
the association—"Victorian" w ith "rules" and "control"—and will desire 
som ething sim ilar.
154 D. A. Miller's book The Novel and the Police  provides a valuable discussion o f how  the 
Victorian novel both reflects and solidifies such tight sod al control. Steven Marcus's book The 
Other Victorians: A  S tudy of Sexuality and Pornography in Mid-Nineteenth-Century England, 
to name one example, provides a useful nuandng of our one-dimensional picture o f Victorian 
society. Marcus reminds us that a / /  people d idn't behave "properly" aif the tim e, how ever  
dominant the hegem ony may have been. I em phasize the familiar rigidity here, but do so  in 
order to discuss how  eccentricity was understood; I som ewhat slight the tim e's cultural 
diversity to clarify m y argument. Notw ithstanding m y emphasis on social control, I 
acknowledge that even  in Victorian society (!), d issent, disobedience, and difference did of 
course exist.
155 See, for just one example, Silas Marner. Godfrey Cass is as ashamed by h is secret w ife's low  
class standing as by her dependence upon opium. Furthermore, when Eppie w ants to marry 
Aaron Winthrop, the connection appalls Cass, because by this point Eppie know s she is 
actually Cass's daughter, yet she plans to marry "beneath" herself.
156 In particular, the idea o f the "fallen wom an" allow ed for little deviation. O nce "fallen," 
she was forever considered impure. See, for instance, Tess of the D'Urbervilles,  and the 
severity with which she and all around her regard her "offense."
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Virginia Woolf, looking backwards a British generation or two, found 
only gloom  and oppression in the Victorian atm osphere; she sum s up the 
whole cultural m ilieu w ith  the single w ord "dam p." "D am p" for her is both 
an adjective and a noun; she finds the age waterlogged by sentim ental tears, 
as by m uch of D ickens's work, for instance; but more broadly and im portantly 
she decries the om nipresent, d ism al chill—the dam pening  of spirit, of 
spontaneity, of joy and  comfort—that Victorian society engendered . She 
writes:
A change seem ed to have come over the climate of England. . . . 
[Djamp now began to m ake its way into every house—dam p, 
which is the m ost insidious of all enemies, . . . silent, 
imperceptible, ubiquitous. . . . [T]he constitution 's? of England 
was altered and  nobody knew it. Everywhere the effects were 
felt. The hardy  country gentleman . . . now felt chilly. Rugs 
appeared, beards were grow n and trousers fastened tight under 
the instep. The chill w hich he felt in his legs he soon transferred  
to his house; furniture was muffled; walls and  tables w ere 
covered too. Then a change of d iet became essential. . . . But the 
change did not stop at outw ard things. The dam p struck w ithin .
Men felt the chill in their hearts; the dam p in their m inds. In a 
desperate effort to snuggle their feelings into some so rt of 
w arm th one subterfuge was tried after another. Love, birth , and  
death were all sw addled  in a variety of fine phrases. The sexes 
drew  further and  further apart. No open conversation was 
tolerated. Evasions and  concealments were sedulously practised
157 "Constitution" here should  probably be read in two senses: the m ost obvious one, related to 
physical health—"the health iness o f England w as altered"; and also the governm ental, 
capital-C sense—"the rules by which England lives were altered." (See the d iscussion  of Mill, 
below, on the rule of m iddle-class public opinion over and above law.)
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on both  sides. {Orlando 227-29)
W oolfs critique cannot fairly be dism issed as generational sour grapes, à la 
Harold Bloom. T hat is, in The A n x ie ty  o f  Influence, Bloom argues that each 
artistic generation, acting out an Œ dipal compulsion, attacks the ideals and 
æsthetic p rincip les of the im m ediately preceding generation. In Woolf's time 
one thinks instan tly  of Lytton Strachey, w ith his scathing attacks in Eminent 
Victorians upo n  the Victorian ideals of hard  work, self-sacrifice, and moral 
earnestness, and  upon  Q ueen Victoria herself in his b iography of her. The 
argum ent could  perhaps be m ade, then, that Woolf, like m any  artists, put 
dow n her ancestors merely as a necessary stage tow ard establishing herself as 
a w riter; th a t it is her struggle against Victorianism itself rather than her 
particular com plain t against it w hich holds m eaning. However, many 
Victorian th inkers observed the sam e central phenom enon as Woolf—that 
contem porary society had become oppressive and controlling in unnervingly 
pervasive, subtle, internalized ways; that it had become very difficult to differ 
from dom inan t society. Even w hen  they are not directly addressing the 
subject, som e Victorian w riters such as William M akepeace Thackeray and 
Anthony T rollope betray that they felt the dam p in their very bones. Woolf, 
then, describes an  oppressive gloom  that was felt by people who were there. 
The sheer volum e of contem porary corroboration dem ands tha t we take her 
portrait of V ictorian culture seriously—which, as I began by saying, we really 
already do.
The best and  most influential V ictorian w riter against contemporary 
damp is John S tuart Mill. His philosophical treatise On Liberty, first 
published in  1859, is "the single m ost eloquent, m ost significant, and most 
influential sta tem en t of the irreducib le  value of hum an individuality"
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(Collini vii). His m ain thesis is that "doing as w e like" (15),t58 as distinct 
from  doing w hat society  likes, is both a fundam ental right and a desirable 
practice. He holds tha t
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any m em ber of a civilised com m unity, against his will, is to 
prevent harm  to others. His own good, e ither physical or moral, 
is not a sufficient w arrant. He cannot rightfu lly  be compelled to 
do or forbear because it will be better for him  to do so, because it 
will make him  happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do 
so would be wise, or even right. These are  good reasons for 
rem onstrating w ith  him , or reasoning w ith  him , or persuading  
him, or en trea ting  him , but not for com pelling him, or visiting 
him w ith any evil in  case he do otherwise. (13)
Furthermore, he asserts that individuals' ability  to act and th ink  for 
them selves is v ital to hum an  happiness and  progress: "W here, not the 
person 's own character, bu t the traditions or custom s of other people are the 
rule of conduct, there is w anting one of the principal ingredients of hum an 
happiness, and quite the  chief ingredient of ind iv idual and social progress" 
(57).
The reason Mill m akes this argum ent is th a t he not only felt the awful 
dam p, he also felt it intensifying. Mill held that Victorian society already 
controlled the ind iv idual m uch too thoroughly an d  was striv ing  to increase 
that control yet further, both by custom and by law. In a letter to his wife
158 M atthew Arnold fam ously  attacked this position, characterizing the theoretical right of 
all to do as w e like as, in actual practice, the anarchist's "right to march where he likes, meet 
w here he likes, enter w here he likes, hoot as he likes, threaten as he likes, sm ash as he likes" 
(Culture and Anarchy  119). This attack supports my characterization of dominant Victorian 
society: the prospect o f virtually  unlimited personal liberty totally unnerves Arnold and the 
respectable society he represents. The choice appears to be strictly dichotomous, between  
civilization, tight social control, and order (Culture) on the one side, and on the other, 
barbarity, chaos, and disorder (Anarchy)—as Arnold's title w ou ld  suggest.
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Harriet w ritten in January 1855, Mill expresses his sense of the issue's 
urgency: "N othing seem s to me more needed [than  an insistence upon 
individual lib e rty ].. . .  It is a growing need, too, for opinion tends to encroach 
more on liberty, and alm ost all the projects of social reform ers in these days 
are really liberticide" (qtd. in  Collini xi). His goal in  On Libert}/, then, was to 
disperse the steadily encroaching damp.
As his letter indicates, for Mill the prim ary source of damp was 
"opinion"—specifically, middle-class opinion. Mill observes, "Where there is 
an ascendant class, a large portion of the m orality of the country emanates 
from its class interests and  its feelings of class superiority" (10). The 
"ascendant class" in his tim e was definitely the m iddle class. More than half 
a century of universal education in support of "h igh  capita lism "-of high 
degrees of specialization and division of labor, unequal distribution of goods, 
and concentration of population  in urban centers of production—had 
produced a sw arm  of m iddle-class professionals. The newly organized high- 
capitalist society required and supported veritable hives of specialized 
workers: bankers, lawyers, clerks, teachers, nurses, salespeople,
adm inistrators, and  managers. As George Orwell notes, the m iddle class of 
Mill's time "w as grow ing suddenly rich [and num erous] after a couple of 
centuries of obscurity" ("Dickens" 67). The m iddle class crow ded itself both 
upw ards and dow nw ards, "on such a scale as to make the old classification of 
society into capitalists, proletarians, and petit-bourgeois (small property- 
owners) alm ost obsolete" (Orwell, "England" 276). In short, the middle class 
came to w ield enorm ous sociopolitical influence.
And the m iddle class never likes eccentricity—not now, and not in 
Victorian Britain. The reason for this is the conservatism  which arises from 
the m iddle class's precarious social position. That is, m iddle class people
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always know they could sink in class at any time, and believe (or a t least 
hope) they could rise if they imitate their betters closely enough. A nd so, as 
Paul Fussell explains,
[wjorried a lot about their ow n taste and w hether i f  s working for 
or against them, members of the m iddle class try to arrest their 
natural tendency to sink dow nw ard  by associating themselves, if 
ever so tenuously, w ith the im agined possessors of money, 
power, and taste. "Correctness" and doing the right thing 
become obsessions . . .  (41)
Most often the "righ t thing," the th ing  that w ould earn upper-class approval, 
is the conservative thing. In any case, the last thing middle-class people w ant 
to do is to offend their betters; to do so w ould be tantam ount to voluntarily 
climbing dow n the social ladder. To protect their position and to leave open 
the possibility of climbing, therefore, middle-class people avoid and 
disapprove of anything remotely capable of offending upper-class 
sensibilities, which tend overw helm ingly to be conservative. (This latter 
point is true because, obviously, people of wealth and pow er have vested 
interests in m aintaining a system that treats them  so well.) This is how  it is 
in the middle class's "class interests and its feelings of class superiority" to 
adopt, even to internalize an oppressive, rigid belief system that seem s to 
work against m iddle-class interests. This is why, now and during Victoria's 
reign, middle-class people shed or m ask their own deviations or 
eccentricities, ultim ately out of fear, and  purse lips and shake heads against 
the eccentricities of others. As Fussell pu ts it, for the m em ber of the m iddle 
class,
[vjirtually no latitude is perm itted  to individuality  or the m ilder 
forms of eccentricity, and [middle-class] employees soon learn to
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avoid all ideological statem ents . . . Terrified of losing their jobs, 
these people grow passive, their hum anity d im in ished  as they 
perceive themselves m ere parts of an infinitely larger structure.
A nd interchangeable parts, too. (40)
Thus, by associating themselves w ith  their "betters" and as an effect of class 
and economic insecurity, m iddle-class citizens very frequently  adopt a 
conservative position. T horstein  V eblen comments upon  the  logic involved: 
Since conservatism  is a characteristic of the w ealth ier and 
therefore more repu tab le  portion  of the com m unity , it has 
acquired a certain honorific or decorative value. It has become 
prescrip tive to such an extent that an adherence to conservative 
views is com prised as a m atter of course in our notions of 
respectability; and it is im peratively incum bent on  all who 
w ould lead a blam eless life in point of social repute. 
Conservatism , being an upper-class characteristic, is decorous; 
and conversely, innovation, being a lower-class phenom enon, is 
vulgar. . . .  Innovation is bad  form. (138)
"Innovation" here applies in the broadest sense: v irtually  any  dev ia tion  from 
old, established, upper-class form s of thought, behavior, or social decorum. 
Deviation or innovation—eccentricity—is sim ply not classy. Thus, 
conservatism  tends, and tended du ring  the Victorian era, to overrule the 
historical association between the u p per classes and eccentricity. (Members of 
the highest classes were am ong the very few whose eccentricity was 
[grudgingly] tolerated, but this is not to say that the highest classes necessarily 
are more eccentric, nor that they are more tolerant of eccentricity. Instead, 
eccentricity is a function of power: certain upper-class people were openly 
eccentric because their wealth and  pow er made it possible for them  to be so.
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not because there is som e inherent, natural tendency am ong upper-class 
people to be eccentric.) In any case, as the self-consciously "respectable," 
conservative, upper-class-im itating m iddle class expanded throughout 
Victorian Britain, a general distaste for eccentricity expanded along with it.
Mill saw  this happening, and tried in On Liberty to reverse the process. 
He saw  quite clearly how  class insecurity leads to intolerant conservatism, 
and w rites m uch in  the vein  that Veblen and Fussell do later:
N ot only in  w ha t concerns others, bu t in  w h a t concerns only 
them selves, the ind iv idual or the fam ily do not ask themselves- 
-w hat do I prefer? or, what would su it m y character and 
disposition? or, w hat would allow the best and  highest in me to 
have fair play, and  enable it to grow and  thrive? They ask 
them selves, w hat is suitable to my position? w hat is usually 
done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or 
(worse still) what is usually done by persons o f  a station and 
circumstances superior to mine! (61; emphasis added)
Eccentricity is not "usually  done" among the u p p er classes; it is only slightly 
more than  generally tolerated. Mill makes his po in t about the aping of 
betters even more strongly in the introductory chapter: "[One] grand 
determ ining p r in c ip le  159 of the rules of conduct, both  in act and forbearance, 
which have been enforced by law or opinion, has been the servility o f  
mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions o f  their temporal 
masters, or o f  their gods" (10; emphasis added). Note the way Mill's syntax 
equates "tem poral m asters" with "gods"; the m iddle-class person fears and 
obeys the one as anxiously and servilely as the other.
Mill argues that conservative middle-class values were becoming so
159 See Chapter 4's d iscussion o f the great search for natural law, which had spread and 
intensified considerably by the tim e of Mill's writing.
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thoroughly internalized that they now exerted more actual pow er upon 
individual subjects than  even the law does. This was especially true in 
England, he claims: "from  the peculiar circumstances of o u r political history, 
though the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier, tha t of law  is lighter, than  in 
most other countries of Europe" (12). In taking this line. M ill sounds at times 
very m uch like Foucault. To explain: in Discipline and Punish, and most 
especially the chapter on "Panopticism" (195-228), Foucault describes the 
difference between older, more spectacular (i.e., more in the nature of public 
spectacles) punitive practices—the rack, the scaffold, d raw ing  and quartering— 
and the new "disciplinary" forms, best illustrated by the Panopticon. 
Disciplinary forms w ork upon the body from w ithin , w hereas older 
punishm ents had been im posed from without. In the Panopticon, a prison 
designed by the Englishm an Jeremy Bentham, inm ates m igh t or m ight not be 
seen at all hours—they had no way of knowing precisely w hen or for how 
long they were being observed—and would be punished for undesirable 
behavior, more or less heavily depending upon the exact nature of their 
offense. Knowing that they were, at least potentially, perpetual objects of the 
jailer's disciplinary gaze, and believing that transgression surely brought 
about precisely calibrated punishment, prisoners learned  to control 
them selves  to avoid such punishm ent. They developed  the sense of 
"conscious and  perm anent visibility that assures the autom atic  functioning 
of power" (201). Foucault argues that from the eighteenth century  onw ards. 
W estern societies—not just prisons, bu t entire cultures—have operated  upon 
the same principle. All people are their own (and each o ther's) overseers, to 
the degree finally that m any transgressive acts and thoughts are quite literally 
unthinkable; self-control m otivated at bottom by fear of pun ishm en t freezes 
certain desires before they can fully develop, express them selves, and be
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enacted.
M ill's On Liberty makes essentially this same argum ent. Mill writes, 
for instance, that "[society] practises a social tyranny m ore formidable than 
m any kinds of political oppression, since, though no t usually  upheld  by such 
extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating  much more 
deeply into the details of life" (8). Furtherm ore, "O ur merely social 
intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces m en to disguise 
them , or to abstain from  any active effort for their diffusion" (34). Similarly, 
"The effect of custom, in  preventing any m isgiving respecting the rules of 
conduct w hich  m ankind impose on one another, is all the more complete 
because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary 
that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to 
himself" (9). A nd m ost in  the Foucauldian line;
1 do not m ean th a t they choose w hat is custom ary, in preference 
to w hat suits the ir own inclination. It does not occur to them  to 
have any inclination, except for w hat is custom ary. Thus the 
m ind itself is bow ed to the yoke: even in w hat people do for 
pleasure, conform ity is the first thing they think of; they like in 
crowds; they exercise choice only among things com m only done: 
peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally 
w ith crimes . . .  (61-62)
Dam p reaches the bones and  works upon the indiv idual subject from within. 
Social control becomes internalized, escaping critical scrutiny, and therefore 
becomes all the more pow erful and thorough-going. In fairly literal fashion, 
it becomes impossible to do w hat middle-class society w ill disapprove of— 
even to be a little eccentric.
One need not search far beyond Mill in V ictorian literature to find
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examples of this kind of rigid, in ternalized social control. In fact, examples 
pop out from the most unexpected places. For exam ple, see Thackeray's The 
Book o f  Sno6s.i60 This collection of pieces originally w ritten  for Punch 
betw een 1846 and 1847 was clearly in tended to entertain  rather than to make 
any kind of social protest. Thackeray was not by any stretch a radical (nor was 
Punch); he was born into wealth, the son o f a colonial adm inistrato r in India, 
and  he studied law before becoming a w riter. Thackeray's gentle satire 
touches himself as frequently  as his targets—e.g., "U niversity Snobs," "Dining- 
out Snobs," "Literary Snobs"—and touches no one w ith m uch bite. 
Thackeray's sketches are light, innocuous caricatures, very m uch in the spirit 
of the later p h y s io lo g ie s . i 6 i  (This makes literary-historical sense: The Book o f  
Snobs  was published just a few years after the physiologies had disappeared. 
T heir influence upon Thackeray is im m ediate and  obvious.) How ever, even 
in this lighthearted setting, Thackeray cannot help but grum ble in mid­
sketch, albeit w earing a forced grin, that "Society having ordained certain
160 It is w ith  Thackeray, and particularly w ith  this book, that "snob" attains its m ost common 
m odem  sense, "One who vulgarly admires and seeks to imitate, or associate w ith  those o f  
superior rank or wealth; one w ho w ishes to be regarded as a person o f social importance"(0£D). 
This describes the broad range o f his satiric targets quite accurately. Thus, he seem s to have 
noticed precisely the tendency toward middle-class conservatism  decried by Mill.
161 Thackeray's book, and Trollope's Hunting Sketches, too, also resem ble the physiologies in 
their organization: they lightheartedly describe certain types or species o f snobs and hunters, 
respectively. Trollope's book describes, among others, "The Man Who H unts and Doesn't Like 
It," 'T he Man Who Hunts and N ever Jumps," 'The H unting Farmer," and "The Master of 
Hounds."
The important difference between these two books and the physiologies appears in 
their cultural function. As d iscussed  in Chapter 4, physio logies served the vital function of 
ameliorating urban life, of making the surrounding hordes seem  harmless and amusing. Hunting 
Sketches  and The Book of Snobs are written am usingly and innocuously, and do make all types 
described appear in a light sim ilar to that of the p hysio logies; how ever, their m ain function 
(aside from providing amusement) is to regulate. That is  the cultural urge they satisfy. They 
provide characteristics by w hich  the different types m ay  be identified, and m ore importantly, 
provide rules by which the different types should live. For exam ple, Trollope's "Hunting 
Farmer" has precisely prescribed for him his clothing, d ow n  to the acceptable colors, how  much 
he should  talk and w ho should  talk first (not much, and he should  w a it for the other to speak), 
his m ost appropriate attitude tow ards foxes (murderous), how  seriously he should take hunting 
(quite), etc. Physiologies are about making strangers seem  innocuous, whereas post­
physiologies are about laying dow n the social law.
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customs, men are bound to obey the law  of society, and conform to its 
harmless orders. . . . [Society] has its code and police as well as governm ents, 
and  he m ust conform who would profit by the decrees set forth for their 
common comfort" (19). He repeats the sm iling complaint shortly afterw ards; 
"there are many disagreeable things in society which you are bound to take 
dow n, and to do so w ith  a smiling face" (21).
Similarly, T rollope's H unting Sketches, another post-physiology, 
seems an odd place for unhappy references to society's rigidity and the 
impossibility of defying public opinion—but there they are. At the beginning 
of the book, Trollope asks rhetorically, "H ow  m any men go to balls, to races, 
to the theatre, how m any women to concerts and  races, simply because it is 
the thing to do?" (1-2), noting society's autom atic, near-universal conformity. 
Then in each sketch, he relates the rules of conduct that bear upon  that 
particular type, in such a way that it is impossible to say whether he mostly 
approves or disapproves of those rules; he seem s to do both at once. For 
example, he begins his sketch of "The H unting  Parson" w ith the equivocal 
statem ent, "The w orld at large is very prone to condem n the hunting parson, 
regarding him as a m an w ho is false to his profession; and, for myself, I am 
not prepared to say that the w orld is wrong" (71). Trollope then justifies the 
parson 's right to hunt for several pages: the parson does too have the tim e, he 
has a right to innocent enjoym ents, hunting is healthful and innocuous, "old 
ladies" are too prudish  regarding clergymen's behavior. But then, in effect, 
Trollope nullifies his ow n apology, on the g rounds that one m ust follow 
society's rules regardless of their wrong-headedness:
[T]he hunting parson seems to have m ade a mistake. He is 
kicking against the pricks, and running counter to that section of 
the w orld which should  be his section. H e is making himself to
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stink  in the nostrils of his bishop, and is becom ing a stum bling- 
block, and a rock of offence to his brethren. It is bootless for him 
to argue, as I have here argued, that his am usem ent is in itself 
innocent, and that some open-air recreation is necessary to him.
G rant him that the bishops and  old la d ie s i^ z  are w rong and that 
he is right in principle, and still he will not be justified. 
W hatever may be our w alk in  life, no m an can w alk well who 
does not w alk w ith the esteem  of his fellows. N ow  those little 
walks by the covert sides,—those pleasant little walks of which I 
am  w riting ,—are not, unfortunately, held to be estim able, or good 
for themselves, by English clergymen in general. (82-83)
Therefore, they are not to be indulged in. It's as sim ple as that. Public 
opinion alw ays has the last word; as Mill puts it, "public  opinion now rules 
the world" (66).
Thus, even fairly conservative w riters such as Trollope and  Thackeray 
register the arbitrary, pervasive, internalized natu re  of Victorian social 
control, even while w riting w orks that are ideologically conservative. Even 
they cannot help but chafe a bit, as their more liberal or radical counterparts 
certainly do, under the heavy yoke of public opinion.
In a social atm osphere this inhospitable to ind iv idual choice and 
difference, the eccentric was bound to become an endangered  species. The 
fourth chapter of this study shows how, by the logic of rapidly advancing 
scientism, the eccentric came to seem a kind of d istinct species; now, as Mill
162 Speaking o f the rule by rigid "old ladies," see George Gissing's New Grub Street (1891); 
"Like her m ultitudinous kind, Mrs. Yule lived  only in the opinions o f other people. What 
others w ould  say w as her ceaseless preoccupation. She had never conceived o f life as 
something proper to the individual; independence in the directing o f  one's course seemed to her 
only possible in  the case of very eccentric persons, or of such as w ere altogether out of society" 
(256). G issing's ambiguous syntax at the end o f this passage suggests that perhaps eccentrics 
are those w ho are "altogether out of society"—that these are not tw o  distinct groups, but one 
and the same.
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argues, that species begins to be excessively squeezed, to suffer, to dwindle, to 
die out. The requisite  social-environm ental conditions, "freedom , and 
variety of situations" (M ill 58), are mostly gone, and  w hat rem ains of them 
disappears daily. M ass-productive, high-capitalist society homogenizes the 
form erly vastly d ifferen t environm ents of d ifferent g roups and  individuals; 
consequently, these d ifferent groups—species, if you w ill—come to resemble 
one other uncannily. N um erous, distinct environm ents and species become 
one:
The circum stances which surround d ifferent classes and 
individuals, and shape their characters, are daily  becom ing more 
assim ilated. Formerly, different ranks, different
neighbourhoods, d ifferen t trades and professions, lived in  what 
might be called different worlds; at present, to a great degree, in 
the same. C om paratively speaking, they now  read  the same 
things, listen to the  sam e things, go to the sam e places, have 
their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same 
rights and liberties, and  the same means of asserting them . (72- 
73)
"[TJhere ceases to be any social support for nonconform ity" (73),163 and this 
will only increase over tim e, because
[t]he dem and tha t all other people shall resem ble ourselves, 
grows by w hat it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is reduced 
nearly to one uniform  type, all deviations from  th a t type will 
come to be considered  im pious, immoral, even m onstrous and 
contrary to nature. Mankind speedily becom e unable to
conceive diversity , w hen they have been for som e time
163 See Marcuse, w ho finds an "organized effort to reject the Other in  his ow n right, to prevent 
autonomy even in a small, reserved sphere of existence" (245).
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unaccustom ed to see it. (74)164 
In the dam p V ictorian atm osphere, "by d in t of no t following their own 
na tu re ,!65 [individuals] have no nature to follow: their hum an capacities are 
w ithered and starved: they become incapable of any strong wishes or native 
pleasures, and  are generally without either opinions or feelings of home 
growth, or properly th e ir own" (62).
Thus, in ternalized  rule by public opinion and the razing of differences 
betw een social environm ents endanger ind iv idual difference, encroach upon 
eccentricity. As Mill notes, the most common response to this state of things 
is. Very well, no great loss:
[Tjhe evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognised by 
the com m on m odes of thinking, as having any  intrinsic w orth , 
or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority, being 
satisfied w ith the ways of m ankind as they now  are (for it is they 
who m ake them  w hat they are), cannot com prehend w hy those 
ways should not be good enough for everybody . . .  (57)
The logical solution, then , is to change public opinion regarding the value of 
eccentricity, beginning w ith the portion of the populace most likely to be 
sw ayed by philosophical argum ents such as Mill's. He muses, "the intelligent 
part of the public [must] be made to feel its [eccentricity's] value—to see that it 
is good there should be differences, even though not for the better, even 
though, as it m ay appear to them, some should be for the worse" (73-74).
And so Mill directly argues that eccentricity is intrinsically valuable. 
This is so, he claims, a t the levels of both the  u n it and  the whole. W hen 
individual difference is encouraged, there is "greater fulness of life about [an
164 N ote again the language o f  natural law, the tim eless generalizations—"X happens."
165 The idea that eccentrics are ordinarily "following their ow n  nature" shores up the concept 
of the eccentric as species: th is is th e ir  nature, as distinct from our more normal nature.
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in d iv id u a rs] ow n existence, and w hen there is m ore life in the units there is 
more in the mass which is composed of them " (63). More "life" does not 
m erely m ean more joie de vivre; Mill argues that the flourishing of 
eccentricity insures both freedom  and progress for the  nation:
In th is age, the mere exam ple of nonconform ity, the mere 
refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service. Precisely 
because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a 
reproach, it is desirable, in  order to break through that tyranny, 
that people should be eccentric. Eccentricity has always 
abounded  when and where strength of character has abounded; 
and  the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been 
proportional to the am ount of genius, m ental vigour, and  m oral 
courage, which it contained. That so few  now dare to be 
eccentric, marks the chief danger of the tim e. (67)
W hen a nation  squashes all the eccentricity o u t of its citizens, that nation 
tends tow ard  the sorry state of China. In this unabashedly  Orientalist view, 
China, "a nation of much talent, and, in  som e respects, even wisdom," 
provides an  instructive "w arning exam ple" (71). There, writes Mill, custom 
and public opinion "have succeeded beyond all hope in w hat English 
philanthropists are so industriously w orking at—in m aking a people all alike, 
all governing their thoughts and conduct by the  same maxims and rules" 
(72). Consequently, all of China's early prom ise has been lost; stagnation, 
excessive conformity, and general backwardness now  reign. All this because 
the nation d id  not recognize w hat Mill now  asserts as (yet another) natural 
law: "A people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and 
then stop: w hen  does it stop? When it ceases to possess individuality" (71).
By this line of reasoning, to be eccentric becomes a kind of patriotic
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duty, a service to one's country. Laurence Steme pu t that sentim ent into 
Toby Shandy's m outh nearly a century before, but now, under repressive 
Victorian social conditions, the idea really  packs cultural power. A nd the 
idea of eccentricity as valuable public service puts a new spin on the now- 
established idea of eccentricity as a uniquely British quality. The idea that 
Great Britain was the eccentric capital of the w orld served the useful cultural 
function of convincing indiv idual subjects that despite the rapid 
encroachments of scientific industrialism , w ith  all its evils, Britons still had 
happy lives full of choice, freedom, and  variety. The idea still served this 
function during  the Victorian era, bu t now  it took on the converse 
importance, as well. T hat is, previously, eccentricity was seen as an indicator 
of British freedom; Britons were free, therefore they had the latitude to be 
eccentric. Mill's line of reasoning casts eccentricity also as causey Britons m ust 
make an effort to be eccentric in order to remain  free. Otherwise, mediocrity, 
stagnation, and tyranny will carry the day.
Taken together, the elements of M ill's argum ent on behalf of 
eccentricity form a sort of grand, overarching natural law  visible in and 
influential for m any areas of Victorian culture. First, the more eccentricity a 
nation encourages in the indiv idual, the m ore it w ill have collectively. 
Britain has so little now  because the "tyranny of opinion" discourages it; 
eccentricity and public opinion are at present natural enemies. A nother way 
of saying this is that if the cultural environm ent nurtures eccentricity, it will 
flourish; if not, then eccentricity will become extinct. Second, the more 
eccentricity the nation has, the m ore "strength of character," "m ental 
vigour," "moral courage," and "genius" its citizens will have. Mill associates 
these qualities in nearly synonym ous fashion. (In fact. Mill argues that 
"[p]ersons of genius are . . .  more individual than  any other people" [65]. This
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takes an old idea in a new  direction. Ever since Quixote, the  British eccentric 
has been said to possess som e special wisdom  of the heart tha t compensates 
for his cracked brain; Sir Roger de Coverley, the Shandys, and  Launcelot 
Greaves all possessed it. M ill, however, asserts a link betw een  w isdom  of the 
head and eccentricity; hence the fam iliar stereotype of the eccentric, absent- 
minded, but brilliant professor.) And third, the more eccentricity and its 
associated qualities appear in  a nation's citizens, the m ore tha t nation will 
succeed and progress. Eccentricity, then, is not just an escape from  dam p into 
a sunnier, less oppressive social climate. It is not m erely a freed o m /ro m . By 
Mill's logic, it is a positive, general good. To be eccentric is a courageous, 
unquestionably laudable act. That is one side of the V ictorian dialectic of 
eccentricity.
As observed above. M ill's language and though t in  On Liberty 
frequently resemble those of a scientist—in particular, of a "naturalist."t66 He 
speaks in term s of "nature" (people [especially eccentrics] m ust follow their 
own or become less varied  and  less human; eccentrics have especially "strong 
natures"), "environm ent" (synonym ous w ith "cu ltu ra l m ilieu"; one's 
"environm ent" shapes one 's whole personality and life), and  "diversity" 
(crucial to the developm ent of the individual, the nation , and  the hum an 
race). Also, he often d irectly  compares hum an life to p lan t or anim al life. 
For instance, he writes, "H um an  nature is not a m achine . . . b u t a tree, which 
requires to grow and develop e [sic] itself on all sides, according to the 
tendency of the inw ard forces which make it a living th ing" (60). Also, 
"Hum an beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are no t undistinguishably  
alike" (67); and again, "He w ho lets the world, or his ow n po rtion  of it, choose
166 "One who is interested in, or m akes a special study of, animals or plants. (A  less precise 
term than zoologist, botanist, etc.)" (OED). The term remained relatively general until the 
twentieth century; close specialization w as not often the case, and w as certainly not the norm, 
during the Victorian era.
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his plan of life for him , has no need of any  other faculty than  the ape-like one 
of imitation" (59). H e seeks and pronounces "grand determ ining principles" 
or natural laws, as a naturalist would. A nd his description of nonconform ing 
hum an beings liv ing  in  an anti-individualistic culture casts them  as anim als 
or plants strugg ling  to  live in an inhospitable environment.i67
Mill, then, sounds a lot like a naturalist. In fact, he sounds like one 
particular hugely influential British naturalist: Charles D arw in. A nd it is 
here, a t the conjunction of Mill's and D arw in 's positions, that the  dialectic of 
eccentricity forks. This makes the following fact all the m ore telling: The 
Origin o f  Species, D arw in 's first major w ork  and his most in f lu e n t ia l , t 6 8  was 
published in  the sam e year as Mill's On Liberty. In 1859 these writers 
expressed and d id  m uch to reify directly conflicting sentim ents of dom inant 
Victorian culture. Mill emphasizes and  reifies the positive side of the 
dialectic: that eccentricity is a necessary antidote to the "ty ranny  of the 
prevailing opinion" (8), as well as v ital to hum an developm ent. This 
understanding of eccentricity fundam entally resembles that of the early 
eighteenth century, w hen eccentricity as practiced by a select few  provided a 
limited alternative to the rigid dichotomy of madness and rationality ; in  both 
views, eccentricity is a needed form of social protest. D arw in (indirectly) 
argues and reifies the negative side of the dialectic: that eccentricity is
■*67 Hence the extended use of the "environment" or "atmosphere" metaphor in th is chapter. I 
em phasize that elem en t (elementl)  of Mill's position to point up the relationship betw een  
M ill's logic and D arw in's, w hich relationship, p lus their relationship to eccentricity, I now  
describe.
*68 That The Origin o f  Species w as very influential does not need to be insisted upon. Still, it is 
worth noting in this regard that Origins went through three editions as fast as the books could  
be printed; that 1250 cop ies w ere sold in London th e first day it was available; that Marx and 
Engels offered to dedicate the first English edition o f Das K apita l  to Darwin (he declined); 
that Darwin's careful deta iling  in Origins of certain species' habits and relationships seriously  
stoked the a lready-w idespread  natural-history craze; that the book w as specifica lly  
addressed to the general educated public, and enthusiastically received by it; and that 
Darwin's social position m ade his argument all the more influential—"It w as o f great 
importance that Darwin [w as a] gentlem[a]n and fam ily m[a]n of complete financial, political 
and sexual respectability" (Burrow 41).
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im practical, m aladaptive, and therefore suicidal in a universally competitive 
world that necessitates adaptation to conditions "as they are." After Darwin, 
the eccentric, already m ade a kind of species earlier in the century, becomes a 
maladaptive  species whose days are num bered.
Still, as noted above, there is an  im portan t conjunction between the 
respective sides of the dialectic both D arw in and  Mill highly value 
indiv idual difference as a creative force. Even D arw in bolsters the positive 
side, then. The heading for On Liberti/'s Chapter 3 neatly sums up Mill's 
position on this subject: "individuality" is "one of the [very important] 
elem ents of well-being," for both the indiv idual and  the hum an race. In that 
chapter, too, he writes in a decidedly Darwinian vein, "Individuality is the 
sam e th ing  w ith development, and . . .  it is only the cultivation of 
indiv iduality  which produces, or can produce, w ell-developed hum an 
beings" (64). Mill's argum ent strikingly resem bles D arw in's assertion that 
ind iv idual variation is necessary to species' developm ent and  survival:
[A jny variation, however slight and from  w hatever cause 
proceeding, if it be in any degree profitable to any individual of 
any species, . . . will tend to the preservation of the individual, 
and  will generally be inherited by its offspring. The offspring, 
also, will thus have a better chance of surv iv ing  . . .  I have called 
this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is 
preserved, by the term  of N atural Selection . . . {Origin 115)
As George Levine observes, for Darwin as for Dickens (as for Mill), "variety is 
not aberration but the condition for life" (150).
But this is so in a fundam entally different w ay for Darwin. The 
passage just quoted shows the overlap betw een D arw in 's position and Mill's, 
but close reading also reveals the point where they diverge: the concept of
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"profitability."169 Mill (and the side of the dialectic he represents) finds 
eccentricity or indiv idual difference inherently  valuable u n der all 
circumstances:!70 again, "it is good there should be differences, even though 
not for the better, even though, as it m ay appear to [people], som e should  be 
for the worse" (73-74). Eccentricity, individuality, or ind iv idual d ifference- 
interchangeable term s for M ill—need not have a function, need  not serve as a 
means to ano ther end; it is a valuable end in  itself. (This in  add ition  to 
serving a practical purpose, keeping social tyranny at bay.) As such, difference 
is and ought to be chosen. Self-selected variations from popu lar opinion 
should be pu t into practice:
As it is useful that w hile m ankind are im perfect there should  be 
different opinions, so is it that there should be different 
experim ents of living; that free scope should be given to 
varieties of character . . .  ; and that the w orth  of d ifferent m odes 
of life should  be proved practically, w hen any one thinks fit do 
try them. (57)
Just as the freedom  to express any opinion causes the best ones to prevail and 
keeps them  strong (Liberty 20-55),!7i the freedom  to live any w ay  one chooses 
ultimately produces the best, most satisfying and useful ways of life.
D arw in does not understand individual difference that w ay at all. For 
him, difference is no t chosen but random ; it occurs unexpectedly and on a
169 Obviously Darwin does not intend the monetary connotation of this word; he's talking about 
animals. H ow ever, that sen se of "profit," which w as nearly as dominant in Victorian tim es as 
in our own, is not at all irrelevant, either, as is discussed below.
170 All but the one exception to which Mill always returns: in  being different and doing what 
one likes, one m ust do no harm to others. But the eccentric is alm ost by definition harmless.
171 This is another significant point o f discursive conjunction; see below, the discussion of the 
"struggle for existence" and of the "survival of the fittest." Mill's understanding of ideas' and 
lifestyles' functioning in society d osely  resembles Darwin's understanding o f species' and  
individuals' functioning in a g iven  environment: all are in com petition w ith each other and 
with the elem ents, as it were, and only the best adapted or strongest w ill survive.
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m inor scale, as a result of genetic perm utation—a slightly different coloration, 
a m inutely elongated tailfeather, an ability to go just a bit longer w ithout 
water. Difference accumulates by  tiny increments; "the steady accumulation, 
through natural selection, of . . . differences, w hen beneficial to the 
in d iv id u a l,. . .  gives rise to all the m ore im portant m odifications of structure, 
by which the innum erable beings on the face of the earth  are enabled to 
struggle w ith each other, and the best adapted to survive" (204). Whereas 
Mill's view is largely anti-teleological, D arw in's is teleological: although 
difference first comes about random ly, it ultim ately serves the concrete 
purpose of im proving the ind iv idua l's  chances of survival; and any given 
difference, "how ever slight and  from w hatever [unpredictable, unchosen] 
cause proceeding," tends to strengthen itself in future generations. 
Differences progress in specific directions—for instance, a species's coloration 
progressively approxim ates that of the local flora—which always tend to 
become m ore and m ore u s e f u l . t 7 2  Hence the liberal sprinkling  throughout 
Darwin's argum ent of qualifying phrases such as "if it be in any degree 
profitable," "if useful," and  "w hen beneficial to the individual." 
"Profitability" is the key.
A nd it is key, for in D arw in 's universe, differences which are not 
profitable rapidly die out, and  so do the individuals who possess them. 
Darwin proposes the "general principle" "that natural selection is continually 
trying to e c o n o m is e ! 73 in every part of the [individual's] organization" (18 6 ).
!72G eorge Levine points out that the key Darwinian term, "Natural Selection," which 
appears even  in the subtitle (the full title  is The Origin of Species by Means of Natural 
Selection, or The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle fo r  Life), is actually an 
oxymoron (99). That is, natural as opposed to human selection indicates randomness, lack of 
control—"letting nature take its course." But selection indicates purposeful choice. The final 
result is a system  in w hich change originates  randomly but progresses according to the specific 
criterion o f usefulness or profitability.
173 See the note on "profitable" above. It is striking, and telling, how  neatly economic 
discourse overlaps w ith scientific.
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That is, "natural selection will always succeed in the long run in reducing 
and saving every p a rt of the organisation, as soon as it is rendered 
superfluous" (187). Thus, "[i]f under changed conditions of life a structure 
before useful becom es less useful, any d im inution, however slight, in its 
development, w ill be seized on by natural selection, for it w ill profit the 
individual not to have its nutrim ent w asted in building up an useless 
structure" (186). O rganism s nourishing superfluous structures are not living 
efficiently; natural selection abhors inefficiency; ergo, inefficient creatures do 
not live and  reproduce. In this way, ind iv idual differences which serve no 
practical purpose drop  aw ay relatively quickly from the species; Natural 
Selection decrees it so. By this logic, if follows that "every detail of structure 
in every living creature . . . may be view ed, either as having been of special 
use to some ancestral form, or as being now  of special use to the descendants 
of this form —either directly, or indirectly through the complex laws of 
growth" (228). T he only individual differences that persist are useful ones— 
and they dissem inate throughout the species. In other words, they don 't 
rem ain ind iv idua l  differences for long.
"Useful," "profitable"—for what, exactly? Strictly for survival. That is 
the sole criterion for judging  whether a given characteristic is "useful." For 
in Darwin's universe, survival is so difficult, such a constant w orry and 
struggle, that it becomes the central focus of life. It is inescapable and 
perpetual for all creatures. This "Struggle for Existence" is to be understood 
"in a large and  m etaphorical sense" (116); it signifies not only direct 
competition betw een anim als, as with two coyotes fighting over a scarce bit of 
meat, or herds of several species competing for space at the local w atering 
hole; but also, m ore generally, the unending difficulty of sim ply surviving 
the environm ent long  enough to reproduce. Thus,
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a p lan t on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against 
the d ro u g h t . . , [Sjeveral seedling missletoes [sic], grow ing close 
together on the same branch, m ay more truly be said  to struggle 
w ith  each other. As the  missletoe is dissem inated by birds, its 
existence depends on b irds; and it may m etaphorically be said to 
struggle w ith  other fruit-bearing plants, in o rder to tem pt birds 
to devour and thus dissem inate its seeds ra ther than  those of 
o ther plants. (116)
The form er, direct kind of struggle is most intense, and  is especially brutal 
among like creatures: "the struggle almost invariably w ill be m ost severe 
between the individuals of the same species, for they  frequent the same 
districts, require the same food, and  are exposed to the sam e dangers" (126). 
But the other, more generalized and metaphorical struggle  never ends. 
Sooner o r later, no m atter how  favorable conditions m ay be a t present, the 
fact of constant universal struggle for existence will b ring  hardship: "each 
[organism] at some period of its life, during some season of the year, during 
each generation or at intervals, has to struggle for life, and to suffer great 
destruction" (129).
The physical forms of species—tangible scientific evidence, verifiable by 
any am ateur naturalist—prove tha t species constantly com pete w ith  each 
other for existence. The telling proof: no adaptation solely helps another 
species b u t m any adaptations harm  them. As D arw in phrases it, "Natural 
selection cannot possibly produce any modification in  any one species 
exclusively for the good of another species . . . But n a tu ra l selection can and 
does often produce structures for the direct injury of o ther species" 228).i74 
Cooperation and peaceful coexistence, then, can occur, bu t only to a very
174 N ote the em phasis here: “cannot possibly"  produce any cooperative modification. N ot only 
does it not happen, it is im possible that it ever could.
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lim ited extent, and only incidentally w ithin the overarching fram ew ork of 
universal dog-eat-dog competition.
D arw in directly credits his discovery of the relationship betw een the 
struggle for life and the developm ent of species to his reading of M althus's 
Essay on the Principle o f  Population (1798). As Loren Eiseley notes, "M althus 
was very popular at this tim e and therefore a pow erfu l a l ly . . . .  Darw in spoke 
of him  adm iringly as a 'g rea t philosopher'" (182). D arw in read M althus in 
1838, very early in the research that culm inated in  The Origin o f Species. In a 
section on M althus in his autobiography, D arw in w rites,
being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence, 
which everyw here goes on, from long con tinued  observation of 
the habits of anim als and p la n ts ,i7 S  it at once struck me that 
under these circumstances favorable varia tions w ould  tend to be 
preserved, and unfavorable ones to be destroyed . The result of 
this w ould  be the form ation of a new species. (1:83)
A nd in  the Origin itself, he acknowledges that the doctrine of the struggle for 
existence "is the doctrine of Malthus applied w ith  m anifold force to the 
whole anim al and vegetable kingdoms" (117).
What Darwin applies, specifically, is M althus 's  fundam ental argum ent 
that just surviving is very difficult—that, in fact, su rv iva l proves unavoidably 
im possible for large portions of the hum an race in  all times and regions. 
M althus argues that four ineluctable natural law s control hum an existence:
175 Here is a crystalline exam ple of how  sdentific discourse begets more of the same. Darwin  
goes out to collect evidence by the familiar practices of science: ostensib ly neutral observation, 
accumulation of specimens, painstaking description, and the form ulation of natural law  as 
suggested  by the evidence. In other words, the information g o in g  into his brain is already 
shaped by the means, the discourse, according to which it is received . Then, w ith  the 
inform ation thus shaped, he reads M althus's natural law s, the very  discursive validity o f  
w hich (natural law s) w as in part solidified  by Malthus. A nd lo! the natural law s make 
beautiful sense! They accord so w ell with his own scientific observations that they 
inspire...another natural law. And so  it goes.
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[T]he pow er of population is indefinitely  greater than the power 
in the earth  to produce subsistence for m an.
Population, w hen unchecked, increases in a geometrical 
ratio. Subsistence increases only in  arithm etical ratio. A slight 
acquaintance w ith  numbers will shew  the im m ensity of the first 
pow er in  com parison of the second.
By th a t law  of our nature w hich  m akes food necessary to 
the life of m an, the effects of these tw o unequal pow ers m ust be 
kept equal.
T his im plies a strong and constantly  operating check on 
population from the difficulty of subsistence. (13-14)
Clearly the M althusian  universe—and so by  extension the D arw inian one—is 
an extremely com petitive one. More people will alw ays be begotten than can 
be supported by the available resources; therefore they will, nay m u s t  rem ain  
perpetually at each other's throats, often quite  literally, or die themselves. As 
Levine argues, though  probably not forcefully enough, "'The Struggle for Life' 
seems to im ply  that life is an individualistic w ar" (101)—very much like the 
frank "w ar of each against all" that appalled  Engels in the impersonal, 
business-centered big city (37).
A lthough  D arw in never actually uses the phrase "survival of the 
fittest," he certainly makes the concept appear to be the  law of nature. In fact, 
he offers it as such: "[There is] one general law , leading to the advancem ent of 
all organic beings, namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the 
weakest die" (263). This law tends tow ard  ever greater totality; it tends to 
become m ore an d  m ore the case, because over tim e the strong become even 
stronger and  overw helm  the weak, by num bers and by more successful 
adaptation to conditions: "[Tjhroughout na tu re  the forms of life which are
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now dom inan t tend  to become still more dom inant by leaving many 
m odified and  dom inant descendants" (113). This is true w ith in  species, too. 
Individuals usually  resemble each other closely anyw ay, because change 
occurs and progresses only in very  sm all gradations. In addition, though, 
species becom e m ore hom ogeneous over time as ind iv iduals possessing 
certain adaptations which strengthen  them for the struggle  survive and 
reproduce, and  w eaker individuals n o t  possessing these useful adaptations 
die out. D arw in characterizes "Unity of Type" as one of "two great laws" by 
which "all organic beings have been form ed" (233).t76 O n all levels, then, the 
strong become even stronger; dom inance leads to greater dom inance.
The converse is also true: rare  a n d /o r  weak creatures, which according 
to natural law  are never as num erous nor as well adap ted  to environm ental 
conditions, and  w hich therefore cannot successfully com pete for existence— 
that is w hy they are rare a n d /o r  w eak—become even rarer and die away. 
Darwin argues that "rare species w ill be less quickly m odified or improved 
w ithin any given period, and they w ill consequently be beaten in the race for 
life by the m odified  descendants of the  commoner species" (154). Iron nature 
weeds them  out. For in all cases, "any variation in the least injurious"— 
"injurious" m eaning "causing the organism  to be less w ell equipped to 
struggle for life"—"any variation in  the least injurious [is] rigidly destroyed" 
(131).
Thus, a M althusian understand ing  of life was w idely  held in Victorian 
times; then D arw in 's more generalized and scientifically docum ented use of 
the principle established it even m ore firmly. Before D arw in, and especially 
during  the Romantic era, the dom inant conception of N ature was a
176 The other, "Conditions of Existence," w a s  earlier established by G eorges Cuvier, as Danvin 
acknowledges. It held that natural selection progress by means of adaptation by creatures to 
their environment. See the discussion o f adaptation below.
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harm onious one. N ature operated by laws that som etim es rem ained difficult 
to discover and  understand, but which w ere nevertheless operant, 
m aintaining all of heaven and earth in perfect, peaceful balance. The 
Bridgewater Treatises, which were published in eight volum es between 1833 
and 1836, are the culm inating expression of that pre-Darwinian 
understanding. They argue by design for a d ivine Designer, in several 
thousand pious pages. But Darwin's influential and essentially M althusian 
conception of the universe pretty much exploded the "harm ony" theory. As 
Tennyson fam ously phrased it. Nature now appeared  "red in tooth and 
claw." Friedrich Engels astutely comments:
Until Darwin, w hat was stressed by his present adherents was 
precisely the harm onious co-operative w orking  of organic 
nature, how  the plant kingdom  supplies anim als w ith 
nourishm ent and oxygen, and animals supp ly  plants w ith 
manure, ammonia, and carbonic acid. H ard ly  was Darwin 
recognized before these same people saw everyw here nothing 
but struggle. (Qtd. in Eiseley 195; emphasis in original)
This is a vital discursive point. When people talk of scientific "discoveries"— 
i.e., recognitions of a priori facts and natural laws; seeing w hat's simply there 
to see, as opposed to form ulating figurative ways of understanding—Darwin's 
nam e probably comes up more often than anyone's. (As in: "Darwin 
discovered evolution.") D arw in ostensibly saw  the sim ple, factual truth that 
had eluded previous generations. But as Engels's com m ent implies, this is 
not necessarily so. It is more accurate to say that "these same people" (i.e., 
most everyone) w ho used to see only harm ony in  nature now became 
persuaded by an em erging discourse that that account was inaccurate. They 
allow ed themselves to be taught to understand nature  and the w orld
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differently. In other words, Darwin's Origin m ade an em ergent discourse the 
dom inant one, and  this new discourse p roduced  new knowledge of the 
w orld—new facts, new  certainties, and, th rough  the process of reification, new 
material realities. Which is w hat discourse alw ays does, according to 
Foucault: discourse always produces varieties of p o w er/ knowledge, and so as 
the discourse changes, forms of pow er/know ledge thereby produced will,
tOO.t77
Speaking of discourse and the struggle for survival, it should be noted 
that the model for understanding discourse which underlies this study  is, at 
bottom, D arw inian. I refer to certain elem ents of discourse as "dom inant," or 
coming to dom inance, which implies d irect com petition or struggle between 
discursive elem ents. (In this my m odel for discourse is also Millian, as 
noted above.) D om inant elements, like dom inan t species, do not necessarily 
cause w eaker elem ents to grow completely extinct, bu t the form er do make 
the latter's existence tenuous and difficult. This makes them  unable to 
compete w ith  dom inan t elements, w hich renders them  w eaker still, leaving 
the dom inant d iscourse that much m ore dom inant. Discourse, then, like a 
thriving, spreading  species, consolidates and increases its own strength. 
Additionally, 1 characterize certain changes in discourse—for instance, the 
limited acceptance of eccentricity as a m eans to provide an alternative to the 
m ad /ra tional dichotom y in the early e ighteenth  century—m uch like Darwin 
characterizes useful variation. That is, such  changes take strong root, as it 
were, because they are well adapted to their cultural environm ents, because 
they serve the needs those environm ents produce. In these ways, the model 
of discourse inform ing this study perpetuates the discourse Darwin helped 
establish as dom inant.
177 H is entire œuvre  can be characterized as focused upon this central principle; but see most 
especially  The Order of Things, Discipline and Punish and The H istory of Sexuality  I.
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This is the main reason this s tu d y  ends w ith  the  Victorian era. The 
very fact that a Darwinian understand ing  of the w orld  is so firm ly established 
that it perm eates even this s tu d y 's  m ethodology show s how  dom inant it still 
is; it is even more so now than  it w as a hundred years ago. To delineate the 
discursive rules that came to dom inance in D arw in's tim e is to delineate the 
discursive rules we now live by  even more faithfully. O n the m atter of 
eccentricity and the related cu ltu ral concepts clustered around it—most 
especially m adness and science—o ur direction was a lready  chosen by the end 
of the n ineteenth  century. We have gone farther in th a t d irection  since then, 
but it is essentially the same  direction.
Perhaps the Darwinian concept most conducive to relating this 
discussion explicitly back to eccentricity is that of adaptation . Up to now the 
relevance of this section on D arw in  to the concept of eccentricity has been 
largely left implicit. The focus has rem ained on the Darwinian 
understand ing  of the w orld itself, in order to establish clearly w hat that is 
before show ing its influence upon  understandings of eccentricity. But again, 
adaptation is a useful segué, because the more general significance of this 
concept—to hum ans as well as to p lan ts and  other anim als—seem s so clear.
Cham bers actually asserted the importance of (hum an beings') 
adap tation  to the environm ent fifteen years before D arw in, in his 
controversial Vestiges o f  the Natural History o f  Creation-A^s
To secure the im m ediate m eans of happiness it w ou ld  seem  to 
be necessary for men first to study  w ith all care the constitution
178 Briefly, so  as not to stray even  farther afield  from Darwin and eccentricity: Vestiges, first 
published anonym ously in 1844, w as controversial because, as Chambers him self writes, it w as 
"the first attem pt to connect the natural sciences into a history o f creation" (388). H e boldly 
counters Biblical and catastrophic accounts o f the earth's developm ent w ith  a 
uniformitarianism very much like Darwin's. The book's very anonym ity also accounts for some 
of its controversial quality, in that many th ou ght that Prince Albert, the Royal Consort, 
w idely  know n to be a great amateur naturalist, had written it him self.
271
of nature, and , secondly, to accom m odate themselves to that 
constitution, so as to obtain all the realizable advantages from 
acting conform ably to it, and  to avoid all likely evils from 
disregarding it. (380)
This is essentially the point Mill makes, a lthough Chambers frames as useful 
advice the position Mill decries. D arw in argues more generally in the Origin 
th a t the key factor to rem aining com petitive in  the struggle for existence, and  
therefore the key factor to survival, is the successful adaptation of the 
indiv idual (and th rough  the individual, the  species) to the environm ent. As 
he puts it, "natural selection acts by either now  adapting the varying parts of 
each being to its organic and inorganic conditions of life; or by having adapted 
them  during long-past periods of tim e" (233). Quite simply, those 
individuals which ad ap t themselves, survive; those which do not, die. This, 
too, is posed as ineluctable natural law.
To help yourself you  m ust inevitably hu rt others. W e're sim ply not 
built for cooperation. W e're all pretty m uch the same. Individual difference 
is only good when it can be assimilated by  the collective—that is, w hen it is 
not really difference at all—and w hen it is practical. Dog, eat dog. These are 
lessons of D arw inian science. And perhaps the most im portant one is: adap t 
yourself to your environm ent, which necessitates intense struggle against 
your own kind, or die. You certainly can 't make the enviro nm en t  change; 
you m ust alter yow rse//to survive in it. N atu re  itself proves the tru th  of this- 
-just look around. Come on, be practical. Be realistic.
This is the m ode of thinking w hich  D arw inian science, even m ore 
dom inant today, establishes as common sense, as self-evident truth, as "the 
w ay things are." The Frankfurt School characterizes it as "operationalism "— 
as an exclusive focus upon practicality, the bottom  line, and seeing other
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people, organisms, nature, and  really the w hole w orld, in terms of how they 
can be used to benefit the individual in the w ar o f each against all.
H erbert Marcuse describes operationalism  as the "Happy 
Consciousness—the belief that the real is the rational and  the system delivers 
the goods" (84). "The real is the rational": this terse sum m ary of the  
overarching post-Darwinian assum ption com m unicates two fundam ental 
assum ptions of the dom inant discourse. First, em phasize the word 
"rational": "w hat is real is rational" (123), i.e., existing m aterial conditions are 
chosen, well thought out, and good. Science, d riven  by capitalism, has 
undeniably im proved certain m aterial realities o f life. Because hum an ratio, 
reason, has been applied via science and business, life is better. Hum ankind 
is able to bu ild  cheaper, more reliable houses m ore quickly; to produce and 
distribute m ore food and clothing to more people; to provide more people 
with m ore nonessential goods; and, through the use of m achinery, to relieve 
more people from drudge labor, than ever b e fo r e .  179 (Theoretically, anyway; 
disregarding the actual inequities of distribution and  the necessity for huge 
"reserve arm ies of the unem ployed," w ith  all th e  a ttendan t miseries, which 
are built into capitalism.) This success of technological-capitalist society 
makes rebellion nearly impossible, for to rebel is to reject the good life. The 
system delivers the goods, so why w ould anyone w ant to overthrow the
■>791 em phasize that this w as and is the dominant mode of discourse. There were, of course, 
many energetic and well-known dissenting voices during the Victorian period, as there are now. 
For instance, William Morris imagined in the utopian novel N e w s  fro m  Nowhere w hat truly  
labor-saving machinery and cooperative society m ight be like, wrote several essays for 
socialism against capitalism, and spoke to socialist groups on m any occasions. In Past and 
Present and elsew here, Thomas Carlyle decried the exploitation o f workers by the "captains of 
industry," the institution of the "cash-nexus" as the sole hum an bond which is universally 
recognized, and capitalist competition to undersell with all its cruel consequences. And John 
Ruskin deplored the unfairness capitalism encourages in Unto This Last. These dissenters from 
the dom inant v iew —Carlyle, in particular—tend to be seen  a s sym pathetic but finally 
unrealistic eccentrics: yes, they have a good  point, but they don 't recognize how  things really 
are. Which, o f course, the dominant discourse would  have u s say, in accordance with its logic— 
rebellion is not practical, so dissenters must be impractical.
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system? As M arcuse puts it, "The more rational, productive, technical, and 
total the repressive adm inistration of society becomes, the more 
unim aginable the  m eans and w ays by which the adm inistered individuals 
might break the ir servitude and seize their own liberation" (6-7).
This is literally true; d issent becomes actually unimaginable, 
unthinkable. As Foucault and  Mill w ould surely agree, "The coordination of 
the individual w ith  his society reaches into those layers of the m ind where 
the very concepts are elaborated which are designed to com prehend the 
established reality" (Marcuse 104). As 1 have argued throughout this study, 
discourse orders thought and one's world view. The discourse Darwin 
helped establish as dom inant sees rebellion against the system as sim ply not 
practical, and  practicality is the discourse's central dem and; therefore, 
rebellion m akes no sense. A nd one cannot seriously consider nonsense for 
long.
It is significant that Mill observes, 'T here is now  scarcely any outlet for 
energy in this country except business" (70), in that only practical pursuits 
such as business seem viable. Even very m inor rebellions/im practicalities 
such as acting a bit eccentric simply do not pay. As Mill paraphrases the 
common a ttitude , w hy is w hat is good enough for "everyone" not good 
enough for one? Furtherm ore, how  does one argue w ith  public opinion? 
With a success like the V ictorian British Empire, up o n  w hich the sun  never 
sets? W ith a system  delivering the goods—especially after the Reform Act of 
1860 am eliorated the system 's w orst cruelties? To differ from society's 
consensus is to tilt a t w indm ills, w hich one cannot seriously consider; it is 
too self-evidently silly. You just hurt yourself, so obviously it's best to 
submit, to adapt. In M arcuse's words, 'T he impact of progress turns Reason 
into subm ission to the facts of life" (11). Darwinian discourse teaches that
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self-adaptation to the environm ent—to public opinion, to "reality," to the 
practical consensus—is necessary for survival. To approach things from, say. 
Mill's direction—to try  changing society so that it accepts individual difference 
more readily—seems foolishly idealistic and obviously hopeless.
And so, as the hegem ony "finds its ideology in the rigid orientation of 
thought and behavior to the given universe of facts," "[ojperationalism  . . . 
becomes the theory and  practice of containment^' (17). As Max H orkheim er 
and Theodor W. A dorno p u t it, "The individual is reduced  to the nodal point 
of the conventional responses and modes of operation expected of him " (28). 
Individuals come to be view ed therapeutically, in terms of how  they should 
be altered to fit in. "Thought and expression, theory and practice are to be 
brought into line w ith  the facts of [the individual's] existence w ithout leaving 
room for the conceptual critique of those facts" (Marcuse 107). A nd under 
such discursive conditions, "[tjhe intellectual and  em otional refusal 'to  go 
along' appears neutoric and im potent" (Marcuse 9).
W hich now  shades into the other sense of the assum ption that "the 
real is the rational." Emphasize the word "real": if the real is rational, then 
the ideal m ust be irrational. As Marcuse explains, in an operationalist 
system, "Values [such as individuality , ethics, and benevolence] m ay have a 
higher dignity (m orally and spiritually), but they are not real and thus count 
less in the real business of life—the less so the higher they are elevated above  
reality" (147; em phases in original). Such values "rem ain m atters of 
preference"; "the ideas become mere ideals, and their concrete, critical content 
evaporates into the ethical or metaphysical atm osphere" (148). They cease to 
be standards, and as such implicit critiques, of existing society; instead they 
become individual em barrassm ents, indicators of a sham eful lack of realistic 
thought.
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One of the justifications of eccentricity has always been the ideals 
associated with it, benevolence above all. Sir Roger de Coverley, Launcelot 
Greaves, and the S h a n d y s ^ S O  are sympathetic characters because they are 
benevolent despite their oddity , because the hum anitarian ideals that a re part 
and parcel of their quixotic nature are finally more valuable than  their 
deviation from  social norm s is obnoxious. (That this plus-and-m inus, debit- 
and-credit kind of thinking appears inherent in conceptions of eccentricity 
even early in the eighteenth  century reveals the first grow th of the 
operationalism  which comes to m aturity  in the nineteenth.)
But in the operationalist Victorian era, such ideals get transferred to 
the debit side; they become personal weaknesses, liabilities, flaws. Because 
they are merely  ideals—the m ore elevated the merer—and because ideals are 
essentially impractical, the idealism  that used to be eccentrics' saving grace 
now becomes their w orst stigm a. Eccentrics appear "neurotic and im potent," 
as
the hum an qualities of a pacified existence seem asocial and 
unpatriotic—qualities such  as the refusal of all toughness, 
togetherness, and brutality; disobedience to the tyranny of the 
majority; profession of fear and weakness (the most rational 
reaction to this society!); a sensitive intelligence sickened by that 
which is being perpetrated ; the commitment to the feeble and 
ridiculed actions of protest and refusal. . . .  In the totalitarian 
society, the hum anist attitudes tend to become escapist attitudes .
. .  (Marcuse 242-43)
180 W illiam  M akepeace Thackeray attacked Tristram Shandy vodferously, calling Stem e a 
"mountebank," a "worn-out old  scamp," and a "foul satyr" who w as "vain, wicked, witty, and 
false" (qtd. in W att 31). A lthough th e  attack is ad hominem, one cannot help but speculate 
that the new , operationalist Victorian attitude toward benevolence and eccentricity m otivated  
this respectable, m iddle-class attack, on  som e level.
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In short, w hereas the eccentric used to be adm irable if flaw ed, in  Victorian 
times every  quality  seems a flaw. The touch of m adness and m inor deviance 
associated w ith  eccentricity still look bad—worse than ever, in fact, am id the 
general dam p. A nd now eccentrics' quixotic idealism and benevolence 
appear as de luded  and ridiculous as Don Quixote "flying" upon  a wooden 
horse. The eccentric becomes a mere escapist.
One last general point should be m ade before the discussion of 
particular exam ples proceeds. The w ord  "eccentric" was first used  as a noun 
in 1832, culm inating the process of coming to view  the eccentric as a distinct 
species. By the rules of Darwinian discourse, and specifically D arw in 's theory 
of species, the eccentric had to be view ed as a distinct and maladaptive  
species. The eccentric's distinctive characteristics—im practical individual 
difference, idealism , slight madness—appeared in this new  ligh t as plainly 
m isguided adaptations, or failures to adapt, to the operationalist 
environm ent. This was a species that could not compete in the struggle for 
life. This species was at best misguided, and at worst doomed.
Furtherm ore, now  that "the eccentric" had  a name, tha t nam e exerted 
great norm ative, containing power. As M arcuse argues, an operationalist 
culture tends
to consider the names of things as being indicative a t the same 
time of the ir m anner of functioning . . . [WJords and concepts 
tend to coincide, or rather the concept tends to be absorbed by the 
word. The form er has no other content than that designated  by 
the w ord  in the publicized and standardized usage, and  the w ord 
is expected to have no other response than  the publicized and 
standardized  behavior (reaction). (86-87)
Put briefly, an  eccentric is as an eccentric does. The fact th a t the name
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"eccentric" w as applied raised certain expectations and reflected certain 
discursive assum ptions: an eccentric was predictably  and sim ply  a person 
who behaved eccentrically, who exhibited the now -traditional, distinctive 
characteristics of the eccentric.
The eccentric became a mere "character," t8i as A ugust Strindberg 
defines the w ord , in the A uthor's Foreword to M iss Julie-.
[I]t became the m iddle-class term  for the autom aton, one w hose 
nature had  become fixed or who had adapted h im se l f  to a 
particular role in  life. In fact a person who had  ceased to grow  
was called a character, while one continuing to develop . . . w as 
called characterless, in a derogatory sense, of course, because he 
was so hard to catch, classify, and keep track of. . . .  A  character 
came to signify a m an fixed and finished: one who invariably  
appeared either d runk  or jocular or m elancholy, and  
characterization required nothing more th an  a physical defect 
such as a club-foot, a wooden leg, a red nose; or the fellow m igh t 
be m ade to repeat some such phrase as: "That's capital!" or:
"Barkis is w illin '!" (95; emphases added)
Note S trindberg 's acknow ledgem ent and critique of the dom inant 
D arw inian/ operationalist discourse, his sneer for those w ho value self­
adaptation and self-lim itation, and who dislike people who are "hard  to 
catch, classify, and  keep track of." In any case, the eccentric or "character" 
came to be defined by eccentricity in a fairly rigid, thorough-going way.
This point m ay seem  a bit obvious w hen p u t this directly; w hat else 
would the eccentric be but  eccentric? However, to illustra te  the developm ent.
181 Dickens em ploys the word "character" in this w ay as early as 1836, in Sketches by  Box: "a 
greater number of characters [lives] within [my neighborhood's] circumscribed lim its, than all 
the rest of the parish p ut together" (13). The book also contains a w h o le  sixty-page section  
headed "Characters."
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contrast, say, Coverley of The Spectator w ith  S trindberg 's ow n example, 
Barkis of David Copperfield (1850). C overley has several personal 
characteristics which have no bearing on eccentricity: he cham pions the Tory 
party; he belongs to the Spectator Club; he likes coffee. O n the other hand, 
Barkis is nothing but  eccentric: we never see Barkis do anything or be 
anything but that odd  m an who repeatedly, cryptically  m utters to young 
David, "Barkis is willin'."t82 (Perhaps we could  also identify him as a 
stagecoach driver—another noun, another uncom plex function indicated by a 
noun.) In this fashion, the concept and the w ord  "eccentric" m erged, and 
concom itantly the range of possible m eanings of "eccentric" and actual 
eccentric practices closed off.
These available m eanings and practices represented  the sides of the 
dialectic delineated above. In Darwinian term s, the species "eccentric" 
exhibited two distinct varieties, one "good" an d  one "bad." One side of the 
dialectic, less dom inant bu t still committed, found  eccentricity a valuable 
alternative to oppressive, internalized-rule-bound, respectable Victorian 
society. As such, eccentricity was more valuable than  ever before, which is 
w hat Mill argues. This side idealized eccentricity; this variety of eccentric, 
em bodying the alternative183 discursive elem ent w hich prized  eccentricity, 
took a thoroughly adm irable, respectable form. T he other side of the dialectic
■I82 Actually, later in the book, after Barkis has married P eggotty  and so no longer has any 
reason to repeat "Barkis is willin,"' he becomes a miser, hoards h is m oney in a chest, and takes 
up an alternate refrain, "Old clothes!" (H e is trying to convince visitors, and apparently even 
his w ife, that there is nothing in  the chest worth stealing.) T he point is that he continually 
repeats a g iven  refrain and does nothing else. He is an eccentric, therefore/because he behaves 
eccentrically all the time. In any case, he reverts in the en d  to h is first, m ost characteristic 
phrase; h is  last words are "Barkis is willin'!" (Dickens, D a v id  C opperfie ld  445).
183 It cannot be called truly oppositional because, as argued below , it ultim ately supports the 
dom inant operationalist discourse. Alternative elem ents on ly  offer choices (and in this case, 
extremely limited ones) supposedly different from those offered by the dom inant discourse but 
in the end not challenging the dom inant discourse. (See W illiam s, M arxism and Literature 121- 
27, for a discussion of dominant, residual, emergent, oppositional, and alternative cultural 
strains.)
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found eccentricity more hideous than  ever before—impractical, silly, idealistic 
in the w orst sense, and  m aladaptive. The anti-eccentric strain, more 
dom inant, cast eccentrics in a negative light; this variety of eccentric appeared 
quite m ad, unable to function in the practical world, exiled, and  doom ed. In 
the end, both sides of the dialectic spelled the eccentric's extinction. Both 
idealization and vilification rendered the eccentric, in both varieties, an 
impotent, endangered species.
It is no accident that Strindberg uses Barkis to illustrate his point, for 
Barkis's creator, Charles Dickens, is deservedly the British w riter most 
associated with eccentrics. When the subject of eccentrics comes up, Dickens 
tends to spring to m ind, his works being full to bursting w ith  memorable 
"characters" who exemplify both sides of the dialectic of eccentricity. (That is, 
some exemplify one side, some the other.) His influence upon Victorian 
culture, and specifically upon conceptions of the eccentric, was incalculable. 
As Levine writes, "N o literate person living betw een 1836 and 1870 could 
have escaped knowing about Dickens" (120)184—and during  those years, the 
British population w as becoming m uch m ore w idely literate. Most illiterate 
persons probably knew  about Dickens, too, for quite often "a group of twenty 
men and w om en [w ould sit] together in a . . . shop listening to one of their 
num ber reading a loud from a copy rented from a circulating library at 
twopence a day" (M ersand vii). Those w ho couldn 't read could listen.
Dickens's w orks reached this vast audience w ith special force, because 
of his publication m ethod: all his novels p lus Sketches by Boz (1836-7) were
184 He adds, "After 1859, the same would have been true of Darwin" (120).
See George G issing's book-length study o f Dickens's work: "for at least five-and-twenty  
years of [Dickens's] life, there w as not an English-speaking household in the world, above the 
d a ss which know s nothing of books, where his nam e w as not as familiar as that of any 
personal acquaintance, and where an allusion to characters o f his creating could fail to be 
understood" (Dickens 280). Dickens's name was such a household word that he very nearly 
named the magazine Household Words, w hich he edited , "Charles Dickens: Conducted by  
H im self '  instead (Gissing, Dickens 280).
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published in m onthly (or in a couple of cases, weekly) parts. As Peter 
Ackroyd observes, "such serialisation encourages suspense and m aintains the 
continuity of in terest w hich m ore conventional publication in toto w ould 
have precluded, and there is no doubt also that serial publication encouraged 
precisely the k ind  of breathless, and  almost topical, excitement which the 
newspapers also satisfied" (199). Dickens often perform ed his works publicly, 
as well; in  fact, the biographical consensus is that he w orked him self to death 
doing so.185 These personal presentations added  y e t more to his w orks' 
immediacy and influence.
A dditionally, prin ts representing characters from  his novels sold 
briskly (and all his novels were published w ith  accom panying illustrations), 
as did products designed to cash in on the novels' popularity.186 For example, 
after The Pickwick Papers (1837) proved im m ensely popular, people could 
and did buy "Pickwick chintzes, Pickwick cigars, Pickwick hats, Pickwick canes 
with tassels, Pickwick coats, W eller corduroys and Boz cabs" (M ersand vii- 
viii). Dickens's m ultim edia influence was in  fact impossible to escape, as 
George O rw ell claims was still the case in m id-tw entieth  century:
Many children begin to know  his characters by sight before they 
can even read . . .  A thing that is absorbed as early as that does 
not come up against any critical judgm ent. . . . [Dickens] is an 
institution that there is no getting away from . . .  I should doubt 
w hether anyone who has actually read Dickens can go a week 
w ithou t rem em bering  him  in one context o r another. W hether 
you approve of him  or not, he is there, like the N elson Column.
. . . Even people who affect to despise him  quote him
185 See, e.g., Ackroyd and John Forster.
186 Apparently Dickens did not plan or market such merchandise him self. In fact, one of his 
lifelong crusades w as to stop other people's making a killing from his success, which crusade 
largely took the form o f trying to im prove copyright law.
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unconsciously. (90-91)
So literate or not, one w ay or another, m ost Britons im bibed Dickens's 
contributions to the discourse of eccentricity.
Dickens's w ork, like operationalist discourse in general, distills 
eccentrics dow n to their essence. His eccentric characters such as Mr. Barkis 
are really nothing but  eccentric. As O rw ell writes, they are seen and 
mem orable forever " in  one particular a ttitude, doing one particular thing" 
(98), an odd  one. W hether they are the "positive" or "negative" variety  of 
eccentric, "[t]hey say perfectly the thing that they  have to say, bu t they cannot 
be conceived as talking about anything else" (99). Such characters are in fact 
the m ost comm on type in Dickens. Infrequently  a som ew hat r o u n d e d ,tS 7  
complex character (generally the hero) appears, b u t nearly everyone in 
Dickens's w orld  exists in  only one dim ension:
Dickens sees hum an  beings w ith the m ost intense vividness, but 
he sees them  alw ays in private life, as "characters," not as 
functional m em bers of society;! 88 that is to say, he sees them  
statically. Consequently his greatest success is The Pickwick
187 E. M. Forster, w ho popularized the terms "flat" and "round" characters to describe, 
respectively, sim ple, one-dim ensional characters whose personalities can be sum m ed up in a 
single sentence, and more com plex characters who learn and change, writes, "Dickens's people  
are nearly all flat (Pip and D a v id  Copperfield attempt roundness, but so diffidently that they  
seem more like bubbles than solids)" (108). He also writes, much in the vein of Marcuse, that 
the single idea around w hich  the flat character is constructed "is not his idée fixe, because 
there is nothing in him  into w hich  the idea can be fixed. H e is the idea, and such life as he 
possesses radiates from its ed ges and from the scintillations it strikes w hen other elem ents in  
the novel impinge" (104).
188 N ote O rwell's telling distinction between "functional members o f society" and "characters."
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Papers, w hich is not a story at all, m erely a series of sketches;i89 
there is little attem pt at developm ent—the characters sim ply go 
on and  on, behaving like idiots, in a k ind  of eternity. (82-83) 
Furtherm ore, as G issing writes, "W ith the norm al in character, w ith w hat (all 
things considered) we may call wholesom e norm ality, Dickens does not often 
concern him self" (Dickens 114-15). In Dickens's world an  eccentric is an 
eccentric is an  eccentric, and this applies to most everyone. This, too, 
weakens the cultural power of eccentricity: w hen everyone is eccentric, 
especially this eccentric, then no one is. It appears that this is "just how 
people are." The w ord/concept grows diffuse and  loses meaning.
D ickens's works reflect and reify both sides of the dialectic of 
eccentricity delineated above. On the positive side, Dickens gives us the 
"Good Rich M an" (Orwell 52).i90 This character
is usually  a "merchant" (we are not necessarily to ld  w hat
As J. H. Stonehouse's catalogue shows, Dickens's library contained many volum es of 
sketches, both h ighm inded (e.g.. Sketches o f  the L ives and Characters of the Leading 
Reformers o f  the Sixteenth Century: Luter, Calvin, Zwingle, Socinus, Cranmer, Knox, 1843) and 
less so (e.g., W ilson's Wonderful Characters, 1821 edition). Interestingly, and significantly, 
Dickens also ow ned  an 1820 English edition of Don Quixote and an 1867 condensation of that 
work. W it and Wisdom of Don Quixote. No wonder, then, that Dickens continues the direct 
Quixote genealogy in his "Good Old Men" (see below) and betrays the influence o f early 
nineteenth-century physiologies.
On a different point: Cuvier's Animal Kingdom  and Darwin's Origin of Species were 
also in Dickens's library, among many other contemporary scientific texts. Dickens knew a lot 
about his tim e's science, and it shows in his writings. See Fulweiler, w ho demonstrates how  
Darwinian patterns appear in Our Mutual Friend. See also Levine on Dickens's and Darwin's 
mutual know ledge and influence, especially 120-50.
190 Gissing refers to this type as "benevolent old boys" {Dickens 115).
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m erchandise he deals in),i9i and he is always a superhum anly 
kind-hearted o ld  gentlem an who "trots" to and  fro, raising his 
employees' w ages, patting children on the head, getting debtors 
out of jail and, in general, acting the fairy godm other. . . . [I]t is 
the same figure over and over again, the good rich  man, 
handing out guineas. (Orwell 52)
Examples include the Cheeryble Brothers of Nicholas Nickleb}/ (1839), Samuel 
Pickwick of The Pickwick Papers, John Jamdyce of Bleak House  (1853), the 
Garland brothers of The Old Curiosity Shop (1841), and  m ost famously, 
Ebenezer Scrooge of A  Christmas Carol (1843), after Christm as Eve, of course.
Eighteenth-century eccentrics such as Sir Roger de  Coverley and later. 
Sir Launcelot Greaves, resemble Don Quixote b u t are less mad and 
m isguided, and m ore concretely benevolent, than the Spanish  knight. They 
are show n actually im proving  social conditions in tangible  ways, and not 
m erely inspiring others by their idealism. This quixotic type or species of 
eccentric persists, m aintaining its characteristic behavior, in  the early 
nineteenth-century physiologies. There, the em phasis shifts even more 
firmly to the type's benevolence; the benevolent eccentric emerges as the 
eccentric, fairly exclusively, by the beginning of Queen V ictoria's reign. And
191 This point is more significant than Orwell seems to recognize; he d oes not speculate on what 
Dickens's vagueness here m eans. Gissing provides an answer: he argues that Dickens practices 
a degree o f "idealization" unusual even for a novelist. Truly h o r r i^ n g  elem ents are distilled 
and slightly  altered until, a lm ost alchemically, they become much less threatening. For 
exam ple, Mrs. Gamp's v ileness, which w ould horrify anyone in real life, is subtly  altered into 
highly quotable and hum orous vulgarity. Dickens idealizes her v ileness into com edy (Dickens 
100-108). Vagueness about the G ood Old Man's precise source of income idealizes that income: 
since obviously the character is  kind and generous down to his very bones, the m oney must be 
presumed to have come honestly and fairly. N o one could possibly have been oppressed in the 
process o f its acquisition. W e could not so easily think this if w e were given  a  specific source to 
contemplate; w e w ould inevitably worry about the poor coal miners, or the starving, striking 
factory workers. Or other heartless Scrooges (as he w as before Christm as Eve), o f which there 
are several: for instance, Ralph Nickleby of Nicholas N ickleby,  D aniel Q uilp o f The Old 
Curiosity Shop, and Mr. Jaggers o f Great Expectations (1861). D ickens's idealization of the 
Good Old Man's income assists the Good Old Man's support of the capitalist status quo (see 
below).
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now, in Dickens's novels, the species alters again, so that it comes to em body 
Benevolence in alm ost allegorical fashion. The Good Rich M an is ju st that, 
in the way Marcuse explains: the noun and  function completely coincide; the 
Good Rich Man is only good and rich. One can trace a direct line of descent, 
then, from  the early seventeenth  cen tury  (Cervantes) to the  late n ineteen th  
(Dickens), and thence forw ard into ou r ow n time: Quixote begat Coverley; 
Coverley begat Greaves and the Shandys; Greaves and the Shandys begat the 
real-life benefactors described in the physiologies; and the real-life benefactors 
begat the Victorian Good Rich Man. There is a clear line of developm ent: 
m adness, originally as prom inent a feature as benevolence, steadily drops 
away, finally leaving only the latter. The type gradually becomes idealized as 
the em bodim ent of good-hearted generosity. Ironically, the eccentric, sym bol 
of individuality , grows less individual and  more typical, to the point du rin g  
Dickens's time that a type-nam e such as the "Good Rich M an" actually fits.
The Good Rich M an's personal oddities disappear except for his 
unusual goodness—and even the rem ain ing  traces of oddity  point to that 
goodness. Bleak H ouses  John Jarndyce provides a good example. His 
"eccentricity does not pass bounds; the better we know  him the less 
observable it grows" (Gissing, Dickens 115); and really, it is barely noticeable 
in the first place. It consists solely in two m inor oddities. First, he alw ays 
refuses any acknow ledgem ent of his generosity. Upon first m eeting him , the 
perceptive Esther Sum m erson observes, "I felt that if we had been a t all 
dem onstrative [of our gratitude], he w ould  have run  away in a m om ent" (63). 
A nd second, w henever he feels w orried , d isappointed, or otherw ise in low  
spirits, he soliloquizes that the w ind is "either in the east, or going to be" (64). 
Esther smokes this gentle ruse quickly, too: "[Tjhis caprice about the w ind was 
a fic tion ;. . .  he used the pretence to account for any disappointm ent he could
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not conceal, ra ther than  he would blame the real cause of it, or disparage or 
depreciate any one. We thought this very characteristic of his eccentric 
gentleness" (80). Refusing to have his kindness recognized, and  blam ing the 
w eather rather than  any person for his discom fort, only m ake his 
benevolence seem  still more thorough and genuine. As oddities go, they 're 
just not very odd—they 're  good.
There are no Good Rich Women. There are certainly none in Dickens, 
and none in o ther V ictorian works, to my know ledge, tha t flaw lessly fits the 
type. There are sym pathetic, generous female characters, to be sure; take, for 
instance, D orothea Brooke of Middlemarch  (1871-2). She veritably aches to do 
good. But she does not fit the eccentric stereotype, in  that she is a complex, 
thoughtful character. That is, the Good Rich Man is on/y  that; Dorothea is 
not especially rich (and has nothing w hatever to do w ith business), and is 
ambitious, a characteristic not at all part of the Good Rich M an's makeup. 
Also, she falls in  love and marries, twice—som ething the G ood Rich Man 
distinctly does not do (see below). Finally, she appears in a context, the world 
of George Eliot, w hich demands that w e take all characters seriously, 
especially D orothea—som ething we are significantly never nudged  to do, and 
are even encouraged n o t  to do, with Victorian eccentrics.
The discourse of eccentricity excluded w om en from  the category of 
eccentrics du ring  the eighteenth century; the Victorian species Good Rich 
Man, a descendant of the eighteenth-century type, persists in this exclusion. 
The defining characteristic of the Good Rich Man is total generosity with 
wealth, usually earned  through unspecified trade. A generous fem ale  
merchant, though, w ould  be hard for Victorian society to im agine, and w ould 
seem unbelievable to a mass audience of a realistic novel. (She w ould  need 
to be single by m isfortune, and m arried off quickly, to rem ain wholly
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sympathetic.) As Sandra M. G ilbert and Susan Gubar argue, the ideal (and, I 
would add , particularly m iddle-class) role for nineteenth-century British 
women was "Angel of the House." This type, self-sacrificing, utterly 
domestic, and pure  through an d  through, appears again and again  in Dickens: 
Esther Sum m erson, Lizzie H exam  {Our Mutual Friend, 1865), Little Nell {The 
Old Curiosity Shop), Agnes W ickfield {David Copperfield). G ilbert and Gubar 
argue that w om en who do no t fit this type were view ed in  the  dark  tw in role 
of "M adw om an in the Attic"; they were "warned that if they do not behave 
like angels they  m ust be m onsters" (53), and as such should  be locked away, 
like the first M rs. Rochester in  fane Eyre.
Roles perceived to be available to women, then, d id  no t include Good 
Rich Person. The Angel of the H ouse's kindness does som ew hat resemble 
the Good Rich M an's; how ever, it differs in its sphere. The form er operates 
entirely w ith in  the home; the latter, largely outside it. Esther Summerson 
and her type m ake members of the household happy through  self-sacrifice 
and generosity of time. The Cheerybles and their type m ake people outside 
the home, very  frequently com plete strangers, happy th rough  no-strings- 
attached cash donations. In these ways, even though the attitudes of Angel 
and Man are very  similar, the social roles differ fundam entally.
Two female characters in  Dickens's works approach being  Good Rich 
Women: Miss H avisham  and Betsy Trotwood. The form er appears to be Pip's 
generous benefactress, an illusion she maintains as long as possible. 
However, Pip eventually discovers that his real benefactor is a man, the 
convict Abel M agwitch, w ho could almost be a harm less Good Rich Man 
himself if not for the frightening  fact that he is a convict. (It is in the 
character of escaped convict that he meets and threatens young  Pip at the 
beginning of the story). A nd Miss Havisham  is not only not a Good Rich
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Woman; it turns out she is actually plotting her revenge upon  the male sex 
(as m uch of it as possible) by training Estella to wreak havoc upon it.
Betsy Trotw ood comes closer to the type. She never quite reaches it, 
however, because she is a b it too complex and full of guile for it. She behaves 
quite generously tow ard David Copperfield and Mr. Dick, to be sure. But she 
also feels irrationally  annoyance w ith  David for his no t having  been born a 
g ir l;i9 2  it takes considerable tim e on her part and ex traordinary  innocent 
suffering on D avid 's to convince her to drop her resentm ent. She is capable 
of considerable im patience and irritability toward others—i.e., characteristics 
outside the defining one of benevolence. And she hides the fact of her not 
having lost all her m oney; she allows Mr. Dick and D avid to struggle and, as 
they think, scrape by w ith  great peril and difficulty, only to reveal later that 
she had  5,000 pounds all along. "1 w anted to see how yo u  w ould  come out of 
the trial. Trot [David]," she says (776). The Good Rich M an represents pure, 
uncom plicated benevolence (from  the Latin bene, well, and  vo len s ,  wishing)- 
-benevolence so pure it w ill not allow itself to be recognized, nor give 
another person any pain. The type could not conceive of throw ing a loved 
one, a blood relative, into the dog-eat-dog world just "to see how  he would 
come out of it." In these ways, the women most closely resem bling the Good 
Rich M an never quite fit the type; the category, possessing a long male 
lineage, continues to exclude w om en.% 93
"Impossible not to like and to respect Mr. Jam dyce," w rites Gissing 
(Dickens 115)—that is, Mr. Jam dyce and the type he represents. The Good 
Rich M an's bone-deep good-heartedness dem ands this response. The side of 
the dialectic represented by Mill, and less one-sidedly by Dickens, finds great
192 On the same nonsensical principle, she despises Peggotty for having been bom  w ith  such a 
ridiculous "pagan" name.
193 Intriguing: a genealogy w ithout women! Reproduction o f the species w ithout females! It's 
a phenomenon for the freak books.
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value in eccentricity. Character portraits such as Dickens's Good Rich Man 
reflect and  reify this w idespread cultural desire. That Dickens w ould support 
eccentricity in this way jibes well w ith  the strong stand against oppressive 
operationalism  he takes in Hard Times. There he offers Thomas G radgrind 
as a w arn ing  exam ple, an em bodim ent of every th ing  anti-hum anist, bottom - 
line-obsessed, and  disgusting:
Thomas G radgrind, sir. A m an of realities. A  m an of facts and  
calculations. A m an who proceeds upon  the principle that tw o 
and two are  four, and nothing over, and who is not to be talked 
into allow ing for anything over. . . . W ith a rule and a pair of 
scales, and  the multiplication table alw ays in his pocket, sir, 
ready to w eigh and measure any  parcel of hum an nature, and  
tell you exactly w hat it comes to. It is a m ere question of 
f ig u r e s ,!  94 a case of simple arithm etic. (3)
G radgrind forbids his children to read  or hear any fiction, to indulge any 
sentim ent or w onder, and to behave any way bu t practically. Consequently, 
they grow  up m iserable. Louisa G radgrind  retu rns to him  and renounces her 
entire upbringing  as a blight upon her na tu ra lly  sensitive soul:
"Father, you have trained me from  my cradle. . . .  1 curse the 
hour in which 1 was born to such a destiny. . . . How could you 
give me life, and  take from me all the inappreciable things that 
raise it from  the state of conscious death? W here are the graces 
of m y soul? W here are the sentim ents of m y heart? W hat have 
you done, O  father, what have you  done, w ith  the garden that 
should  have bloom ed once, in  this great w ilderness here!" (215-
194 "A. Mere Q uestion o f Figures" was apparently one of fourteen titles for Hard Times short­
listed by Dickens (Craig 11). Clearly, in Dickens's m ind the "mere question of figures" 
approach to life, Gradgrind's, goes hand-in-glove w ith  "hard times."
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16)
W hat was attractive about the Good Rich Man is that he w orked  for Louisa's 
side against her father's. The good eccentric represented sentimental, 
idealistic considerations h igher and  m ore im portant th an  m ere practicality.
Which was also one of his two glaring flaws. In a culture which 
tended to find, w ith G radgrind, that "the Good Sam aritan was a Bad 
Economist" (215), such ideals seem ed impractical a n d  soft-headed, almost 
suicidal. The good eccentric appeared  all the m ore valorous for being 
benevolent against the cu ltu ral grain—and all the  m ore ridiculous. 
Im m ediately, though, the dom inan t culture w ould  find  him  fundam entally 
hard  to believe; bottom -line-oriented society w ould inescapably consider the 
mathematics of getting and spending. As Orwell observes, "Even Dickens 
m ust have reflected occasionally that anyone w ho was so anxious to give his 
m oney away would never have acquired it in the first place" (52). And it 
w ould  seem clear that only som eone like Scrooge w ho had hoarded it over 
an extended miserly life could long afford the type's exaggerated generosity; 
anyone else w ould run  ou t of m oney in a m onth. In th is m anner Dickens 
idealizes eccentricity by rem oving all alloy from  the single quality of 
benevolence; and in doing so, he idealizes eccentricity in  a different way—he 
m akes it seem merely  ideal, im possible, nonexistent.
Even if benevolence this total and  one-dim ensional w ere considered 
an ideal one could actually aspire to, the problem  of the eccentric's supposedly 
essential impracticality w ould  still rem ain. H arold  Skim pole of Bleak House 
best exemplifies how eccentricity becomes associated fundam entally with 
blam eful impracticality. As w ith  m any of his characters, Dickens identifies
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Skimpole's single dim ension and repeats it and repeats it and repeats it. 195 
Again and again  we are told that Skimpole is a "baby," a "mere child in the 
world" (70), tha t he has "no Will at all—and no W on't—sim ply C an 't" (435), 
that even Esther Summerson and John Jarndyce "are designing people 
compared w ith  [him]" (71), that he can 't even count change, the language of 
money being as incom prehensible as "M oorish" (596), and so on. A nything 
vaguely practical draw s the same silly response: Skimpole sm ilingly throws 
up his hands and  asserts that such things are beyond him, beyond his deepest 
nature—"I h av en 't the ruled account-book, I have none of the tax-gathering 
elements in m y com position, I am not at all respectable, and 1 d o n 't  w ant to 
be. Odd perhaps, bu t so it is!" (532).
Skim pole him self offers several eloquent, Millian defenses of 
eccentricity. O ne particularly forceful statem ent of this position likens 
humans to bees, perhaps alluding to Bernard de M andeville's The Fable o f  
the Bees (1724). (M andeville argues that individual vices such as vanity 
produce public good by stimulating trade. The adm ittedly tenuous link 
between this position and Mill's is that in  each, individual actions bring 
about culture-w ide benefits; the individual's right to act even in w ays which 
are not approved by the community at large m ust therefore be protected.) As 
Esther describes Skim pole's oration,
he pro tested  against the overw eening assum ptions of Bees. He 
d id n 't a t all see why the busy Bee should be proposed as a m odel 
to him; he supposed the Bee liked to make honey, or he 
w ouldn 't do it—nobody asked him. It was not necessary for the
195 See Gissing: "[Dickens's] art, especially as satirist, lies in the judicious use of em phasis and 
iteration. Emphasis alone w ould  not have answered his purpose; the striking thing m ust be 
said over and over again till even  the most stupid hearer has it by heart" (Dickens 146). Note  
Gissing's implicit recognition that much of Dickens's Victorian audience w as listening, not 
reading, and so D ickens's influence extended beyond the literate.
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Bee to make such a m erit of his tastes. . . . He m ust say he 
thought a Drone the em bodim ent of a p leasanter and  w iser idea.
The Drone said, unaffactedly, "You will excuse me; I really 
cannot attend to the shop! I find myself in a  w orld  in  which 
there is so much to see, and  so short a time to see it in, that I 
m ust take the liberty of looking about me, and  begging to be 
provided for by som ebody who doesn't w ant to look about him."
This appeared to Mr. Skim pole to be the D rone philosophy, and 
he thought it a very good philosophy—alw ays supposing the 
Drone to be willing to be on good terms w ith  the  Bee: which, so 
far as he knew, the easy fellow always was, if the  consequential 
creature w ould only let him , and not be so conceited about his 
honey! (93)
"All he asked of society was, to let him  live" (69), to "suffer him to ride his 
rocking-horse" (71),196 which is just what Mill asks on eccentrics' behalf. 
Through Skimpole, Dickens asks for respectable society 's tolerance for 
individual difference, observing tha t jostling practicality is no more viable a 
model for life than self-indulgent dronishness. T he argum ent regarding 
practicality is m uch the same lesson Dickens teaches th ro u g h  the bad example 
of characters such as Scrooge, Ralph Nickleby, Jaggers, Gradgrind, and
196 Clearly, this is an allusion to Tristram Shandy  and the eccentric's "hobby-horse." Dickens 
owned Sterne's com plete works (Stonehouse 105), and apparently th ey  made a deep, lasting 
impression.
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Bounderby (Hard Times).i^7 As Skimpole pu ts it, "Very odd and curious, the 
mental process is, in  you men of business!" (77). The eccentric "infant" 
Skimpole accepts him self and others, and  w ants others to do the sam e; he 
speaks "as if he knew  that [he] had his singularities, but still had  his claims, 
too, w hich w ere the  general business of the com m unity and m ust not be 
slighted" (70). Dickens, like Mill, argues th a t Skimpole's eccentricity m ust be 
valued, protected, and  even encouraged.
But then  again: Drones? As m odels for hum an life? As sc ience-saw y 
Victorians w ould know , drones do not contribute to the hive's prosperity , 
they m erely live off worker bees. Bees presum ably do not experience 
resentm ent w ith  such  an arrangem ent; hum an beings, m ost of them  
alienated w orkers w ho would enjoy living like Drones instead, resent it very 
much. W hen Skim pole says such th ings as, "Live upon you r practical 
wisdom, and  let us [Drones] live upon  you!" (598), he appears m uch less 
sympathetic. Esther, representing respectable, practical society, receives such 
statements w ith  serious doubt which readers are apparently in tended to feel, 
as well. A lthough she finds Skimpole "at once so whimsical and so loveable" 
(64) that she cannot help  liking him, she also has trouble "in endeavouring  to 
reconcile anyth ing  he said with anything I had  thought about the duties and 
accountabilities of life . . .  I was confused by not exactly understanding w hy he 
was free of them . T hat he was free of them , I scarcely doubted; he was so very 
clear about it himself" (70). She even suspects his sincerity, since in effect
197 Dickens describes the em inently practical and successfully competitive Bounderby in quite 
unsympathetic terms:
He w as a rich man: banker, merchant, manufacturer, and what not. A big, loud  
man, w ith  a stare and a metallic laugh. A  m an m ade out of coarse material,
which seem ed to have been stretched to make so  much of him A man w ith  a
pervading appearance on him of being inflated like a balloon, and ready to 
start. A  man w ho could never sufficiently vaunt h im self a self-made man. A  
man w ho w as alw ays proclaiming, through that brassy speaking-trumpet o f a 
voice o f his, his old  ignorance and old poverty. A  man w ho w as the Bully o f  
hum ility . (14)
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being impractical w orks out so practically for him: "I could not satisfy myself 
that it was as artless as it seemed; or that it d id  not serve Mr. Skimpole's idle 
turn quite as well as any other part, and w ith  less trouble" (522).
Im practicality m ight be an ultra-practical adaptation  on Skimpole's part. 
W hether it is or not, his ingratitude is clearly in tended  as unsym pathetic; it is 
obviously not w arranted. After decades of living off Jam dyce's selfless, 
boundless generosity, he finally leaves Jamdyce, dy ing  soon afterwards. He 
"left a d iary  behind him , w ith letters and other m aterials tow ards his Life; 
which was published , and which showed him to have been the victim of a 
combination on the p a rt of m ankind against an am iable child." Maybe—but
he wrote w hat every reader of the novel knows to be false: "Jarndyce, in
common w ith  m ost o ther m en I have know n, is the Incarnation of
Selfishness" (831). Skim pole's saying so shows him  to be an extremely 
ungrateful drone.
Dickens only seem s  to defend eccentricity, then, or does so with only 
one hand. He w rites forceful, Millian defenses of eccentricity, but pairs 
eccentricity w ith infantile impracticality. He rejects iron practicality, and 
makes eccentricity appear "whimsical and loveable"; how ever, at the same 
time he m akes defenses of eccentricity fairly im p la u s ib le ,t 9 8  and delivers 
them through characters whose interests are served by being eccentric, who
198 This Skim polean defense of impractical eccentricity, too, indicates that his arguments 
should be understood as implausible:
I alm ost feel as if you  ought to be grateful to me, for giv ing you  the opportunity 
of enjoying the luxury of my generosity. I know you like it. For anything I can 
tell, I m ay have com e into the world expressly for the purpose o f increasing 
your stock of happiness. I may have been bom to be a benefactor to you, by  
som etim es giv ing y o u  an opportunity of assisting me in m y little perplexities.
W hy should  I regret m y incapacity for details and w orld ly  affairs, w hen  it 
leads to such pleasant consequences? (71)
Skimpole, a total sponge, as benefactor? N o way. That is plainly ridiculous. But even to hint 
at such a connection is to cast another shadow on the Good Rich Man type of eccentric; if 
Skimpole-as-admirable-benefactor som ewhat resembles Jamdyce in the sam e role, so much the 
w orse for the latter.
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receive benefaction w ithout gratitude. In the end , being an extremely hard­
working, respectable middle-class Victorian himself, Dickens cannot 
unqualifiedly vaunt the supposedly im practical, dronish eccentric. What 
Dickens builds up he sim ultaneously tears dow n. The ostensible cham pion 
of the eccentric at the sam e tim e "shows traces of the T've always kept myself 
respectable' habit of m ind" (Orwell 73). Those people should see things the 
way they are, get practical, and stop sponging off the rest of us: this is the 
message underlying even Dickens's most a rden t argum ents on the eccentric's 
behalf.
Gissing, who w as born only a generation after Dickens, and  who 
studied him, was alive to this signification. He calls Skimpole "a character, in 
the proper sense of the w ord"—i.e., S trindberg 's—and continues, "Skimpole is 
one of the few people in Dickens whom we dislike" (123). Gissing doubts 
Skimpole's sincerity, m uch like Esther Sum m erson: "If we incline to think 
his eccentricity overdone, be it rem embered tha t the m an was in part an actor, 
and a very clever actor too" (123).
Gissing articulates w hat Dickens only intimates: that respectable 
Victorian society despises the eccentric and  his supposedly essential 
impracticality. In 1891 Gissing published New Grub Street, a semi- 
autobiographical novel recounting his sufferings at the hands of practical- 
minded late-Victorian society. There, he depicts Edwin Reardon and Harold 
B if fen, two good-hearted, impractical, eccentrict99 authors, as sym pathetic yet 
hated. Reardon refuses to attend parties and finagle positive reviews in order 
to market his new  novel, insisting upon his w ork 's succeeding only on its 
own merit. He refuses to w rite "commercial" fiction, too. Biffen persists in
199 As the respectable Mrs. Yule's firiends say, "Mr. Reardon is growing so very eccentric—has 
an odd distaste for society—occupies him self with all sorts o f  out-of-the-way in terests.. . .  And 
really, such curious eccentricities!" (253). See below for w hat these "eccentric" tastes are.
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w riting  "absolute realism in the sphere of the ignobly decent" (150),200 despite 
know ing full well that such w ork  will never sell. Like Quixote, they take 
their greatest delight in old, ou tdated  books: in their case, Greek and Roman 
classics. Like Skimpole, they find the language of Money as 
incomprehensible as Moorish. As Biffen puts it, they rem ain "rabid idealists, 
both of [them]" (150)—as the m ad-dog descriptor "rabid" signals, plainly a bad 
thing to be. (One w ould h av e  to be "rabid" to rem ain an  idealist willfully in 
such a practical-minded culture.) Gissing sums up his society's attitude 
tow ard such people in these w ords:
The chances are that you  have neither u n d ers tan d in g  nor 
sym pathy for m en such as Edwin Reardon and H aro ld  Biffen.
They merely provoke you. They seem to you inert, flabby, 
weakly envious, foolishly obstinate, im piously m utinous, and 
m any other things. You are m ade angrily contem ptuous by their 
failure to get on; w hy d o n 't they bestir them selves, push  and 
bustle, welcome kicks so long as halfpence follow, m ake a place 
in the world's eye . . .  ? (455)
In short, why don 't they get practical, go out into the "real world," and 
compete? Not to compete is not to survive. In these circum stances, even 
Reardon himself m ust find his eccentric im practicality blameful: "My
200 In characterizing his ow n  work, Biffen differentiates it from D ickens's in much the same 
w ay G issing does his own, in his stu d y  o f that author "I want to  deal w ith  the essentially 
unheroic, w ith  the day-to-day life o f that vast majority of people w ho are at the mercy of 
paltry circumstance. Dickens understood the possibility of such work, but his tendency to 
melodrama on the one hand, and his hum our on the other, prevented him  from  thinking of it" 
(151).
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behaviour is contem ptible; I know that" (50).20i
Gissing deplores this dom inant a ttitude , but he credits it w ith  so m uch 
cultural pow er, and  the  nonscientific, pro-eccentric position w ith  so little, 
that he, too, finally  strengthens the hegem ony. He plainly show s how  m uch 
he dislikes the direction his society is m oving; however, in  describ ing  this 
movement as inexorable, as a k ind of irresistible natural law , he uses 
operational ism 's ow n term s to streng then  w h a t he hates.
More unam biguously  th an  D ickens, Gissing m akes the M illian 
argum ent that eccentrics such as R eardon and  Biffen are actually  valuable, 
hum ane exem plars in  a cruel, D arw in ian  w orld , and that it is no t them  but 
society which should  change:
[T]ry to im agine a personality w holly  unfitted for the rough  and  
tum ble of the w orld 's  labour-m arket. From the fam iliar po in t of 
view  these m en w ere w orthless; v iew  them  in possible re la tion  
to a hum ane o rder of society, and  they are adm irable citizens. 
Nothing is easier than to condem n a type of character w hich is 
unequal to the coarse dem ands of life as it suits the average m an.
These tw o w ere richly endow ed  w ith  the kindly and  the 
im aginative virtues; if fate th rew  them  am id incongruous 
circum stances, is their endow m ent of less value? You scorn 
their passivity; bu t it was their na tu re  and their m erit to be
201 See, too. The P riva te Papers o f Henry R yecroft, first published in 1901, shortly after 
Gissing's death. There, Ryecroft, an eccentric character cut from the same cloth as Reardon and 
Biffen, muses, "'Unpractical' [sic] 1 was called by th ose w ho spoke mildly; 'id iot'—1 am  sure— 
by many a ruder tongue. And idiot I see m yself w henever I glance back over the long devious  
road. Something, obviously, 1 lacked from the beginning, som e balancing principle granted to 
most men in one or another degree. I had brains, but they were no help to me in the com m on  
circumstances of life" (150). Here again eccentricity is posited  as an absence, a deficiency, a 
lack o f practical reasoning.
Incidentally, on  th is poin t of the eccentric's im practicality, it is  te lling that Ryecroft, 
at the end of a reverie on reading, writes, "Come, once m ore before I die I w ill read Don 
Quixote" (240).
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passive. . . . The sum  of their faults was their inability to earn 
money; but, indeed, tha t inability does not call for unm ingled 
disdain. (455)
True, they do not and  cannot compete effectively by society's standards; bu t 
the standards are wrong. The fault is not eccentrics'.
Furthermore, G issing points out that society's standards, part and  
parcel of a broadly "scientific" (i.e., operationalist) perception of the w orld, 
have only recently become dom inant. The vulgar, bottom -line practicality 
personified in New Grub Street's Jasper Milvain (who resembles Dickens's 
G radgrind) has only really become the norm  during  Queen Victoria's reign. 
This w ould imply that this understanding  of the w orld , these standards for 
hum an thought and behavior, are not necessarily eternally, unquestionably 
viable: they have taken other shapes which w ere considered good and natural 
in their own times; they could in the future take d ifferent shapes which will 
then be accepted.
Society may well be w rong, then, in adopting  operationalist discourse 
so completely. Still, Gissing credits that discourse w ith  nearly irresistible 
strength. As Ryecroft, apparently  speaking for G is s in g ,2 0 2  observes:
1 w onder w hether there are many m en w ho have the same 
feeling w ith regard to "science" as I have? It is som ething more 
than  a prejudice; often it takes the form  of a dread, almost a 
terror. Even those branches of science w hich are concerned w ith 
things that interest m e—w hich deal w ith  p lants and  anim als and 
the heaven of stars—even these 1 cannot contem plate w ithout 
uneasiness, a sp iritual disaffection . . . W hen it comes to other
202 The Preface to this very autobiographical "memoir" speaks o f Ryecroft very 
sym pathetically. In contrast to the case of Skimpole, no clue w hatsoever suggests that 
Ryecroft's words are to be received w ith anything but respect and thoughtful consideration.
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kinds of science—the sciences b latant and  ubiquitous—the science 
by w hich m en become m illionaires—I am  possessed w ith  an 
angry hostility, a  resentful apprehension. . . .  1 hate and fear 
"science" because of my conviction that, for long to come if not 
for ever, it w ill be the remorseless enem y of m ankind. I see it 
destroying all sim plicity and gentleness of life, all the beauty of 
the world; 1 see it restoring barbarism  under a m ask of 
civilization; I see it darkening m en 's m inds and  hardening  their 
hearts; I see it bringing a time of vast conflicts, which will pale 
into insignificance "the thousand wars of old," and, as likely as 
not, w ill w helm  all the laborious advances of m ankind in blood- 
drenched chaos. (240-41)
And yet, as biblically horrible as the effects of enthroning "science" may be— 
well, perhaps there's som ething to it, he suggests. Gissing does after all 
explicitly endorse a D arw inian  view of hum an nature;
Man is not m ade for peaceful intercourse w ith  his fellows; he is 
by nature self-assertive, commonly aggressive, always critical in 
a more or less hostile spirit of any characteristic which seems 
strange to him. T hat he is capable of profound affections merely 
modifies here and  there his natural contentiousness, and 
subdues its expression. (Ryecroft 82)203  
Furtherm ore, Gissing argues that "[hjum an creatures have a m arvellous 
pow er of adapting them selves to necessity" (212), which makes eccentrics, 
who fail to do so, all the more blam eful and  m aladaptive. A nd finally, he 
takes the stance that inexorable "science" is alm ost a natural force itself, 
destructive yet unstoppable: "[Ojnly a few could prophesy its tyranny, could
203 Gissing's own logic w ould then suggest that the harmless, uncontentious eccentric is not 
"natural," or that his peculiar nature differs significantly from m ost people's.
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foresee that it w ould revive old evils and  tram ple on the  prom ises of its 
beginning. This is the course of things; w e m ust accept it" (242). The best one 
can say, as w ith  Ryecroft, is that "I—poor little mortal—have had  no part in 
bring the ty ran t to his throne" (242). T yrannical operationalism  rem ains on 
its throne regardless of our individual w ishes or actions; w e m ust adjust 
ourselves to endure  its reign.
The idealization of eccentricity, then, actually w orks against 
eccentricity, specifically on the point of practicality. In o rder to make the 
eccentric look especially good, writers such as Dickens and G issing emphasize 
the figure's im practicality. O n one level this shows him to be above dirty, 
m undane considerations such as pounds and  pence; on another, this makes 
him look soft-headed or dronish to new ly operationalist, bottom-line- 
oriented Victorian culture. The eccentric comes to be regarded  as a mere  
idealist, an object of disgust—which further solidifies the discourse that finds 
him disgusting. ("If this is the alternative, then I'll stick w ith  good old 
practicality, thank  you.") Late in the century, Gissing makes so convincing a 
case that his society is cruel to eccentrics, that operationalism  rules w ith an 
iron fist, that it  m akes the m inor protest w hich the eccentric em bodies seem 
all the more pathetic and doom ed. Who w ould persist in eccentricity, 
knowing w hat horrible things lay in store? Gissing's H enry Ryecroft 
w ouldn 't, "[n]ot w ith the assurances of fifty years' contentm ent such as I now 
enjoy to follow upon it!" (29). To change society so that it accepts individual 
difference m ore readily—which was apparently  Gissing's, and more 
ambiguously, Dickens's wish—rather than  to change oneself into the shape 
prescribed by the hegemony, really does become an impossible dream . And 
so the attem pt to protest against the hegem ony by idealizing eccentricity 
finally supports the powers that be instead.
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This was also true w here the quality  of asexuality was concerned; this 
was the second feature which, w hile idealizing the eccentric as an attractive 
alternative to the norm , sim ultaneously  m ade him  appear less adm irable. 
Asexuality, like benevolence, w as assigned to every generation of eccentrics 
since Don Quixote. It generally signified special purity, a disinclination for 
w orldly pleasures, and a devotion to h igher ideals. It continued to do so 
during  Dickens's and  Gissing's time. Now, however, in addition to carrying 
the stigm a attached to idealism  in general, the eccentric's asexuality began to 
carry a specifically biological stigm a. As Max Horkheim er and T heodor W. 
A dorno argue, "W here the m astery  of na tu re  is the true goal," w hich it 
certainly was in operationalist V ictorian G reat Britain, "biological inferiority 
rem ains a glaring stigma, the w eakness im prin ted  by nature as a key stim ulus 
to aggression" (248). To a society taught by Darwin—survival-focused, 
descent-m inded, biologically savvy—asexuality signaled biological inferiority, 
the inability to reproduce, and , generally, physical weakness. A nd this 
w eakness invited scorn and ridicule. D arw in taught the huge im portance of 
reproduction to the survival of a species; here was a character who specifically 
does not engage in sex and cannot reproduce. What a m aladaptive, doom ed 
species! W hat a biological failure! D arw in argues that nature ruthlessly 
eradicates m aladaptations and  useless features; the asexual eccentric seem ed 
an extinction w aiting to happen.
D ickens's idealized eccentrics all seem  to have this m aladaptive 
quality: for example, most notably, John Jarndyce,204 Samuel Pickwick, the 
Cheerybles, post-ghost Scrooge, and  one of the Garland brothers. One 
G arland—the less intense do-gooder—is m arried  and has a child; the other.
204There is no indication that he ever consum m ates h is brief marriage to Esther Summerson. 
H e provides perhaps the best exam ple o f the w ay the eccentric's goodness goes hand-in-glove  
w ith h is asexuality: he dem onstrates the form er by the latter, voluntarily stepping ou t o f the 
marriage to offer h is place to the less eccentric, m ore biologically viable Allan W oodcourt.
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who assists Little N ell and  her grandfather, is actually never named but 
instead, significantly, is referred to throughout The Old Curiosity Shop as 
"the Bachelor." Also in  th a t novel. Master H um phrey , narra to r of the story 
and another, even m ore generous benefactor to N ell, is referred to until the 
very end as "the single gentlem an." 205 Gissing tends to connect eccentricity 
with the failure to reproduce, as well: neither H enry Ryecroft nor Harold 
Biffen ever m arries, fathers children, nor even approaches any kind of sexual 
relationship. E dw in Reardon is an exception; he is m arried  and has in the 
indefinite past fathered a couple of children. But even he fails sexually: by 
the beginning of the  novel, he and his wife A m y have developed serious 
differences of opinion regarding his impracticality. These differences rapidly 
intensify until she leaves him . Reardon dies shortly  afterw ards, after which 
she marries the successfully competitive, practical Jasper Milvain. Much as 
in the case of John Jam dyce, the sexually unsuccessful eccentric makes way 
for the "better" (i.e., less eccentric, more virile) m an. A nd so, again, the 
means used to idealize eccentricity, to em phasize its desirable, admirable 
qualities, end up streng thening  the case against eccentricity.
It is hard to see instantly how advocating and idealizing eccentricity 
would effectively squelch it; only closer exam ination reveals the process. It is 
much easier to see (and  to dem onstrate) how em phasizing negative aspects of 
eccentricity w ould have the sam e effect. We tend  to rem em ber Victorian 
eccentrics of the positive variety, probably fulfilling our ow n need for 
alternatives to an oppressive hegemony. But w e often forget that the 
literature of the time exhibited plenty of the negative variety, as well.
Many oddballs, particularly in Dickens, are exhibited as freaks and, in
205 The Victorian convention  generally held that bachelorhood precluded fatherhood. We of 
course know better; I m erely w ish  to point that to specify a m an as a bachelor in that time was 
to indicate som ething about him which w e would not necessarily assum e today.
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fact, inhabit categories sim ilar to those of the freak books. Mr. Krook of Bleak 
House, for instance, is several familiar kinds of freak at once. For one, he 
resembles the rude, self-taught prodigy. Like the  farm er-m athem atician who 
could chalk out elaborate equations on his trousers as he plow ed a furrow , 
despite never having been to university, Krook is capable of chalking out the 
letters spelling 'Ja rn d y ce ' and "Bleak House" from m emory despite  not 
understanding  w hat they mean. He teaches him self how to read and  write 
simply by im itating letters' shapes, an uncanny ability which ultim ately 
provides the vital clue solving Lady Dedlock's mystery. Krook also closely 
resembles "Dirty Dick," a London tradesm an who, disappointed in  love, 
refused ever to clean his shop again. Krook says, much as his freak-book 
model reportedly had, "I have a liking for rust and  m ust and cobwebs. . . .  I 
can 't abear to . . . a lter anything, or to have any sweeping, nor scouring, nor 
cleaning, nor repairing going on about me" (5 2 ).2 0 6  And so the junk and  filth 
accumulate in  vast heaps around  him. Krook is a new  type of oddball, too: 
the victim of spontaneous combustion. Strange but, as Dickens insists in the 
novel's Preface, scientifically, verifiably true (xiv).
None of these types or aspects of his personality is presented as 
especially sym pathetic; as in the freak books, they appear in the light of 
bizarre oddities, m onstrous qualities—certainly nothing to be em ulated  or 
envied. A nd these are precisely the kinds of useless lusus naturae Darwin 
claimed natural selection quickly and ruthlessly removes from  a species by 
killing the in d iv id u a l .2 0 7  Which Krook's case goes to dem onstrate: he 
vanishes suddently  an d  mysteriously in a puff of smoke. His self-taught- 
prodigy quality is m ost attractive, but even there he comes off as stupidly
206 The other, more fam ous D ickens character who resembles Dirty Dick in this w ay is Mrs. 
Havisham. Her wedding-banquet room resembles Dick's shop, and the trauma which started  
her dissolution is the sam e as his.
207 Tellingly, Krook has fathered no children and is a lifelong bachelor.
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idealistic or just plain paranoid:
"[I'm] trying to ieam  myself to read and write," said Krook.
"And how  do you get on?" [asked Jarndyce].
"Slow. Bad," returned  the old man, im patiently. "It's hard at 
m y tim e of life."
"It w ould be easier to be taught by some one," sa id  m y guardian.
"Aye, b u t they m ight teach me wrong!" re tu rned  the  old man, 
w ith  a w onderfully suspicious flash of his eye. "1 don 't know 
w hat 1 m ay have lost, by not being leam d [sic] afore. 1 w ouldn 't 
like to lose anything by being learnd wrong now. . . .  I'd  rather 
tru st my ow n self than  another!" (201).
And lest the connection of freakish qualities w ith eccentricity specifically be 
thought unw arranted , or a stretch: the word "eccentric" is used a lot in such 
cases. For instance. Miss Flite, Krook's lodger, describes him as "a very 
eccentric person. He is very odd. Oh, 1 assure you he is very o d d . . .  . [H]e is a 
little—you know!—M—!" (51). And just to drive the po in t hom e, Dickens even 
has Krook him self agree: "The old m an overheard, and  laughed. 'It's true 
enough'" (51).
Krook's case brings up two points regarding the Victorian eccentric 
which require further developm ent. First, m any characters (in both senses of 
the word) possess physical freakishness of types recognizable from the freak 
books; the difference, though, is that now indiv idual odd ity  of this kind is 
often connected w ith personal cruelty or insensitivity. Daniel Quilp, the 
demonic, m alevolent dw arf harrassing Little Nell an d  her grandfather, is 
probably the clearest and most dram atic example of this new  principle. The 
freak books devote as m any pages to dw arves' lives as to lives of any other 
type, and these portraits are alm ost universally positive, if patronizing. But
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Quilp is positively satanic:
The creature appeared  quite horrible, w ith  his m onstrous head 
and little body, as he rubbed his hands slowly round , and round, 
and  round  again—w ith som ething fantastic even in  his m anner 
of perform ing this slight action—and, dropping his shaggy brows 
and cocking his chin in the air, glanced upw ard  w ith  a stealthy 
look of exultation that an im p m ight have copied and 
appropriated  to himself. (25)
Like an im p, he takes his greatest pleasure in inflicting to rm ent upon the 
innocent: his wife. Little Nell, her grandfather. Kit N ubbles, and  Quilp's 
acrobatic employee Tom  Scott. Quilp even sym bolically carries the fires of 
hell about w ith  him; he constantly smokes rancid-sm elling cigars. Dickens 
directly links this character's physical oddity w ith his dem onic rancor, 
frequently suggesting, as in the passage just quoted, th a t they are of a piece. 
He also makes Q uilp 's  oddity, and Kit's innocent bu t too-candid reference to 
it—he calls Q uilp "an uglier dw arf than could be seen anyw here for a penny" 
(76)—the m ain m otivation for Q uilp's relentless cam paign to destroy Kit. 
Unlike the m erely aw estruck freak books, Dickens's novels strongly suggest 
that people w ith physical oddities must be deform ed in sp irit, as w e ll.2 0 8
This is often true, too, in matters of perceived g ender appropriateness. 
For instance, the shockingly "masculine" Sally Brass v irtua lly  enslaves the 
"M archioness" and  schem es w ith her bro ther Sam pson against innocent 
Little Nell and  her grandfather. After her com euppance, she apparently 
becomes a transvestite soldier or sailor, just as described in  the  freak books: 
Some said w ith confidence that she had  gone dow n  to the docks
208 See, too, Silas W egg of Our M utual Friend. That "literary m an w i t h  a w ooden leg," surely 
the wooden-Ieg-bearer to w hom  Strindberg alludes, schem es to steal the Harmon fortune from 
the trusting N od d y Boffin.
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in m ale attire, and  had become a female sailor; others darkly 
w hispered that she had enlisted as a private in the second 
regim ent of Foot G uards, and had  been  seen in  uniform, and on 
duty, to wit, leaning on her m usket and  looking out of a sentry- 
box in St. James's Park, one evening. (548)
H er "unnatural" m asculinity and her "unnatu ra l"  cruelty—excessive even in 
a dog-eat-dog w orld—appear to be of a piece. She is cruel because she is 
masculine; a more "natural" w om an w ould  naturally  be kinder. The same 
masculinity that draw s her to the arm ed services causes her viciousness. Her 
difference is also her flaw.
Much the same can be said of Frank Fairlie's "unnatural" femininity. 
Mr. Fairlie, Laura Fairlie's eccentric uncle in Wilkie Collins's novel The  
Woman in W hite  (1860), is disturbingly wom anish. The character Walter 
Hartright describes him  like this:
His beardless face was thin, worn, and  transparently pale, but not 
wrinkled209 . . . His feet were effeminately small, and were clad 
in buff-coloured silk stockings, and  little wom anish bronze- 
leather slippers. Two rings adorned his w hite delicate hands . . .
Upon the whole, he had a frail, languidly-fretful, over-refined 
look—som ething singularly  and unpleasantly  delicate in its 
association w ith a m an, and, at the sam e tim e, som ething which 
could by no possibility have looked natural and appropriate if it 
had been transferred to the personal appearance of a woman. . . .
[M]y sym pathies shu t themselves up  resolutely at the first sight 
of Mr. Fairlie. (32)
This bizarre femininity, Collins suggests, is also at the root of his blameful
209These qualities were ideal in the Victorian w om an—w ith  a bit less em phasis on being 
"worn," of course.
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passivity. "Like a w om an" (by Victorian lights), Fairlie is so hypochondriacal, 
fretful, and helpless tha t he fails to perceive the danger to Laura and fails to 
do anything to stop it. Again, his difference, his inappropriateness to his 
gender, is presented as his flaw.
As in these exam ples, then, individual difference frequently took 
specifically physical forms, some of which were recognizable from patterns 
established in the freak books. Such differences were newly tantam ount to 
taints; they signaled m aladaptations, weaknesses, and other personality flaws. 
Eccentricity in the broad sense—uniqueness, difference, ex-centricity—spelled 
trouble.
C om plem enting this phenom enon in com pleting the eccentric's 
demise was a strengthened connection between eccentricity and madness. 
O dd characters were, m ore often now, quite plainly mad, no question about it. 
This is a fundam ental change in  conceptions of eccentricity; m adness and  
eccentricity had  rem ained distinct concepts ever since Sir Roger de Coverley, 
yet now they blurred together. Now to call someone "eccentric" became 
m uch the sam e as tapp ing  one's forehead and whistling. W hich is to say, the 
figure of the eccentric began to disappear; he was quite often subsumed under 
the category of m adm an, or, w hen he was a good eccentric, under the category 
of philanthropist. The figure's separate, unique cultural territory shifted, 
now dum ping him in o ther realms. Vestiges of the clear distinction between 
m adness and eccentricity rem ain in  the period, as discursive shifts tend not to 
happen all at once. For instance, in David Copperfield Dickens has Betsy 
Trotwood argue that Mr. Dick is not insane but merely "a little eccentric— 
though he is not half so eccentric as a good many people" (204). She, and 
Dickens, understand the difference. It was, however, a rapidly receding 
difference, certainly on the w ay out when David Copperfield appeared in
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1850.
Mr. Dick provides an excellent illustration of the  changes in 
conceptions of eccentricity. In m any ways, he is an avatar of the good 
eccentric. As Trotw ood says, "He is the m ost friendly and am enable creature 
in existence; and  as for advice!" (204). Dickens also strongly  emphasizes 
Dick's harmlessness. David owes m uch to Dick's goodheartedness: it is by 
Dick's advice that Trotw ood initially determ ines to take the fleeing boy in. 
David comes to take a positively Shandean delight in w atching Dick w alk  up 
and dow n in Dr. Strong's garden and  listen to Strong's incom prehensible 
ramblings on Greek etymology: "1 th ink  of it as one of the pleasantest things, 
in a quiet way, that I have ever seen. 1 feel as if they m ight go w alking to and 
fro for ever, and the w orld  might som ehow  be the better for it" (252). The 
main elements of the good eccentric, then , do appear in the personality  of Mr. 
Dick: pursu ing  harm less hobbies, he rem ains kind, mild, and  benevolent; the 
w orld is a better place for his being in  it.
And yet, Dick is not quite "all there," which reflects the new  tendency 
to conflate eccentricity w ith madness. Probably the best that can be said of 
him, brain-wise, is that he is not so m uch m ad as "simple," or w ha t we today 
would call "developm entally challenged" or "retarded." He describes himself 
as "simple," anyway:
"[W ]hat do you consider me in  this respect?" touching  his 
fo rehead .. . .  "Weak?" said Mr. Dick.
"Well," I [David] replied, dubiously. "Rather so."
"Exactly!" cried Mr. Dick, w ho seemed quite enchanted by
my rep ly .. . .  "In short, b o y ,. . .  I am  sim ple Yes, I am! [Betsy
Trotwood] pretends I am not. She w on 't hear of it; bu t I am. 1 
know 1 am." (652)
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Certainly he takes deep, rap t pleasure in simple, boyish pastimes: flying kites, 
above all, and also marbles, pegtop, hare and hounds, slid ing  on the ice, and 
cricket. His faith and love for David are as simple and unalloyed as a child's. 
Accordingly, he is treated like a child: "[H]e was only allowed to rattle his 
money, and  not to spend it. . . . [TJhere was an agreem ent between him  and 
m y aunt that he should account to her for all his disbursem ents" (249). So, 
for instance, he is allowed one shilling 's w orth of gingerbread, w hich he 
loves (again like a child), per day, and  Trotwood arranges for payment.
But in Dickens's w orld, being childlike is always good; and as Gissing 
observes, in any case, Dickens "very often associates kindness of disposition 
w ith lack of brains" (Dickens 117).2i0 Simplicity alone does not equal 
m adness. However, Dickens gives ample evidence of Dick's madness 
elsewhere. The m ain sym ptom : Dick is persistently , unquestionably 
delusional—m uch like Quixote, the original eccentric. Dick insists, w ith the 
clockwork repetitiveness noted by Gissing, that w hen King Charles I was 
beheaded in 1649, somehow, by some unknow n process, the "trouble in his 
head" was pu t into Dick's instead (202 et al.). From the time the reader is 
in troduced to Dick until the novel's end, Dick labors fruitlessly on his 
"M emorial," an autobiography. The problem is, every time he begins to 
w rite, he ends up writing about King Charles 1 instead of himself. He simply 
cannot not  write about the king, nor can he help believing he bears the long- 
dead  king's "trouble." He experiences the most relief from  this delusion is 
w hen he flies kites—kites m ade of m anuscript pages describing the royal 
trouble in  his head. The tw entieth-century reader, perhaps, cannot help 
thinking of a standard  psychiatric-w ard stereotype: the m an who believes he 
is N apoleon.
210 W hich provides yet another exam ple of the Victorian era's practice of a Darwinian credo.
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Trotw ood tries to explain the delusion aw ay as Dick's "allegorical way 
of expressing" real, traumatic quarrels he had years ago w ith his brother and 
sister (205). How ever, her own patronizing, parental care of Dick, in addition 
to her revelation that if she were not caring for him  he w ould be in an 
asylum for life (204), expose that argum ent as a pleasant fiction. When, late 
in the novel, D avid muses, "I really feel alm ost asham ed of having known 
that he was no t quite in his wits, tak ing  account of the utm ost I have done 
with mine" (624), it seems an obvious fact, a given, that Dick really is "not 
quite in his w its." Dick, then, exemplifies the increasing tendency to blur the 
formerly clear distinction between m adness and  mere eccentricity.
This tendency is perhaps even m ore pronounced w hen it concerns 
women. Again, Gilbert and Gubar dem onstrate that Victorian women who 
did not fit the ideal domestic model tended to be dismissed as insane. Elaine 
Showalter's The Female Malady and Jane M. Ussher's W omen's Madness: 
Misogyny or Mental Illness? among other historical studies, lend detailed, 
w ell-docum ented verification of tha t generalization. Women who 
som ewhat resem ble eccentrics, who alm ost fit the definition, (still) end up 
excluded from it; they are better defined as sim ply mad. For example. Miss 
Flite of Bleak House, like Mr. Dick, possesses a kind heart like the good 
eccentric's. How ever, this receives considerably less emphasis than Dick's 
benevolence; she never helps the "w ards in Jarndyce" in any concrete, 
practical way, but is merely well disposed tow ards them. H er virtue seems to 
lie in being harm less—which all by itself seems not much of a virtue. The 
more central fact of her existence is tha t she is utterly delusional; she is, in 
essence, Mr. Dick w ithout his utility. She attends Chancery every day, hoping 
against all reason that this week Jam dyce vs. Jarndyce will be decided, in her 
favor. She carries her "documents" there, assorted trash from her purse
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which is assuredly neither paper nor relevant to the case. She shows Esther 
and company her collection of caged birds, and  relates the strange ideas she 
has regarding them: "I can 't allow them  to sing m uch, . . .  for (you'll think 
this curious) I find my m ind confused by the idea that they are singing, while 
1 am following the argum ents in Court. A nd my m ind requires to be so very 
clear, you know!" (55-56). "'Mad!' w hispers Richard"; and "'Right! Mad,
young gentlem an," she herself confirms (32). As a hatter, clearly. Which 
finally keeps her, like other women, ou t of the category of eccentrics; and 
which participates in the increasing tendency to conflate individual oddity 
with madness.
Thus, everything w orked to eradicate eccentricity in the Victorian era. 
Respectable, increasingly m iddle-class-dom inated society hated and feared 
individual difference, and so tried to squelch it. This attitude tow ard 
individual difference is reflected in, and fu rther reifies, negative views of the 
eccentric in Victorian literature, especially the novels of Dickens and Gissing. 
Those who disliked and fought the repressive tendency idealized and 
advocated eccentricity as a cure for the tyranny of public opinion; however, in 
the end, even this process further contributed to eccentricity's demise. The 
eccentric came to appear a mere  idealist—a fatal trait in a Darwinian world. 
And as eccentricity was sim ultaneously idealized and demonized into, 
respectively, philanthropy and deform ity or m adness, the very category 
shrunk. In Darwinian term s, the species "eccentric" approached extinction. 
As Gissing writes of Reardon, the eccentric came to be merely "one sickly and 
all but destitute man against a relentless w orld" (219). To many, "every blow 
directed against him appeared dastardly" (219); but the blows landed with 
none the less force. In essence, this is the understand ing  of eccentricity that 
we inherit, that we still possess a hundred years later.
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